It is always difficult to talk about new developments in the Russian army. This is not because difficult issues are difficult to explain. Just the opposite. It is difficult because there are too many "specialists" who will tell you about the correct decisions and solutions in general on the basis of a computer game that has been played for several years. For example.
We have entered an age when a limitless belief in machine brains has led to the fact that on paper, in plans and imagination, everything looks quite different from what it does in life. That is why today we will consider the issue not so much from the point of view of "how it should be" as from the point of view of "it is."
Today there is a lot of talk about recreating the "Soviet structure" in the Russian army. We already see the re-creation of divisions with our own eyes. The next step is the reconstruction of military districts. At least, talk about the need for this has been going on in the military environment for a long time.
Most experts quite reasonably talk about the dangers of large districts, about the complexity of management, supply, and control of military units located thousands of kilometers from each other.
But we have already spoken about the districts, so today we will talk about brigades and divisions. Is it worth the candle, or is it just another way to "master" the people's money. How thoughtful and expedient is such a step today? And most importantly, how will such an enlargement affect the combat effectiveness of the ground forces?
You should start from scratch. From what all Soviet officers know, but, alas, not all Russian ones. Not to mention civilians, far from military service. A platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division, corps, army, front (district) is perceived by the majority in approximately the same way as a similar division occurs at some factory. More quantity, slightly different tasks, but in general - this is an enterprise.
The Soviet Army never compared brigades and divisions. For one simple reason. According to the tasks that they solve. Even the ranks of the division commander and brigade commander were different. The brigade commander, like the regiment commander, is a colonel, and the division commander is already a major general.
What's the difference? From the point of view of the layman, none. And from a military point of view? A unit commander, even a senior officer, a colonel, solves tactical tasks in battle. But the division commander must already be a strategist. At the same time, continue to solve tactical problems.
Even in the very name of the division, these tasks are laid down. Compound! Connection of parts. A mechanism of various components that do their own work, but in general the mechanism is intended for other, more complex work.
Today, the definition of "connection" can often be found in materials about teams. And even in specialized publications. Sometimes you just want to ask: comrades "military", where did you study at all? And did you study at all? Only in armies, where a couple of regiments are united in brigades, can we talk about a formation.
So let's start from scratch.
A brigade is a tactical military formation in all branches and types of the Armed Forces, which is an intermediate link between a regiment and a division. Along with the regiment, it is the main tactical formation. The structure of the brigade is similar to the regimental, but includes a larger number of units. Up to two regiments. The total number of the brigade varies from 2 to 8 thousand people.
Division - an operational-tactical formation of units and subunits. The size of the division (in different armies) varies from 12 to 24 thousand people. These are three motorized rifle regiments, tank, artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments.
This is an anti-tank battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an engineer-sapper, a medical, repair and restoration and an engineer-sapper battalion. These are separate companies of RChBZ, UAV, and electronic warfare. This is the commandant's company.
These are their own arsenals and food warehouses. In general, the unit has a complex rear structure, which ensures the functioning of the division even in an autonomous mode for a long time.
When measures were taken to eliminate the divisional structure for the brigade structure, we were told a lot about the mobility of brigades. About the advantages of just such a system of division of the army. Some experts talked about the possibility of participation of brigades in hostilities abroad. That is, in fact, about changing the doctrine of the use of the Russian Armed Forces.
All this is true, but, in our opinion, the main reason for the reorganization was the problems in the Russian economy. Moreover, approximately the same picture was observed in other armies of the world. Probably, except for the US Army and NATO.
Can you imagine the work that was done then by the headquarters of the districts and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces? To preserve the country's defense capability in the face of the restructuring of the army structure, it was necessary to rebuild almost everything. And these are not words, but the real work of the headquarters.
Although it was the headquarters that became the first of those who began to be "cleaned". It was necessary to destroy the old command and control system. At all levels. Destroy and create a completely new one, in accordance with a new concept.
Remember, veterans of the Soviet Army, their own, personal, reaction to this transition. They broke down the established stereotypes, standards, principles, ideas. The very system of training troops was worked out precisely at the division. Even the training system for officers at the General Staff Academy had to be changed.
But there were also changes in the principles of mobilization work. There were reductions in a large number of senior officers and generals. Outwardly, it looked like the destruction of the army as such.
Probably the only officers who, since the beginning of the restructuring of the army, agreed with the brigade system, were the participants in the Chechen wars. It was thanks to them that the new concept was adopted in the army. But there the army fought not with the army, but with militants, terrorists and just bandits. This is a different war. More precisely, a different concept of war.
At the same time, a new concept of war appeared, which even today, in modern conditions and in the modern international situation, has quite a lot of supporters. They began to talk about the impossibility of a big war.
The world is not run by idiots. Everyone understands that a big war is the death of humanity. Consequently, in the new world, all wars will be local, sluggish. States no longer need large armies. We need small but well-armed armies.
We kind of stopped noticing the power of the American army and its equipment. We have ceased to notice the power of the NATO army in Europe. These armies did not fit into our new concept of war.
And it was here that an excellent explanation of the elimination of divisions lurked. The management team is much more mobile, flexible and efficient. This means that it is the brigade that can be used in the shortest possible time in emergency cases. At least during that period, it was precisely this opinion that prevailed.
By the way, it was then that the reorganization of the military districts began. Remember what we had in 1991.
8 military districts (Moscow, Leningrad, North Caucasian, Volga, Ural, Siberian, Trans-Baikal Far East). There was also a special area - the Kaliningrad OR.
Marshal Igor Sergeev began to enlarge. In 1998, in order to save state. funds. Remember the merger of ZabVO and DalVO? Continued by Sergei Ivanov (2001 - PrivO and URVO). Well, Serdyukov finished. We received four huge military units with almost autonomous units and formations due to long distances. The life of the officers of the headquarters of the Central and Eastern districts is good. Like truckers. Life is a road …
But back to the beginning of our conversation. Be that as it may, over the years of breaking the structure of the army, we have achieved quite serious successes. They abandoned, no, they handed over to the local authorities, military camps and warehouses. The infrastructure was abandoned altogether. Housing stock in cities and towns was handed over.
If today you look at what is left of the once flourishing military towns and places of deployment of military units, then you want to cry. What was in the cities has long been handed over to private hands, refurbished and used by businessmen. They will not give it back.
And military camps in the wilderness have been successfully plundered by local residents and are in such a state that it is easier to build new ones than to restore old ones. At least cheaper. In short, a beautiful tale about the speedy restoration of the divisional structure of the Armed Forces will be just a fairy tale for a long time to come.
Just imagine a newly minted divisional commander who is engaged in the formation of a division somewhere beyond the Urals. It's just that the algorithm of work is nothing more. Why the division commander and his officers will be engaged in this, we think, is understandable. The golden principle "If you can't handle it - let's appoint someone else" is still valid in the army today.
So. Decide on the location of the division headquarters. At the same time, coordinate everything with local authorities (regional or republican) at all levels. From some land allotment to a water utility and sanitary service.
Further, the same work with the regional authorities is already to determine the locations of the units and headquarters of regiments and other subunits. On all counts.
Further construction. A division is not a company. It will be necessary to build a small but city. With all the ensuing consequences. In the sense of not only storing and ensuring the safety of military equipment and weapons, but also providing housing for conscripts, contract soldiers and officers.
The list of jobs for the command of a new division can be continued indefinitely. Moreover, work that has nothing to do with providing combat training. But most importantly, all this will have to take place in the Russian traditional manner: "There is no money, but you are holding on!"
From this it becomes clear what is happening in the army today. The military budget can "pull" so far only a few divisions. And it is exactly where this budget is divided. Closer to Moscow. Hence the Taman (5th motorized rifle) division, and then the Kantemirovskaya (4th tank) division. Fortunately, they were not brigades for long, they did not have time to mutilate.
The same divisions that were deployed a little further, but which are widely announced by the Ministry of Defense, are now doing the work described above. And they will do it for years to come. Based on what we know about cases in some of them.
Let's recall the new divisions. 152nd Motorized Rifle Division in the Rostov Region, 42nd Division in Chechnya, 19th and 136th (as part of the 58th Army) in the Southern District, 3rd Motorized Rifle Division in the Belgorod Region (ZVO).
Observing the birth pangs during the creation of 3 motorized rifle divisions in Valuyki, we can say with confidence that deploying a brigade (albeit not the most successful one) into a division (the same one, on a C grade) is not just about bringing three times as many soldiers into the field and pour them into the dirt. Although there was such a thing, we will not hide it.
This is a difficult, difficult and slow process. Yes, signing the order is a matter of three seconds. Three years have not passed since that moment, but God forbid that in the fourth year in Valuyki there was a full-fledged division deployed from the brigade.
And if we talk about 100% success, it will take twice as long.
So do we need divisions or not? Do you need huge budget costs and again have to suffer in the navel area from a tightened belt in exchange for a restful sleep?
It’s a paradox, but we cannot be sure of our own safety without the revival of the divisions. Moreover, not only in the border areas, where this is due at least to the theoretical danger of an attack, but also in the depths of the territory as a nucleus for the concentration of mobilization resources.
Perhaps you need to give some kind of comparison or example? Please. After 2013, the US Army (yes, yes!) Experts began to unanimously reproach the loss of "density". Yes, the appearance on the stage of the brigades has become the object of criticism. And when the number began to be reduced …
The hardest thing we could find was the accusation that the US Army would never repeat the operation against Iraq today. And American experts speak it out loudly. And they say precisely that the brigade is a tactical tool, and the division is a strategic one. A hammer and a sledgehammer, if it's simpler.
Therefore, we want to express the following opinion: both a hammer and a sledgehammer are good in a skillful hand.
In the most dangerous areas (the Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine), having divisions is a heavier strike-strategic tool.
And in the rear, it is precisely the brigades that should be completed - as a more mobile instrument of the second line. With an emphasis on the fact that, if necessary (or over time), this brigade can be reorganized into a division.
It is possible that this borderline combination will just become the very golden mean necessary for the proper state of the organizational structure of our army.
