In this article we will look at the construction of domestic "mosquito" forces and summarize the cycle.
Despite the fact that in the USSR they paid great attention to the development of a small fleet, in the GPV program 2011-2020. included a minimum of strike ships with a displacement of less than a thousand tons. It was planned to build 6 small artillery ships (IAC) of the project 21630 "Buyan" and several of their "older brothers", small missile ships "Buyan-M" - and that, in fact, was all.
The purpose of these ships is not at all easy to understand. Take, for example, the artillery "Buyan": a small, about 500 tons of displacement, the ship had to have good seaworthiness, but shallow draft, in order to be able to operate at shallow depths of the northern Caspian and the Volga River. But what is an artillery ship to do there? Buyan's armament consists of a 100-mm artillery system, two 30-mm AK-306 metal cutters, a Gibka launcher (for using standard Igla MANPADS missiles) and a Grad-M MLRS, and the MLRS hints at the possibility of acting against coastal targets. This is great, but if we are already creating a river ship to act against the enemy's land forces, then who will become the most dangerous enemy for him? An ordinary tank - it is well protected and has a powerful cannon that can quickly inflict decisive damage to a ship of several hundred tons. And the Buyan's armament lacks a weapon capable of knocking out a tank. Of course, it can be assumed that installing a tank gun on a ship of such a small displacement will create problems, but the placement of a modern ATGM should not have caused any difficulties. But even with an ATGM, a river ship can hardly count on survival in modern combat - it is large enough and noticeable (and no stealth technology will help here), but at the same time it is practically not protected even from small arms, and after all it owes services will have to "substitute" for fire from the shore.
With the project 21631, or MRK "Buyan-M", everything is even more difficult. It is larger (949 tons), but, like the Buyan, it belongs to the type of river-sea ships. Two AK-306 installations were replaced by the "spark" AK-630M-2 "Duet", but the main innovation is the rejection of the MLRS and the installation of launchers for 8 "Caliber" missiles. But why does a river boat, in essence, need such firepower? Against who? Several Iranian missile boats? So they will be behind the eyes of the Uranium anti-ship missile system, and in general it is much easier to destroy such a trifle from the air. In general, the composition of Buyan-M's weapons looks completely incomprehensible, but exactly until we remember about international treaties limiting armaments, and in particular the INF Treaty of December 8, 1987.
A detailed description of the reasons why the United States and the USSR signed this treaty clearly goes beyond the scope of this article, but it should be noted that the treaty banning the ground deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles of medium (1000-5500 km) and small (500-1000 km) range was beneficial to both sides. The Americans were deprived of the opportunity to inflict a disarming strike on the most important targets on the territory of the USSR (from Berlin to Moscow, only 1613 km in a straight line), and such a strike threatened to become truly "lightning-fast" - the flight time of the Pershing-2 was only 8-10 minutes …The USSR, in turn, was deprived of the opportunity to destroy the main European ports with one short blow and thereby block the transfer of US ground forces to Europe, which, against the background of the superiority of the ATS countries in conventional weapons, made NATO's position completely hopeless. Interestingly, under the INF Treaty, the USSR was forced to abandon the RK-55 Relief, which is a land-based version of the S-10 Granat naval missile, which became the forerunner of the Caliber.
However, it should be remembered that under the INF Treaty, only land-based missiles were destroyed, while air and sea cruise missiles remained permitted. In the era when the USSR was alive, which possessed the most powerful fleet and missile-carrying aircraft, this did not carry an excessive threat, but now, when the Russian Federation at sea and in the air has only a shadow of its former Soviet power, this limitation has begun to play against us. Yes, the United States of America destroyed its land-based Tomahawks, but it now has 85 surface ships and 57 nuclear submarines capable of carrying sea-based Tomahawks, any destroyer of which can carry dozens of such missiles. The capabilities of our fleet are incomparably less, and the only serious "counterargument" is strategic aviation, capable of carrying medium-range missile launchers, but even here our capabilities are far from desired. Under these conditions, the creation of a certain number of cruise missile carriers capable of moving along the unified deep-water system of the European part of the Russian Federation (of course, provided that it is still maintained in a sufficiently “deep-water” state) makes some sense. Not a panacea, of course, but …
In view of the above, it seems quite understandable to refuse further construction of ships of the project 21630 "Buyan" (three ships of this type, which were part of the Caspian Flotilla, were laid down in 2004-2006, that is, long before GPV-2011-2020) and the laying of nine RTOs of project 21631 "Buyan-M", the last of which is to be commissioned in 2019. Accordingly, we can say that the plans of the GPV 2011-2020. in part of the "mosquito" fleet will be fully implemented. And even exceeded.
The fact is that in addition to the Buyan and Buyan-M, which were planned to be built according to the GPV 2011-2020, the Russian Federation has begun building small missile ships of the 22800 Karakurt project. These ships will have a displacement of about 800 tons, i.e. even less "Buyan-M", speed up to 30 knots, armament - all the same 8 "Caliber", 100-mm (or 76-mm) gun mount and anti-aircraft missile and artillery system. According to some reports, the ships of this type were going to install "Pantsir-M" or "Broadsword", and this would be a good choice, but the embedded board of the "Storm" MRK hints that at least the first ships of the series will have to do with the old AK-630 or even 306. Initially, it was assumed that the series will be 18 ships, then it was assumed that it would be reduced to 10-12 ships.
Where did they come from, after all, in the original GPV 2011-2020. there was nothing like that? Probably the most resonant statement related to the "Karakurt" was the words of the commander-in-chief of the Navy V. Chirkov, said by him on July 1, 2015:
"So that we keep up with the pace of ship construction, to replace, for example, Project 11356, we are starting to build a new series - small missile ships, corvettes with cruise missiles on board Project 22800"
The commander-in-chief was not accused of anything after these words … the mildest epithet "on the Internet" was "inconsistency with the position held." Indeed, how can you replace full-fledged frigates with eight-hundred-ton RTOs?
Nothing, and this is obvious. But V. Chirkov was not going to change frigates for "Karakurt", because the commander-in-chief has no frigates "for exchange". Three ships of Project 11356 will come to the Black Sea, period. For the other three, there are no engines, and there is nothing to say about 22350: all the problems are described in the previous articles, and it is clear that even the lead Admiral Gorshkov will replenish the fleet in a very, very long time. For frigates, the GPV program 2011-2020 failed miserably, and the only way to at least partially smooth the situation is to build ships of other classes. The question is not that we are building RTOs instead of frigates, but that we will either get 3 frigates to the Black Sea, and that's all, or we will get the same 3 frigates and, in addition to them, some Project 22800 ships. spoke the commander-in-chief.
But here another question arises. If we, realizing the need for urgent replenishment of the ship's personnel, are ready to replace frigates, which we will not build anyway, with other ships at the time we need, then why was Project 22800 "Karakurt" chosen? Do we really need small rocket ships?
Surprisingly, but true: at the stage of the formation of our shipbuilding program, the command of the Russian Navy almost completely abandoned the sea mosquito fleet (represented by small missile / anti-submarine ships and boats). Planned for construction in GPV 2011-2020. Buyany-M, in essence, are mobile river platforms for launching the Kalibr missile launcher, belong to the river-sea type and do not have sufficient seaworthiness to operate in the open sea. How justified was the rejection of missile boats and / or RTOs?
Let's try to guess: it is known that small missile ships and boats are quite capable of operating in coastal areas and can be effective against enemy surface ships of their own class and larger ones, such as a corvette or a frigate. But they have a number of fatal "flaws": narrow specialization, very modest air defense, small size (which makes the use of weapons limited by excitement to a greater extent than that of larger ships) and relatively short cruising range. All this leads to the fact that modern land-based aviation and long-range mobile coastal missile systems are quite capable of replacing missile boats and RTOs. Moreover, a modern RTO is not a cheap pleasure. According to some information, the price of the RTOs of the project 22800 "Karakurt" is 5-6 billion rubles. corresponds to the cost of 4-5 aircraft of the Su-30 or Su-35 type. At the same time, the main enemy in our coastal waters will not be enemy missile boats or frigates, but submarines against which RTOs are useless.
Apparently, such (or similar) considerations played a role in the formation of the GPV-2011-2020. In addition, the program involved the massive construction of corvettes, which are capable of performing, among other things, the functions of RTOs. But the construction of corvettes also did not work out. What was left? Laying new Buyans-M? But they, by virtue of their "belonging" to the "river-sea", are not seaworthy enough. Another question: why do our RTOs need seaworthiness? If we assume that the range of Caliber missiles against ground targets is 2,600 km, then the same Grad Sviyazhsk (the lead ship of the Buyan-M type), anchored in a cozy bay of Sevastopol, is quite capable of striking Berlin. Well, after moving to Evpatoria, it will reach London. Thus, from the point of view of a big war with NATO countries, the seaworthiness of our RTOs is not very much needed.
But this is from the standpoint of a big war, and the navy is not only a military, but also a political instrument, and it is used regularly in politics. At the same time, the state of our surface forces is so … does not correspond to the tasks facing them, even in peacetime, that in the current year, 2016, we were forced to send the Buyan-M project to reinforce the Mediterranean squadron "Green Dol". It is clear that the Russian Federation in its military capabilities is orders of magnitude inferior to the USSR, and today no one expects the revival of the Mediterranean 5th OPESK in all the splendor of its former power: 70-80 pennants, including three dozen surface warships and a dozen submarines …But sending a "river-sea" type ship to the Mediterranean service … this is a clear overkill even for today's Russian Federation. However, let's not forget that in the USSR, they could not provide the Mediterranean squadron exclusively with ships of the first rank: starting in 1975 (or is it 1974?), Small missile ships were sent to reinforce the 5th OPESK (we are talking about the project 1234 "Gadfly "). It is worth paying tribute to their crews:
“In the Aegean Sea we got caught in a hard storm. I happened to get into storms both before and after that. But this one was remembered for the rest of my life. Developed 6-point excitement, the wave is short, almost like in the Baltic, the ships chatter and hit so that they, shuddering with the whole hull, already ring, the masts are shaking so that it seems that they will now come off and overboard, rolling in all planes up to 30 degrees, we draw water with containers, the commander of the BC-2 worries about the missiles."
Service in a "foreign sea" on a ship of 700 tons of full displacement … "Yes, there were people in our time." But, according to the recollections of eyewitnesses, our "sworn friends" from the 6th fleet took the "Gadflies" very seriously:
“In fact, when the KUG MRK entered the Mediterranean Sea, it was immediately monitored by ships and aircraft of the 6th Fleet, the combat readiness of air defense systems increased on aircraft carriers and cruisers, and AUG fighters patrolled in the direction of KUG-AUG. They worked out the tactics of their combat use for us, and we for them: an excellent opportunity for training air defense crews."
Of course, the author of this article did not participate in the BS as part of the Gadfly Group, but he sees no reason to ignore such memories: a group of 3-4 such ships, armed with 6 Malachite missiles each and carrying combat duty in relative proximity to the AUG, posed a serious threat to American ships. Taking into account the above, the construction of a series of MRKs of project 22800, which differ from "Buyanov-M" primarily in increased seaworthiness, makes some sense. Of course, an attempt to solve the tasks of frigates (or better, destroyers) with small missile ships is, of course, a palliative, but in the absence of stamped paper, you have to write in plain text.
Thus, the construction of a series of MRKs for the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy is fully justified by today's gloomy realities, and would not raise questions if … if in 2014 new (and not provided for by the GPV 2011-2020) patrol ships of the project were not laid down at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard 22160.
On the one hand, reading about their purpose on the official website of the manufacturer, you get the impression that it is not so much about a combat ship, but about something borderline with the function of the Ministry of Emergencies:
“Border patrol service for the protection of territorial waters, patrolling a 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the open and closed seas; suppression of smuggling and piracy; search and assistance to victims of maritime disasters; ecological monitoring of the environment. In wartime: guarding ships and vessels at sea crossing, as well as naval bases and water areas in order to warn about an attack by various enemy forces and assets."
Accordingly, try to fit them into the existing "table of ranks" of warships according to the GPV 2011-2020. there seems to be no point - the tasks are completely different. And the performance characteristics, to put it mildly, are not impressive: "about 1,300 tons" of the standard displacement for the domestic corvette is somehow not enough ("Guarding" - 1,800 tons), but a lot for the MRK. Standard armament - one 57-mm gun mount A-220M, "Flexible" and a pair of 14.5-mm machine guns - are quite sufficient for a border guard or a pirate catcher, when the most dangerous thing that threatens a ship is a fast boat with light small arms. But for a serious fight, such a set, of course, is not suitable.
But here are other characteristics: sonar complex MGK-335EM-03 and GAS "Vignette-EM". The latter is capable of detecting submarines in the sonar or noise direction finding mode at a distance of up to 60 km. What are they on the patrol ship for? Environmental monitoring of the environment? So that no Turkish poachers in their "Atylai" (German diesel-electric submarine type 209) violate the ecological balance of the region? And if they do, then what? Shake your finger? No anti-submarine weapons on patrol ship 22160 seem to be provided. There is only a helicopter, but it is said specifically about it:
"Telescopic hangar and a landing area with a means of support for takeoff, landing and maintenance of a search and rescue helicopter weighing up to 12 tons, type Ka-27 PS".
Of course, the Ka-27PL is not so fundamentally different from the Ka-27PS anti-submarine, and if the PS can be based, then perhaps the PL will be able to be deployed? There is a hangar, there is fuel, there is also maintenance, the question remains about the ammunition depot for the anti-submarine helicopter and their maintenance / supply, but maybe this can be solved? But further - the most delicious:
Additional armament, installed at the request of the customer:
1 SAM "Shtil-1" with two modular launchers 3S90E.1.
1 integrated missile system "Caliber-NKE".
Of course, either one or the other can be installed on the Project 22160 ship, and according to reports made in October 2015, it is the "Calibers" that will be installed.
From the point of view of shock functionality, such a ship will not lose anything to the MRK of project 22800: all the same 8 "Calibers", all the same speed of 30 knots, but as a "projection of force" 22160 is preferable, if only due to the greater displacement (and hence, seaworthiness) and the presence of a helicopter (allowing you to monitor the movements of those whom we frighten). On the other hand, artillery and other weapons represent an obvious step backward - instead of a 76-mm or even 100-mm AU, there is only a weak 57-mm, instead of a ZRAK, it is just a "Flexible" with its capabilities of a conventional MANPADS. But the presence of powerful enough sonar equipment, which the project 22800 is completely devoid of: in combination with a helicopter and an anti-submarine "Caliber" is not so bad.
In fact, in Project 22160, we see another attempt to create a corvette, and it could even be successful: add a little displacement, replace the "Flexible" with a ZRAK, put a "hundred" instead of a 57-mm cannon … But again it did not work out. And most importantly, if we thought that our fleet needed such a "peaceful tractor", that is, a patrol ship with a powerful GAS and eight "Calibers" (absolutely irreplaceable means of environmental monitoring, yes), then why not just start mass construction 22160, without being distracted by any "Karakurt"?
OK. The author of these articles is not a professional naval sailor, and, of course, does not understand a lot in naval art. It is quite possible to assume that something was wrong with the patrol ships of Project 22160, and they are not suitable for our fleet. And therefore, the ships will not go into a large series, two such patrol ships were laid down in 2014, and that's enough, and instead of them the more suitable for the Russian Navy "Karakurt" will go into the series. After all, the first ships of Project 22800 (Hurricane and Typhoon) were laid down in December 2015.
But if so, then why was the next pair of patrol ships 22160 laid down in February and May 2016?
If you take a closer look at what we are doing now in terms of small military shipbuilding, the hair just stands on end. We began to recreate the Russian Navy after a huge break in military shipbuilding. If this was any plus, it was that we could start from scratch and avoid the mistakes of the USSR Navy, the main of which was the creation of many non-unified projects. And how did we take advantage of this opportunity? Here is the corvette 20380, not everything goes well with the diesel power plant. But in 2014, we are starting the serial construction of patrol ships of largely similar functionality, whose power plant is different, more powerful, but also diesel. What for? Did you step on the same rake a little? Or, perhaps, there are some reasonable assumptions that the new power plant will be more reliable than the previous one? But then why not unify it with the power plant that is used on corvettes 20380/20385 in order to continue their construction? Why do we even need two types of corvettes (and patrol ship 22160, in fact, is such) with a similar purpose? And at the same time, there are also small rocket ships, which, of course, will have different power plants from both projects 20380 and 22160? Why do we need the simultaneous use of 100-mm, 76-mm and 57-mm gun mounts? Or (if 76-mm is still abandoned) 100-mm and 57-mm? Why do we need the simultaneous production of ZRAK "Pantsir-M" (or "Kashtan") and the much weaker "Flexible"? Surveillance radar on the project 20380 corvette - "Furke" and "Furke-2", on the patrol ship of project 22160 - "Positive-ME1", on the MRK project 22800 - "Mineral-M". Why do we need this zoo? Are we seriously going to surpass the USSR in terms of the range of manufactured weapons ?!
According to the author, the problem is as follows. The project 20380 corvette was created by the Almaz Design Bureau, and the Project 22160 patrol ship was created by the Northern Design Bureau. The teams are different, and the subcontractors are also different. As a result, everyone is concerned about the promotion of their own products, and by no means unification with the ships of competitors. On the one hand, this is a natural consequence of market competition, but on the other hand, why does the state need such consequences? Of course, competition is a blessing, it does not allow you to "work up fat" and "rest on your laurels," therefore, in shipbuilding and in any other industry, it is extremely undesirable to lock everything into one team. But you need to understand that honest, decent competition occurs only in books on economics authored by professors who are divorced from life, and in our reality, it is not the one who offers the best product that wins, but the one who has a greater "administrative resource" or other similar "benefits". Accordingly, it is up to the state to establish such “rules of the game” under which the benefits from competition would be maximized, and the damage would be minimized. One of these "rules" could be a requirement for all creative teams to unify weapons and assemblies when designing ships of the same (or similar) classes. Of course, this is easy only on paper, but the benefits of this approach are undeniable.
Conclusion: the construction of the "mosquito" fleet is the only area in terms of surface shipbuilding, where by 2020 we will seriously overtake the schedule. However, the only reason we do this is to try to replace the larger ships (frigates and corvettes) with anything that can walk the sea. Given the unjustified diversity of projects, there is little joy in this.
Well, let's summarize the implementation of the GPV shipbuilding program for 2011-2020.
The only position where we failed, if not by much, is the Project 955 Borei SSBN. It is quite possible that we will still receive 8 ships of this type by 2020 (not 10, as planned, but a deviation of 20% is not so terrible). The decrease in the number of "Ash", obviously, will lead to the fact that at least in the period until 2025 (and most likely until 2030) the number of nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines will decline even from their present, completely insufficient number. The NNS 677 "Lada" project turned out to be a failure: instead of the expected ones under the GPV 2011-2020. Only three ships of this type will enter service with 14 units, and even those, taking into account the refusal of their large-scale construction, are likely to be of limited combat capability. The Varshavyanks will have to replenish the fleet of non-nuclear submarines, but if the order for 6 such diesel-electric submarines for the Pacific Ocean is placed in a timely manner, then there are good chances to receive 6 Black Sea and 6 Pacific diesel-electric submarines on time.
The program for the construction of landing ships has completely failed: instead of four Mistrals and 6 Grens, we may get 2 Grens. An error in assessing the importance of localizing naval power plants in Russia has led to the fact that by 2020 instead of the planned 14 frigates, the fleets will receive a little more than a third, i.e. only five, and then on condition that "Polyment-Redut" by some miracle will bring to mind. The program for the construction of corvettes, even if the commissioning of four patrol ships of project 22160, which we will also write into corvettes, will be completed by 46%, while the Redoubt air defense problems will be pursued by 11 ships out of 16, and problems with the power plant - all 16. But the construction of 9 "Buyans" according to the plan and a dozen "Karakurt" above the plan, most likely, will go on schedule, unless the company "Pella", which had not previously been engaged in the construction of warships, and "More" in Feodosia, which (due to being part of an independent Ukraine) for a long time did not seriously engage in military construction.
In general, we have to admit that the shipbuilding program within the framework of the GPV 2011-2020. did not take place, and for once not because of a lack of funding, but as a result of systemic errors in the development strategy of the Navy, the organization of the military-industrial complex and control over this work by the state.
And yet this is not the end. Despite the fiasco of the 2011-2020 shipbuilding program, the country still has about 15 years before the ships that replenished the domestic fleet in the years of the USSR and the early Russian Federation and now constitute the backbone of the Russian Navy, leave the system. The future of our fleet depends on whether the leadership of the country, the Defense Ministry, the Navy and the military-industrial complex will be able to draw the right conclusions based on the results of the GPV 2011-2020, and whether they have enough energy to reverse the current situation.
There is still time. But there is very little of it left.
Thank you for the attention!
