Recently, in our media, the allegedly impending reduction of airborne troops for a number of different reasons has been very lively discussed. Some of the articles were written so confidently that, to be honest, I even had doubts. And, taking a few materials, I went to the place where they can give real comments on these issues.
Indeed, it became interesting what could think about this not colleagues, who, to put it mildly, do not sin with knowledge of the topic, but real representatives of the Airborne Forces.
I showed several materials on this topic to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Avetisov, with whom I met within the walls of the regional paratroopers society.
Alexander R. Avetisov, reserve lieutenant colonel, graduate of the Kalinin Suvorov military school and the landing department of the Kolomna higher military artillery command school. Served in the DRA (12.1979-12.1981), took part in counter-terrorist operations on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Awarded with the Medal "For Military Merit" (1991), the Order of Courage (1997), "For Military Merit" (2001).
For someone, perhaps, the opinion of the writers will carry more weight, but from my point of view, the opinion of such a person weighs more.
Let's start, perhaps, with the question of how much, in your opinion, does all the talk about the much-needed reduction of the airborne forces make sense at all? And here is the second question: some writers refer to the completely (from their point of view) negative experience of using landings by the armies of different countries, they say, unjustified losses, insignificant results
- Speaking about what was written in those materials, I just want to express regret that the Airborne Forces are shown in this way, their role is clearly belittled.
First of all, I would like to go over the statement that the shortage of aircraft must necessarily lead to a reduction in the number of personnel. I can personally compare this only with the case that there should be as many pistols in the army as there are bullets. Not hit first - that's it, the gun is no longer needed.
So tying the airborne forces or adjusting them to the number of aircraft is completely wrong.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War and World War II is very important, many authors are great that they remember and use it, but here are the conclusions …
The conclusions are completely wrong. As if mass operations were not carried out, and if they were carried out, then these operations were a failure, so today the airborne forces are not needed.
With the same success, the Strategic Missile Forces can be cut in half, they also did not have a single successful operation. Well, or start.
Well, perhaps the example of the Strategic Missile Forces will be somewhat attracted, but there really is some similarity here, you must agree.
You can, in turn, give examples from the Great Patriotic War, and not "Mardi Gras", which, frankly speaking, is already fed up, as an example, but ours.
Vyazemskaya operation. Quite a famous moment in the war. The Kiev operation is less well known, although the success of this operation led to the liberation of Kiev on November 7, 1943. Landing operations in the Far East in 1945, again … For the Japanese, this was very unexpected.
Czechoslovakia, 1968. A very illustrative example of the use of airborne forces. Landing by parachute method to the airfield, which had to be captured.
And the landing method should not be discounted. 1979, Afghanistan. This method of landing was used several times, and more than successfully.
I dare to think that the ground forces are unlikely to cope with such a task, since the equipment of the airborne troops is better suited for transportation by aviation.
In general, it is worth paying attention to the fact that in the modern armies of the world the role of mobile troops is not diminished, but on the contrary, it is increasing. And given the vast distances of our country and the moment that we are very unlikely to start fighting "on foreign territory with little blood", it turns out that hostilities can begin anywhere. And demand immediate intervention.
And it will not always be possible to prepare this intervention in advance.
The exercises that took place in our country this year, I hope, very clearly showed, especially to our potential ones, that the Airborne Forces fully meet modern requirements in matters of mobility.
Will it not work out (as some predict) that the Airborne Forces will turn into a kind of flag suitable exclusively for peacekeeping operations or mobile infantry, following the example of Afghanistan?
- Here I would very much like to emphasize that the Airborne Forces are the elite not because the shape is beautiful and any fountain is knee-deep, but because the troops are modern, mobile, and so on.
Army colleagues are often interested in training aspects. The Airborne Forces is not a closed type of troops, the training experience was studied and adopted at our training grounds, but alas, the difference is significant and it is difficult to quickly master it.
As an example, I will gladly cite the competition in 1999 between representatives of the 1st Infantry Division of the US Army (the most elite, I note, part) and the national team of representatives of the Russian Airborne Forces. Ours won 9 out of 11 competitions.
Including artillery fire remained with ours with a clear advantage.
What the Americans considered an advantage, that is, guidance and correction via satellite, did not play any significant role. Yes, the projectiles, guided through the satellite, lay down next to the targets, in the in-goal. But our gunners, without satellites, quite normally smashed targets to pieces, quite surprising the Americans.
The fact that the Americans later awarded ours with their insignia can, of course, be viewed in different ways. But the main thing here is the recognition of our airborne training school. And how this is done is not so important in principle.
Where does everything come from? There is only one masterpiece for all time: "The Science of Winning" by Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. Vasily Filippovich Margelov not only adapted these immortal postulates for the needs of the Airborne Forces, translating them into modern language, but elevated them to the rank of understood and implemented.
To fight not by numbers, but by skill, take the night as an allies, use all possible types of weapons for victory, and, if necessary, appoint as such everything that can be reached - Suvorov's roots and trunk, Margelov's branches and fruits.
Today, many "experts" loudly say that the role of mobile, especially parachute units, is minimized, since the risks are very high. There are air defense systems, modern detection systems, and automatic weapons, which are ubiquitous … The risks of losses during the landing are so great that in general it is not worth trying
- To be honest, this just amazes me today. The very fact that people who are completely unfamiliar with the tactics of using airborne forces today sit down and seriously talk about it. Tactics, operational control, I note, this is a military art. This is a whole science.
It is clear that today no one will throw troops on machine guns. Modern means, which were discussed in those articles, are also available here, can you imagine? And they do not just exist, they, the means, make it possible to "prepare" the platform and corridors for the landing so that not a single bush will move there when the landing is to be landed. There will be nothing to move there if someone does not understand.
Up to a tactical nuclear charge.
Still, a nuclear strike is too much …
- No brute force! The point here is not in a nuclear charge, but in the fact that the airborne troops are capable of landing and operating in the territory cleared with such a charge. That's all.
Yes, an extreme, of course, but if necessary, the Airborne Forces will act in such conditions.
About military operations, if possible. Many of those we are discussing say that the Airborne Forces are very narrowly focused troops
- Military operations … And what about military operations? We do not take, for example, special forces, which can work perfectly in the mountains, sweeping terrorists out of there. This is their main task. And the main task of the Airborne Forces is to inflict damage on the enemy. Anyone who meets.
And the second thing. I would say - the most important task. This is the seizure and retention of territories. Wherever these territories are located, in which climatic region, in the mountains, underground, in the tropics, it does not matter.
This is a task for modern mobile troops, which our airborne forces are.
Again, in what tactical situation, in isolation from our own, behind enemy lines, in unfamiliar territory, in conditions of all-round defense and difficult supply - this is the true essence of mobile troops.
First of all, the airborne troops are the Troops, I emphasize so boldly.
It is impossible even to imagine, as in a joke, that a paratrooper with a bayonet-knife ran somewhere there, performing some task. In 1995, when it was necessary to take the cement plant with the forces of one battalion, Shamanov ordered three days to iron the point with the forces of three artillery battalions. Preparing for disembarkation.
These are the troops. Who can not only complete the task on their own, but who have everything for the proper performance of this task. Up to the control of ballistic missiles, which can fly somewhere and sweep something into dust, so that the troops would then work there.
There are no universal troops, there are those who are as close as possible to this. Someone will say that it is difficult to cope with a breakthrough in defense without tankers. Yes it is. But consolidating success, capturing the line - these are not tanks. This cannot be done without the infantry.
Regular infantry can cope with such a task with the support of tanks. But when you need real mobility, when you need a quick reaction - sorry, but the appropriate troops are needed here. That is, yes, what we are talking about.
Well, you must agree, if we are talking about a really quick transfer of units from point A to point B, and the points are two thousand kilometers apart, who will cope with such a task faster, a combined-arms regiment or an airborne regiment?
I think you all know the answer.
I'll try to make a certain definition: the Airborne Forces is the "long arm" of modern combat, right?
- Yes exactly. Only here should not be confused or compared with the missile forces. They are also a long arm. But the missile forces will never be able to work like the Airborne Forces. It will be very difficult to distribute the enemy's defeat to the entire depth of his defense without mobile troops. Yes, not impossible, but rather difficult.
What is, in essence, a reconnaissance and strike complex? This is the aggregate in the first place. MTR / reconnaissance works to determine the coordinates of targets, then everyone is connected to the testing: submarines, OTRK, tanks, artillery … That's all.
Yes, the models of planes and helicopters will change, technology in general will always change. The platforms will appear on air cushion or anti-gravity cushion, I don't know. I know that the concept of full-depth reconnaissance, capture and retention of key areas and territories will not change. This is, excuse me, a classic.
On the application, a question that clarifies, probably. Many authors express themselves in that regard: they say, why? There is a special task force, there is reconnaissance, they landed behind enemy lines, found a target, transmitted the coordinates - and the "Caliber", "Iskander" flew there … Why not a war of the 21st century?
- I will say it again, perhaps it is worth clarifying. In the abbreviation of the Airborne Forces, the third letter is "troops". Accordingly, they include reconnaissance and fire units, everything that is required to complete a combat mission.
This is a complex, it is stupid to divide the MTR, reconnaissance and so on into different baskets. Everything must work together, with one fist. It's just that the fist is mobile, and it can be used exactly as it is accepted by the concept of use.
Example? Excuse me.
1941 year. An attempt to stop the German armada, trained and taking a running start by the forces of hastily called and formed divisions and militias. Stopped, yes. But at what cost?
Training and understanding of the correct application, that is, all the same concept. Our soldiers began the Great Patriotic War in rifle cells, there were not even trenches. Have you finished?
Yes, and it is worth noting that we also have assault detachments, in terms of efficiency no worse than the German ones. But what did its application look like? Tank and a pair of cover guns. Sappers. Signalers. And in special cases, attack aircraft could arrive. And this is how the assault group worked.
Let's remember the first Chechen one. We started to collect paratroopers, yes. Collected. And the paratroopers say: give us our own officers. And where to get them, considering that we started as usual, on the run. The officers were appointed ordinary …
Then they began to collect combined airborne groups. Again, there was no particular success. Naturally, by the way.
But when they began to create units, and even organize them at training grounds, then it began that the universal sadness settled among the terrorists.
And now the Airborne Forces is just such an organism. Well-coordinated and balanced. Capable of performing a very wide range of tasks. We study, we study every day. If there were real flaws in the operation to humiliate Georgia, then subsequent actions in the same Syria showed that the lessons are not in vain.
I don’t want to offend anyone, but all this talk about reducing the airborne forces, unfortunately, is being conducted by people who, for the most part, have no idea how to control troops, how to conduct military operations in a modern situation and using modern technology.
Fortunately, we still have people dealing with such issues who have a clear understanding of these issues. Amateurs don't belong here. But, of course, you can reason.
