Frigate of project 22350 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov"
So, one of the key problems in the construction of the domestic surface fleet was concept errors: in order to save money, it was planned to build ships of the wrong classes that could effectively solve the tasks assigned to the fleet. In this article we will try to figure out what is wrong with the frigates of the "Admiral Gorshkov" class.
By the time of planning the GPV 2011-2020. The Russian Federation had neither the financial nor the industrial resources to build a balanced ocean-going fleet, but, nevertheless, a presence in the ocean had to be ensured. This function was and is being performed by the few remaining ships of the 1st and 2nd ranks, built for the most part during the years of the USSR. But there are too few of them left for the tasks that the country's leadership has set for the Russian Navy today: even the presence of a small detachment of ships in the Mediterranean on an ongoing basis has become an almost unbearable load for the existing ship composition. The construction of 15-20 frigates capable of operating in the ocean could largely solve this problem, but here it was necessary to choose:
1. Or we are building ships that can indicate our presence in the ocean, but are not able to fight in remote sea areas with a serious enemy.
2. Or we are building ships that can not only demonstrate the flag, but also conduct successful military operations in the ocean, at least against minor maritime powers, as well as "look after" the AUG of our overseas "friends" - and destroy them with the beginning of a large-scale conflict …
Interestingly, the first path is not at all as bad as it might seem at first glance. As mentioned earlier, the main task of our Navy in the event of a full-scale Armageddon is to ensure the security of SSBN patrol areas, which can be achieved by “clearing” enemy multipurpose nuclear submarines in our near sea zone. And for such a "cleanup" we need stationary systems for monitoring the underwater situation, good land-based anti-submarine aircraft, our own multipurpose nuclear submarines, non-nuclear submarines with VNEU and, of course, relatively small surface anti-submarine ships with the obligatory basing of helicopters on them. Such a "seine" is capable of detecting the deployment of enemy nuclear submarines even before the start of the conflict, which will ensure their destruction even before the latter can begin to carry out their tasks.
At the same time, the requirements for surface ships of the "seine" are relatively low: it must have a high-quality hydroacoustic complex (SAC) and anti-submarine weapons capable of hitting submarines at the SAC detection range. Such a ship does not need some kind of super-powerful air defense - it still cannot fight off a full-scale raid, so we are talking only about the SAM (or even the SAM) of self-defense. Strike weapons, if at all necessary to put them, may well be limited to a certain number of light anti-ship missiles "Uran". With these requirements, it is quite possible to keep within the standard displacement of the order of 2, 5-2, 7 thousand tons.
Such a ship will be small, but this does not mean at all that it will be suitable exclusively for operations in the near sea zone. Let's turn to the experience of the USSR - Project 1135 patrol ships, the famous "Petrel", having a standard displacement of 2 835 tons, sailed across all the oceans of the planet. Solve the assigned tasks in the Central or South Atlantic, while visiting Guinea? Please … Combat services in the 5 OPESK (Mediterranean Squadron of the USSR Navy) were not at all considered something out of the ordinary for them. And yes, these TFRs knew how to stand up for the honor of their country!
SKR "Selfless" makes a bulk on the American cruiser URO "Yorktown", displacing it from the Soviet terrorist forces
Their modern, improved counterparts could well support the ocean watch of our missile cruisers and BODs, and in the future, with the advent of full-fledged ships of the far ocean zone, "go into the shadows", focusing on "coastal" tasks. Or not to leave … In general, the author does not undertake to assert that the surface fleet of the Russian Navy should have developed in this way, and only in this way, but as an option, and a budget option, such a path was quite reasonable.
But if our leadership decided to take the second path, if the ships GPV-2011-2020. we were preparing to fight in the ocean in earnest, without waiting for the implementation of subsequent shipbuilding programs, then … In this case, the fleet needs universal missile and artillery ships equipped with powerful and numerous strike and defensive weapons. Indeed, in the ocean they could only be accompanied by a few of our atomarines, but one could only dream of an air cover. Accordingly, the promising ocean "fighter" GPV 2011-2020. required:
1. Sufficient ammunition load of long-range anti-ship missiles to "break through" the missile defense of a strong enemy ship warrant.
2. Powerful and layered anti-aircraft and anti-missile protection (by ABM, the author means a system of protection against anti-ship, not ballistic missiles), which would give him a chance to live long enough to strike.
3. Powerful SAC for detecting submarines trying to attack our ship, as well as long-range anti-submarine weapons capable of destroying an attacking submarine immediately after detection.
4. A pair of helicopters for PLO and aerial reconnaissance missions.
5. Sufficiently large dimensions to ensure that everything listed in paragraphs. 1-4 of this list could "work" in conditions of ocean winds and rolling.
In other words, according to the second option, the fleet required full-fledged destroyers, but not frigates.
What could our developers offer the fleet here? As you know, the concept of specialized pairs was in effect in the USSR for some time: it was assumed that the Moskit anti-ship missile system and the Uragan air defense missile system of the Project 956 destroyer, together with the powerful means of detecting and destroying submarines, which the Project 1155 Udaloy BOD possessed, would have a greater combat efficiency than the armament of the two Spruence-class station wagon destroyers. But nevertheless, subsequently an attempt was made to move away from the "division of labor" to a single universal ship, which they tried to create on the basis of the Udaloy BOD. The new project 1155.1 appeared shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, of the four ordered and two laid down ships of this project, only the "Admiral Chabanenko" was completed. This project was considered more successful than the original 1155, and the only complaint against "Chabanenko" was the lack of a long-range air defense system capable of threatening aircraft carriers of cruise missiles and other guided weapons. It is all the more surprising that the original version of the destroyer of Project 21956, which actually became the development of the "Admiral Chabanenko", provided for the same SAM "Dagger" as the main air defense complex.
Although … the next version of the destroyer 21956 with the Rif-M air defense system (in fact, the Fort-M, that is, the most modern air defense system of the S-300 family in the fleet, installed only on the Peter the Great) does not look optimal: they managed to to place only one radar for tracking and illumination of the target, and even that is located directly in front of the mast, which provides it with the widest "dead angle" in the stern of the ship. It seems that the cruisers of the project 1164 "Atlant" radar, performing similar tasks, is located much more rationally. But in the "dagger" version, the ship has two missile guidance radar - one in the bow and one in the stern, which is why it has 360-degree protection and can repel attacks from opposite directions … so, despite the obvious advantages in the range of the "Rif" M”, it is still not clear which of the presented variants of the destroyer is better protected.
In general, the destroyer of Project 21956 has taken a certain intermediate position between the BOD of Project 1155.1 and the missile cruiser of Project 1164. It is interesting that our ship roughly corresponds in size to the American destroyer Arleigh Burke, as for the combat characteristics, it is somewhat more complicated. On the one hand, our destroyer has less ammunition - 72 missiles (8 torpedo tubes for missile-torpedoes of the Caliber-PLE complex, 16 Caliber launchers and 48 SAM silos) versus 94 Arleigh Burk universal launchers (plus 8 anti-ship missiles Harpoon "on old modifications), but the" American "has nothing like the anti-ship missiles and PLUR" Caliber ". From the point of view of anti-ship capabilities, "Arlie Burke" loses in all respects, and the point is not only in the quality of missiles, but also in a very interesting radar station called "Mineral-ME", the analogue of which (according to the author's data) today day the Americans do not. This station is an over-the-horizon target designation system, consisting of:
1. Active radar station "Mineral-ME1", capable of detecting and tracking a target the size of a destroyer at a distance of 250 km under certain circumstances (over-refraction conditions).
2. Passive radar station "Mineral-ME2", capable of determining the position of emitting radar systems (depending on the range) at a distance of 80 to 450 km.
Thus, under certain conditions, a Russian ship can independently detect and develop target designation for an over-the-horizon target, and the significance of this fact can hardly be overestimated - before that, only AWACS aircraft and helicopters could do this, and even (with a known delay in data transmission) some reconnaissance satellites (like the famous "Legend"). However, the capabilities of Mineral-ME are far from absolute, and the availability of such equipment cannot completely replace external target designation.
As for air defense / missile defense, the combination of the Rif-M air defense system, capable of simultaneously firing at 8 air targets with 16 missiles, with the new Fregat-MAE-4K radar, which, according to some reports, is a replacement for the Podkat radar, and excellent sees any low-flying targets, most likely, provide the Russian destroyer with significantly better air defense capabilities than its American counterpart AN / SPY-1 of any modification can give. Although, of course, one single radar for tracking and target illumination, our ship does not paint and does not allow to reflect attacks from different directions. On the other hand, our destroyer has the ZRAK Kortik, while the Americans have not put Vulcan-Phalanxes on their Berks for a long time, and this Vulcan is no match for our ZRAK. The Arleigh Burke has two three-pipe 324-mm torpedo tubes, which are not provided on our ship, but these are dubious weapons against submarines, and the author does not know whether the American 324-mm torpedoes can be used as an anti-torpedo weapon. Both our and American destroyers can carry 2 helicopters.
At the same time, the destroyer of project 21956 has two significant advantages for domestic shipbuilding - it was designed for a gas-gas turbine installation, which we did well, and, although not all of its weapons were the most modern ("Rif-M"), but on the other hand - mastered by the industry … Thus, technological risks during its creation were minimized. In general, approximately such a ship was needed by our ocean fleet.
For the first time, the model of the destroyer of project 21956 appeared on IMMS-2005 (then with the Kinzhal air defense missile system), and in 2007 - with the Rif-M air defense missile system.
We can say that projects 21956 and 22350 are practically the same age, and it is possible that the project of the frigate appeared even earlier, since the preliminary design of 22350 was developed by specialists of the Northern PKB back in 2003.
And here's what is interesting: with a very similar nomenclature of the main armament (16 "calibers" and 48 missiles for the destroyer versus 16 calibers and 32 missiles for the frigate), the total displacement of the frigate is halved! It is clear that one and the same developer at the same time could not create a ship that was twice as small and equivalent to a destroyer. What did you have to sacrifice to achieve such a result?
The first is the power plant. To reduce fuel consumption, it was decided to use not too powerful diesel engines for economic propulsion, which caused the speed of the latter to drop to 14 knots, but the fuel reserves had to be cut as well - at 14 knots the frigate can only cover 4,000 miles, i.e. almost one and a half times smaller than the destroyer. Has this become a problem?
As mentioned earlier, one of the tasks of the Russian Navy is to monitor aircraft carrier and other shipborne strike groups of a potential enemy. In the ocean behind the same "Nimitz", a ship with a non-nuclear power plant cannot keep up, but the AUG will go with the speed of the escort ships, ie. all the same "Arleigh Burke". It is interesting that the Americans on their destroyers ("Arlie Burke", "Zamvolt") use exclusively gas turbines without any diesel engines, and the same "Arlie Burke" has 4 units of the same power. This gives it a very high economic speed - 18-20 knots, while at a speed of 18 knots the destroyer is able to cover 6,000 miles. Our project 21956 would actually become his equal in these indicators, but the frigate would not. An attempt to keep up with the destroyer at 18 nodes will lead to the need to turn on afterburner turbines, which will quickly "eat up" the already small supply of fuel, and if the frigate pursues the AUG at its economic 14 nodes, it will be more than 175 kilometers behind in a day of such "pursuit" … So, the tactical capabilities of our ship are significantly reduced, while the total power of the power plant of the project 22350 frigate (65,400 hp) is comparable to that of the destroyer of project 21956 (74,000 hp), the device is more complicated, the reliability is lower, and the cost (due to its complexity) will be quite comparable to the destroyer 21956.
A good price to pay for "miniaturizing" a ship?
Next is the weaponry. To our great happiness, work on the Onyx / Yakhont, which was created largely with Indian money, and the magnificent Kalibr missile system (which the author today considers the pinnacle of world naval tactical rocketry) was completed successfully, and moreover - by the beginning of planning for GPV 2011-2020. it was clear that both complexes had taken place. Therefore, UKSK 3S14, capable of using the above types of missiles, has no alternative for our ships. Frigate 22350 received two UKSK for 8 silos each, and only 16 missiles, as much as the destroyer. But the destroyer was supposed to place another 8 torpedo tubes - rocket-torpedoes and torpedoes in them were capable of protecting the destroyer from submarines. Unfortunately, they could not find space for 533-mm torpedo tubes on Project 22350 frigates, therefore, if a destroyer could “fill” all of its 16 silos with anti-ship missiles, a frigate … can also do this, but then it will remain almost defenseless against submarines. So you will still have to put rocket-torpedoes in the UKSK and thus reduce the ammunition of the anti-ship missiles.
But with the anti-aircraft missile system, everything is completely wrong, and here you should again make a small retreat.
In the USSR, an extremely successful S-300 air defense system was created, which went into series in the distant 1975. Subsequently, the complex was constantly improved, which allowed it to remain a formidable weapon to this day, however, despite all the modernizations, the principle of its guidance system remained the same - semi-active homing. That is, in addition to a surveillance radar capable of detecting a target, a radar station for "illumination" of targets was also needed, and the missile seeker was guided, guided by the reflected beam. This approach had its advantages and disadvantages, and at the very beginning of the 90s, an attempt was made to switch to an active guidance scheme. For this, the 9M96E and 9M96E2 missiles were developed, which had an active seeker, a moderate flight range (40 and 120 km, respectively) and differed from the S-300 family of missiles in light weight. If the 48N6E 1992 release had a maximum range of 150 km, a warhead mass of 145 kg and a rocket weight of up to 1,900 kg, then the 9M96E2, not too inferior in range, had a weight of only 420 kg (although the warhead weight was reduced to 24 kg) - it may have been assumed that the active seeker would provide better accuracy, so that a particularly powerful explosive charge would not be needed.
The idea was in all respects successful and promising, so it was decided to create both sea and land anti-aircraft missile systems. The first was named "Redut", the second - the S-350 "Vityaz", but today we are only interested in the maritime air defense system.
On frigates of project 22350 "Redoubt" was supposed to work in tandem with the newest radar "Polyment", with four AFAR-lattices - outwardly they resembled the American AN / SPY-1 "Spy", which is part of the American "Aegis" system. At the same time, the domestic "Polyment" was supposed to combine the functions of control of the surface and air situation and control of the "Redut" missile defense system, i.e. specialized stations for illumination of targets for the air defense system were not required. All this - the low weight, the absence of "extra" fire control radars, the ability to build echeloned defense (to 9M96E and 9M96E2 were added 9M100 with infrared seeker, and in one shaft of the same 9M96E2 4 pieces of 9M100 were placed) made the Polyment-Redut system an excellent choice for a ship of medium displacement. It could well be placed on the destroyer of Project 21956, and such a solution, according to the author, would be much more effective than the Rif-M air defense missile system (which is still more appropriate for a cruiser). Naturally, the developers of the Project 22350 frigate equipped their brainchild with the Polyment-Redut - no reasonable alternative to this complex simply existed. And everything would be fine if …
… if this complex took place. But as of today, neither the Redut air defense system nor the Poliment radar are capable of performing the tasks assigned to them. And, in all honesty, we note that it is completely unknown when this situation will be corrected, and whether it will be corrected at all.
"As a high-ranking source in the Military-Industrial Commission explained to Gazeta. Ru, the Almaz-Antey concern, which includes the Fakel plant, disrupted the state defense order last year" due to its catastrophic lag on the Polyment-Redut topic., mainly associated with the failure to achieve the technical characteristics of anti-aircraft guided missiles 9M96, 9M96D, 9M100 ".
"We have all the topics tumbled down. The air defense system should be installed on corvettes and frigates, and due to its untimely delivery to the right, the delivery dates for the ships, in particular, the Admiral Gorshkov, because of this system, cannot be commissioned for several years already, although it is on the move, but there is no missile, and the ship of the Ministry of Defense cannot receive it, "the source told Gazeta. Ru.
According to him, this issue was raised several times at the presidential meetings in Sochi, and this year the last warning was given. The catch-up schedules have been formed, and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who is in charge of the defense industry, is responsible for them.
"The last tests took place literally in June, again they found a mistake, again it was not confirmed, again unsuccessful launches. The Ministry of Defense suspended the tests, including because they shot all the targets and ammunition intended for testing. There is no sense, it is planned to create an interdepartmental commission and figure it out. because these experiments are going nowhere."
These are quotes from an article on "VPK News" dated July 19, 2016. And here is another piece of news, already on "VO", dated August 12, 2016:
The board of directors of NPO Almaz (part of the VKO Almaz-Antey concern) on Tuesday dismissed the head of the company, Vitaly Neskorodov, for "systematic failure to fulfill the instructions of the general director of the concern (Almaz-Antey), omission in work and loss of trust" …
What's wrong with all this? Well, in addition to the obvious fact that today our newest frigates do not have air defense at all, except for two ZRAK "Broadsword", and it is not at all clear when the "light at the end of the tunnel"?
First of all, the fact that the situation with "Polyment-Redut" at the beginning of the GPV 2011-2020. was more than predictable. Work on this topic began in the early 90s, and it is clear that in those wild times, funding was hardly sufficient, but in the early 2000s the situation probably changed. However, in 2009-2010. the complex remained unfinished. Of course, the creation of an air defense system is a long and difficult business, but at that time work on this topic had been going on for more than 15 years! PAK FA, on which work began in 2002 (and funding was received in 2005), made its first flight in 2010, and the 6th generation fighter, whatever one may say, is "a little" more complicated than missiles!
The author would not dramatize the situation if it were not for the key air defense system both for the fleet (where the Redoubt was supposed to provide air defense for both frigates and corvettes), but also for the ground forces, where the S-350 Vityaz should was to replace the S-300PS and Buk-M1-2. The creation of a weapon of this degree of importance had to be closely monitored by the customer, the work had to be divided into stages, and their execution had to be strictly controlled, as well as the reasons for failures and time shifts to the right had to be identified. With personal organizational conclusions. Yes, the author remembers, “we are not 37 years old”, but all the possibilities are there for long before the start of the formation of the GPV program for 2011-2020. to figure out how bad our affairs on the subject of "Polyment-Redut" were.
Someone might say: it's easy to talk about it in hindsight. But for many years, testimonies of people "familiarized with the matter" have been leaking into the network, who with hints (for disclosing military secrets do not stroke the head, though not for 37 years) made it clear how deplorable and dangerous the situation on the topic "Polyment-Redoubt" … In short, as Iosif Vissarionovich said, “cadres decide everything”. And if these shots massively scatter for free bread … And if doubts (as it turned out, more than justified) appeared even among people as far from the sea as the author of the article, then by all 200% it can be assumed that interested persons with the appropriate clearance could understand the situation many years ago.
The result - the lack of an adequate level of control on the part of the state representatives, on the one hand, and the reluctance of responsible persons on the part of the developers to honestly report on the actual state of affairs, led to the fact that the domestic surface ships of the GPV 2011-2020. were deprived of air defense.
The creation of promising air defense systems in the Russian Federation, of course, was not limited to work on the Polyment-Redut and Vityaz S-350. The S-400 are put into operation, the S-500 is "visible" behind it … the high combat effectiveness of these air defense systems is beyond doubt. And the desire of the sailors to see the same S-400 on the ships of the ocean-going fleet is understandable. The Long Arm, a 40N6E anti-aircraft missile capable of hitting 400 km, is extremely interesting for our fleet. The tactics of using modern carrier-based aircraft assumes the presence of 1-2 AWACS aircraft, which, being located 250-300 km from the enemy order, perfectly “see” everything from an unattainable distance, and can perform the functions of “conductors”, i.e. control of the rest of the groups (air defense, demonstration, air defense suppression groups, strike groups). In this case, carrier-based aircraft are able, for example, to attack without leaving the radio horizon, i.e. without going into the air defense zone of the ship's order at all. Excellent tactics, but the presence of long-range anti-aircraft missiles capable of threatening the "flying headquarters", i.e. AWACS aircraft, can make the most serious adjustments to it.
S-300FM launchers aboard the Chinese destroyer Type 051C.
However, the S-400 is not so easy to "overwhelm". In addition to the masses and dimensions, there are also requirements for the longitudinal / lateral roll of the ship, which will be fulfilled only on something large enough - at one time, "Fort" (a marine analogue of the S-300P) was not so easy to "register" on decks of Soviet missile cruisers.
Nevertheless, the installation of "Fort", "Fort-M" on ships the size of the same destroyer 21956 is quite possible and probably the same applies to the S-400, but on the frigate … No, theoretically nothing interferes - please! It is interesting that in the export version of frigate 22350 (we are talking about project 22356), the installation of "Rif-M" was allowed (any whim for your money!). But from a frigate, she will be able to work only with the smallest excitement.
If the Russian Federation would include in the GPV 2011-2020. destroyers of project 21956 or the like instead of frigates, the failure of the Polyment-Redut theme would not be a verdict for the air defense of such ships, simply because the destroyers could well have installed the same Rif-M or the "chilled" S-400 … Interestingly, the Reduta missile defense system was supposed to be part of the S-400 complex (and the 9M96E missiles were going to be included in the Rif-M standard armament), i.e. an arbitrarily long delay on the Redoubt would only lead to the fact that the ship's Rif-M / S-400 would not have part of its missiles, but could use the existing 48N6E, 48N6E2, 48N6E3. Interestingly, such an approach greatly enhanced the capabilities of the destroyer in terms of tracking enemy surface (and including aircraft carrier) groupings, when the ships are in line of sight - missiles with a semi-active seeker are perfectly guided to a surface target, and a series of 7, 5-meter missiles weighing almost two tons, with a 185-kg warhead, accelerating to a speed of 2,100 m / s …
SAM "Rif"
But for ships of the "frigate" class, we currently have only the "Shtil" air defense system. This is a formidable weapon, but still, the limited range (50 km) and the lack of modernization potential (the complex uses analogous missiles of the Buk ground air defense missile system) do not allow considering the complex as promising. Although, today its capabilities are still quite large.
Here, of course, you can remember the cost factor. What is the point of speculating about which is better - a destroyer or a frigate, if money was barely enough only for frigates? But here's the thing - there is no reason to believe that the destroyer of Project 21956 would have cost us much more expensive than frigate 22350. After all, the cost of a warship is not determined by the displacement, but by the systems that "fill" this displacement. And here we are surprised to find that the destroyer of Project 21956 is not too different from the frigate 22350.
Power plant? About the same money, maybe 15 percent will be more expensive because of a little more power. UKSK "Caliber"? They are the same on both the destroyer and the frigate. The Mineral-ME over-the-horizon targeting radar - both there and there. A good general-view radar and an overwhelmed S-400 (or "Rif-M") are unlikely to be fundamentally more expensive than the "Polyment-Redut". 130mm cannon? The same for the frigate and destroyer. Hydroacoustic complex? Again one to one. 533-mm torpedo tubes of the destroyer against the "Paket-NK" frigate? You can put both on the destroyer, our torpedo tubes are not so expensive. ZRAK-and? And there, and there - equally. BIUS? And there, and there - "Sigma".
In fact, the increase in the displacement of the destroyer of project 21956 is associated both with the need to carry much larger reserves of fuel (but it also has a higher range), and with the provision of ocean seaworthiness. At the same time, it should be understood that a destroyer will be able to use weapons in more waves / wind than a frigate, and the crew's habitability conditions on it can be improved much better, which is not the last thing for an ocean-going ship. That is, in essence, the main mass gain for a destroyer is hull structures, but the fact is that the hull itself (in comparison with the units that it carries in itself) is as cheap as it gets. And there is a feeling that the Project 21956 destroyer would cost the Russian treasury 20 percent, maybe 25 percent more than the Project 22350 frigate. Or even less. Is it hard to believe? Let us recall the motivation for refusing the expanded construction of corvettes 20385 (https://izvestia.ru/news/545806):
“… The estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2, 2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. The equally modern frigates of the 11356R / M project, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and they cost the same.
If one of the dear readers does not understand too well how this could have happened, then here is a simple everyday example. If we come to an electronics store and see a stationary computer and a laptop equal to it in terms of capabilities, can we expect that a laptop will cost less than a stationary one, on the grounds that it is lighter?
And returning to the fleet … if instead of 8 frigates of project 22350, we could build 4 destroyers, then, of course, it was necessary to build frigates. But if instead of 8 frigates we can build 6 destroyers, and half the destroyer still has money left, it will be a completely different arithmetic.
In general, the following can be said. Severnoye PKB created an excellent frigate design. And if domestic developers, in the end, are able to bring to mind the "Polyment-Redut" so that its real characteristics correspond to the declared ones, then the Russian fleet will receive one of the best frigates in the world (and in its displacement, perhaps, the best). But the funds that will be spent on these frigates could have been spent with much greater benefit on the construction of Project 21956 destroyers.
The frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" became, in fact, an experimental ship. Everything on it is new: the power plant, and artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons, and the BIUS. After so many years of neglect of military shipbuilding, Project 22350 has become overly innovative in order to be able to count on serial construction in a short time - and this at a time when the country is desperate for surface ships. The construction of destroyers of project 21956 would carry much less risks in technical terms, but more efficiency in military terms.
