The experience of military-industrial cooperation of the Warsaw Pact countries may be in demand in the CSTO
This year marks 60 years since the creation of the Warsaw Pact (VD), which united the USSR and almost all the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the military-political union. The reasons for the collapse of this unique organization are purely political, more precisely - Gorbachev's treacherous course towards the collapse of the anti-NATO coalition. Meanwhile, the VD marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of the military-industrial complex of the participating countries on the basis of their close intersectoral cooperation. This experience can be in demand today.
Already in June 1955, a month after the proclamation of the Warsaw Pact, the participating countries agreed to develop a long-term program of military-industrial cooperation with each other. It was ready by 1958 and was adjusted taking into account geopolitical circumstances and scientific and technological advances. According to available data, if in 1961, on the basis of cooperation in the countries of the military, about 25 percent of the volume of military-technical production was produced, by the end of the 70s, more than 40 percent.
Joint (equity) financing of the relevant R&D and finished products was carried out, in which the share of the USSR was at least 40 percent. East Germany and Czechoslovakia - about 20 percent each. On the basis of cooperation in the 1950s and 1970s, telecommunications and space reconnaissance, warning and protection against missile weapons, submarines and long-range air forces, as well as devices ensuring the highest possible accuracy of retaliatory strikes against NATO targets, were created in the 1950s and 1970s. At the same time, the share of East German and Czechoslovak "stuffing", for example, in Soviet missile armament and anti-missile defense means, in general, exceeded 30 percent, in the technical equipment of tank units and the USSR Navy it reached 20 percent.
The increasingly close development of military-industrial cooperation in the VD could not but worry the member countries of the NATO bloc. Therefore, various efforts were made to slow down and disrupt this interaction, including using the foreign policy mistakes of the Soviet leadership.
So, in the late 50s, the unbridled anti-Stalinist policy of Moscow led to a break in relations with Albania, which participated in the VD, and it was in this country that (since 1951) the largest Soviet naval base in the Mediterranean region was located - the port of Vlora. Moreover, it was adjacent to NATO naval facilities in Italy and Greece, which could not but restrain the aggressive plans of the alliance in the Balkan-Black Sea region (as well as against Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1955-1956). The conflict with Tirana almost turned into military actions of the USSR against Albania. In 1961, the base had to be evacuated. At the same time, Albania almost stopped supplying chromium, cobalt, vanadium, nickel and their alloys, mercury, graphite to the Soviet defense industry. Yes, the volume of these supplies, it would seem, is not large, but their aggregate price per unit of conventional output was at least four times lower in comparison with the capital investments of the 60s - early 80s in the development of resources of the same raw materials in the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR …
According to available information, provoking anti-Soviet protests in the countries of the internal affairs was also aimed, among other things, at disengaging the military-industrial complex. The notorious events in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1980) led to the fact that in 1956-1957, 1967-1969 and 1980-1983, the supply of defense products for cooperation from these countries was reduced by at least half.
In 1966, a cross-sectoral balance was developed for the military-industrial sectors of the entire VD region, with details on the supply of cooperative products. In 1967, this document was adopted and began to be implemented. As a result, by the beginning of the 80s, the aggregate needs of the military-industrial complex of the countries of the military dynasty for raw materials, semi-finished products, components and finished products were provided for more than 90 percent by the industrial and marketing cooperation of the participating countries (although Romania in 1968 announced a limited participation in the technological chain, and Albania in the same year withdrew from the VD). What was missing - mainly raw materials and semi-finished products - was imported from friendly India, Cuba, Vietnam, Guyana, Guinea, Iraq, Congo (Brazzaville), Angola, Mozambique, Uganda.
And by the end of the 70s, a "checkerboard" scheme was developed for enterprises - suppliers and consumers of military-technical products (including intermediate, that is, subject to further processing) in the VD region. This made it possible by the second half of the 1980s to optimize economically and technologically the ties between such enterprises and to cut the costs of transport and logistics support of the military-industrial complex by more than a third.
Such a unique experience may well be in demand in the development of military-industrial cooperation in the CSTO. It is increasingly relevant in connection with geopolitical trends and the active transfer of arms production in the NATO region closer to the borders of the Russian Federation and Belarus. Moreover, the alliance is hatching such plans in relation to Ukraine, Georgia (for more details - "Live, mine", "MIC", No. 44, 2015).
By the way, up to a third of the military-industrial complex in the Eastern European countries - participants of the former Warsaw Pact are now used by the military-industrial complex of the leading NATO states. The role and capabilities of these facilities were appreciated by the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance back in the 60s and 70s …
