Advertising is known to be the engine of progress. It has always been like this all over the world. Except for Russia. Here in the naval rocket industry … regression is heavily advertised. Or, to put it in your own words, propaganda has replaced advertising. Moreover, the propaganda of the nonexistent super-merits of the new Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile is clearly going off scale - either because of the incompetence of the propagandists themselves, or because of the underestimation of the competence of those to whom it is directed. In the near future, a massive stuffing about the next victory of "Bulava" should appear in the media - "salvo firing from a depth of 50 m on the move with a sea state of 6-7 points" is expected.
The first and only salvo of full ammunition - 16 liquid-fuel missiles RSM-54 - was carried out 15 years ago by the strategic missile submarine Novomoskovsk. The tests were carried out in order to check the "behavior" of the cruiser after it has, within 90 seconds, freed from almost 645 tons of "jet" cargo, replaced by seawater. And the cruiser behaved at five-plus, and all the mass-dimensional warheads dummies successfully “hit” the conventional targets. This shooting became a world military-technical record for Soviet submariners. American submariners from the Ohio submarine dared to release only four Trident-2 missiles with a total weight of just over 236 tons. There were 12 days left before the August events in Moscow and the collapse of the USSR that followed. Today, in the Russian Navy, the launch of two missiles is already considered a "salvo".
However, back to the Bulava. Who still does not believe in her victory - a step out of the readership! These notes are not for you.
FIRST MYTH: "BULAVA" WILL REPLACE "BLUE" AND "LINER"
Let's start with information about the unsuccessful launches of two Bulava missiles at the end of 2015 from the Vladimir Monomakh submarine. This means that the condition established by the Russian Minister of Defense (in 2013) on the conduct of five successful launches of the Bulava missile, which should precede their acceptance into service, has not been fulfilled. This fact makes it premature to discuss the issue of full-scale salvo firing. And in general, a discussion about the combat merits of the Bulava. To smooth over the negative impression of its unsuccessful tests, the former generals who have become venerable military experts, as it were, show everyone the dummy: bite, take a bite, the RSM-54 had even more unsuccessful test launches than the Bulava, and they cite fantastic figures for persuasiveness …
The reality is as follows.
RSM-54: the number of test launches from a ground stand and a submarine - 58, including 17 unsuccessful ones (29, 3%).
RSM-54 (Sineva and Liner): five test launches, which were carried out after the resumption of serial production of RSM-54 missiles in Russian conditions, all successful.
Bulava: 25 launches, including 11 unsuccessful (44%).
It is appropriate to note here that if the resumption of production of the RSM-54 missiles had not been realized, and the creation of the Bulava missile corresponded to today's reality, then for several years Russia would have no naval strategic nuclear forces at all.
11 years ago, the author of these lines in his article entitled "Project 2020: a country without missiles?" predicted "Bulava" a long and difficult path of creation. Alas, the gloomiest predictions came true. Today it is known that Project 667BDRM submarines armed with RSM-54 missiles can carry out combat duty until 2025–2030 as part of the North-Western Group of Naval Strategic Forces. And the existence of the Northeast Group, starting in 2016, will depend on the actual completion of the development of the Bulava missiles.
Next, we should dwell on the statement (forecast) of the Bulava's “fathers” that liquid-propellant ICBMs cannot compete with solid-propellant ICBMs “neither in the duration of the active section, nor in the survivability of the complex in a retaliatory strike, nor in the resistance in the active section to the effects of damaging factors. anti-missile defense . This is, to put it mildly, a big delusion.
In the treaty process on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, the following were adopted as the main controllable parameters of missiles: the number of deployed missiles, the number of warheads on the missile and the throw weight delivered by the missile at the specified firing ranges or demonstrated in a real launch. In this case, the throw weight of modern missiles with multiple warheads is defined as the weight of the last stage of the missile, which delivers warheads (warheads, warheads) to various aiming points. The thrown weight includes: warheads, means of countering (overcoming) missile defense, propulsion system, control system equipment and structural elements that are not separated from the last (often called combat) stage of the missile.
"Novomoskovsk" still remains the world record holder for salvo ballistic missile fire.
Throwing weight is the most important parameter characterizing the combat effectiveness of a missile, as well as its energy capabilities. The ratio of the throw weight of the rocket delivered to a firing range of 10 thousand km to the launch weight of the rocket is called the technical level of the rocket by interbranch documents (in the USSR and in Russia).
For missiles with a "bus scheme" of sequential dilution of warheads by aiming points, the weight (mass) of the disengagement system, the onboard control system is determined during the design and can be taken constant for a specific missile. In this regard, the task is reduced to determining the rational weight (power) of the warhead and the rational weight of the countermeasures to break through the missile defense. At the same time, it is clear that for missiles with a limited throw-weight, it will be necessary to find a rational combination of the warhead power and the weight of the countermeasures. And the implementation of enhanced countermeasures on such missiles leads either to a reduction in the number of warheads, or to a decrease in their power and weight.
MYTH TWO: THE POSSIBILITIES OF OVERCOMING ANY PRO
Let us consider how the problem of equipping modern strategic missiles of Russia with means of countering anti-missile defense has been solved or is being solved.
For naval liquid-propellant missiles "Sineva" and "Liner" with a predicted service life up to 2030, the possibility of re-equipment by the number of warheads is provided: from four medium power classes with anti-missile defense means to 8-10 small power classes with various sets of countermeasures (false goals). The throw weight (mass) of these missiles is about 2 thousand kg.
For modern solid-propellant sea missiles "Bulava", the beginning of combat duty of which was to take place in 2014-2015 (actually in 2016-2017), the projected service life is up to 2050-2060. We should expect modernization work, including countermeasures. At the same time, the possibilities of modernization will be limited by the value of the cast weight (mass) - 1150 kg and the possibility of its increase. Most likely, this means that an increase in breakthrough qualities will be possible only by reducing the number of warheads, since low power class warheads have already been used.
For modern land-based liquid-propellant missiles - Voevoda with a throw-weight of 8800 kg and Stiletto with a throw-weight of 4350 kg - the projected service life is 2020–2022. In this regard, no work should be carried out to modernize the combat equipment of these missiles.
For land solid-propellant missiles with a monobloc warhead "Topol M", as well as "Yars" with a multiple warhead, modern countermeasures are provided. However, the implementation of more effective anti-missile defense in subsequent upgrades will be limited by a small throw weight (mass) - about 1200-1300 kg and will lead either to a reduction in the number of low power class warheads or to the use (in a monoblock version) of a medium power class unit.
Heavy missiles silo-based "Sarmat" (of the "Voyevoda" type) with an 8-ton, for example, throw-weight can provide effective protection against missile defense, provided that from 2 to 4 tons of throw-in weight are allocated for the protection of 10 warheads of increased or medium power classes.
The main results of this reasoning are summarized in the table "Information on the strategic nuclear deterrent forces."
The foregoing circumstances lead to the conclusion that, in the future, guaranteed strategic deterrence can be ensured if the strategic nuclear forces include missiles with increased throw-weight. Such missiles are capable of adequately countering predicted missile defense options. The survivability of such missiles in the stationary-based version before launch can be ensured by a twofold increase in fortification resistance during the modernization of existing stationary silos, as well as by anti-missile defense of starting positions and positional areas by existing or known means.
As for the mobile basing of ground strategic means of deterrence, the possibility of their countering missile defense is less due to the small throw weight of solid-propellant missiles (less than 1.5 tons). This may require spending on additional missile deployments and withdrawing from the process of treaty limitations on strategic offensive arms.
In this regard, the ongoing transition to solid-propellant sea missiles has a drawback associated with a decrease in the throw weight, which is illustrated by the above table of characteristics of Russian and American sea missiles.
The main and very sad conclusion from this table is the fact that the Russian solid-propellant naval rocket industry lags behind the American one by almost 40 years, which follows from the comparison of the Trident-1 and Bulava missiles, which have comparable tactical and technical characteristics and almost the same conditional technical level., inferior to the modern American technical level ("Trident-2") by about 20%, and the domestic liquid-propellant sea missile RSM-54 (including the versions "Sineva" and "Liner") - one and a half times.
MYTH THREE: ADVANTAGES OF SOLID-FUEL ROCKETS
Next, we will dwell on the statement about the advantage of solid-propellant missiles in the duration of the active section, survivability in a retaliatory strike, and resistance in the active section. Most likely, such a statement is intended for specialists not related to rocketry. There is no doubt that the duration of the active phase of solid-propellant missiles is traditionally shorter than that of liquid-propellant ones. But when can this factor become decisive? For example, after the appearance of space echelons of missile defense ("Star Wars"). However, even in this case, liquid-propellant rockets can fend off "space" interceptions, for example, due to dashed trajectories (turned off - turned on the main engine), due to trajectories maneuvering in an arbitrary direction, as well as reducing the time of the active section during new design.
As for the resistance to damaging factors in the active area, today all customer requirements are accepted and fulfilled by the developers. If these requirements are proven to increase, then the increased energy of liquid-propellant missiles will help their implementation.
MARSHAL'S OPINION
The resumption of the serial production of the modernized RSM-54 missiles made it possible to preserve the combat potential of the Russian NSNF. Photo from the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
In conclusion of my notes, I will appeal for support to the indisputable authority of Dmitry Ustinov, the only “marshal of industry” among the defense ministers. In 2013, the Stolichnaya Encyclopedia Publishing House published the book Stories about Russian Missiles. In 2005, the assistant to the Minister of Defense Dmitry Ustinov, Igor Vyacheslavovich Illarionov, told the author of this book the following story. “Shortly before the death of Ustinov, Illarionov visited him in the hospital. We talked about current affairs. Suddenly the minister said:
- You know, but Victor was right.
- What are you talking about, Dmitry Fedorovich? - asked Illarionov in surprise.
- I say, Vitya Makeev was right when he resisted with all his might and did not want to build a solid-fuel machine. I have changed my mind about many things here in the ward. We bent him great then. But in vain …
Ustinov pondered. Illarionov broke the silence.
- But why, Dmitry Fedorovich? You have always believed so much in solid fuel technology!
- I still believe. Only we can't grow up to be Americans. And there was nothing to push. Our destiny is liquid fuel. With our capabilities, nothing can be done better.
Ustinov thought again.
- And you and I, Igor, drove solid fuel workers in vain. They almost overstrained. Vitya and Misha Yangel made excellent cars. And for industry, and for the army, and for the navy …"
FORECAST AND REALITY
The creation of the RT-2 rocket (under the START treaty - RS-12, according to NATO classification - SS-13 mod. 1 Savage), which was in service with the Strategic Missile Forces from 1969 to 1994, led to an increase in the transported weights. Liquid rockets of that time were transported to the launch site without fuel and refueled after being loaded into the mine. The RT-2 (RT-2P) rocket was delivered to the combat launch position separately: in one container the first stage (weight about 35 tons), and in the other - the docked second and third stages. Technical solutions to the issue were found, but improved roads and appropriate transport units were required for delivery to the starting position.
The creation of a marine solid-propellant rocket R-39 (under the START treaty - RSM-52, according to NATO classification - SS-N-20 Sturgeon) with a launch mass of 90 tons required the construction of a new basing system, the transition from "wheeled" to "rail" transportation of missiles, new crane equipment for loading heavy rockets and much more. The work was delayed and was not completed during the Soviet era. During the Russian period, the operation of the R-39 missiles was terminated ahead of schedule, and its carriers - five Project 941 heavy submarine cruisers of the Typhoon system - have been scrapped or are being prepared for scrapping; another, Dmitry Donskoy, has been converted into a test platform for Bulava.
Of course, all the problems of the operation of both sea and land, stationary and mobile solid-propellant missiles were solved by domestic developers, but they also required increased costs and increased development time. One of the conclusions of the developers of the first domestic intercontinental ballistic missiles is that a solid-propellant rocket engine is a luxury available only to rich countries with highly developed science and economies. But here's the catch: even a rich country like the United States buys its liquid-propellant rocket engines from Russia and installs them on its missiles.
Recently, at a congressional hearing, US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Procurement and Technology Frank Kendall warned that premature abandonment of the Russian RD-180 rocket engine would cost the Pentagon more than $ 1 billion, and American companies could build their own engine no earlier than 2021. … So should we chase the American fashion for solid-propellant missiles, if our liquid-propellant ones are no worse, and in some cases even better? The question, of course, is rhetorical also because the government has invested billions of rubles in the development of the Bulava and the creation of a carrier for it - the strategic submarines of Project 955 Borey.
It can be stated that today in Russia there are different opinions, different approaches, different possibilities, but, unfortunately, there is no competent, fair and unbiased arbiter on strategic rocketry issues.
