Frigate "Admiral Gorshkov"
What is still wrong with the domestic program of surface shipbuilding, adopted in the GPV 2011-2020? Immediately, we note that its developers faced a very non-trivial task. The resumption of the massive construction of surface ships after a twenty-year hiatus required the convergence of extremely contradictory requirements. On the one hand, the newly created ships were supposed to become reliable as a Kalashnikov assault rifle, because in the face of a landslide reduction in the number of ships, the country simply could not afford to build squadrons to stay at the berths. The fleet already has almost no BODs, destroyers, cruisers and TFRs of the 1st and 2nd ranks, and by 2030 - 2035 the overwhelming majority of them will have to leave the ranks. Therefore, the creation of unreliable ships in operation in the period 2011-2020 will leave the country without a surface fleet.
But how can you ensure the reliability of new projects? Usually, in such cases, designers try to adhere to time-tested, proven solutions in everyday operation. Here are just all the time-tested solutions we have twenty years ago and more, so putting them at the forefront means creating obviously outdated ships. Such a fleet of the Russian Federation is not needed - in the conditions of the numerical superiority of "probable allies" and "sworn friends", our projects should, at least, not yield, but it would be better to surpass similar foreign ones. To do this, new ships should be massively equipped with the latest systems, weapons and equipment, which, due to a pause in construction, have not been "tested" by the fleet, but in this case, reliability problems are almost inevitable.
Let's add to this the well-known antagonism between shipbuilders and naval sailors - quite often it is more convenient and / or profitable for shipbuilders to build something completely different from what the fleet needs, and vice versa - sailors often want to get something that design bureaus and industry are not able to give them.
In order to draw up a competent shipbuilding program taking into account all of the above, you need a systematic approach, the highest competence and professionalism, as well as sufficient powers to coordinate the activities of developers, manufacturers and "end users" - seafarers. It is necessary to identify potential adversaries, study the prospects for the development of their naval forces and the role of their fleets in the war against us. After assessing the goals and objectives, tactics, composition and quality of the potential enemy's naval forces and determining their own financial and industrial capabilities, set realistic tasks for their fleet, both in time of war and in time of peace, because the fleet is still a powerful political instrument. And not at the moment, but at least for a period of 35-40 years, because during this time the strengthening of its own fleet and changes in the composition of the Navy of potential adversaries, as well as the political situation in the world, can greatly change the tasks facing the Russian Navy.
BOD "Admiral Chabanenko"
And then, using the cost / efficiency scale with might and main, to determine by what means we will solve the assigned tasks: to deal with the possible performance characteristics of promising weapons (and all other) complexes, to determine the best carriers, to understand the role of submarines, aviation, surface ships, ground and space components of our naval defense (and attack) within the framework of the "general picture" of the goals and objectives of the Russian Navy. And, having thus understood why we generally need surface ships, determine their required classes, performance characteristics and quantity. So, for example, project 949A Antey SSGNs were created - from the task (destruction of the AUG) to the method of its solution (cruise missile strike), and through understanding the performance characteristics of a specific missile (Granite) to the required forces (24 missiles in a salvo) on an operational-tactical mission for a submarine ship. But the methods of solution could be different (coastal naval missile aircraft, carrier-based aircraft, etc.) - impartial calculations, analysis, professionalism and again professionalism are needed here in order to achieve maximum results without spending too much.
Was all this done during the formation of the 2011-2020 GPV in the part of the surface fleet? Is this being done today?
Consider the largest surface ships GPV 2011-2020. We are talking about the Mistral universal amphibious assault ships (UDC) and the Ivan Gren large amphibious assault ships (BDK). As you know, the first were planned for construction in the amount of 4 units, and the second - 6 units.
UDC "Mistral" in the last few years has been, perhaps, the most discussed in the press and "the Internet" ship. He had his supporters and opponents, but, according to the author of this article, the main reason for such a high interest in the French UDC is due to the fact that neither one nor the other fully understood why these ships are needed by the domestic fleet.
UDC "Diximud" of the "Mistral" type
And indeed. If we go to the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the section "Main Command of the Navy" and ask what tasks the said fleet should solve in wartime, then we will read:
1. Defeat enemy ground targets in remote areas;
2. Ensuring the combat stability of strategic missile submarines;
3. Inflicting defeat on anti-submarine strike and other enemy groupings, as well as coastal targets;
4. Maintaining a favorable operating regime;
5. Support from the sea for the front troops in the conduct of their defense or offensive in coastal areas;
6. Defense of the sea coast.
As you can see, the only task for which the Mistrals are somehow suitable is No. 5 "Support for troops from the sea", which can (and should) be understood, inter alia, as the landing of assault forces in the interests of the ground forces. At the same time, many supporters of the Mistrals just insisted that this type of ships, capable of landing troops from helicopters (and heavy equipment from landing boats), is capable of providing a qualitative leap in our operations of this type. The figures were given - if the tank landing ships of the USSR could provide landing on 4-5% of the world coast (simply because it is far from every place that the TDK can be brought to the coast), then for landing boats the availability is much higher (for displacement boats - 15-17%, for hovercraft boats - up to 70%) well, and helicopters in general are not hindered by any coastline.
Well, perhaps, the main command of the Navy really decided to take a step into the future in terms of organizing amphibious operations? But here's the question: if it really turned out that the Soviet ideas about the landing of marines and their equipment are outdated and we need UDCs - why then simultaneously with the Mistrals were going to build as many as six "Ivanov Grenov", which are, in essence, the development of the famous large landing ships "Tapir" project 1171, ie the quintessential Soviet approach to landing craft? After all, these ships are an expression of completely different concepts of amphibious operations. Why should we follow both at once?
And what did the sailors themselves say about this? Personified, perhaps, only the statement of the commander-in-chief of the Navy V. S. Vysotsky:
The Mistral is designed and built as a power and command projection ship … … it cannot be viewed in isolation as a helicopter carrier or landing craft, command ship or hospital floating. The presence of an equipped command center on board this class of ships makes it possible to control forces of various scales at any distance from the bases of the fleet in the sea and oceanic zones."
Of course, there is a rational grain in such a statement. The Mistral is indeed much more comfortable, has good opportunities for providing medical assistance, allows you to take on board a lot of supplies and people, and has a lot of space in order to stuff them with control equipment. It would be useful, for example, in missions of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. But as a control ship for several frigates trying to defeat the US 6th Fleet, it looks somewhat strange. Of course, not only the United States is our adversary, for example, the Syrian barmaley. But how would the Mistral help there? There is no way to do without the organization of a ground base for the aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces (the author does not specifically mention a large aircraft carrier, so as not to provoke a "holivar" not related to the topic of the article). And where is the ground base - there you can place combat helicopters, and control directly from there, why fence a vegetable garden with a control helicopter carrier?
And what else? Deliver goods to Syria? This is a big challenge, but isn't it expensive? Can it still be easier to buy Ukrainian transports on the cheap? If a little more seriously, the Russian Navy, alas, unencumbered by numerous overseas bases, simply must have a powerful fleet of auxiliary supply ships capable of servicing a grouping of ships where ordered - in the same Mediterranean Sea, for example. And unlike the Mistral, this is really one of the most urgent needs. Such ships could be used to supply the Khmeimim base.
What's interesting - let's say we deliberately turn everything upside down. Instead of first defining the tasks, and then finding out the classes and performance characteristics of ships to solve them, we will take it for granted that we ALWAYS need a helicopter carrier. That is needed, and that's it. And if it is needed, then let's think about how to adapt the helicopter carrier to the tasks of our fleet. Even so, even in this case, the Mistral does not look like a good option - it's funny, but the ideal candidate for the position of the Russian helicopter carrier would not be the UDC, but the modernized TAVKR project 1143, i.e. a cross between a missile cruiser and an anti-submarine helicopter carrier. Such a ship, being stuffed with anti-submarine helicopters, cruise missiles and powerful anti-aircraft weapons, but also having powerful means of communication and control, could well not only provide SSBN operations and participate in the defeat of hostile enemy ship groupings, but also perform many other tasks assigned (according to the website of the Ministry of Defense) to our fleet, including:
1. Search for nuclear missile and multipurpose submarines of a potential enemy and tracking them on routes and in mission areas in readiness for destruction with the outbreak of hostilities;
2. Observation of aircraft carrier and other naval strike groups of a potential enemy, tracking them in the areas of their combat maneuvering in readiness to strike at them with the beginning of hostilities
TAVKR "Baku"
And, of course, to carry out the very control of "forces of various scales at any distance from the bases of the fleet in the sea and oceanic zones", about which Vysotsky spoke. Interestingly, according to some, alas, anonymous sources, some in the Navy's headquarters thought about the same:
“We do not need the unarmed DVKD that the French Navy has. Such "mistrals", in fact, giant floating transports with modern systems of combat control, navigation, reconnaissance and communications, a kind of defenseless floating command posts that need to be covered both from the sea and from the air by other warships and aviation, - said a source in General Staff. - The DVKD of our Navy should not only control the actions of various types of forces of naval groupings (surface ships, submarines, naval aviation), or even the actions of interspecific groupings in naval and oceanic theaters of military operations,not only deliver and land marines on armored vehicles using helicopters and landing craft, but they themselves must have sufficient fire and strike power to be full-fledged self-protected multifunctional warships as part of these groups. Therefore, the Russian DVKD will be equipped with cruise missiles with an increased firing range, the latest air defense missile defense and anti-aircraft missile defense systems"
The author of this article would not like a resumption of the "holy war" on the topic of whether the Mistrals are needed by our fleet, or not. According to the author's personal opinion, which he does not impose on anyone, some kind of work for them in the Russian Navy would probably have been found (especially in non-war times). But the UDC "Mistral" was in no way a "basic necessity", and were not optimal for the performance of the tasks facing the Navy. This, in turn, leads to sad thoughts: either we set tasks for the fleet "for show", or the commander-in-chief of the Navy is not a decisive figure in the choice of classes and types of promising ships.
But back to the UDC. Another reason for the acquisition of Mistrals in France was the acquisition of modern technologies that were absent in the domestic fleet, and this meant both purely shipbuilding technologies and information technologies, such as the French BIUS (as if the French were going to sell it to us, yeah). Buying technology is definitely a good thing. But what technologies did the domestic navy most urgently need by the beginning of the 2011-2020 GPV?
During the Soviet era, the country had a powerful industry capable of producing a variety of types of ship power plants. Nuclear, boiler and turbine (KTU), gas turbine (GTU), diesel … in general, anything. But the problem was that not all of them were equally successful. It just so happened that we got excellent gas turbine and nuclear power plants, but somehow it did not work out with boiler turbines - it was KTU that became the “Achilles heel” of Project 956 destroyers, and everyone heard about the torment with the power plant of our only heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, who is even a little interested in the domestic military fleet. The same, alas, applies to the diesel installations of surface ships - we did not go well with them. Now let's see what power plants are equipped with the ships of the GPV-2011-2020 program.
In other words, someone decided that the Russian fleet would henceforth be diesel. And this despite the fact that in Russia the technologies for creating powerful marine diesel engines have not been worked out at all!
In terms of power plants for surface ships, the Russian Federation had a choice. We could use gas turbine units, but in their pure form they are not ideal. The fact is that, having acceptable weight and size characteristics and having a fairly low fuel consumption at a power close to the maximum, the gas turbine units were very “voracious” in the economic mode. But we could use the COGOG scheme, adopted on the cruisers of the 1164 Atlant project, where two gas turbines worked for each shaft, one, relatively low-power, for economic progress, the second for a complete one, however, it had a drawback: both turbines could not work on one shaft at a time. We could use the COGAG scheme, which duplicated COGOG in everything, with one exception - in it, both gas turbines can operate on the same shaft at the same time, and from this the power plant provides a higher speed than COGOG. EI of such a scheme is more complicated, but we were quite capable of mastering their production - our reliable as a bayonet SKR project 1135, as well as their descendants of project 11356 (including those that were supplied to India ) are equipped with just such installations.
But instead, for the frigates of Project 22350, we developed a power plant according to the CODAG scheme - when a diesel engine of economic speed and a gas turbine work on one shaft, while both of them can work on one shaft at the same time. Such installations are even somewhat heavier than COGAG, but this pays off with better fuel efficiency, both economically and at full speed. Of course, you have to pay for everything - of all of the above, it is CODAG that is the most difficult. Well, for the rest of the ships, we decided to use powerful marine diesel engines without a gas turbine.
However, problems could still have been avoided: the fact that the Country of Soviets was good at gas turbines and it doesn't matter - diesels is not a verdict at all. And this is not a reason to use exclusively GTU for all the millennia of long and happy life remaining in our country. If our professional specialists and fathers-commanders, having weighed all the pros and cons, came to the conclusion that the future belongs to the diesel engine, then so be it. But since we are not strong in this matter, who prevented us from acquiring the corresponding technologies abroad?
The pre-war USSR soberly assessed its capabilities in terms of creating modern and powerful turbines - there was some experience, but it was clear that the independent creation of relatively light, powerful and at the same time reliable turbine installations could take much more time than we had. Therefore, a very successful Italian model was purchased for the cruiser "Kirov" and Italian help in training the necessary specialists was bought. As a result, having spent the currency once, in return we acquired many years of Italian experience in turbine and boiler construction, and subsequently, using the knowledge gained, we developed improved models for the cruisers of the 68 and 68-bis project and other ships that proved to be excellent in service.
And since we decided that “diesels are our everything”, then we should have remembered the Stalinist experience - to acquire production lines, diesel projects or assistance in their development, to buy the necessary technologies … Yes, it is expensive, but this is how we could get a reliable product and in the future to design high-quality powerful ship diesel engines already independently. And if the military fleet of the Russian Federation is diesel, then all these costs would pay off handsomely, as the purchase of the power plant of the Italian cruiser in the 30s of the last century paid off. Diesels became for us a key element of the surface shipbuilding of the GPV 2011-2020, the success or failure of the program depended on them in the literal sense of the word, because the power plant is the heart of the ship, without which everything else no longer matters. This is what the money intended for the purchase of the Mistrals had to be spent on. But it was in this key area that we ignored the foreign experience, which we needed so badly, and decided to put on domestic developments - they say, and so it will do.
Corvette "Guarding"
The result was not long in coming. In 2006, the interagency tests of the DDA12000 units were completed with full success, and then a series of publications about the "propulsion" problems of the project 20380 corvettes, on which they were installed. Further, it was decided that the new, improved series 20385 will receive German diesel engines from MTU - it can be seen that the DDA12000, which passed all the required tests, turned out to be so "good". And again the proverb was confirmed that the miser pays twice: if he didn’t buy “fishing rods” in time, that is. projects, technologies and equipment for the production of marine diesel engines, we were forced to spend money on "fish", ie the diesels themselves. And then sanctions struck, and we were left without a German product. As a result, as of 2016, we have only projects of diesel corvettes, but we do not have reliable diesel engines for them. And how do you order to carry out the GPV 2011-2020 in its "corvette" part? The first serial corvette of project 20385 is equipped with the same DDA12000 … but what choice do we have?
A similar picture is observed with small ships - if the IAC "Buyan" supposedly received domestic diesel engines, then its "elder brother" - the missile "Buyan-M" - was supposed to run on diesel engines of the same German MTU according to the project. Of course, the import substitution program has started, some Buyany-M diesels will be received, but … the main thing is that the word “some” does not become the key word in this phrase.
We're talking about diesels. But our fleet will not live on diesel engines alone - gas turbines (diesel-gas turbine power units of the frigates "Admiral Gorshkov") should also be installed on the newest frigates of the Russian fleet. Interestingly, by the time the GPV 2011-2012 began, we could not make gas turbines for them either. In fact, it was like this - we either bought gas turbines from the Ukrainian company Zorya-Mashproekt, or they were made by the domestic NPO Saturn, but in the closest cooperation with Zorya, and the most complex parts of the turbines, their assembly and bench testing were carried out in Ukraine. Thus, no matter how awful it sounds, we got into a large-scale surface shipbuilding program without having any gas turbine production for them AT ALL. We were completely dependent on foreign suppliers!
Was it possible to correct this situation? As it turned out - no problem. When economic ties with Ukraine were severed, the same NPO Saturn was able to launch the production of power plants for frigates 20350 "Admiral Gorshkov" in Russia. And after all, which is typical, this did not require any super-efforts - neither the World Cup had to be canceled, nor the funding of Rusnano had to be cut. It's just that the leadership of "Saturn" has made another labor feat, that's all. In the context of high interest rates on loans, the ever-jumping dollar exchange rate, the WTO and regular global economic crises, daily exploits are, in general, a standard requirement of the job description for the head of any industrial enterprise in the Russian Federation. There is nothing to even talk about.
But only because of the lost time, we obviously disrupt the construction of ships of this type - instead of 8 units by 2020, we will get 6 units by 2025.
To plan the creation of a fleet without adequate ship engine building, and do almost nothing to correct this situation … Epithets that come to mind are colorful and juicy, but, alas, they are completely irreproducible in print. Here, after all, how? It has been said for more than 10 years that the country needs to get off the oil needle. And what is needed for this? Of course, to strengthen the non-resource sectors of the economy. And so, the Russian Federation is going to build a large surface fleet, the ships of which should receive diesel engines and gas turbines. What is the main problem of an industrial enterprise in a market economy? Instability of demand. Today it is like that, tomorrow it is different, the day after tomorrow a competitor came out with a new development and the demand for our products fell below low, tomorrow this competitor went bankrupt and the demand grew again … But building a fleet gives a guaranteed demand for the production of ship engines, their repair and maintenance. Here all the laws of economics are simply shouting: "Urgently build your own production!" That diesels, that gas turbines, it's not just that, this is a high-tech production, a whole industry, there are only one or two such enterprises all over the world, these are the jobs of engineers and highly qualified workers, these are taxes to the state treasury, these are possible export delivery!
Here you can argue, remembering the world division of labor and so on, that almost no state can fully provide itself with high-tech products alone, that we need to concentrate on what we do well, and buy the rest abroad. In some ways, this approach is correct. But not in the key areas on which the state's defense depends!
Against this background, any reasoning about how useful the Mistral is for us as a storehouse of shipbuilding technologies looks at least … strange, let's put it this way.
Frigates and corvettes. Before proceeding to the analysis of the success or failure of the ships of projects 11356, 20350, 20380 and 20385 (for which there is simply not enough space in this article, so we will deal with this in the next one), you need to answer the questions: how reasonable was it to assign solutions to problems surface forces of the Russian Navy on ships of the class "frigate" and "corvette"? How did it happen that we abandoned our usual destroyers, large and small anti-submarine ships and other TFR in favor of frigates and corvettes?
The frigate as a class of warships has undergone an interesting evolution - being a sailing prototype of cruisers, it was transformed into them, and its very name was forgotten for a long time. During the Second World War, the frigate returned, but in a completely different rank: now this was the name of relatively small escort destroyers designed to defend transport convoys, primarily ocean ones. But after the Second World War, he quietly unnoticed went the way from a purely auxiliary unit to the main universal missile and artillery ship of many fleets. At the end of the 20th century, small escort ships grew, became stronger and … ousted cruisers and destroyers from the lists of most of the world's navies.
In the USSR, the idea also arose of creating a kind of foreign frigates capable of solving the same tasks as they, only better. We have collected information on the most advanced ships of this type: Oliver H. Perry, Bremen, Cornwall, Maestrle, Kortenaer, MEKO 200 Yavuz, etc. The German "Bremen" was recognized as the best, and it was decided to surpass it, with which, I must say, Zelenodolsk PKB coped perfectly, having created an excellent project 11540 "Yastreb" in the early 80s of the last century.
project 11540 "Yaroslav the Wise"
Thus, the path "to the frigates" was trodden back in the USSR. By the way, the 1st Institute of the Navy proposed to call the project 11540 a frigate, but Gorshkov did not approve, preferring to call the "Hawk" a patrol ship (TFR). It is no less interesting that the same institute proposed to equip the Yastreb with a diesel-gas turbine installation according to the CODAG scheme (which was subsequently received by frigates 22350), but, sensibly assessing the capabilities of our industry, they preferred the gas-gas turbine version COGAG.
Well, then came a period of timelessness and lack of money. The fleet did not want to leave the oceans, but the construction of cruisers and large destroyers was impossible for economic reasons. Largely because of this, the economical frigate / corvette concept was adopted, in which the frigate was assigned the role of an ocean-going universal missile-artillery surface ship, while the corvette was to become an equally versatile ship in the near sea zone.
On the one hand, it seemed that such an approach was well founded and had the right to exist. Firstly, by doing so, the fleet had to avoid the amazing variety of ships of various types of the Soviet Navy, and unification is far from the last thing, even regardless of the size of the military budget. It is difficult to overestimate the benefits of the convenience of basing, supplying and repairing ships of the same type. For a fleet wishing to froth the oceanic expanses, such a decision also looked the most economical, because frigates were the smallest surface ships of all who could boast of an "oceanic" status. Ships of this class are very seaworthy and were distinguished by decent autonomy, which was confirmed to a certain extent by the Falklands Conflict of 1982, when the British "Broadswords" and "Alakriti" operated quite successfully on the other end of the Atlantic. Frigates evolved into versatile ships, but retained a moderate size and cost. So why don't we "designate" the frigate as the main missile-artillery ocean-going ship? Moreover, the same SKR of project 11540, being half the size of the BOD of project 1155, carried almost the same range of weapons - already at the stage of its creation, some experts noted that their massive construction could make large anti-submarine ships unnecessary, because much smaller and more cheap TFRs are quite capable of taking their place in the ocean.
In general, on the one hand, the frigate seemed like a panacea, but on the other … You should never get carried away with external analogies - they are often false. Yes, foreign frigates, reaching 3, 5 - 4 thousand.tons of standard displacement, really became generalists, capable of fighting against air, surface and underwater enemies. The only trouble is that they did all this equally badly. Anti-submarine defense? Some ships of this class were equipped with decent GAS or GAK, but the typical anti-submarine weapons of frigates of Western countries, with rare exceptions, were only 324-mm torpedo tubes. Which, neither in range nor in power, could in any way compete with the 533-mm torpedoes of modern submarines. And therefore, when the British ships in the Falklands found the diesel submarine "San Luis" attacking them, they pursued her, … without approaching her. The task of fire destruction of the enemy was entrusted to the helicopters, and they, despite all their efforts, could not do anything. Whether the British had at least the same ASROC or long-range 533-mm torpedoes, the result could have been different, but the British could only shoot themselves from a 324-mm torpedo tube.
Anti-aircraft weapons? More or less adequate protection was provided only by self-defense complexes like Sea Wolf, RAM or Crotal, but attempts to put something more serious gave rather psychological protection - mainly Sea Sparrow was used, which, as an air defense system, was evaluated in the USSR very low (including due to the lack of multichannel). Only Oliver H. Perry had a truly powerful air defense system with a Standard air defense system, but again at the cost of completely abandoning missile defense missiles, which is why our analysts considered its air defense to be almost the weakest of all frigates. Impact capabilities? As a rule, 4-8 small subsonic anti-ship missiles "Harpoon", "Exocet" or something similar - this should have been enough to destroy a missile boat, or even two, or "showdown" with a classmate, but not to attack a serious ship group.
The problem was that, despite its versatility, in the western fleets the frigate was still a secondary ship, designed to operate in the operational "shadow" of the "Big Brothers" represented by the US AUG. Yes, some fleets of NATO countries were built around frigates, but these fleets themselves were initially focused on solving secondary tasks. Even frigates were quite suitable for enlightening some African or Asian natives who had the same frigates, only smaller, worse and with less trained crews. And our "Yastreb", surpassing foreign frigates, nevertheless, was not spared their shortcomings - its anti-ship missile "Uran" was created to deal with relatively small (up to 5 thousand tons) targets, the anti-aircraft missile system - a short-range, here in the anti-submarine part, of course, he was good: the combination of a decent GAK and missile torpedoes was much more dangerous than the capabilities of almost any other frigate of the 80s. In principle, Project 11540, with certain reservations, could indeed replace the BOD 1155, but the problem is that the Udaloy BOD, acting without the support of ships of other classes, was not able to successfully solve the problems of fighting the enemy fleet in the ocean.
As a result, seemingly being in the same class with the western counterparts, the Russian frigate had to perform completely different tasks and in completely different conditions. Western frigates are, first of all, escort and anti-submarine defense ships, capable of finishing off what, by some miracle, survived after the carrier-based Nimitz aircraft and the Ticonderoog cruise missiles. Well, and protect yourself from a single aircraft or anti-ship missiles. No one has ever demanded that western frigates fight a numerically superior enemy under the dominance of enemy aircraft. But for Russian ships in the ocean, this became almost the only form of combat use.
In view of the above, the Russian Navy does not need frigate-class ships to solve its tasks in the oceans. He simply does not need them due to the lack of firepower inherent in this class of ships. The Russian Navy needs ships with the power of a full-fledged destroyer, and as a result … As a result, the project of a promising domestic frigate 20350 is an attempt to push the power of a destroyer into the displacement of a frigate.
And we can say the same about the idea of a Russian corvette. Having set ourselves the goal of creating a light (standard displacement less than 2,000 tons), but at the same time a universal missile and artillery ship, we tried to cram the power of the frigate into the displacement of the corvette.
But what came of it - in the next article.
To be continued!
