The shelling of "Khmeimim" became the most significant news of the first days of the year. Although the information about the destroyed Su-24 and Su-35 was not confirmed, many experts have already spoken about the unwillingness of the Russian army to defend the airbase. One of the most common complaints was the lack of special protective caponiers.
There were also accusations that after the withdrawal of troops announced by Vladimir Putin, the contingent relaxed. Let's try to figure out how the defense of "Khmeimim" (in the army slang - "Khimki") is actually organized, and see how the US and NATO armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are protecting similar facilities.
Syrian Khimki
Before the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria, Khmeimim was the Basil al-Assad international airport. And even when a Russian base was deployed on its territory, it did not stop accepting civil flights, the passenger terminal functions here as usual.
During the construction of the facility, the Syrian authorities thought least of all about its safety. The airport is located outside the city of Latakia, it is surrounded by a large number of various farms, settlements, factories. In the north, the mountains begin, where it is easy to find convenient sites for observation and shelling. Despite its international status, the airport was never designed for a large number of aircraft; there was enough space for civilian aircraft on the apron opposite the terminal.
Photos taken in 2015 clearly show that the Su-24, Su-30 and Su-34 are located along the runway. Over the course of two years, the Russian military has seriously expanded the airbase. Several additional parking areas, taxiways, and a large number of utility facilities appeared. But the main problem of Khimki remained small capacity.
Now there are three parking lots at the airfield. The main one is located to the left of the airport terminal. Su-24, Su-34, Su-25, as well as Su-30 and Su-35 are based there. There is a TECH nearby. Two other parking lots are on the opposite side of the runway: one is a compact one, on which duty fighters are located, and behind it is the largest one, where Il-76 transport aircraft, A-50 AWACS aircraft, and An-124 aircraft are accommodated.
Also, the Russian military built a helicopter base from scratch, in fact a new airfield with several interconnected shelters, with an apron and a runway.
Why are Russian aircraft not protected by caponiers? The answer is simple enough - cover will significantly reduce the base area. If you look at the satellite images of last December, you can clearly see that the equipment is very dense, in some places almost in two rows and even on taxiways. The parking lots at the TECH and the civil terminal are in operation. True, the "civil platform" is occupied not by combat vehicles, but by transport vehicles - An-72, Tu-154, Il-76.
Of course, the parking space can be expanded. In particular, the main one is to the left of the terminal. It's the closest there. But the facility is sandwiched between the runway and outbuildings. At the same time, at the request of safety measures, it is impossible to bring parking closer to the runway. It must be admitted that the Russian military is faced with a problem that the American and British military in Iraq and Afghanistan had to solve earlier. In 2001 and 2003, they also used civilian airports, and it turned out that they were not suitable for the safe deployment of more military aircraft.
Half of the country for the base
There is only one way out - the creation of large united military bases from scratch. This is how the United States got the Ballads in Iraq, and the United Kingdom got the Camp Bastion in Afghanistan. And if the Americans placed "Ballads" still relatively close to the city, then the British were building their base tens of kilometers deep into the desert.
Another important feature of such facilities: the airfield itself is located in the center of the base, and it is surrounded by a large number of various buildings. This layout makes the parking areas of the equipment as far as possible from the borders of the base, thereby protecting them from mortar and rocket attacks. And with a ground attack, the militants will have to make their way to planes and helicopters through built-up areas for a long time. Therefore, both in "Ballad" and in "Camp Bastion" equipment was not in caponiers, although the bases were subjected to constant shelling by mobile groups armed with mortars and launchers.
Knowing the vulnerability of Khimki, the Russian military from the very beginning of the operation paid close attention to defense from land in order to prevent mortar and rocket attacks. Another big danger is the calculations of MANPADS.
Of course, the security and defense system of the main Russian base in Syria has not been disclosed, but if we analyze the publications and photographs, we can assume that it consists of three rings. The first is the airbase itself, its perimeter and checkpoint. Here the service is carried out by the Russian military police. She patrols along the engineering barriers, as well as in the territory, checks cargo at checkpoints.
The second ring - positions within a radius of several kilometers from the base. Most likely they are occupied by marines, paratroopers, and possibly motorized rifles. They are reinforced by units equipped with T-90 tanks, which can not only hit targets at a great distance, but also detect objects at night and in bad weather. Most likely, these positions block the points from where the MANPADS calculation is able to shoot down the plane.
The third ring is mobile special forces groups, and possibly even KSSO fighters, who are checking suspicious places in a strip several tens of kilometers around the base. Their goal is mobile teams and the identification of caches. The second and third rings are supported by helicopters, which also patrol the perimeter, look for suspicious objects and, if necessary, strike.
You can protect yourself, you can not exclude
Judging by the available information, only in 2016-2017, Khmeimim was fired at with unguided rockets several times.
But why can't you create a solid perimeter? The fact is that the area of the base is very densely populated, next to it, as already noted, dozens of villages and farms. Where would you order them to go before placing several rings of defense within a radius of up to 50–70 kilometers?
Now, in the area of the Khmeimim airbase, several protection systems have been created to minimize the effectiveness of the shelling. In particular, these are artillery radars, detecting launched missiles and mines. There are also special systems such as the Russian "Pantsir" and the American Centurion. They are capable of shooting down missiles and, under certain conditions, mines. The bases are covered with electronic reconnaissance systems that detect the radio traffic of mobile groups of militants. Electronic warfare systems are also actively used, jamming communication channels and GPS signals.
But the militants also learned to bypass high-tech protection. For example, at Camp Bastion, mobile teams hid in road traffic, did not use communications and navigation systems. The shelling was carried out at maximum range. For this, rockets with an increased fuel supply were used. Such products were distinguished by very low accuracy, but it was quite enough for those tasks.
In the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain, shelling is viewed as a necessary evil. Even on protected bases, their number can be seriously reduced, but it is impossible to completely get rid of mines and missiles falling from the sky. In this situation, only the competent distribution of objects on the territory saves. Simply put, the least significant objects should be in the zone of maximum risk.
So the defense of the Russian base "Khmeimim" by today's standards must be recognized as quite effective. But effective protection from journalists capable of destroying any amount of equipment on the pages of their publications has not yet been found.
