First of all, we note that all ballistic missiles are part of the corresponding ballistic missile complexes, which, in addition to the ballistic missiles themselves, include prelaunch preparation systems, fire control devices and other elements. Since the main element of these complexes is the rocket itself, the authors will consider only them. The first BR for the fleet was created on the basis of the existing land P-11, created, in turn, as a copy of the German Aggregat 4 (A4) (FAU-2).
The chief designer of this BR was S. P. Korolev.
When developing the marine modification of the BR R-11FM, a whole range of complex problems associated with a liquid-propellant jet engine (LPRE) was solved. In particular, the storage of the fueled ballistic missiles was ensured in the submarine's shaft (the R-11 rocket was refueled before firing). This was achieved by replacing alcohol and liquid oxygen, which required constant drainage after refueling and, accordingly, replenishment, with kerosene and nitric acid, which could be stored in sealed rocket tanks for a long time. Finally, its start was ensured in the conditions of the ship's pitching. However, shooting was only possible from the surface. Although the first successful launch was made on September 16, 1955, it was not accepted into service until 1959. The ballistic missile had a firing range of only 150 km with a circular probable deviation (CEP) of about 8 km, which made it possible to use it only for firing at large area targets. In other words, the combat value of these first ballistic missiles was small (the firing range was almost 2 times less than that of the BR (A4) ("V-2") arr. 1944, with almost the same CEP).
Construction "V-2"
The next BR R-13 was created specifically for the submarine from the very beginning. Initially, the work on this ballistic missile was directed by S. P. Korolev, and then V. P. Makeev, who became the permanent chief designer of all subsequent sea ballistic missiles of the USSR Navy.
With an almost 2.5-fold increase in mass, compared to the R-11FM, the dimensions of the R-13 BR increased by only 25%, which was achieved by an increase in the density of the rocket layout.
First surface-launched ballistic missiles:
a - R-11FM;
b - R-13 1 - warhead; 2 - oxidizer tank; 3 - fuel tank; 4 - (control system equipment; 5 - central chamber; 6 - steering chambers; 7 - dividing bottom of the oxidizer tank; 8 - rocket stabilizers; 9 - cable barrel;
c - the trajectory of the R-11FM rocket 1 - the end of the active section; 2 - the beginning of stabilization in dense layers of the atmosphere
The firing range has increased more than 4 times. The improvement in firing accuracy was achieved by the separation of the warhead at the end of the active phase of the flight. In 1961, this BR was put into service.
The R-13 missile was structurally a single-stage ballistic missile with a single-piece detachable warhead. The head and tail section of the rocket were equipped with four stabilizers. 1 head part; 2 oxidizer tank; 3 control equipment; 4 fuel tank; 5 central combustion chamber of a liquid-propellant engine; 6 rocket stabilizer; 7 steering chambers
But she could also start only from the surface position, therefore, in fact, this BR was outdated at the time of adoption (back in 1960, the United States adopted the Polaris A1 BR with a solid-propellant rocket engine (SRMT), an underwater launch and greater firing range).
Development of American marine ballistic missiles
Work on the first domestic BR with an underwater launch R-21 began in 1959. For her, a "wet" start was adopted, that is, a start from a mine filled with water. In the USA, a "dry" start was adopted for offshore ballistic missiles, that is, a start from a mine, in which there was no water at the time of launch (the mine was separated from the water by a bursting membrane). To ensure a normal start from a mine filled with water, a special regime for the liquid rocket engine to reach maximum thrust was worked out. In general, it was thanks to the liquid rocket engine that the problem of underwater launch in the USSR was solved easier than in the USA with a solid-fuel engine (adjusting the thrust of this engine then caused significant difficulties). The firing range was again increased by almost 2 times with another improvement in accuracy. The missile entered service in 1963.
The flight path of the R-21 rocket:
1 - start; 2 - separation of the head part; 3 - the entry of the warhead into the atmosphere
However, these data were two times worse than that of the next US ballistic missile, the Polaris A2 ', which was put into service in 1962. Moreover, the US was already on its way with a Polaris A-3 ballistic missile (Polaris A3) with a firing range already in 4,600 km (entered service in 1964).
Launch of UGM-27C Polaris A-3 from the USS Robert E. Lee (SSBN-601) nuclear submarine missile carrier
November 20, 1978
Given these circumstances, in 1962 it was decided to start developing a new BR RSM-25 (this designation of this BR was adopted under the SALT agreements and we will continue to adhere to the designations of all subsequent BRs in accordance with them). Despite the fact that all US naval ballistic missiles were two-stage, the RSM-25, like its predecessor, was single-stage. Fundamentally new for this ballistic missile was the factory refueling of the rocket with long-term storage components of the propellant, followed by ampulization. This made it possible to remove the problem of servicing these BRs during their long-term storage. After that, the ease of maintenance of the BR with liquid propellant rocket engine was equal to the BR with solid propellant rocket engine. In terms of firing range, it was still inferior to the "Polaris A2" BR (since it was single-stage). The first modification of this missile was put into service in 1968. In 1973, it was upgraded to increase the firing range, and in 1974 it was equipped with a three-unit multiple warhead of the cluster type (MIRV KT).
R-27 missile URAV Navy index - 4K10 START code - RSM-25 US Defense Ministry and NATO code - SS-N-6 Mod 1, Serb
The increase in the firing range of domestic SSBNs was explained by the objective desire to remove the areas of their combat patrols from the zone of greatest activity of the anti-submarine forces of a potential enemy. This could only be achieved by creating a maritime intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The assignment for the development of the RSM-40 ICBM was issued in 1964.
R-29 marine ballistic missile (RSM-40) (SS-N-8)
Using a two-stage scheme, it was possible for the first time in the world to create a naval ICBM with a firing range of almost 8,000 km, which was more than that of the Trident 1 ("Trident-1") ICBMs then being developed in the United States. Astro correction was also used for the first time in the world to improve the accuracy of shooting. This ICBM was put into service in 1974. The RSM-40 ICBM was constantly modified in the direction of increasing the firing range (up to 9,100 km) and the use of MIRVs.
Intercontinental ballistic missile with one-piece warhead (R-29)
1. Instrument compartment with hull withdrawal motor. 2. Combat unit. 3. Second stage fuel tank with hull drift oxidation engines. 5. Engines of the second stage. 6. First stage oxidizer tank. 7. First stage fuel tank. 8. Guide yoke. 9. First stage engine. 10. Adapter. 11. Dividing bottom
The latest modifications of this ICBM (1977) were so qualitatively different from the first samples that they received a new designation RSM-50 according to OSV. Finally, it was this ICBM for the first time in the USSR Navy that began to be equipped with MIRVs of individual guidance (MIRVs IN), which characterized a new stage in the development of this type of weapon.
Loading rocket R-29 (RSM-50)
At the first stage of the development of naval ballistic missiles (from 1955 to 1977), they were intended to destroy large area targets. Improving the accuracy of shooting only reduced the minimum size of the area target and, therefore, expanded the possible number of targets to be fired. Only after the MIRV was put into service in 1977, it became possible to strike at point targets. Moreover, the accuracy of delivering strikes with MIRVed ICBMs is practically equal to the accuracy of strikes with nuclear weapons by strategic bombers.
Finally, the last ICBM with LPRE of the USSR Navy, the RSM-54, was put into service in 1986. This three-stage ICBM with a launch weight of about 40 tons had a firing range of more than 8,300 km and carried 4 MIRVs.
R-29RMU2 RSM-54 "Sineva" - ballistic missile of submarines 667BDRM
The firing accuracy has doubled compared to the RSM-50. This was achieved by dramatically improving the individual guidance system (IH) of the warhead.
The flight path of the RSM-54 rocket
Work on the creation of a ballistic missile with solid propellant engines was carried out by the USSR back in 1958-64. Studies have shown that this type of engine does not provide advantages for marine ballistic missiles, especially after the application of ampulization of the filled fuel components. Therefore, V. P. Makeev's bureau continued to work on a ballistic missile with liquid propellant rocket engines, but theoretical and development work on a ballistic missile with solid propellant rocket engines was also carried out. The chief designer himself, not without reason, believed that in the foreseeable future, technological advances would not be able to provide the advantages of these missiles over a ballistic missile with liquid propellant engines.
V. P. Makeev also believed that in the development of marine ballistic missiles it is impossible to "jump" from one direction to another, spending huge funds on the results that are achievable even by the simple development of the already existing scientific and technical groundwork. However, in the late 60s and early 70s, ICBMs with solid propellants began to be created for the Strategic Missile Forces (RS-12 - 1968, RS-14 - 1976, RSD-10 - 1977). Based on these results, strong pressure was organized on V. P. Makeev from Marshal D. F. Ustinov in order to force him to develop ICBMs with solid propellants. In an atmosphere of nuclear missile euphoria, they did not accept any objections to the economic plan ("how much money is needed, we will give as much"). Rockets with solid propellants then had a significantly shorter shelf life compared to rockets with liquid propellant engines due to the rapid decomposition of solid fuel components. Nevertheless, the first naval ballistic missile with solid propellant rocket was created in 1976. Tests were carried out on the SSBN pr.667AM. However, it was adopted only in 1980 and did not receive further development.
Medium-range missile 15Ж45 of the RSD-10 "Pioneer" complex (photo from the INF Treaty)
The accumulated experience was used to create the RSM-52 naval ICBM with 10 MIRVs.
The RSM-52 missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads with a yield of up to 100 kilotons. 78 RSM-52 missiles were destroyed as part of a 12-year project
The resulting mass and dimensions of this ICBM turned out to be such that the SALT treaty saved the country from their ruinous large-scale deployment on SSBNs.
Summing up the development of naval ballistic missile systems in the USSR Navy, I would like to note that, having surpassed US ICBMs in firing range since the mid-70s, they were inferior to them in accuracy and in the number of warheads. The relationship between the accuracy of firing ICBMs with the provisions of military doctrine was discussed earlier, when considering SSBNs, here we will focus on technical aspects. It is known that the radius of destruction in an explosion (including a nuclear one) is proportional to the cubic root of the charge power. Therefore, to obtain the same probability of destruction with the worst accuracy, it is necessary to increase the power of the nuclear charge in proportion to the cube (if the accuracy is 2 times worse, then the power of the nuclear charge must be increased by 8 times) or to refuse to hit such targets. Losing in the element base of control systems, domestic ICBMs not only had lower firing accuracy, but also a smaller number of MIRVs (each warhead had to be equipped with a more powerful charge, and, therefore, its mass increased).
For this reason, it is groundless to accuse designers of certain shortcomings of these weapons systems.
The main TTD of naval ballistic missiles in service with the USSR Navy are shown in the table.
See also Main stages of development of the sea strategic complexes of the USSR and the USA
