History repeated itself later, namely in November 2015, at the Malabar-2015 exercise, but with our Halibut B-898 (Sindgudhwai) as part of the Indian Navy. The diesel-electric submarines were able to “destroy” the next American SSN-705 “City of Corpus Christi” (Los Angeles-class) submarine without hindrance, from which it becomes clearer that ours and the Swedish ones, as well as 6 German low-noise submarines of the 212A type will be worthy rivals. But so far there are fewer of ours in the Baltic Fleet, and you will have to surface more often, since they are not air-independent. And, as we know, reaching the periscope depth is extremely dangerous in the area of the theater of operations, where the enemy's anti-submarine aircraft are regularly patrolling, since modern search radars with AN / APS-137D (V) 5 AFAR installed on the P-8A "Poseidon", have a synthetic aperture that allows detecting the smallest structural elements of submarines, including periscopes and various antenna equipment on mast devices at ranges of up to 50-80 km. For this reason, the two Halibuts are unlikely to succeed in operating in the vicinity of Grönholm Island without disclosing their presence to NATO naval aviation for a long time.
But there are also aspects of the use of Vyborg and Dmitrov that can bring the BF tangible success in terms of protection against British or American multipurpose nuclear submarines such as Trafalgar, Astyut and Los Angeles, which may well enter into the Baltic Sea for strikes with Tomahawk cruise missiles deep into our territory. These submarines with a 95% probability, as we know from the exercises, will not be able to detect quiet and small diesel-electric submarines, and will be easily destroyed by torpedoes from 6 533-mm TA. Here we can say that Astyutes and Trafalgars can launch Tomahawks from the coasts of Denmark or Norway, but this is minus 600-700 km of flight range.
The unique super-quiet diesel-electric submarine pr.677 "Lada". In addition to 6 standard 533-mm torpedo tubes, the submarine has a ten-fold universal vertical launcher for the 3M55 Onyx anti-ship missile system and all modifications of the Caliber cruise missile, including the strategic 3M14. All 3 submarines under construction and testing (St. Petersburg, Kronstadt and Velikiye Luki) are intended for the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy, while the military-political situation has dictated an urgent need to replenish the submarine component of the Baltic Fleet for several years
Diesel-electric submarines of project 877 have one more opportunity, which is absent from NATO non-nuclear submarines. Their 533-mm torpedo tubes can launch strategic 3M14 Caliber cruise missiles at strategic targets of any European country from a submerged position. All diesel-electric submarines / diesel-electric submarines of the fleets of NATO countries are capable of using only UGM-84 "Sub-Harpoon" anti-ship missiles. But the question still remains open: the number of NATO submarines operating in the Baltic Sea is 10 times more than ours, and the "anaerobic" autonomy of the underwater passage of some of them is 20-25 times greater. The only way out is to accelerate the development program of a highly efficient air-independent power plant (VNEU) for non-nuclear submarines of project 677 "Lada".
Lada will be equipped with a promising VNEU based on an electrochemical generator (similar to the concept of the German U-212), but with the generation of hydrogen by the decay of diesel fuel. Work in this area is being carried out by the Rubin Central Design Bureau. According to Igor Vilnit, General Director of "Rubn", the modular design of the new unit will make it possible to install it not only on submarines under construction in parallel, but also to replace it on submarines already in the fleet. Sea trials of the advanced power plant will begin in the Baltic Sea this year.
At the end of his article, Hasik begins to simply "shine" with his deep knowledge of modern air defense systems, as well as active protection systems for armored vehicles. He proposes to destroy the mixed anti-aircraft missile unit deployed "near the bridge" by striking one guided aerial bomb with semi-active laser guidance. But this decision is not even close to the realities of modern battle tactics. Firstly, not a single mixed anti-aircraft missile battalion (under the command of a sane person) will not represent a dense concentration of air defense missile systems, air defense systems, MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery installations on a small "heel" of land at the entrance to the bridge. All air defense systems will be located at an optimal distance from each other for the possibility of mutual cover of some air defense systems with others: for example, the Tor-M2, located at the entrance to the bridge, has a “dead zone” of 1 km, in case it misses the missile defense system or UAB, in 300-500 meters behind can be ZRAK "Pantsir-S1", which will safely "finish off" the approaching WTO. Additional air defense systems (MANPADS operators and anti-aircraft artillery systems) can be scattered within a radius of 1-2 km in different directions from the entrance to the bridge. Imagine what type of warhead this UAB should have in order to destroy such an air defense formation. Is it a tactical nuclear weapon or a high frequency electromagnetic generator? Interesting. But why, then, does the bomb need laser guidance?
However, we also have an answer to this option, and more than one. To destroy such "smart" aerial bombs, our specialists have developed a combat EMP generator "Ranets-E". The specialized protected PBU, located on the MAZ chassis, is equipped with a powerful parabolic mirror with a high-frequency electromagnetic emitter. A focused beam is capable of actually “burning through” the electronics of any promising air attack weapon at a distance of about 15 km and making its correct functioning impossible at a distance of up to 40 km. It is known that "Knapsack-E" can be equipped with 45 and 50 dB antennas with radiation angles of 60 and 20 degrees, respectively. But that's not all. Any guided aerial bombs, even in the amount of a couple of dozen, can be intercepted directly by self-propelled anti-aircraft missile systems, which these bombs are intended for. All modern complexes ("Tor-M1", "Tor-M2", "Pantsir-S1") are capable of shooting down such objects at a distance of up to 5-12 km (depending on the EPR). And if the S-300PM / S-400 also operates in the area, then such a bomb will not fly up to a hypothetical "bridge with anti-aircraft guns" even 20 km. Apparently Hasik re-read the blinkered Western literature about Operation Desert Storm, where the "invisible" Nighthawks destroyed the fortified areas and bunkers of the Iraqi army, which were covered only by the outdated Osa and Shilki air defense missile systems.
Further, Hasik proposes to fight "Russian tanks at the Fulda Corridor" by dropping cluster bombs with self-aiming warheads with IKGSN (Hasik calls them "sensor fuses"). But what does the Fulda Corridor have to do with it? In the list of tasks of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, even in the event of a conflict with NATO in Eastern Europe, there are no plans for a march-throw of the 20th combined-arms army to the center of Western Europe to the French border, where you will have to “tinker” with thousands of NATO units armed with modern anti-tank systems Spike, Javelin and drones carrying Brimstone tactical missiles. The main task of our army is to keep the Belarusian-Polish border, the Kaliningrad region, to prevent NATO units in the Baltic states from raising their heads, to stop possible enemy maneuvers on the territory of Ukraine, by the way, together with the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Our strategic Tu-160 bombers, equipped with hundreds of Caliber TFRs, will be engaged in "shaking" the strategic depth of NATO in Western Europe, which must successfully overcome all the lines of the alliance's air defense. We will consider the latter at the end of the article. Now let's get back to NATO cluster bombs and Russian tanks.
The fact that our tank brigades will operate under the cover of military air defense, as well as Russian air defense aviation not far from the border, missile and bomb strikes by NATO air force assault aviation will be of an episodic nature. The scenario when a link of British or German tactical strike fighters "Tornad GR.4" will conduct unhindered bombing of our armored vehicles will not work here. From this it becomes clear that in order to combat our ground forces, NATO tactical aviation will be forced to use high-precision missile weapons with a range of more than 150 km, so as not to enter the engagement zone of our air defense. As an example of such weapons, the tactical long-range cruise missile "TAURUS-M" immediately appears before us.
The cruise missile "TAURUS-M" is a cassette modification of the well-known concrete-piercing "TAURUS KEPD 350". The rocket is equipped with a powerful turbojet engine P8300-15 Williams International with a thrust of 680 kgf. It gives the rocket a flight speed from 650 to 1050 km / h in the mode of following the terrain at an altitude of 20-30 m. organized by the S-300PM complexes. After all, such a low-altitude "stealth" missile can penetrate even through the NVO 76N6E viewing area at ranges of more than 30 km, in places of the most difficult terrain, etc. action. The "TAURUS-M" can also be destroyed by the "Tor-M2" air defense missile systems covering the tank subunits; But sometimes everything can go according to the worst scenario: the military air defense overloaded with the interception of drones may not have time to react to the inconspicuous "TAURUS", then all hope remains on increasing the capabilities of the active protection complexes (KAZ) of our tanks.
Today, a very small number of main battle tanks of the Western Military District are equipped with active protection systems, but work in this area is carried out on a daily basis. So, in September 2015, it became known about the installation of KAZ "Arena-E" on some MBT T-72B3 ZVO. The modernized "Arena-E" received several antenna posts of miniature radar for detecting and "capturing" ATGMs flying up to the tank / BMP, which increased the survivability and reliability of the complex. The main performance characteristics remained the same: the maximum speed of the targeted target is 2520 km / h, the detection range of the attacking projectile is 50 m, the azimuth sector of protection is 270 degrees, the elevation sector is from -6 to +20 degrees. And it is precisely in the low elevation sector of interception that the problem of all existing KAZs lies, since the self-aiming combat elements (SPBE) of the TAURUS-M cluster warhead descend to the target with angles close to 90 degrees - it is not possible to destroy them with conventional KAZ. But let's not think so pessimistically: the military "Torah" and "Armor" leave almost no chances for a "breakthrough" of our airspace by the western aggressor, the shooting at the Kapustin Yar range has confirmed this dozens of times.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM HAS AN EXTREMELY SHAKE POSITION BEFORE THE ICS OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES
Returning to the previously promised review of the potential of the NATO Joint Air Defense System in Europe, it is worth noting that any strategic aerospace offensive operation (SVKNO) of the North Atlantic Alliance against Russia will last exactly as long as the West needs to fully feel and understand all economic and military-political " delights "from the response of our side. The conflict is unlikely to develop into a nuclear confrontation, and the technical impossibility of completely destroying the industrial and military infrastructure of our country will reduce the confrontation to a limited "attack" by the NATO bloc with far-reaching consequences for it.
In the Baltic and Black Sea operational directions, NATO air defense and missile defense is formed on the basis of two regional anti-missile systems "Aegis Ashore" (near the Polish town of Redzikovo and Romanian Deveselu), as well as the anti-aircraft missile systems of air defense / missile defense "Patriot PAC-2 /" covering them 3 ". In the central part of Eastern Europe, there is 1 division of the S-300PS air defense system of the Slovak Air Force, and about 15 similar Ukrainian complexes. Several Arley Burke-class Aegis URO destroyers and Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers may additionally be sent to the Black and Baltic Seas, which will become the forward positioning area of the SM-3 missile defense system together with the Ashora. But, in fairness, I will note that these ships can be considered the first applicants from the European missile defense link to destroy our anti-ship missile systems and torpedo armament for diesel-electric submarines, especially in the Black Sea, where the dominance of the Black Sea Fleet and Russian naval aviation is most pronounced.
As for the "Patriots", they have very limited capabilities to combat cruise missiles and other low-flying targets (NLC). Multifunctional radars for illumination and guidance AN / MPQ-53 are not placed on universal towers, which limits the radio horizon of the complex to 30-33 kilometers along the KR flying at an altitude of 60 m (the S-300 and S-400, thanks to the 25-meter 40V6M tower, have a radio horizon 38- 40 km for a similar target). In addition, "Patriot PAC-3" with its ERINT anti-missile missiles is "sharpened" for the fight against operational-tactical ballistic missiles in conditions of low-medium-intensity radio countermeasures; homing heads will hit all our sources of electronic warfare (aircraft and electronic warfare drones, etc.). The maximum speed of targets for the Patriot PAC-3 is about 5800 km / h (almost 2 times less than that of the S-300PMU-1), which will create certain difficulties not only in the destruction of new hypersonic missiles of the Zircon type, but and the existing high-speed, stealth and maneuverable Iskander. Aegis Ashor, designed to deal exclusively with ballistic targets, simply will not be able to handle the 9M728 Iskander-K stealth missiles and a whole swarm of similar Calibers. Theoretically, they could use their "advanced asset" in the land "Aegis Ashorah" - long-range missiles RIM-174 "SM-6 ERAM" with ARGSN, which would receive target designation from aircraft of the "AWACS" system. Its range is approaching 240 km, according to the NLC - about 180, but imagine how many land UVPU Mk 41 are needed, set up by a "fence" every 150 km along the line passing through the territory of the eastern NATO countries in order to reliably protect the airspace of the alliance from " breakthrough”of hundreds of thousands of Russian strategic cruise missiles. At least 20-25 Ashor facilities, which will cost about $ 5 billion, but still will not guarantee one hundred percent security.
The RIM-174 "SM-6 ERAM" long-range air defense missile system is equipped with an active radar homing head from an AIM-120C AMRAAM air-to-air missile, thanks to which all Aegis ships and, in the future, Aegis Ashore capable of intercepting either over-the-horizon low-altitude targets, or targets hidden by natural landforms. Considering that the ground structure of the Aegis Ashor anti-missile system with AN / SPY-1D radar is located at an altitude of 15-20 m, external target designation from E-3C aircraft will be required to defeat over-the-horizon cruise missiles, whose combat duty over Eastern Europe will be very difficult in working conditions of Russian fighter aircraft with electronic warfare systems on board
From everything we draw an unambiguous and unpleasant conclusion for NATO that no matter what "Great Wall of China" from "Ashora" and "Patriots" the Americans build in Eastern Europe, their anti-aircraft and anti-missile qualities will not allow achieving a comprehensive defense from the retaliatory actions of our Aircraft at the European theater of operations. At the same time, the capabilities of our air defense and missile defense, at a completely satisfactory level, ensure the safety of most of the strategically important industrial enterprises and military facilities, especially in the center of the state, and also create favorable conditions for the actions of the Russian ground forces in the border areas where there is a danger of work assault and strike aircraft of the enemy. This was achieved not only due to the geographical factor of the gigantic area of the Russian Federation, but also due to the more advanced technological base of air defense systems. With the entry into the Russian Aerospace Forces of the 8-channel anti-aircraft missile systems S-350 "Vityaz", the Russian air defense will acquire improved "all-aspect capabilities" at the division level to combat "complex" missile systems attacking from different directions.
The general assessment of the results of the probable application of the Pentagon's "Third Offset" strategy in the Baltics and Eastern Europe does not allow the West to feed itself any illusions about NATO's domination in this region. This is well understood in Washington and Brussels, and therefore the "loud" article by James Hasik mentioned at the beginning of our review is a real propaganda "zombie" of the leading Western press.
