The plethora of articles about the unprecedented resurgence of the Russian navy and air force evokes mixed feelings. Is that really true? We, born in the late USSR, lived for so long in conditions of falls and defeats that they became our organic part. We have lost the habit of believing in victories. And the reports of American analysts writing about the extremely dangerous Russian Navy, which has risen from the ashes and once again, cause us doubts. However, it is quite easy to distinguish truth from fiction.
FLEET
Subjective assessments are, of course, important. We are all humans. A good attitude and self-confidence are worth hundreds of ships. And yet, the main drawback of other assessments (“everything is good with us” and “everything is bad with us”) is that they are biased and do not provide specifics. What indicator can accurately reflect the real state of affairs in the Russian Navy? The number of miles traveled and tons of fuel burned, running hours. But the layman has almost no access to this information.
Under these conditions, the most accurate indicator of the state's concern for the fleet is the number of ships and vessels ordered for the Navy. And not just ordered, but completed. This indicator also characterizes the capabilities of the shipbuilding industry.
What are the disadvantages of such an indicator? First of all, inertia. Years pass from the beginning of preparation for the construction of the vessel to its delivery to the customer. That is, if right now we decide to start building a ship and allocate money for this, we will see the real fruit of our efforts only in a few years.
Conversely, if we build ships in series and suddenly decide to give up this pointless business, then the conveyor will not stop instantly. The hulls already on the stocks have been financed, equipment has been ordered for them and contractors are already shipping everything that is required. The ship will be completed in a few years, although we have lost interest in it now. At the same time, of course, one must understand that it is easier to destroy than to build, therefore the "incubation" period of the collapse is undoubtedly shorter than the same "incubation" period of growth.
Therefore, looking at the statistics, one must clearly realize that the decline or rise in shipbuilding began not at the time of actually noticeable growth or decline, but several years earlier.
What do we see as a result? The collapse of shipbuilding in 1993-95. This means that in reality the state abandoned military shipbuilding in the period 1990-1991. Just on the eve of the collapse of the USSR. What happened next was just the completion of what could still be completed. There could be no talk of any new designs and projects. The bottom of this fall was reached in 2002 - zero ships were built.
Uncertain growth was outlined only in 2007-2010. During these years, the first completely new projects appeared, created in post-Soviet Russia from scratch - for example, SKR project 20380. All this speaks of weak, but still the first attempts to revive the fleet at least minimally, undertaken in 2005-2008.
Finally, more sustainable growth has been seen since 2012, i.e. they began to engage in serious military shipbuilding at the turn of 2008-2010. The connection with the conflict in Ossetia and Abkhazia is obvious, when it became clear even to a purely liberal state that it would not hurt to have some kind of fleet.
The statistics for 2015 are incomplete, but it is possible that a fall is indeed taking place: today, sanctions are affecting, which slow down the commissioning of actually finished ships. At the same time, it is obvious that the volume of military shipbuilding in Russia in 2012-2015 steadily exceeded the period 1995-2010. In terms of the number of ships built, we are at about 60% of the 1989 level, and about 20% in terms of tonnage. The latter is partly due to a significant reduction in our oceanic ambitions. Today we build mainly ships of the near sea zone, while in the USSR the share of ships in the far ocean zone reached half of all military shipbuilding.
Evaluating these statistics, it is also necessary to take into account the fact that Russia now lacks part of the shipbuilding capacities. Those. it is basically impossible to reach the level of the USSR. Moreover, the capacity losses are quite serious. For example, Nikolaevsky Shipyard was one of the best factories in the industry, the only one that built aircraft-carrying ships, in fact, the second after Sevmashzavod in terms of capacity. There is no "Lenin's Forge" in Kiev, there is no Kherson Shipyard, there are no a number of small ship-repair enterprises in Estonia and Latvia. In fact, some factories in Russia itself were also destroyed.
There is not much to be happy about. Our country deserves more. At least 50% of 1989 in terms of tonnage is quite realistic. At this rate, it is quite possible to build a very dangerous and sharp-toothed fleet, albeit not an ocean one, like the US Navy. Such a fleet would be quite capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor or defending the interests of the state in peacetime.
The main thing that is encouraging is that the year 2002 is not "zero".
AVIATION
The main purpose of this article, of course, was to provide statistics on ships and fleet. Let us touch on aviation only superficially, because statistics on it are kept and publicly available, in contrast to the naval (https://russianplanes.net/registr).
In contrast to the section on the fleet, statistics on the aviation industry cover all aircraft built at the factories of the Russian Federation, including for a foreign customer. That is why, even in the worst years, these figures were not equal to zero. Even in the most difficult times, Russia still supplied at least piece of aircraft for export. However, the tendency to catch this does not interfere. Another important note: 2015 is excluded because there are no complete statistics on it yet, but, obviously, some decline should be expected.
As you can see from the table, things in the aircraft industry are somewhat more "fun". Since it is not accepted and even stupid to count the tonnage for aircraft equipment, the estimate concerns only the number of aircraft produced. In terms of aircraft production, we reach 50% of 1989, and even more than 50% in helicopters.
CONCLUSIONS
We can confidently say that the most difficult times are behind us. Both the shipbuilding and aviation industries were able to weather the devastating effects of the 90s. However, it is quite obvious that it will not be possible to reach the level of the USSR in the near future. The outlined success is still too fragile and unstable. It is no coincidence that they are hitting us with sanctions right now. Right now there is still a chance to inflict heavy damage on the incipient and still too weak revival of industry. Competitors need to be destroyed while they are weak. That is why today Russia is under pressure as never before, because if the trend is not reversed today, in 5-6 years it will be much more difficult to do.
Another thing is also obvious: there was no industrial paradise in the 90s. The fact that in the first years after the collapse of the USSR something was still being built and assembled, speaks not of some successes of the democratic authorities of new Russia, but exclusively of the strength of the industrial power that the USSR created and which continued to work for several years even after the death of the state. … Separate white spots of the 90s (such as the surrender of Peter the Great in 1998) also speak more of the will of workers and engineers, solely for the sake of the Motherland who pulled the hull and board, for months without receiving a salary and a Sabbath at night to feed their families, rather than about merit of reformers from the market economy.
None of us want to go back to the 90s. Therefore, all that is required of us is not to give our potential adversaries such joy as the repeated collapse of our production and armed forces.
