As the last war, in which fleets were used with high intensity, recedes further and further into the past, more and more frankly strange decisions are entering the practice of the navies of various countries.
One of these solutions is the strange idea that universal amphibious ships are capable of replacing normal aircraft carriers in one form or another. Alas, for the authors of this idea, even an inferior light aircraft carrier surpasses the UDC in the role of a carrier of strike aircraft as much as a normal aircraft carrier is superior to a light one. Let's figure it out in more detail.
Non-aircraft carriers
Let's start from the end right away. A multipurpose landing craft is not an aircraft carrier. This is a landing ship. Yes, it has a through flight deck, it has the ability to lift aircraft with short or vertical takeoff and vertical landing, but as an aircraft carrier, that is, a ship designed primarily for deploying aircraft and ensuring their combat use, it is flawed.
There are many reasons, let's look at the main ones.
The first is the speed factor. An aircraft carrier is an instrument in the struggle for supremacy at sea and in the air. Its aircraft, depending on the performance characteristics, are capable of shooting down enemy aircraft or attacking its ships. Having achieved freedom of action, an aircraft carrier can ensure the use of an air group against targets on the coast. The latter, by the way, is not as good for carrier-based aircraft as for base aircraft, but, firstly, there may not be a choice, and secondly, they will not fight against the coast for long - exactly until the landing force captures normal airfields, and even there it will be possible to pour in to the enemy in full …
But war is, as the Americans say, a two-way street. The enemy in a war always has the right to vote, and it is impossible to rule out the possibility that an aircraft carrier will be attacked. The specificity of the battles of carrier-based aircraft against the base is that it is impossible to raise the entire air group from the aircraft carrier at once, so we can only talk about the fact that a small group of aircraft from the decks will join the patrols in the air, then, after they have worked on the strike group and Withdrew from the battle, the turn of the missile ships will come, and only at the exit from the attack it will be possible to work with the new planes raised from the deck "after" the enemy - not to disrupt the attack, but to his losses in aircraft and materiel. You can get away from this predestination only by receiving information in advance that the enemy is raising his aircraft to strike right now. It is possible, but very difficult, and therefore rare.
So, in such operations, speed is of fundamental importance. In all the fleets of the world, aircraft carriers are either one of the fastest ships, or simply the fastest, and it's not just that. Preparing to repulse the blow described above, almost any American commander will try to "hide" an aircraft carrier - for example, using the well-known "windows" in the spans of enemy satellites to take the group under a cloudy front, and then "expose" a supply tanker, hung with corner reflectors a reflected signal similar to an aircraft carrier, both on satellites and on the radar of a reconnaissance aircraft allegedly "accidentally" missed to the warrant. The aircraft carrier itself, at maximum speed, leaves where the enemy will be looking for it with the least probability.
When the enemy breaks through, losing dozens of vehicles to the line of launching missiles at the main target, he may discover that it is a tanker, but it will be too late - the interceptor-decks arriving from nowhere and missiles from the escort ships will notably “chop” him.
Another similar situation is when the entire aircraft carrier group must be withdrawn from the attack, as a whole. For example, enemy air reconnaissance was able to obtain information about the location of the aircraft carrier group. At the same time, about 500 km to airfields from which the enemy can raise large air forces to strike. It is logical to assume that the enemy needs time to:
- passing information through command chains, headquarters of different levels, issuing an order to an air force to strike;
- preparation of the entire formation for a combat mission;
- ascent, collection in the air and flight to the target.
How long does it all take? In various cases, when the "designation of strikes" on American aircraft carrier groups were actually carried out, this could take up to a day. Although in some magical ideal world where everything works like a clock and everyone is ready for anything, one could try to keep within 5-6 hours. But even five hours at a speed of 29 knots (any normal aircraft carrier could and can go at such a speed with sufficiently serious excitement) means a withdrawal from the point where the ships were discovered at a distance of almost 270 kilometers, which is a lot, and even if the enemy is competent and conducts a full-fledged additional reconnaissance of the target, then the ships still have a chance to leave. And in the real world, where 5-6 hours is more of a fantasy, and even more so.
But speed is needed. And a lone aircraft carrier, performing an exit from under an airstrike on its own, leaving in place a compound of missile ships around which its interceptors will fight, and a ship group, whose commander wants to evade a raid with all ships, needs SPEED.
And here our UDC-instead of-aircraft carriers suddenly find themselves “so-so”. Let's take, for example, the most "fashionable" modern UDC - "Juan Carlos". The maximum travel speed is 21 knots. In a five-hour time span, it will be able to travel 74 kilometers less than a ship traveling at a speed of 29 knots, and 89 kilometers less than a ship traveling at a 30-knot speed. And on a 6-hour period of time, respectively, 83 and 100 km. For a day, the difference will be 356 and 400 km.
This is already a large enough order of numbers to be considered the difference between life and death. And this is an unsolvable problem. The American UDC "Wasp" and "America" have almost the same speed limits - about 22 knots.
UDC must carry the landing. And the landing party needs crew quarters, a supply of food and water, decks for military equipment, ammunition for at least two or three days of fighting, operating rooms for the seriously wounded evacuated by helicopters. In the stern, you need a docking camera, it should contain landing craft, air cushion boats or some other. All this requires volumes inside the hull and superstructure.
And the volumes require contours - they must be fuller than can be done for a fast warship. And this is additional hydrodynamic resistance and lower speed. Moreover, as a rule, in the UDC there is no place even for a sufficiently powerful main power plant, at least in the world there are no examples of UDC, which would have a power plant comparable to a power plant of the same size of an aircraft carrier, and which would have an excess of free volumes inside.
All this also affects aviation flights - you can estimate, for example, the size of the “island” on the Waspe and ask yourself the question: why is it so big?
But this is only the first problem generated by the need for volumes for the landing and everything connected with them. The second problem is that, due to the same volumes, it is impossible to accommodate a large air group on the UDC. This may surprise someone, but nevertheless it is.
Let's take such an extreme example as the UDC of the “America” type. With a displacement of over 43,000 tons, it is a large ship, the largest landing ship in the world. How many F-35B aircraft is its hangar designed for? For 7 cars. Surprise, huh?
When this ship was conceived, it was assumed that it would be able to carry 22 aircraft. Tests of the head showed that no, it cannot. That is, they fit on it - 7 in the hangar and 15 on the deck. But there is nowhere to place special forces evacuating downed pilots, their Osprey tiltroplanes (at least 4 units), search and rescue helicopters for lifting pilots who have ejected over the water (2 units). Does not work. There is also not enough space to rearrange the planes.
So, there is only one way out - to cut the composition of the air group, to reduce it. And according to the plan of the Marines reform (see article "Step into the unknown, or the future of American Marines") and will be done - by 2030, the typical F-35B squadron will be reduced to 10 vehicles.
At Waspe the picture is even worse, there, due to the presence of the landing deck for the equipment, all the other rooms and the hangar had to be compacted even less. And most importantly, there is less space for servicing and repairing units removed from aircraft, which sharply limits the number of days during which the air group can be used with high intensity.
For fun, let's compare the hangar of "America" and "the most terrible hangar in the world" in the words of some British - hangar "Invincible", which has twice the displacement.
As you can see, the absence of the need to allocate volumes for the landing makes it possible on a small, but aircraft carrier, to have comparable capabilities for storing aircraft as on a large, but UDC.
What does this lead to? And here's what.
Since September 2018, the 211st Fighter Squadron of the Marine Corps has been carrying out combat missions. and inflicted blows from the UDC "Essex" on the Taliban (banned in Russia) in Afghanistan, and on the terrorist group ISIS (banned in Russia) in Syria and Iraq. F-35B aircraft were used. The statistics of blows is of interest.
The aircraft flew more than 100 sorties, spent more than 1200 hours in the air, and all this within 50 days. That is, 2 sorties per day. Taking into account the indicated hours - two on average six-hour departures.
For comparison: during the disastrous campaign "Kuznetsov" to the Syrian shores, he performed 7, 7 combat sorties per day from the deck. And this was seen in Russia as a failure and a political catastrophe.
Or another example: the French "Charles de Gaulle", with a displacement even slightly less than the "America", calmly made stable 12 sorties a day during the war in Libya. And his air group has a much larger number than any UDC, includes as many as two AWACS aircraft. And for him 12 sorties is far from the limit.
The Americans should not be considered stupid - they created their UDC in the first, second, third and whatever stage as landing ships. And as such, they were almost always used. And I must admit - these are really good landing ships. And even the six AV-8B or F-35B, which usually serves to support amphibious operations, are quite appropriate there. Let's call a spade a spade: this is the personal strike aircraft of the commander of a battalion group going to the landing.
Any battalion commander may well assess the situation when he has six attached attack aircraft. The Americans, taking into account their states and command chains, have something like this situation. And they are only trying to use their landing ships as ersatz aircraft carriers, and only for experimental purposes, and only in simple conditions. And, since they have them, why not try?
But for serious tasks they have Nimitzs, with a 29-knot speed, an air group larger than our air group in Syria, with a six-meter thick anti-torpedo protection on each side, with 3000 tons of maximum mass of aircraft weapons on board. And it is they who will solve these serious problems.
For the Americans, the UDC will be included in the game either when supremacy at sea and in the air has already been conquered, or when it is not yet contested. America can afford it, it has enough ships and money. But the countries that foolishly imitate it, betting on the use of UDC with short take-off and vertical landing aircraft instead of aircraft carriers, are doing a stupidity that will prove fatal in the course of a real war.
An amphibious operation, if it is not the extremely dangerous and high-speed attacks of the "littoral regiments of the marines" planned by the Americans (which it is not yet known how will end), requires the achievement of supremacy at sea and in the air. History knows of successful examples of operations that were carried out without such - for example, the capture of Narvik by the Germans. But these operations went through, as they say, on the verge, it would have been a little unlucky, and instead of victory there would have been a resounding defeat. Basically, both in our country and in the West, military science requires the establishment of supremacy at sea and in the air before carrying out an amphibious operation.
And then to land the troops.
Countries that plan to use UDC instead of an aircraft carrier, in fact, plan to use a tool to establish supremacy at sea and in the air, which should be used AFTER supremacy at sea and in the air has been achieved. Naturally, this will not end well in a real war.
Using the UDC as an aircraft carrier is heresy. Unfortunately, there are plenty of her supporters among the "near-war" journalists. And they create a dense information background, pushing this bad idea into the minds of the population, and with it into the minds of politicians, and some of the military too.
But stupidity, repeated as many times as you like, is still just stupidity.
However, the use of an amphibious assault ship as an aircraft carrier is not the only strange idea that is slowly becoming a kind of commonplace in world naval affairs (for the time being). The last decades have given another no less surprising idea - the construction of relatively large aircraft carriers, but with an inferior air group, consisting of "vertical" and helicopters.
And she, too, is worth a detailed analysis.
Big, expensive and useless
Today in the world there is one "clean" example of this type of ship - the aircraft carriers CVF of the "Queen Elizabeth" type of the Royal Navy of Great Britain. The ships turned out to be strange: on the one hand, a modern design, advanced self-defense systems, a convenient hangar, more or less decent basic dimensions (waterline dimensions), which make the ship quite versatile … and cut down on the capabilities of the air group.
Let's compare "Queen Elizabeth" with a couple of its closest weight and size counterparts. There are two of them in the world today.
The first is a long-decommissioned old "Midway". And the second is, surprisingly enough, our "Kuznetsov" and his Soviet-Chinese "brother" "Varyag-Liaoning", or already a completely Chinese representative of this family - "Shandong".
Don't be surprised. The ships have a very similar length, almost the same hangar, except for the Midway, they are all springboard. The British ship, with almost the same length and basic dimensions, has much wider sponsons carrying a deck and a two-tower "island". The deck is also made very wide, for the sake of a convenient location of aircraft on it.
I had to pay for everything already at this stage. Due to the need to carry a wide deck, the ship was given a significantly greater width along the waterline (39 meters versus 34, 44 at Midway and 33, 41 at Kuznetsov). This slightly increased the hydrodynamic resistance. Well, then the British saved on the power plant, and now the maximum speed that this ship can develop is 25 knots. No longer a UDC, but in a real war with an adversary of at least Algerian level, such high-speed qualities may have a rather big price.
Nevertheless, we are interested in the principle itself: did the British do the right thing when they built a carrier of "vertical units" in such a building?
It should be remembered right away that this ship's architecture was not a foregone conclusion, the CVF option with an angular flight deck, catapults and finishers was fully discussed.
What could it be and what would be the strength of this ship?
Let's take Kuznetsov first for an analogy. If the British did like us, that is, a springboard aircraft carrier with a finisher, then like us, they would have the same aircraft capacity (hangars are about the same), and just like us, they could not use AWACS aircraft and would have to use helicopters.
Further differences begin. The third launching position at Kuznetsov makes it possible to launch aircraft with a thrust-to-weight ratio of 0, 84 and even lower, according to some sources, to 0, 76 (thrust-to-weight ratio of the Su-33 at the maximum take-off weight). The latter value is very close to the thrust-to-weight ratio of the F-35C, an aircraft for horizontal take-off from the deck, with a normal take-off weight, that is, at least with full fuel and occupied internal weapon attachments, without underload.
And without a catapult.
And this, among other things, more than 25% more fuel capacity compared to the F-35B with better weight efficiency (no fan). And, as was quite expected, almost 300 kilometers greater combat radius. Here it is, the cost of saving. How many advantages it will pull in shock tasks, for example, you can simply not say.
The F-35B has 14 inches (36 centimeters) shorter internal weapon bays and substantially narrower. This will limit the possibilities for the development of offensive strike weapons, in the future it will be easier to create a missile or bomb for the F-35C, and at times.
In fact, for a more or less serious combat mission, the F-35B will have to be loaded with weapons on an external sling, and this is goodbye, stealth.
But that's not all.
War always means losses, and, besides this, there are periods in the life of a country when it is necessary to maintain combat effectiveness, but there is not enough money.
If the British happened to find themselves in a similar situation (and they have been in it more than once), and an aircraft carrier with aerofinishers would allow them to cover losses or build up forces at the expense of the F / A-18. You have to understand: the F-35 in any version is a very expensive aircraft with a very long and difficult inter-flight service. Even the United States does not plan to abandon the proven Hornets completely, the F-35C will replace only part of the carrier-based aircraft.
And the Hornet is quite capable of taking off from the springboard, the Americans did all the necessary calculations to assess the possibility of taking off from the Vikramaditya, and there is no reason to believe that the Hornet will fail.
But he cannot sit back without a finisher.
And Britain also amputated this opportunity for itself along with the finishers. And it is very possible that she will pay for it, such luck as Falkland may not have.
But all this pales against the background of what the capabilities of Queen Elizabeth would have been if the British had built it in the version that they, in general, considered - in the version of a catapult aircraft carrier.
The main striking force of the aircraft carrier is 36 F-35B aircraft. In fact, the ship, taking into account the possibility of storing the aircraft on the deck, can lift up to 72 aircraft, of which, however, most will be helicopters.
Let's look at Midway. During the Vietnam War, this ship carried up to 65 aircraft, and during Desert Storm it proved to be the champion in the number of sorties among all other aircraft carriers, beating even the nuclear-powered Nimitz.
Could a British aircraft carrier do this? No. The F-35 has a huge duration of inter-flight service - up to 50 man-hours for each hour of flight. And if for an aircraft with horizontal take-off and landing, well-trained technicians sometimes could reduce this figure to 41 man-hours, then with a "vertical" such a number does not work. For understanding: a two-hour flight with such a laboriousness will require one hundred man-hours, which when using an "average" size of personnel, for example, 4 people, means 25 hours for service. And the British cannot supplement these super-complicated machines with some simple "workhorse" like the Hornet.
What if there were catapults? First, the ship would be able to base AWACS aircraft, which raise the power of its air group by orders of magnitude even in comparison with AWACS helicopters. Secondly, it would be possible to use transport aircraft, as the Americans do. And do not think that this is something secondary, sometimes "delivery on board" can be critically important.
Which air group is stronger - for example, 24 F-35C and 3-4 E-2C Hawkeye or 36 F-35B with AWACS helicopters? This question does not require an answer from the word "in general".
But the answer to another question is very interesting: what can British aircraft carriers and their air groups be able to do without American support? Repeat Falklands? Yes, they can, but today it is not "Daggers" with old bombs that are the most popular combat aircraft in the third world.
Well, and secondly, the use of simpler aircraft, and massive air group strike missions, and high-intensity flights would be available to British naval pilots.
But the British decided otherwise.
How much did the British manage to save on this strange decision? Approximately 1.5 billion pounds for each ship, despite the fact that they spent 6, 2 billion on each. Well, if they just decided to do with a combination of a springboard and finishers, then, apparently, the rise in the cost of ships would be less than a billion for each. After saving that money, they turned the aircraft carrier into a defective toy.
This is not the only example.
Japanese and Hindus
As you know, Japan is slowly but surely leading a creeping remilitarization. Today this process can no longer be hidden, although it is still possible to find individuals who are unable to use the eyes for their intended purpose. One of the directions of such modernization are the plans of the Japanese to convert one of their Izumo-class helicopter carriers into a light aircraft carrier, the carrier of the F-35B aircraft. It must be said that, although the dimensions of the Izumo are not particularly impressive, as a carrier of "vertical" it is much better than any UDC, and incomparably better than the same "Invincibles". Its dimensions almost catch up with the UDC of the Wasp type, the pitching parameters are about the same, the speed, as it should be for a battleship, is 30 knots. According to some estimates, the ship will be able to carry up to 20 F-35Bs, although not all will fit into the hangar.
Here, however, an important caveat must be made. The Japanese, as the former rivals of the Americans in the Pacific War, are well aware of the importance of an aircraft carrier. The modern concept of the AUG as a small compound with a "core" in the form of an aircraft carrier and fast cruisers and destroyers was first proposed by Minoru Genda even before World War II. They do not need to explain either the value of normal aircraft, or everything necessary for their flights - catapults and finishers. They themselves can explain to anyone.
But at the time of the beginning of work on the ships, Japan had a lot of political restrictions on military development. In general, they still exist now. As a result, they not only made a compromise ship, but also got it in an extremely compromise way - by building it as a helicopter carrier.
However, a bad example is contagious. Does it make sense for other countries not burdened by Japanese historical and political "baggage" to repeat "Izumo"?
Surprisingly, we have a wonderful comparison that closes this question.
India is currently completing construction of its first self-built aircraft carrier, the Vikrant. This in itself is extremely instructive: if India could, then Russia could also, there would be a desire.
We are now, however, interested in something else.
“Vikrant” is interesting in that its “content” is somewhat similar to “Izumo”. For example, these ships use the same turbines in the main power plant - a classic of the Western fleets General Electric LM2500. The power plants themselves for both projects are twin-shaft.
If we abstract from non-production factors, then, in fact, Izumo and Vikrant are how two countries solved the same problem (building an aircraft carrier ship) using the same resources (world market of components and subsystems) and similar technical solutions.
And if you compare them, then the results turned out, frankly, not the same.
Both sides used almost the same power plant (the difference is probably in the gearboxes). Both sides had to buy all the necessary electronic equipment, including everything needed to control the flights of a large air group. Both sides bought aircraft lifts. Both sides bought minimal air defense equipment.
Both sides spent comparable money on ship hulls. The built ships are not very different in basic dimensions.
What's the output?
One side has at least 26 combat aircraft with horizontal takeoff and landing on board. Now it is the MiG-29K, but India, on whose market all weapons manufacturers in the world, except for Chinese, are sharpening their teeth, and which has more or less equal relations with most countries in the world, can choose. The F / A-18 is already guaranteed to be able to take off from the Vikrant. Most likely, the F-35C will be able to with an incomplete combat load. It is not a fact that it will work out, but it cannot be ruled out that the Rafale will also be able to break away from the deck using a springboard
Should Russia develop a new version of the MiG-29K, for example, with a more advanced radar and a reduced landing speed for a comfortable and “soft” landing on the air arrestor, it will also be “registered” there without any problems. As well as the hypothetical non-existent shipborne Su-57K. And if a Su-33 is handed over to India to make up for losses as a friendly aid, then they will be able to fly from this ship.
And what about the other side? And there is only F-35B. Moreover, due to the smaller body, in smaller quantities.
The same story as with the British: they built a ship for almost the same money that a relatively normal aircraft carrier would cost, and only one type of aircraft with limited (at least against the background of the F-35C) capabilities can be based.
All that was needed was to slightly enlarge the hull and design the aerofinishers and a wide deck. And also - to slightly increase the length of the ship, gaining an advantage in seaworthiness. The Indians did just that, losing, however, 2 knots of speed. This, of course, is bad, but on the other hand, it is apparently still possible to provide a higher speed for a Vikranta-class ship due to the contours.
And what if Vikrant received a catapult with work from a waste heat boiler? Then the Hawkeye could well appear on board one day, albeit at the cost of reducing the number of combat vehicles. But sometimes it is worth it, especially if the air group on board is formed "for the task" and its composition is not a dogma.
We repeat: the Japanese understand everything perfectly, but there are political factors.
Let us briefly mention the last example - the Italian "Cavour". By and large, about it you can say about the same thing as about the Japanese "Izumo": with this money and with these components it was possible to get a much more interesting ship. But the Italians have the opportunity to carry tanks and some infantry on it. It is true that tanks cannot be landed by landing, but part of the infantry can be. Why does an aircraft carrier need this? But that's how they have it all.
Now the ship will receive its 15 F-35Bs (10 in the hangar) and will continue to serve with them. Not bad for 35,000 gross tonnes.
In all of this, it is important for us that no one in our country would think to take Juan Carlos, Izumo or Cavour as a model. With our finances and technological limitations, we need to take a completely different path.
