Several years ago, the shipbuilding program included in the GPV 2011-2020 was discussed with great interest, and especially its revised version (2012), according to which, by 2020, the fleet should include:
1) 10 Project 955 strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs);
2) 10 Project 885 multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGN);
3) 20 non-nuclear submarines, including six diesel-electric submarines of the 636.3 Varshavyanka type (fairly improved) and the remaining 14 - the revised project 677 Lada;
4) 14 frigates, including 6 ships of project 11356 ("admiral's" series for the Black Sea Fleet) and 8 frigates of the latest project 22350;
5) 35 corvettes, including 18 projects 20380 and 20385, and the rest - a completely new project;
6) 4 cans of Mistral-class universal landing craft (UDC), including two built in France, and the same number at domestic shipyards;
7) 6 large landing ships (BDK) type 11711 "Ivan Gren";
8) 6 small artillery ships of the project 21630 "Buyan";
9) a number of small missile ships (MRK) of the project 21631 "Buyan-M".
The program looked very serious. Of course, there was no question of any revival of the nuclear missile oceanic fleet created in the USSR and destroyed with its disintegration - the emphasis was on ships in the near sea zone, which were non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, and, in fact, frigates. It was certainly amusing to hear how the Project 22350 frigate, with its range of 4,000 nautical miles at 14 knots, was universally called an ocean-going ship. Here are the Soviet cruisers of the 26-bis project, capable of traveling 4,880 miles at 18 knots (and the Pacific ones even up to 5,590 miles at the same speed) - these are, as is universally recognized, ships with a very limited cruising range sufficient for the Black and Baltic Seas., but unsuitable for the North and Pacific theaters. And frigate 22350 is an ocean frigate.
In essence, the GPV shipbuilding program for 2011-2020 is a program for the construction of a coastal fleet focused on protecting the maritime borders of the Motherland. It should be admitted that this was the only reasonable option for the development of the Navy at that time. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian shipbuilding industry has had almost no new orders, completing the ones laid down in the late 80s and 1990-91. ships and forced to be content with a beggarly stream of state money, irregularly supplied to the factories. The industry was greatly assisted by export contracts, which made it possible to preserve at least some production and personnel, but this was negligible for the development of military shipbuilding. And therefore, in the period 1990-2010. the industry did not live, but survived, having received a blow, perhaps even more powerful than in the period 1917 - 1927, when the revolution and the civil war almost put an end to the domestic shipbuilding. This time the period of timelessness turned out to be even longer, which almost destroyed the most important thing - cadres. Old people retired, men "in their prime" abandoned the choking industry in search of opportunities to feed their families, and young people simply did not want to go to work for beggarly salaries. But the processes of creating warships, in comparison with the first third of the last century, have become more complicated not even at times, but by orders of magnitude, and therefore by 2010 the "point of no return", after which the Russian Federation would finally lose the ability to create modern naval weapons, turned out to be closer than ever.
Destroyer "Boevoy" laid down in the Abrek Bay
Fortunately, the Russian Federation did not reach the last line. Funds for the reconstruction of the fleet were found, but now the leadership of the Navy, as well as the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, have a different task - to properly dispose of the opportunities provided to them. We will try to figure out how much this was possible.
It is a well-known fact that by 2010 the Russian Navy was an extremely sad sight. No, if you count the ships that are formally included in all four fleets, without forgetting the Caspian Flotilla, then you get a rather powerful force, second only to the US Navy, but (albeit with a large margin from the hegemon) firmly holding the honorable second place in the world. But if we take into account the actual state of the ships, some of them are under repair, some are in a protracted wait, and some are simply mothballed, it turns out that all four fleets of the Russian Navy had only 23 active surface ships of the 1st and 2nd -th rank:
1) 1 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" (project 1143.5);
2) 1 nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Peter the Great" (project 1144);
3) 3 Project 1164 Atlant missile cruisers;
4) 3 destroyers (EM) of project 956 "Sarych";
5) 10 large anti-submarine ships (7 - project 1155, 1 - project 1155.1, 1 - project 1134-B and 1 - project 61);
6) 5 patrol ships (2 - Project 11540 "Yastreb" and 3 - Project 1135).
Note: the author does not vouch for the absolute accuracy of the figures presented and will be glad to any clarifications.
It turned out to be even more difficult to restore the number of submarines. Presumably, the Russian Navy had in service (not counting those under repair, reserve / conservation):
1) 8 SSBNs (5 projects 667BDRM: "Tula", "Yekaterinburg", "Bryansk", "Karelia" and "Verkhoturye", the latter being repaired in August 2010, 3 projects 667BDR: "St. George the Victorious", " Podolsk "and" Ryazan "). (There was one more submarine of Project 941 "Akula", but there were no standard ballistic missiles for it);
2) 5 Project 949A SSGN "Antey" ("Smolensk", "Chelyabinsk", "Tver", "Orel" and "Omsk");
3) 16 multipurpose nuclear submarines (more precisely, MPLATRK, which stands for Multipurpose Nuclear Torpedo Submarine with Cruise Missiles, differs from SSGN in that it does not have special missile silos, and from PLAT (nuclear submarine torpedo) in the ability to launch missiles through torpedo devices), including: 9 projects 971 "Pike-B": "Kashalot", "Magadan", "Samara", "Panther", "Wolf", "Leopard", "Tiger", "Vepr", "Cheetah"”, 2 projects 945A:“Pskov”,“Nizhny Novgorod”, 1 project 945 (“Kostroma”) 4 projects 671RTM (K)“Shchuka”;
4) 13 diesel-electric submarines of type 887, including one type 887V "Alrosa".
But even these figures (even if they are real and not overestimated) do not fully reflect the picture of the plight of the fleet, because even of those ships that were formally listed as “ready for a campaign and battle”, not all of them were. Due to the poor condition of the power plant, none of the destroyers of the 956 project could go on long voyages, and the only aircraft-carrying cruiser, in addition to problems with the power plant, did not have an air group, which is why the latter could only perform representative and training functions.
An equally sad sight was the naval aviation, which by 2011 was reduced to almost a nominal value.
In addition, it should be borne in mind that the situation with combat training is far from being the best. Despite the fact that, in general, the situation has improved significantly compared to the "wild nineties" and the beginning of the two thousandths, the number of campaigns and the complexity of the exercises of the Russian Navy did not come close to meeting the standards of the USSR.
In general, it can be stated that the catastrophic collapse in the number of warships and aircraft / helicopters, combined with insufficient combat training, led to a drop in the combat qualities of the domestic fleet to a completely unacceptable state. Despite the presence of a number of large and powerful ships of the 1st rank, the Russian Navy has obviously lost its oceanic status, but even on its own shores one could hardly expect much from it. Even the fulfillment of the first task of the fleet: ensuring the action of the naval strategic forces with the aim of delivering a nuclear missile strike by the latter in a full-scale nuclear conflict, was under threat.
What has changed after the adoption of the GPV 2011-2020 program?
The training of personnel is being intensified. The ships "detach" from the wall and begin to spend a lot of time at sea. For the author, as a person who has not served in the navy, it is impossible to determine to what extent the level of today's training of the fleets meets the requirements of modern naval combat. Presumably, we have not yet matured to the best Soviet practices (when our fleet was able to handle Aport, Atrina, etc.), but, in any case, crew training is now being carried out in the most intensive way for the entire period of the recent history of the Russian Federation. …
A military shipbuilding program was adopted, which can be characterized in the most positive way:
First, she is extremely ambitious. Not in the sense that after its implementation, the Russian Federation will become a generally recognized thunderstorm of the oceans - this is still a long way off. In fact, the implementation of the GPV 2011-2020 in its "sea" part will only partially solve the problem of protecting the near sea zone. The ambitiousness of the naval shipbuilding program is different - at the time of its adoption, it significantly exceeded the capabilities of the domestic industry and it could only be fulfilled by strengthening our shipbuilding enterprises with all their allies in the most significant way. Accordingly, the adoption of this program was supposed to provide significant industrial growth, but even taking this into account, such a massive supply of ships to the fleet in the time period only until 2020 looked dubious. Nevertheless, there is no smell of "manilovism" here, this is the right approach, which should be welcomed in every possible way. How can one fail to recall a certain character of the national cinema, who, in response to the remark "You want a lot, you will get little!" quite rightly remarked: "But this is not a reason to want little and not get anything."
Secondly, the program was drawn up taking into account the real capabilities of the domestic shipbuilding industry: the main emphasis is placed on submarines and relatively small ships - corvettes and frigates. Thus, Russian shipbuilding has the ability to develop "from simple to complex."
Thirdly, the classes and number of ships determined for the construction of the GPV 2011-2020 largely solved the most priority tasks of the domestic fleet: the renewal of the naval component of the Strategic Nuclear Forces was ensured and ship groupings were created, if not completely excluding, then at least significantly complicating the detection and destruction of our strategic missile submarine cruisers before they launch ICBMs.
Fourth, the necessary conditions were provided for the training of qualified command personnel of the fleet, and I would like to dwell on this in more detail.
In tsarist Russia, a naval qualification was practiced for a long time. What it is? In essence, this is a set of requirements, without which an officer could not be promoted to production in the next rank. The main condition was the time spent by the officer on the ship in months, days or sea companies.
In Soviet (and not only) literature, the naval qualification was scolded many times. Indeed, the requirements were often such that it was possible to achieve high posts only by old age, and career growth did not depend in any way on the skills and talents of the officer. In addition, there is a big difference where and how a person served his qualification, because in other cases a year can be safely counted as three. But many authors overlook something else: of course, on the one hand, the naval qualification was an evil that impeded the career development of worthy officers. But on the other hand, to some extent, he protected “favorites” and people who were random in the navy from fast promotion. After all, how does the qualification work? Someone had a desire to put at the head of the Ministry of Defense a person who had nothing to do with military affairs, who had previously (only by God's permission) had been in charge of the Federal Tax Service. But no, it's not possible at all - first graduate from the Academy of the General Staff, then if you please command a company for a year, then … then … then … after that … … and then - you are welcome to the ministerial chair!
The problem is that if today, by a miracle and completely free of charge, five Storm-class aircraft carriers fully equipped with all the necessary materiel and twenty Leader-class destroyers appear at our berths, and their decks will be filled up with tons of gold bars (to pay for their operation) then we still (and for a very long time) will not be able to use them (ships, of course, not ingots). Even if there will be plenty of money, and the bases are equipped, but we do not have competent commanders of all levels capable of leading the crews of these ships, and there is nowhere to take them.
The Navy of the young USSR learned very well what the shortage of command personnel is. In the 1930s, the industry unleashed a steel tsunami of new ships on the military men - several cruisers, dozens of patrol boats and destroyers, hundreds of submarines … But where did they get people who could organize service on them and skillfully command them in battle? So they had to drive "at a gallop across Europe" - if a young officer showed at least some hope, he was immediately dragged up. We owe a lot to the inexperience of our commanders, far from always, to the successful actions of our fleets in the Great Patriotic War.
The death of the leader "Moscow"
And it is from this point of view that the post-war shipbuilding programs of the Soviet Navy should be assessed, when obsolete ships were put on stream. Yes, they could hardly protect the sea borders of the USSR in 1950-60s, such a need arose, but they became a real “forge of personnel”, and without them the mighty oceanic fleet of the USSR of the 1970s-80s would have been simply impossible.
So, the saturation of the Russian Navy with a large number, albeit not the largest, but modern ships equipped with the latest technologies, BIUS and weapons, just allows you to prevent such a shortage. And it will give the country a sufficient number of experienced personnel for the ocean-going fleet of the Russian Federation, the construction of which was supposed to start after 2020.
Thus, we can say that the program of military shipbuilding, laid down in the GPV 2011-2020, even in the case of its incomplete implementation, had a real chance to become one of the most necessary and useful shipbuilding programs in the entire history of the Russian State. For this, there was "nothing at all" - to correctly determine the classes and performance characteristics of the ships included in the program, linking them with the capabilities of domestic design bureaus developers of naval weapons and other devices and equipment. And the industry, of course.
Alas, the closer we are to the cherished year 2020, the stronger the feeling that in this matter we have managed to "slip" so that we have squandered most of the potential of GPV 2011-2020 to nowhere.
However, in terms of the design and construction of submarines, we made a minimum number of mistakes, and those that do exist were made long before the formation of the shipbuilding program for 2011-2020. Although, in fairness, it should be admitted that the merits of our program also stem from decisions made long before 2010.
Strategic nuclear forces
At the end of the existence of the Soviet Union, the situation with our SSBNs (which the author will call all nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles) was somewhat anecdotal. The attempt to switch to solid-propellant ballistic missiles in general should be considered correct, since solid fuel provides a number of significant advantages to the rocket. A lower flight trajectory, several times smaller active trajectory section (i.e., the section where the rocket flies with the engines on), short preparation for launch, less noise (there is no need to fill the mines with seawater before starting), etc. In addition, liquid fuel is dangerous during storage, although, strictly speaking, solid fuel is also not a gift - the accident at the Votkinsk plant in 2004 is an example of this. Therefore, work on a solid propellant "ballista" was more than justified. But nothing can justify the launch of the R-39, a monstrous rocket weighing 90 tons, weighing 16 meters in length. Of course, she needed an equally Cyclopean carrier, and it was created - Project 941 "Shark" with a surface displacement of 23,200 tons. This is practically the Sevastopol dreadnought, hidden under the water!
"Severstal" of project 941 and (small such, in a corner) - multipurpose nuclear submarine "Gepard" of project 971 "Shchuka-B"
Creating this "victory of technology over common sense", the Soviet military still insured themselves against the fiasco of solid-propellant missiles, and in parallel with the construction of "Sharks" laid a series of SSBNs of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin", armed with missiles on liquid fuel R-29RM. Seven of these ships were added to the USSR fleet in 1984-90, however, one of them was subsequently converted into a carrier of deep-sea underwater vehicles. But the R-39 turned out to be quite an efficient weapon, so the work on this topic was continued within the framework of the R-39UTTKh "Bark" theme. These missiles were going to re-equip the "Sharks" after the R-39 expired, and, in addition, they designed new SSBNs of project 955 "Borey". It must be said that missiles for all types of SSBNs (both R-29RM and R-39 and R-39UTTKh) were created by the Design Bureau im. Makeeva is an experienced design bureau that has created three generations of ballistic missiles for submarines.
But with "Bark" the Makeyevites suffered a failure, probably, the collapse of the USSR played an important role in this, because of which it was necessary to change the type of rocket fuel (the manufacturer ended up in the near abroad). Probably, the rocket could still be brought to mind, but now it took a lot of money and time. The Russian Federation still had time, but money … The rest is well known: a very controversial decision was made to create a single center for the development of sea and land ballistic missiles on the basis of the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute (MIT).
The first Borey was laid down back in 1996 for Bark missiles, but in 1998 the project was completely redone for MIT's brainchild - Bulava, the only (but indisputable) advantage of which was its relatively small size and weight (36.8 tons) …
On the whole, the Borey turned out to be an extremely successful boat, combining moderate displacement, fairly powerful armament (16 SLBMs) and excellently low noise levels. The Russian Federation has put into operation three such SSBNs, and the next seven are being built according to the improved project 955A, and the directions of modernization have been chosen flawlessly - the number of missiles has been increased from 16 to 20, while the noise levels and others that unmask the submarine will be reduced. What, in fact, are the key parameters for SSBNs.
SSBN project 995 "Borey"
Submarines of the Borey class are very good ships and, by and large, they have one drawback (but what a one!) - this is their main weapon, the Bulava SLBM. Which, due to unclear reasons, still does not want to function stably. At one time it even seemed that the Bulava would turn out to be a completely disastrous project and would not fly at all; some suggested that the Borei be remade for firing cruise missiles … Still, Bulava somehow flew, but how? It seems that normal launches are successful, then for some reason failures occur, and the rocket does not reach the target. Of course, work is underway to improve the Bulava, but will they lead to success? By the way, if they don't, there won't be a word about it in the open press.
There is only one consolation in all this. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future is there a political force that is crazy enough to check on its own skin how many Bulava SLBMs launched from Russian submarines will successfully hit their assigned targets. Persons prone to suicide tend to avoid politics, and those who reach political empires are madly in love with life and absolutely do not want to part with it. All the USSR had to persuade one such "lover of life" for 4 years, from the summer of 1941 to 1945 inclusive.
But there are other considerations - the old but reliable Project 667BDRM Dolphins with Sineva missiles (and now the Liner) will be able to ensure our security until 2025-2030. And if all of a sudden everything goes really bad with Bulava, then we still have time to react somehow. According to some information from the open press, GRKTs them. Makeeva has already begun developing a new ballistic missile to replace the Bulava, and there is every reason to hope for the success of this project. And although it is now being said that these are missiles for future Husky submarines, it is most likely that the Borei can be adapted for them.
Nuclear multipurpose submarines.
Project 885 "Ash". With him, everything is short and clear, this is the crown of the submarine shipbuilding of the USSR … but not only. Ships of this type began to be designed almost 40 years ago, when it was decided to try to get away from the diversity of the submarine fleet (anti-aircraft missile "Antei", torpedo "Shchuks", multipurpose "Shchuki-B") and create a single type of universal submarine for non-strategic purposes. The idea looked very attractive, but, nevertheless, the work was pretty delayed: the head "Ash" was laid back in 1993, and in 1996 the construction was stopped.
Work on the SSGN was resumed only in 2004 on an improved design. Probably, the first pancake to some extent turned out to be a lump - nevertheless, "Severodvinsk" was built in conditions of the wildest underfunding, using reserves for unfinished submarines, and its creation was "slightly" delayed. Laid down in 1993, the SSGN was handed over to the fleet only in 2014 after three years of tests and improvements. However, from subsequent ships of this type one should expect very high combat effectiveness, quite comparable to the best multipurpose nuclear submarines in the western world - the Seawulfs of the US Navy.
Unfortunately, the high combat capabilities entail the immodest cost of the product. Until now, according to the open press, it is the price that is the main claim to the ships of the project 885 and 885M. The series of "Ash" was reduced to 7 units, and even then - the introduction of the last of the planned for construction of SSGNs is scheduled for 2023. And if the cost of the 885M project remains an insoluble problem, then one cannot count on any large series of Ash trees. But once announced plans to transfer 30 such ships to the Navy! At the same time, the start of serial construction of a new type of submarine, "Husky", should be expected no earlier than 2030. Accordingly, it can be stated that the Russian Navy in the next decade and a half will have extremely powerful nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, but can we build enough of them to at least keep the total number of our non-strategic atomarines at the current level? Unlikely.
To some extent, the situation could be corrected by the massive construction of non-nuclear submarines, but …
Diesel-electric submarines and submarines with VNEU.
The basis of today's non-nuclear submarine forces are boats of project 877 "Halibut", of which (in repair and on the move), according to open sources, there are 16 units, including those built according to the modernized projects "Alrosa" and "Kaluga". An impressive number is supported by the high quality of our submarines, which were one of the best non-nuclear submarines in the world in the last quarter of the twentieth century. But nevertheless, these boats were created according to the project of the 70s of the last century and were put into operation in the period 1980-1995. They are still combat-ready and dangerous, but, of course, they have not been at the forefront of military progress for a long time.
"Alrosa" (project 877B) in the harbor of Sevastopol
The "Halibuts" were to be replaced by the "Lada" submarines, whose development began in the late 80s of the last century. The new submarines were supposed to be significantly smaller and cheaper than Project 877 and, moreover, much less noticeable (for example, the noise level was supposed to be only 50% of the level of "Halibuts"). A high level of automation, a modern BIUS, a new sonar complex and other equipment, and in terms of weapons, in addition to torpedo tubes, the boat received 10 silos for modern cruise missiles "Onyx" or "Caliber". In fact, submarines of this type (according to the project) had only one serious drawback - a diesel-electric power plant. The latter, due to the low speed and submerged range provided by it, limited the tactical capabilities of our ships, in comparison with the boats with VNEU that appeared at the end of the last century. But by 2012, work on the domestic air-independent engine seemed to have advanced far enough, which allowed the fleet command to count on completing Project 677 with them in the very near future. Therefore, our shipbuilding program provided for the construction of 6 submarines - modernized "Varshavyanka" according to project 636.3 and 14 submarines of project 677 according to an improved project with VNEU. "Lada" promised to be optimal for closed maritime theaters and the near sea zone of the North and Far East of the Russian Federation. They were conceived as a kind of underwater "Kalashnikov assault rifle": small, easy to operate, cheap and not requiring large deployment costs, very "quiet", but with great autonomy, high underwater speed and modern weapons. Boats of this type could be a terrible headache for any ship group that dared to poke their heads to our shores.
Diesel-electric submarines of the "Lada" type
But they didn’t. According to the open press, it is difficult to understand whose fault it is - the head developer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau or one of its contractors. Many claims have been made against the Lada submarines, the most famous is the chronic shortage of power from the propulsion system, which usually went out of order, developing 60-70% of the full power. There were also serious deficiencies in the operation of a number of major systems, such as SJSC Lira and BIUS Litiy, and it is unclear whether they could be eliminated. And although on July 28, 2016, Igor Ponomarev, vice president for military shipbuilding of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, announced that there was no final decision on the termination or resumption of construction of the Project 677 submarine, there are too many signs that the submarine did not work out.
The head submarine "Saint Petersburg" has been in trial operation since 2010, and has not yet been finally accepted by the fleet. And for a reason, in 2013, the Rubin Central Design Bureau received an order to develop the appearance of the 5th generation non-nuclear submarine Kalina: there is an opinion that this submarine could go into production as early as 2018 instead of Project 677 boats.
But there are a lot of questions about Kalina as well. Despite a number of victorious reports, the development of the domestic VNEU was delayed, and today we do not have any air-independent engine for submarines. Now, several teams are engaged in the development of VNEU, including the Rubin Central Design Bureau, and the VNEU of the latter is to undergo sea trials in 2016. But it should be understood that more than one year may pass between such tests and serial production.
This option is also possible - some time ago there were publications about the creation of lithium-ion batteries. On the one hand, this is not as promising technology as VNEU, but nevertheless their application can significantly increase the cruising range (including full cruise) of a diesel-electric submarine. There are also some hopes that the development of lithium-ion batteries was a success for domestic developers better than VNEU. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in the event of a complete failure of the VNEU development in the Russian Federation, Kalina will receive conventional diesel-electric power, but with lithium-ion batteries, which will still significantly increase their capabilities in comparison with the power plants of the submarine of project 877 or 636.3.
All this, of course, is excellent, but: non-nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy are needed right now, and the first Kalina can be laid down no earlier than 2018. And it is more than likely that the indicated period will "slide" to the right more than once … the same as the famous captain Vrungel said: "As you name the yacht, so it will float." Well, who came up with the idea of naming the newest submarines from the domestic auto industry?
The Russian Federation has production facilities and money, but now and for the next few years we will be able to build only the updated, still formidable, but obsolete Varshavyanka of Project 636.3, which is a deep modernization of the same Project 877 (more precisely, its export modification 636). This is not encouraging, but today such construction is the only way to ensure at least some acceptable number of our non-nuclear submarine forces.
On the whole, the Russian submarine fleet found itself on the brink of an unstable balance. Not counting the submarines commissioned under the GPV 2011-2020 program. The Russian Navy as of 2016 has (in service, under repair, awaiting repair):
1) 6 SSBNs of project 667BDRM;
2) 25 non-strategic nuclear submarines (8 SSGNs of project 949A "Antey", and 17 MPLATRK: 10 of project 971 "Shchuka-B", 3 - of project 671RTM (K) "Shchuka", 2 of project 945 "Barracuda", 2 of project 945A "Condor");
3) 16 diesel-electric submarines of project 887.
In essence, this is a completely scanty figure, moreover, it is also smeared across all four fleets of the Russian Federation, and if we consider that a significant part of these ships are not in service, then the picture is completely unsightly. Even worse, almost all of the ships listed above were commissioned in the 80s and early 90s, and almost all of them will have to leave the Russian Navy by 2030. And what can we put into service instead of them? While unconditional progress is to be expected in the part of SSBNs (8-10 Boreyev and Boreev-A), the picture is far from optimistic in terms of multipurpose submarines. According to current plans, by 2023 we should receive only 7 SSGNs of project 885 and 885M "Ash". Perhaps in the period 2020-2030 some more of these ships will be ordered. But now one such submarine is being built for up to 6 years (the laid down in 2016 "Perm" in the fleet is expected only in 2022) and if even in the near future the time of their construction can be reduced to 4 years, then can we count on the laying of 18 SSGNs " Ash "in the period 2021-2026? Obviously not, which means that the worst times for Russian non-strategic atomarines are still ahead.
The situation could somehow be corrected by non-nuclear ships, now it is quite possible to expect that according to GPV-2011-2020, the Russian Navy will include 12 diesel-electric submarines of project 636.3 (six for the Black Sea and Pacific fleets) and three diesel-electric submarines of project 667 Lada. Moreover, the latter, perhaps, will never become full-fledged warships, and project 636.3 is no longer the best that plows the depths of the ocean. But still, this is as many as 15 ships, and if in the period 2020-2030 the construction of the newest submarines of the Kalina project begins, then by 2030 we will be able to seriously increase the number of non-nuclear submarines in comparison with what we have today. And at least so to correct the truly deplorable situation with nuclear multipurpose submarines. But in general, neither by 2020 nor by 2030 a serious breakthrough in the number of submarine forces of the Russian Navy is expected.
But it is in the part of submarines in the GPV 2011-2020 program that the least number of mistakes was made. The types of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines have been correctly identified, and the work on their missile armament has been relatively successful: Onyx and Caliber were unambiguously successful, but Bulava, of course, is questionable. It is quite possible (here open sources do not indulge in data) that the latest torpedoes "Physicist" and "Case" will at least reduce our lag in torpedo weapons, and perhaps even even it out. But even despite all this, failures in the development of small non-nuclear submarines and in reducing the cost of the latest SSGNs have led to the fact that over the next 15 years we will, at best, stabilize the current situation.
What then can we say about the surface fleet, in the construction of which the Russian Navy, it seems, decided to make every conceivable mistake, without missing a single one …
To be continued.
