The depressing situation in the field of ballistic support threatens the development process of practically all weapons of warfare
The development of the domestic weapons system is impossible without a theoretical base, the formation of which, in turn, is impossible without highly qualified specialists and the knowledge they generate. Today ballistics is relegated to the background. But without the effective application of this science, it is difficult to expect success in the field of design and development activities related to the creation of weapons and military equipment.
Artillery (then missile and artillery) weapons were the most important component of Russia's military power at all stages of its existence. Ballistics, one of the main military-technical disciplines, was aimed at solving theoretical problems arising in the development of missile and artillery weapons (RAV). Its development has always been in the area of special attention of military scientists.
Soviet school
The results of the Great Patriotic War, it would seem, irrefutably confirmed that Soviet artillery is the best in the world, far ahead of the development of scientists and designers of almost all other countries. But already in July 1946, on the personal instructions of Stalin, by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Academy of Artillery Sciences (AAS) was created as a center for the further development of artillery and especially new artillery technology, capable of providing a strictly scientific approach to solving all the already pressing and emerging issues.
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 50s, the inner circle convinced Nikita Khrushchev, who by that time was the head of the country, that artillery was a cave technique, which it was time to abandon in favor of rocket weapons. They closed a number of artillery design bureaus (for example, OKB-172, OKB-43, etc.) and repurposed others (Arsenal, Barricades, TsKB-34, etc.).
The greatest damage was inflicted on the Central Research Institute of Artillery Weapons (TsNII-58), located next to OKB-1 Korolev in Podlipki near Moscow. The TsNII-58 was headed by the chief designer of artillery Vasily Grabin. Of the 140 thousand field guns that participated in the battles of World War II, more than 120 thousand were made on the basis of his developments. The famous divisional gun Grabin ZIS-3 was evaluated by the highest world authorities as a masterpiece of design thought.
There were several scientific schools of ballistics in the country at that time: Moscow (based on TsNII-58, NII-3, VA named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky, MVTU named after N. E. Bauman), Leningrad (based on Mikhailovskaya Art Academy, KB Arsenal ", The A. N. Krylov Naval Academy of Shipbuilding and Weapons, partly" Voenmekh "), Tula, Tomsk, Izhevsk, Penza. Khrushchev's line of "rocketing" weapons inflicted irreparable damage to all of them, leading in fact to their complete collapse and elimination.
The collapse of the scientific schools of ballistics of barrel systems took place against the background of a deficit and interest in the early training of ballisticians in the rocket and space profile. As a result, many of the most famous and talented ballistic gunners quickly retrained and were in demand by the newly emerging industry.
Today the situation is fundamentally different. The lack of demand for high-level professionals is observed in the conditions of a significant shortage of these professionals with an extremely limited list of ballistic scientific schools existing in Russia. The fingers of one hand are enough to count the organizations that still have such schools, or at least their pitiful fragments. The number of doctoral dissertations defended in ballistics over the past ten years is counted in units.
What is ballistics
Despite the significant differences in modern sections of ballistics in terms of their content, in addition to the internal one, which was widespread at one time including the processes of studying the functioning and calculation of solid-propellant ballistic missile (BR) engines, most of them are united by the fact that the object of study is body movement in various environments, not limited by mechanical bonds.
Leaving aside the sections of internal and experimental ballistics that have independent significance, the list of issues that make up the modern content of this science allows us to single out two major areas in it, the first of which is usually called design ballistics, the second - ballistic support of firing (or otherwise - executive ballistics).
Design ballistics (ballistic design - PB) is the theoretical basis for the initial stage of designing projectiles, missiles, aircraft and spacecraft for various purposes. Ballistic support (BO) of firing is the basic section of the theory of firing and is, in fact, one of the most important elements of this related military science.
Thus, modern ballistics is an applied science that is interspecific in focus and interdisciplinary in its content, without the knowledge and effective application of which it is difficult to expect success in the field of design activities related to the creation of weapons and military equipment.
Creation of promising complexes
In recent years, more and more attention has been paid to the development of both guided and corrected projectiles (UAS and KAS) with semi-active laser seeker, and projectiles using autonomous homing systems. Among the defining problems of creating this type of ammunition, of course, first of all, are the problems of instrumentation, however, many issues of BO, in particular the choice of trajectories that guarantee a decrease in errors in inserting a projectile into the "selectable" miss zone when firing at maximum ranges, remain open.
Note, however, that the UAS and KAS with self-targeting combat elements (SPBE), no matter how perfect they are, are not able to solve all the tasks assigned to the artillery to defeat the enemy. Different fire missions can and should be solved with a different ratio of precision and unguided ammunition. As a consequence, for high-precision and reliable destruction of the entire possible range of targets, a single ammunition load should include conventional, cluster, special (additional target reconnaissance, lighting, electronic warfare, etc.) ballistic projectiles with multifunctional and remote explosive devices, as well as guided and corrected projectiles of various types. …
All this, of course, is impossible without solving the corresponding BO tasks, first of all, the development of algorithms for the automated input of the initial settings of firing and gun guidance, the simultaneous control of all projectiles in a salvo of an artillery battery, the creation of universal algorithmic and software for solving the problems of hitting targets, moreover, ballistic and software The support must meet the conditions of information compatibility with combat control and reconnaissance assets of any level. Another important condition is the requirement to implement the corresponding algorithms (including the evaluation of primary measurement information) in real time.
A fairly promising direction for creating a new generation of artillery systems, taking into account the limited financial capabilities, should be considered an increase in firing accuracy by adjusting the firing settings and the response time of the explosive device for unguided ammunition or trajectory correction using the executive bodies of the onboard projectile flight correction system for guided ammunition.
Priority issues
As you know, the development of the theory and practice of shooting, the improvement of means of warfare lead to the requirement of periodic revision and publication of new rules of fire (PS) and fire control (FO) of artillery. As evidenced by the practice of developing modern SS, the level of the existing BW firing is not a deterrent factor for improving SS, even taking into account the need to introduce sections in them concerning the features of shooting and fire control when performing firing missions with high-precision ammunition, reflecting the experience of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus and during conduct of hostilities in hot spots.
This can be confirmed by the development of BOs of various types of active protection systems (SAZ) in the range from the simplest SAZ of armored vehicles to the SAZ of silo launchers of the MRBM.
The development of modern types of high-precision weapons, such as tactical missiles, small-sized aircraft, sea and other missile systems, cannot be carried out without further development and improvement of algorithmic support for strapdown inertial navigation systems (SINS) integrated with a satellite navigation system.
The initial prerequisites for the possibility of practical implementation of the corresponding algorithms were brilliantly confirmed during the creation of the Iskander-M OTR, as well as in the process of experimental launches of the Tornado-S RS.
The widespread use of satellite navigation means does not exclude the need to use optoelectronic correlation-extreme navigation systems (KENS), and not only on OTR, but also on strategic cruise missiles and MRBM warheads of conventional (non-nuclear) equipment.
Significant disadvantages of KENS, associated with a significant complication of the preparation of flight tasks (FZ) for them in comparison with satellite navigation systems, are more than compensated for by their advantages such as autonomy and noise immunity.
Among the problematic issues, although only indirectly related to the BO methods associated with the use of KENS, is the need to create special information support in the form of images (orthomosaics) of the terrain (and corresponding data banks) that meet the climatic season when the rocket is used, as well as overcoming fundamental difficulties associated with the need to determine the absolute coordinates of protected and camouflaged targets with a marginal error not exceeding 10 meters.
Another problem, already directly related to ballistic problems, is the development of algorithmic support for the formation (calculation) of the missile defense and the issuance of coordinate target designation data for the entire range of missiles (including aeroballistic configuration) with the reporting of the calculation results to the interface objects. In this case, the key document for the preparation of PZ and standards is the seasonal matrix of planned images of the terrain of a given radius relative to the target, the difficulties of obtaining which have already been noted above. The preparation of PP for unplanned targets identified during the combat use of the RK can be carried out according to aerial reconnaissance data only if the database contains georeferenced space images of the target area corresponding to the season.
The provision of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) largely depends on the nature of their basing - on the ground or on board a carrier such as an aircraft or a sea (submarine).
While the BO of ground-based ICBMs can be generally considered acceptable, at least from the point of view of achieving the required accuracy of delivering the payload to the target, the problems of high-precision launches of submarine ballistic missiles (SLs) remain significant.
Among the ballistic problems requiring priority resolution, we point out the following:
incorrect use of the WGS model of the Earth's gravitational field (GPZ) for ballistic support of launches of submarine ballistic missiles during an underwater launch;
the need to determine the initial conditions for launching a rocket, taking into account the actual speed of the submarine at the time of launch;
the requirement to calculate the PZ only after receiving the command to launch the rocket;
taking into account the initial launch disturbances on the dynamics of the initial segment of the BR flight;
the problem of high-precision alignment of inertial guidance systems (ISS) on a moving base and the use of optimal filtering methods;
creation of effective algorithms for correcting the ISN on the active section of the trajectory by external reference points.
It can be considered that, in fact, only the last of the indicated problems received the necessary and sufficient solution.
The final of the discussed issues relates to the problems of developing a rational appearance of a promising group of space assets and synthesizing its structure for information support for the use of high-precision weapons.
The appearance and composition of a promising grouping of space weapons should be determined by the needs of information support for the branches and arms of the RF Armed Forces.
With regard to assessing the BO level of the tasks of the BP stage, we restrict ourselves to analyzing the problems of improving the BP of launch vehicles for spacecraft (SC), strategic planning and ballistic design of unmanned near space dual-purpose vehicles.
The theoretical foundations of the spacecraft's BP LV, laid back in the mid-50s, that is, almost 60 years ago, paradoxically, have not lost their significance today and continue to remain relevant in terms of the conceptual provisions laid down in them.
The explanation for this, generally speaking, amazing phenomenon can be seen in the following:
the fundamental nature of the theoretical development of BP methods at the initial stage of the development of domestic cosmonautics;
a stable list of target tasks solved by the spacecraft launch vehicle that have not undergone (from the standpoint of BP problems) cardinal changes over the past more than 50 years;
the presence of a significant backlog in the field of software and algorithmic support for the solution of boundary value problems that form the basis of the methods of BP LV spacecraft, and their universalization.
With the emergence of the tasks of operational launching of communication-type satellites or satellites of space monitoring systems of the Earth into low-altitude or geosynchronous orbits, the fleet of existing launch vehicles turned out to be insufficient.
The nomenclature of the known types of classical launch vehicles of the light and heavy classes was also unacceptable from an economic point of view. For this reason, in the last decades (practically from the beginning of the 90s), numerous projects of intermediate class LVs began to appear, suggesting the possibility of their air launch for injecting a payload into a given orbit (such as MAKS Svityaz, CS Burlak, etc.) …
With regard to this type of LV, the BP problems, although the number of studies devoted to their development, is already in the tens, continue to remain far from exhausted.
New approaches and trade-offs are needed
The use of ICBMs of a heavy class and UR-100N UTTKh deserves a separate discussion in the order of conversion.
As you know, the Dnepr LV was created on the basis of the R-36M missile. Equipped with an upper stage when launched from silos from the Baikonur cosmodrome or directly from the strategic missile launch area, it is capable of placing a payload with a mass of about four tons into low orbits. The Rokot launch vehicle, which is based on the UR-100N UTTH ICBM and the Breeze upper stage, ensures the launch of spacecraft weighing up to two tons into low orbits.
The payload mass of the Start and Start-1 LV (based on the Topol ICBM) during satellite launches from the Plesetsk cosmodrome is only 300 kilograms. Finally, a sea-based launch vehicle of the RSM-25, RSM-50 and RSM-54 types is able to launch an apparatus weighing no more than one hundred kilograms into low-earth orbit.
Obviously, this type of launch vehicle is not able to solve any significant problems of space exploration. Nevertheless, as auxiliary means of launching commercial satellites, micro- and minisatellites, they fill their niche. From the standpoint of assessing the contribution to the solution of BP problems, their creation was not of particular interest and was based on obvious and well-known developments at the level of the 60s – 70s of the last century.
Over the years of space exploration, periodically modernized BP techniques have undergone significant evolutionary changes associated with the emergence of various types of means and systems launched into near-earth orbits. The development of BPs for various types of satellite systems (SS) is especially relevant.
Almost already today, SSs play a decisive role in the formation of a single information space of the Russian Federation. These SSs primarily include telecommunication and communication systems, navigation systems, Earth remote sensing (ERS), specialized SSs for operational control, control, coordination, etc.
If we talk about ERS satellites, first of all, optical-electronic and radar surveillance satellites, then it should be stated that they have a significant design and operational lag behind foreign developments. Their creation was based on far from the most effective BP techniques.
As you know, the classical approach to the construction of SS for the formation of a single information space is associated with the need to develop a significant fleet of highly specialized spacecraft and SS.
At the same time, in the conditions of the rapid development of microelectronic and microtechnology technologies, it is possible and moreover - a transition to the creation of dual-purpose multiservice spacecraft is necessary. The operation of the corresponding spacecraft should be ensured in near-earth orbits, within the altitude range of 450 to 800 kilometers with an inclination of 48 to 99 degrees. Spacecraft of this type must be adapted to a wide range of launch vehicles: Dnepr, Kosmos-3M, Rokot, Soyuz-1, as well as to Soyuz-FG and Soyuz-2 launch vehicles at implementation of the SC double launch scheme.
In addition to all this, in the near future there will be a need for a significant tightening of the requirements for the accuracy of solving problems of coordinate-time support of motion control of existing and prospective spacecraft of the types under discussion.
In the presence of such contradictory and partially mutually exclusive requirements, it becomes necessary to revise the existing BP methods in favor of creating fundamentally new approaches that allow finding compromise solutions.
Another direction not sufficiently provided by the existing BP methods is the creation of multi-satellite constellations based on high-tech small (or even micro) satellites. Depending on the composition of the orbital constellation, such SSs are able to provide both regional and global services to territories, reduce the intervals between observations of a fixed surface area at given latitudes, and solve many other problems that are currently considered purely theoretical at best.
Where and what are ballisticians taught
It seems that the stated results, even if a very brief analysis, are quite sufficient to draw a conclusion: ballistics has by no means exhausted its capabilities, which continue to remain in great demand and extremely important from the point of view of the prospects for creating modern highly effective weapons of warfare.
As for the carriers of this science - ballistics specialists of all nomenclatures and ranks, their "population" in Russia today is dying out. The average age of Russian ballisticians of more or less noticeable qualifications (at the level of candidates, not to mention doctors of sciences) has long exceeded the retirement age. In Russia, there is not a single civilian university in which the department of ballistics would be preserved. Until the end, only the Department of Ballistics at the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, created back in 1941 by the general and full member of the Academy of Sciences V. E. Slukhotsky, held out. But it also ceased to exist in 2008 as a result of re-profiling to produce specialists in the field of space activities.
The only organization of higher professional education in Moscow that continues to train military ballisticians is the Peter the Great Academy of Strategic Missile Forces. But this is such a drop in the ocean that does not even cover the needs of the Ministry of Defense, and there is no need to talk about the "defense industry". Graduates of higher educational institutions of St. Petersburg, Penza and Saratov do not make the weather either.
It is impossible not to say at least a few words about the main state document regulating the training of ballistics in the country - the Federal State Educational Standard (FSES) of higher professional education in the direction of 161700 (for the qualification "Bachelor" approved by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation on December 22, 2009 No. 779, for the qualification " Master "- 2010-14-01 No. 32).
It spelled out any kind of competence - from participation in the commercialization of the results of research activities (this is for ballistics!) To the ability to prepare documentation for quality management of technical processes at production sites.
But in the FSES under discussion it is impossible to find such competencies as the ability to draw up firing tables and develop ballistic algorithms for calculating installations for firing artillery and missile launches, calculate corrections, the main elements of the trajectory and the experimental dependence of the ballistic coefficient on the angle of throw, and many others, from which ballistics began five centuries ago.
Finally, the authors of the standard completely forgot about the internal ballistics section. This branch of science has existed for several centuries. The creators of the FGOS on ballistics eliminated it with one stroke of the pen. A natural question arises: if, in their opinion, from now on, such "cave specialists" are no longer needed, and this is confirmed by a state-level document, who will consider the internal ballistics of barrel systems, who will create solid-propellant engines for operational-tactical and intercontinental ballistic missiles?
The saddest thing is that the results of the activities of such "craftsmen from education" will naturally not appear instantly. So far we are still eating up Soviet reserves and reserves, both of a scientific and technical nature and in the field of human resources. Perhaps it will be possible to hold out on these reserves for some time. But what are we going to do in ten years, when the corresponding personnel of the "defense industry" are guaranteed to disappear "as a class"? Who will be responsible for this and how?
With all the unconditional and undeniable importance of the personnel of the sections and workshops of production enterprises, the technological and design personnel of the research institutes and design bureaus of the defense industry, the revival of the defense industry should begin with the education and support of professional theorists who are able to generate ideas and predict the development of promising weapons in the long term. Otherwise, we will be destined for the role of catch-ups for a long time.