12 failures of Napoleon Bonaparte. With each of his next defeat, Napoleon himself left himself less and less chance of rebirth. Or, if you like, to return. Up to 100 days, it was usually the French emperor who rejected any proposals for a decent peace, considering them unworthy.
In 1815, things were different, Napoleon really longed for peace. More than that, he wanted only one thing - a meeting with his son, but Maria Luisa was by no means the last of those who betrayed him. The allies did not want to hear about peace with Napoleonic France, St. Petersburg and London were especially belligerent.
The British, having dealt with the Spanish problems, for the first time during the Napoleonic wars, deployed an army at the northern borders of France. It was headed by the Duke of Wellington, who fought for several years in the Pyrenees, where he managed to defeat many of Napoleon's marshals. Fate divorced him with the emperor himself, but it seems, only in order to bring him down in the last battle.
Guilty without guilt
The return of Napoleon took place just a year after the abdication. Oddly enough, after 100 days, the Bourbons were again imposed on France, who managed to discredit themselves as much as possible. It is no coincidence that it was said about them: "They have not forgotten anything and have not learned anything."
Objectively, for a while, everything was in favor of Napoleon. And as it always was in his life, when a chance arose, Napoleon was quick to take advantage of it. For three months, he was even spared the need to make excuses for failures by correcting the truth.
But this habit almost turned into a mania for the emperor, especially when preparing the famous "Bulletins" for the public. After each new failure, he certainly had more and more objective reasons for justification and more and more guilty ones.
The spring of 1815 is a completely different matter. Instead, it became the duty of the royalist, as indeed of the rest of the press, to mislead the public. Suffice it to recall how she painted Napoleon's bloodless march from the Cote d'Azur to Paris. “The Corsican monster has landed in the Bay of Juan”, “The usurper entered Grenoble”, “Bonaparte has occupied Lyon”, “Napoleon is approaching Fontainebleau”, and finally, “His imperial majesty enters Paris, faithful to him”.
When the emperor led his revived regiments against Blucher and Wellington, he himself, judging by all the signs, had no doubt that he would be able to solve the matter in two or three battles, and not necessarily general ones. The way the French dealt with Blucher under Liny made such expectations fully justified.
If Marshal Ney, who only had to hold out at Quatre Bras against the advancing vanguards of Wellington's army, had not returned D'Erlon's corps to battle, allowing him to strike at the rear of Blucher, the defeat would have been complete. Even the success of the British against Ney then could not have changed anything. At Waterloo Wellington most likely simply would not have fought.
Another thing is that the campaign of 1815 in any case could not have ended successfully for Napoleon, but he would have been able to win for some time. Perhaps, in Vienna, someone became a little more accommodating, although it is very difficult to believe that Alexander I will refuse to continue the struggle. By the way, England would definitely not have laid down arms.
Of course, one cannot ignore the fact that the army that marched in June 1815 against the British and Prussians was much more experienced and professional than the one with which Napoleon surprised the world in the last French campaign. But this in no way prevents thousands of historians from continuing to stubbornly analyze the mistakes of Marshals Grusha and Ney, Napoleon himself after Linyi.
Meanwhile, the outcome of the short campaign, not in favor of the French, was finally decided just in the very first battle of the campaign - at Linyi. Ney returned his first corps from there, which allowed Blucher to withdraw the backbone of the Prussian army from pursuit. Having won at Linyi, Napoleon threw Blucher away from the Anglo-Dutch ally by more than five leagues (almost 30 kilometers).
Even the victorious army, in those days, to overcome such a distance would have taken more than a day, and the Prussians were pretty much beaten at Linyi. However, Blucher, who by no means for his beautiful eyes received the nickname Marshal Vorwärts from the soldiers, repeated to them over and over again: "What we lose on the march cannot be returned to the battlefield."
By country roads, the Prussians reached Wavre - just a half-crossing from Wellington's positions. And the victorious corps of Pear and Gerard, after they received the news that Büllov and Tilman were going to join Blucher, rushed to Gembl. There they were from the main forces of Napoleon at a distance twice as large as the Prussians from Wellington. And this was the result of blindly following the order of the emperor to keep up with Blucher.
Even the guard is dying
From Linyi, Napoleon, having detached Pears behind Blucher, moved his main forces against the Anglo-Dutch army. To the Mont-Saint-Jean plateau, where Wellington's 70-thousandth army, Reil's and D'Erlon's corps, Napoleon's cavalry and guards, together with Ney's corps that had joined, were stationed, they came only in the evening of June 17.
In the distance, fog slowly descended on enemy positions, mostly hidden behind densely scrubbed ridges. The French artillery pulled up almost until dawn. The Napoleonic army, badly battered at Linyi, already slightly outnumbered the forces of the British and Dutch, numbering about 72 thousand people.
Most likely, those researchers are right who believe that Pears could be sent into pursuit with much less forces than 33 thousand - almost a third of the army. But Napoleon himself felt that he had not finished off Blucher, and was too afraid that the old Prussian would abandon Wellington and prefer easier prey. The experience of the last campaign convinced the emperor of this. Moreover, the detachments of Byullov and Tilman were about to join Blucher.
So, on the morning of June 18, the two armies stood opposite each other, but the commanders were in no hurry to start the battle, waiting for reinforcements. Napoleon hoped that Gruschi would be able to push aside Blucher, but did not take into account the fact that the Prussians' road was much shorter, and his new marshal took the order to pursue too literally.
The old Prussian outwitted the French, and they did not even prevent him from joining the arriving reinforcements. Wellington, too, had a right to expect support from the Prussians, despite the blow that the French had inflicted on them at Liny.
Obviously, the duke would have avoided the battle altogether if Blucher himself had not assured him that he would have time to bring at least half of his army to the Waterloo field. And under his command, as it turned out after calculating the losses at Linyi, there were no less than 80 thousand, although not all of them were ready to fight again.
The very course of the battle at Waterloo has been studied as thoroughly as possible, and more than once described in the pages of the "Military Review" (Waterloo. How Napoleon's empire perished). In Russia, the presentation of events by the great Eugene Tarle in his textbook work "Napoleon" is justly considered a classic. To begin with, we will turn to him.
“From the end of the night, Napoleon was in place, but he could not launch an attack at dawn, because the last rain had so loosened the ground that it was difficult to deploy the cavalry. The Emperor drove around his troops in the morning and was delighted with the reception given to him: it was a completely exceptional impulse of mass enthusiasm, not seen on such a scale since the days of Austerlitz. This review, which was destined to become the last review of the army in the life of Napoleon, made an indelible impression on him and on all those present.
Napoleon's headquarters was first at the farm du Cailloux. At 11 1/2 o'clock in the morning, it seemed to Napoleon that the soil was dry enough, and only then did he order the battle to begin. Strong artillery fire from 84 guns was opened against the left wing of the British and an attack was launched under the leadership of Ney. At the same time, the French launched a weaker attack with the aim of demonstrating at the Ugumon castle on the right flank of the British army, where the attack met with the most energetic resistance and ran into a fortified position.
The attack on the British left wing continued. The murderous struggle went on for an hour and a half, when suddenly Napoleon noticed, at a very great distance in the northeast near Saint-Lambert, the vague outlines of the moving troops. At first he thought it was Pears, to whom the order was sent to hurry to the battlefield from night and then several times during the morning.
But it was not Pears, but Blucher, who had abandoned the pursuit of Pears and, after very skillfully executed transitions, deceived the French marshal, and now rushed to the aid of Wellington. Napoleon, having learned the truth, nevertheless was not embarrassed; he was convinced that Pears was on the heels of Blucher and that when both of them arrived at the scene of the battle, although Blucher would bring Wellington more reinforcements than Pears would bring to the emperor, nevertheless the forces would more or less balance, and if before Blucher and He will have time to inflict a crushing blow on the British, then the battle after the approach of Pear will be finally won."
What is Peary's fault …
Here we invite the reader to make a first small digression. And let us ask ourselves a question: why did Napoleon himself, and after him and the numerous creators of the Napoleonic legend, need to blame almost all the blame for Waterloo on Marshal Pear?
After all, even a victory would not have given the emperor and France anything but the continuation of a new war, more terrible than the one that had ended the year before with the fall of Paris and the abdication of Napoleon. Pears himself between Linyi and Waterloo only confirmed the fact that he was absolutely incapable of independent command.
The fact that he missed Blucher was not the most terrible tragedy, by the way, Pear's regiments even managed to catch Tilman's detachment on the right bank of the river. Diehl. The main forces of the Prussians did not become distracted by the blow, which seemed to threaten their rear, and rushed to the aid of Wellington. Even if in his place was Schwarzenberg, whom Blucher simply could not stand, the field marshal would still drive his soldiers into battle.
The fortitude of Wellington's soldiers and the iron will of Blucher, and not at all the miscalculations of Napoleon and the mistakes of the marshals, became the main factors in the victory of the Allies in the last battle. but also necessary.
We only note that the last of Napoleon's defeats made him more legendary than anyone else. And much more. But it was precisely in his last defeat that the emperor was simply obliged to be least to blame. Otherwise, why then do we need a Napoleonic legend at all. And it doesn't matter whether it really is.
We will continue to quote the famous book by E. Tarle.
“Having sent part of the cavalry against Blucher, Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney to continue the attack on the left wing and center of the British, who had already experienced a series of terrible blows from the beginning of the battle. Here, four divisions of D'Erlon's corps were advancing in close combat formation. A bloody battle raged on this entire front. The British met these massive columns with fire and launched a counterattack several times. French divisions one after another entered the battle and suffered terrible losses. The Scottish cavalry cut into these divisions and chopped up part of the composition. Noticing the scrapyard and the defeat of the division, Napoleon personally rushed to the height near the Belle Alliance farm, sent several thousand cuirassiers of General Miglio there, and the Scots, having lost a whole regiment, were thrown back.
This attack upset nearly all of D'Erlon's corps. The left wing of the British army could not be broken. Then Napoleon changes his plan and transfers the main blow to the center and right wing of the British army. At 3 1/2 o'clock, La Hae-Sainte farm was taken by the left-flank division of d'Erlon's corps. But this corps did not have the strength to build on the success. Then Napoleon gives her 40 squadrons of cavalry Millo and Lefebvre-Denuette with the task of striking the right wing of the British between the castle of Ugumon and La-Hae-Saint. Castle Ugumon was finally taken at this time, but the British held on, falling in hundreds and hundreds and not retreating from their main positions.
During this famous attack, the French cavalry came under fire from British infantry and artillery. But this did not bother the others. There was a moment when Wellington thought that everything was lost - and this was not only thought, but also said in his headquarters. The English commander betrayed his mood with the words with which he responded to the report on the impossibility of the British troops to keep the known points: “Let in that case they all die on the spot! I have no more reinforcements. Let them die to the last man, but we must hold out until Blucher arrives, "Wellington replied to all the alarmed reports of his generals, throwing his last reserves into battle."
And where did she go wrong
Ney's attack is the second reason to slow down in quoting. And the second personal mistake of the emperor, which at first he himself, and then loyal historians amicably attributed to the marshal. However, it was not the marshal who grew old and lost either ardor and energy, or skill in establishing the interaction of the combat arms.
It was Napoleon, with each of his subsequent campaigns, more and more acted according to a template, preferring direct massive attacks. Although the army of 1815, readers will forgive the repetition, was much more experienced and seasoned than the scripts of the previous campaign. By the way, they themselves managed to become real professional warriors. But, perhaps, the main thing is that Napoleon at Waterloo had a very bad situation with artillery, and Marshal Ney certainly had nothing to do with it.
No, most of the French gunners were also masters of their craft, the bad thing was that the emperor now had too few guns, and the guns were not the best. Several dozen of the best Frenchmen either lost at Ligny, or simply did not have time to pull up to the Mont-Saint-Jean plateau.
Well, Napoleon was also let down by the damned mud, which made him unable to maneuver the batteries, focusing fire at the main points. The way he brilliantly did it at Wagram, Borodino and Dresden. The shortage of guns could be compensated for by infantry columns. And it was not for nothing that Academician Tarle noted that "Napoleon did not expect infantry reserves."
The emperor
“Sent another cavalry into the fire, 37 squadrons of Kellerman. Evening came. Napoleon finally sent his guard against the British and sent it himself to the attack. And at that very moment there were shouts and the roar of shots on the right flank of the French army: Blucher with 30 thousand soldiers arrived on the battlefield. But the attacks of the guard continue. because Napoleon believes that Pears is following Blucher!
Soon, however, panic spread: the Prussian cavalry attacked the French guard, caught between two fires, and Blucher himself rushed with the rest of his own forces to the Belle Alliance farm, from where Napoleon and the guard had set out. Blucher wanted to cut off Napoleon's retreat with this maneuver. It was already eight o'clock in the evening, but it was still light enough, and then Wellington, who had been under continuous murderous attacks from the French all day, launched a general offensive. But Pears still did not come. Until the last minute Napoleon waited for him in vain."
Everything is over
Let's make a last, very short digression. The turning point passed long before the Prussians approached, and, as many military historians believe, Napoleon had to end the battle, without even throwing the guards into the fire.
E. Tarle wrote:
“It was over. The guard, lined up in squares, slowly retreated, desperately defending themselves, through the narrow ranks of the enemy. Napoleon rode at a pace among the battalion of guards grenadiers guarding him. The desperate resistance of the old guard delayed the winners."
"Brave French, give up!" - shouted the English Colonel Helkett, drove up to the square surrounded on all sides, which was commanded by General Cambronne, but the guards did not weaken the resistance, preferred death to surrender. On the offer to surrender, Cambronne shouted a contemptuous curse at the British.
In other sectors, the French troops, and especially near Plansenois, where the reserve - the corps of the Duke of Lobau, was fighting - resisted, but ultimately, being attacked by fresh forces of the Prussians, they scattered in different directions, fleeing, and only the next day, and then only partially, they began to gather in organized units. The Prussians pursued the enemy all night long for a long distance."
On the battlefield, the French lost a little more than the British, Dutch and Prussians - about 25 thousand against 23 thousand from the allies. But after Waterloo, losses in the retreat were very terrible, which is a rarity for Napoleonic troops. And it is not so important that Blucher insisted that "golden bridges" should not be built to the enemy, and mercilessly pursued the French.
More important is the collapse of the Napoleonic army itself, we recall again, much more experienced and efficient than in 1814. The same Pears, whom Napoleon, or rather, his apologists later made a scapegoat, with great difficulty withdrew his divisions and part of the defeated army from the blows of the enemy, for which, by the way, he was praised by the emperor.
It seems that the emperor himself understood that he was much more to blame for the defeat than Pears. Otherwise, why in his memoirs the passage of Pears from Namur to Paris - after Waterloo, is called "one of the most brilliant feats of the war of 1815".
Napoleon on Saint Helena confessed to Las Casas:
“I already thought that Pears with his forty thousand soldiers were lost to me, and I would not be able to add them to my army beyond Valenciennes and Bushen, relying on the northern fortresses. I could organize a defense system there and defend every inch of the earth."
I could, but I didn't. Apparently, Napoleon experienced disappointment not only on the battlefield at Waterloo, but also after it. And not at all because not only all of Europe, which was pushing many thousands of armies to the French border, were against him again, but also his own wife.
The army remained, but after Waterloo he had no army to win. To repeat 1793 or 1814 with real chances of success has become, by all indications, already impossible. And historians will decide for a long time who betrayed whom after Waterloo: Napoleon's France or Napoleon France after all.
The famous contemporary publicist Alexander Nikonov said about the French emperor: "He wanted peace so badly that he was constantly at war." In 1815, destiny allowed Napoleon to remain in peace or in peace for less than 100 days.
