At the village of Waterloo, on June 18, 1815, the combined Anglo-Dutch army under the command of the Duke of Wellington and the Prussian army under the command of Field Marshal Gebhard Blucher inflicted a crushing defeat on Napoleon's army. On Thursday, Friday and Saturday, commemorative ceremonies will be held at the memorial field near the village of Waterloo, 15 kilometers south of the center of Brussels. In total, the celebration of the anniversary of Waterloo will attract at least one hundred thousand people to the place of the event. The historical reconstruction of the battle will be attended by about 5 thousand participants from different countries, including from Russian clubs, and 300 horses. For firing from guns to simulate a battle, 20 tons of gunpowder will be consumed.
Until the 2015 jubilee, one might think that Waterloo has long been a fact of European history. However, preparations for this year's festive event revealed that the wound inflicted by Waterloo still hurts the French. In March of this year, the French government banned the Belgian government from issuing a two-euro coin dedicated to Waterloo. The Belgians had to melt 180 thousand already minted coins. The French explained their decision by the fact that "excessive" tension in Europe and "side reactions in France" were undesirable. Waterloo, it is believed in Paris, may still cause tension. On Thursday, Paris will defiantly ignore the commemorative ceremony on the battlefield near Brussels. Belgium and Holland will be represented at the ceremony by their monarchs, Great Britain - by the heir to the prince, and the French Foreign Ministry will send secondary officials to it. French historical identity still has problems caused by the Great French Revolution and the loss of European cultural hegemony.
However, now in the shadow of Waterloo there was another extremely important, relevant and instructive European historical event - on June 9, 1815, exactly nine days before the battle at Waterloo, in Vienna in the Hofburg Palace, representatives of powers hostile to Napoleon signed the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, which formalized the system of international relations in Europe for the next 40-50 years. Napoleon's hypothetical victory at Waterloo would be a means of destroying the Vienna system created in opposition to the French Revolution. Waterloo as the final bloody sanction under the decisions of the Congress of Vienna has become a symbol of the end of one and the beginning of another historical era. The eighteenth century of the Enlightenment and the Great French Revolution ended at Waterloo.
Waterloo and the Congress of Vienna with the "Holy Alliance" system were a stage in the development of international law. However, upon closer examination of these two events, it should be recognized that the modern paradox of Waterloo and the Congress of Vienna is that of the main participants in these two events, only one Great Britain has "survived" to date. All other participants underwent, sometimes catastrophic, transformations or completely disappeared from the historical arena. For example, Belgium did not yet exist in 1815. Now there is neither the French Empire nor Prussia. As for the Congress of Vienna, of all the territorial changes it sanctioned in relation to the Russian, Austrian empires, kingdoms of Sweden, the Netherlands, Prussia and others, only one point has remained relevant to this day - the international recognition of the neutrality of the Swiss Confederation. Everything else has sunk into oblivion, something after nine days, something at the end of 1815, something 15 years after Congress, and something 100 after the First World War. The European map is very changeable and flexible. In addition, the Congress of Vienna in conjunction with Waterloo is a brilliant illustration of the fact that any system of international law is a simple reflection of the balance of power between the powers that sanctioned it. Napoleon did not fit into the Vienna system. He challenged her. Therefore, the Allies had to remove him from politics through Waterloo. The international system operates as long as it is beneficial to its participants, or until new political factors or new actors appear. No system of "international law" by itself can replace a realistic foreign policy. Ignoring real politics by creating a system that legitimizes the status quo increases the likelihood that the system will disintegrate under the pressure of specific realities of international politics. This is the main lesson of the Vienna Congress. Waterloo was only the first attempt to destroy it.
The main task of the Congress of Vienna was the decision on the former possessions of the Napoleonic Empire in Europe - vassal and semi-vassal, after the 1792 borders of the year were established with minor adjustments by the powers with France in May 1814. Initially, the representatives of the four allied states - Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia at the Congress of Vienna announced that decisions would be made only by these powers. As for the rest, they can only accept or reject decisions that have already taken place. However, the prince Talleyrand, authorized from France, with the support of the British, managed to ensure that representatives of France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden also took part in the meetings. In practical terms, this meant that a representative of the losing France in the war was added to the pool of victorious powers in Congress. However, his, Talleyrand, intrigues in some respects played an outstanding role in the Congress. Despite this, decisions on the main issues of European settlement at the Vienna Congress were not made on the basis of equal sovereign representation of all Congress participants. Fundamental issues were decided by the "powers". The Congress of Vienna has fully complied with the law of real politics.
The main goal of the Vienna system of international relations was the restoration of "equilibrium" in Europe. The main principle of the Vienna system was declared "legitimism", which was supposed to protect the "Sacred Union" of European monarchs created as a result of it. Legitimism was understood as the historical right of dynasties to resolve the main issues of state structure and state building. In this regard, historical dynasties were considered "legitimate", and not republics and vassal monarchies, on whose thrones Napoleon seated his relatives or henchmen. True, the Congress of Vienna was not consistent with the principle of legitimism. In relation to the King of Naples, Joachim Napoleon (Murat) and the Swedish crown prince Charles XIV Johan (Bernadotte), the legitimate principle was violated. The recognition of Bernadotte and Murat as "legitimate" at the Congress of Vienna was associated with their betrayal of Napoleon.
In the history of the Congress of Vienna, the theme of Russia and Europe, the first Russian participation in the creation of a European system of international relations under the auspices of the "Holy Union" is especially noteworthy for us. After the decisive victory over Napoleon in 1812, Russia had two foreign policy alternatives in the European direction: 1) invade Europe to inflict a final defeat on Napoleon; 2) refuse to invade and leave Europe to itself. The latter was strongly advised by the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, to Emperor Alexander I. Alexander disregarded his advice.
The main thing for Russia in the European system that was being created was the Polish question. With regard to Poland, it was important for Russia to solve two problems:
1) ensure the incorporation into Russia of the territories obtained during the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, 1773, 1795 and prevent the Polish revision of the partitions;
2) to guarantee the safety of Russia from an attack from the territory of Poland. The experience of the Napoleonic wars demonstrated that the Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon in 1807 from the nucleus of divided Polish territories, turned with each military campaign of Napoleon in the East into a bridgehead and an enemy resource potential for an attack on Russia.
After the final defeat of Napoleon in 1814, Russia had two possible decisions regarding the Duchy of Warsaw occupied by Russian troops:
1) to restore on its basis the Polish state vassal from Russia;
2) return the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw to its former owners in the areas of the Commonwealth - Prussia and Austria.
Formally, the Congress of Vienna defended the rights of legitimate dynasties. In this respect, the Poles were "deprived". They did not have a dynasty of their own. Therefore, "legitimism" about Poland meant that it could be divided. The previous partitions of Poland were recognized as "legitimate" from the point of view of the powers. This logic suggested that the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw should return to Prussia. And Krakow from its structure - to Austria.
Russia at the Vienna Congress chose the first option. Of decisive importance for this outcome were:
1) Russia's involvement in European affairs after 1812 (how to refuse territorial reward after the victory over Napoleon, if all other powers are going to take territories?);
2) the presence, since 1803, of a ready-made political project of the Polish state under the scepter of the Romanov dynasty, prepared by the friend of the emperor, the Polish prince Adam Czartoryski;
3) the personality of Emperor Alexander I, who in his outlook was neither Russian nor Orthodox.
The restoration of Poland did not correspond to either Russian public opinion or Russian foreign policy expediency. However, the victories in the war with Napoleon turned the head of the Russian tsar, who in his upbringing, psychology and salon culture was generally inclined to mysticism. Alexander began to see himself as an instrument of God, destined to free Europe from the evils of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and its personal embodiment - Napoleon. The tsar felt obliged to restore the Polish state. The new Polish state not only satisfied the principles of "Christian justice" dear to the imperial heart, but also allowed Alexander I to appear on the political stage in the long-desired role of a constitutional monarch. The Polish plan of the Czartoryski circle was associated with the general goals of the European reform of Russia, in which Poland was to play the role of a skirmisher.
At the Vienna Congress, the territorial claims of the Russian Empire against Poland met with resistance from Great Britain and the Austrian Empire. The plan to re-establish the Polish state under the rule of the Russian Tsar was supported by Prussia. In the Polish question against Russia and Prussia, the French envoy Talleyrand intrigued.
The main territories of the Kingdom of Poland planned by Alexander I until 1807 belonged to Prussia. Consequently, Prussia was to receive compensation from Russia at the expense of the German princes, who were allies of Napoleon until the end of 1813. The most desirable territory for Prussia "for Poland" was to become the economically developed Saxony. As a result, Poland and Saxony became the first major source of controversy at the Vienna Congress. The controversy in Vienna went so far that on January 3, 1815, representatives of Great Britain, Austria and France reached a secret agreement directed against Prussia and Russia. There was no complete unity between Prussia and Russia. The Prussian representative Hardenberg began to ponder the prospect: and not whether Prussia should join the anti-Russian coalition?
The resulting anti-Russian combination was a clear historical warning to Russia, since it marked the very configuration of the coalition hostile to Russia that manifested itself in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Napoleon, who returned to Paris for "One Hundred Days" in vain, warned Alexander I about the anti-Russian intrigue at the Congress. The return of Napoleon to power in France smoothed out the differences between the powers at the Congress of Vienna and led to an early compromise on all key issues. On March 13, 1815, a declaration was signed against Napoleon, declaring him an "enemy of the human race" and outlawing him. On March 25, 1815, Austria, England, Prussia and Russia entered into a new defensive and offensive alliance against Napoleon in Vienna. The fear inspired by Napoleon's return put an end to petty strife, and Congress vigorously tackled the most important and urgent matters. Against this background, on the eve of Waterloo, the Final Act of the Congress was prepared.
According to the decisions of the Vienna Congress, the Kingdom of Poland was created as an integral part of the Russian Empire, endowed with numerous attributes of a sovereign state and being in dynastic union with Russia.
Prussia received for the creation of the Kingdom of Poland in compensation from the territory of the former Duchy of Warsaw - Poznan with the region. From the German principalities to compensation for Poland because of the compromise with Austria, only half of Saxony, but, more importantly, the Rhineland and the former kingdom of Jerome Bonaparte to Westphalia. The new western regions did not have a direct territorial connection with the core of the kingdom of Prussia, which in the near future invited Prussian strategists to fight for a corridor to them. A similar connection between the North German territories was created by Prussia following the war with Austria in 1866.
So, let us note that the end of the June 9, 1815 Congress of Vienna marks the maximum territorial expansion of the Russian Empire into Europe. The indicated advancement at the expense of Poland was paid for by territorial compensation of Prussia. These compensations created the preconditions for the decisive success of this country in the future unification of Germany. The main rival of Prussia, the Austrian Empire, following the results of the Vienna Congress, was content with significant territorial increments in the Balkans and Italy, which made the Habsburg empire an even more "non-German" state. Italian tension diminished Vienna's strength in the struggle with Prussia for hegemony in Germany. Thus, Russian diplomacy at the Vienna Congress laid the foundations for an unfavorable turn of affairs in Germany for Russia. The negative consequences of the unification of Germany under the domination of Prussia were fully manifested for Russia in 1878 at the Berlin Congress.
One more significant remark, concerning this time the reverse side of the medal of the Congress of Vienna - "Hundred Days" of Napoleon and Waterloo. Napoleon was twice offered a peace compromise by the enemy coalition in 1813, which the Emperor of France rejected. For Napoleon, any other status was unacceptable for France, except for its primacy in Old Europe. The hegemony of France, on closer examination, was ensured by the possession of two territories - Flanders and the Rhine region with the "natural border" of France along the Rhine. As a result of the Congress of Vienna, half of these key territories for French imperialism were transferred to Prussia with the sanction and with the direct participation of the Russian tsar, which ensured the hegemony of this state in Germany. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Napoleon struck his first blow in the military campaign of 1815 on the other half, then controlled by Britain, on Flanders. It ended for the emperor in defeat at Waterloo.
Prussia, which united Germany, in 1914, during the outbreak of the World War, exposed Russia to Poland and the second part of the "French imperialist legacy of Napoleon" - Flanders, which at that time was called Belgium and whose neutrality was guaranteed by the same Great Britain. British control after the Congress of Vienna over key areas of Belgium and Holland was not only a means of security for the British Isles, but also served to prevent the emergence of a continental European hegemon - be it France or Germany. Flanders and the Rhine are the key geopolitical areas of Old Europe.
As for the "Polish question", the 19th century has convincingly demonstrated that the main outcome of the Vienna Congress is the Kingdom of Poland, whether in the version of the constitutional monarchy or in the version of the "provinces of the Vistula region", with all its political, legal and social structure, as well as culture. was a foreign body in the Russian Empire.
The twentieth century showed other, alternative to the Congress of Vienna, options for resolving the "Polish question". Independent Poland, created after the First World War, remained a state hostile to Russia throughout its history from 1918 to 1939. Poland coped well with the role of a buffer separating Russia from Europe, but only in relation to Russia ("Miracle on the Vistula"), but not Germany. The 1939 “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” seemed to repeat the variants of the partition of Poland in 1793 and 1795. In 1941, as in 1812, the territory of Poland served as a springboard for the attack on Russia (USSR). The Governorship General of 1940 is a historical reminder of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807.
The Yalta system tried to play a different game in the case of Poland than Vienna in 1815. If the Congress of Vienna compensated Prussia for the creation of Poland under the auspices of Russia, then Yalta compensated Poland for its Soviet vassalage at the expense of Prussia. "People's" Poland received six historical regions of Prussia - East Prussia, Danzig, Pomerania, Poznan, Silesia and part West Prussia along the Oder River. However, such a territorial combination did not remove the "Polish issue" from the agenda of Russia and did not add the Poles' gratitude to our country. In practice, the Helsinki Final Act was intended to guarantee Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR against German territorial revisionism and revanchism. The irony of history: in 2014-2015, it was Germany with its European allies who began to appeal to the very principle of “inviolability of borders” from Helsinki, which was assigned to it at the start of the process.
Indeed, Russia, as Rousseau predicted, will sooner or later choke on an attempt to absorb the Kingdom of Poland, and such an indigestion will result in suffering not only for the Poles, but also for the Russian state and Russian society. The question "what to do with Poland?" stood up to its full height for Moscow immediately after 1992.
In 2014, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that Ukraine, incited by the United States and Germany, took on the former Polish historical role of a troublemaker and rebel in relation to Russia. So far, the "Polish question" for Russia is being resolved from the opposite, that is, by ousting Russia from Europe and depriving it of its sovereignty. True, in this respect, the lessons of the Vienna Congress of 1815 should partly inspire us with optimism. After all, the general impression of the Vienna Congress was this: its participants cared more about the benefits of dynasties than about the fate of peoples. Most importantly, the Congress of Vienna neglected the national aspirations of the divided peoples - Germans, Italians and Poles. Sooner or later, these aspirations were realized, which led to the collapse of the Vienna system in Europe in less than half a century. However, such optimism should not turn a blind eye to another important lesson of the Vienna Congress: Russia, as a civilizational phenomenon alien to Europe, needs to act extremely carefully on the field of European politics.
