The Mongol invasion of Russia in 1237-1241 did not become a big disaster for some Russian politicians of that time. On the contrary, they even improved their position. The chronicles do not hide especially the names of those who may have been a direct ally and partner of the notorious "Mongol-Tatars". Among them is the hero of Russia, Prince Alexander Nevsky.
In our previous article on Batu's invasion of North-Eastern Russia in 1237-1238, we made attempts to calculate the mileage traveled by the conquerors, and also posed questions full of amateurism about the food and supply of the giant Mongol army. Today, the Interpreter's Blog publishes an article by Dmitry Chernyshevsky, a Saratov historian, a member of the United Russia party and a deputy of the Saratov Regional Duma, “Russian Allies of the Mongol-Tatars,” which he wrote back in 2006.
We immediately make a reservation that we do not share the "Eurasian" approach of the researcher (he is a follower of folk historian L. N. Gumilyov), as well as a number of his conclusions, but we just want to note that after V. V. Kargalova was one of the few Russian historians who seriously raised the question of the real size of the army of the steppe people in the campaign against Russia (you can read his opinion in the article: D. V. Chernyshevsky. There are countless arrivals, like pruzi // Voprosy istorii, 1989, no. 2. Pp. 127-132).
After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Slavic and Turkic ethnic groups in the Russian Federation became an ethnic dominant that determines the fate of the state. Interest in the past of Russian-Tatar relations, in the history of the great Turkic state on the territory of our homeland, the Golden Horde, has naturally grown. A lot of works have appeared that in a new way illuminating various aspects of the emergence and existence of the Chingizid state, the relationship between the Mongols and Russia (1), the school of "Eurasianism", which considers Russia as the heir to the power of Genghis Khan, gained wide recognition in Kazakhstan, Tatarstan and in Russia itself (2) … Through the efforts of L. N. Gumilyov and his followers, the very concept of "Mongol-Tatar yoke" was shaken in its very foundations, which for many decades pervertedly represented the medieval history of Russia (3). The approaching 800th anniversary of the proclamation of Genghis Khan (2006), widely celebrated in China, Mongolia, Japan and has already caused an avalanche of publications in Western historiography, is fueling interest in the world-historical events of the 13th century, including in Russia. The traditional ideas about the destructive consequences of the Mongol invasion (4) have already been largely revised, the time has come to raise the question of revising the reasons and nature of the Mongol conquest of Russia.
Long gone are the days when it was thought that the success of the Mongol invasion was due to the enormous numerical superiority of the conquerors. The representations of the "three hundred thousandth horde" that have wandered through the pages of historical books since the time of Karamzin have been archived (5). By the end of the twentieth century, by the end of the twentieth century, historians were taught by the many years of efforts of the followers of G. Delbrück to a critical approach to the sources and application of professional military knowledge in describing the wars of the past. However, the rejection of the idea of the Mongol invasion as the movement of countless hordes of barbarians, drinking rivers on their way, leveling cities to the ground and turning inhabited lands into deserts, where only wolves and crows remained the only living creatures (6), makes us ask a question - and How did a small people manage to conquer three quarters of the then known world? With regard to our country, this can be formulated as follows: how the Mongols were able in 1237-1238. to accomplish what was beyond the power of either Napoleon or Hitler - to conquer Russia in winter?
The general genius of Subudai-Bagatur, the commander-in-chief of the Western campaign of the Genghisids and one of the largest commanders in world military history, the superiority of the Mongols in the organization of the army, in the strategy and the very way of waging war, of course, played a role. The operational-strategic art of the Mongolian commanders was strikingly different from the actions of their opponents and rather resembled the classic operations of the generals of the Moltke Sr. school. References to the impossibility of the feudally fragmented states to resist the nomads united by the iron will of Genghis Khan and his successors are also fair. But these general premises do not help us answer three specific questions: why bother with the Mongols in the winter of 1237-1238? went to Northeastern Russia, as the many thousands of cavalry of the conquerors solved the main problem of the war - supply and foraging in enemy territory, how the Mongols managed to defeat the military forces of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir so quickly and easily.
Hans Delbrück argued that the study of the history of wars should be based primarily on the military analysis of campaigns, and in all cases of contradictions between analytical conclusions and data from sources, a decisive preference should be given to analytics, no matter how authentic the ancient sources are. Considering the Western campaign of the Mongols in 1236-1242, I came to the conclusion that within the framework of traditional ideas about the invasion, based on written sources, it is impossible to give a consistent description of the campaign of 1237-1238. In order to explain all the available facts, it is necessary to introduce new characters - the Russian allies of the Mongol-Tatars, who acted as the "fifth column" of conquerors from the very beginning of the invasion. The following considerations prompted me to pose the question in this way.
First, the Mongolian strategy ruled out campaigns that were meaningless from a military point of view and an indiscriminate offensive in all azimuths. The great conquests of Genghis Khan and his successors were carried out by the forces of a small people (experts estimate the population of Mongolia in the range from 1 to 2.5 million people (7)), operating on gigantic theaters of military operations that were thousands of miles apart against superior opponents (eight). Therefore, their strikes are always well thought out, selective and subordinated to the strategic goals of the war. In all their wars, without exception, the Mongols have always avoided unnecessary and premature expansion of the conflict, the involvement of new opponents before crushing old ones. Isolating enemies and defeating them one by one is the cornerstone of Mongol strategy. This is how they acted during the conquest of the Tanguts, during the defeat of the Jin Empire in Northern China, during the conquest of the Southern Song, in the struggle against Kuchluk Naimansky, against the Khorezmshahs, during the invasion of Subudai and Jebe into the Caucasus and Eastern Europe in 1222-1223. During the invasion of Western Europe in 1241-1242. The Mongols tried unsuccessfully to isolate Hungary and exploit the contradictions between the emperor and the pope. In the struggle against the Rum sultanate and Hulagu's campaign against Baghdad, the Mongols isolated their Muslim opponents, attracting the Christian principalities of Georgia, Armenia and the Middle East to their side. And only Batu's campaign against North-Eastern Russia, within the framework of traditional ideas, looks like an unmotivated and unnecessary diversion of forces from the direction of the main blow and decisively drops out of ordinary Mongolian practice.
The objectives of the Western campaign were determined at the kurultai of 1235. Eastern sources speak of them quite definitely. Rashid ad-Din: “In the year of the ram (1235 - D. Ch.), the blessed gaze of the Kaan stopped on the fact that from the princes Batu, Mengu-kaan and Guyuk-khan, together with other princes and a large army, went to the region of the Kipchaks, Russians, Bular, Madjar, Bashgird, Ases, Sudak and those lands for the conquest of those”(9). Juvaini: “When Kaan Ugetay for the second time arranged a large kuriltai (1235-BC) and appointed a meeting regarding the destruction and extermination of the rest of the disobedient, then a decision was made to take possession of the Bulgar countries, the Ases and Russia, which were in the vicinity of the Batu encampment, were not still finally subdued and proud of their multitude”(10). Only the peoples who are at war with the Mongols since the campaign of Jebe and Subudai in 1223-1224 and their allies are listed. In the "Secret Legend" (Yuan Chao bi shi), in general, the entire western campaign is called the sending of princes to help Subeetai, who started this war in 1223 and was re-appointed to command on Yaik in 1229 (11). In a letter from Batu Khan to the Hungarian king Bele IV, selected by Yuri Vsevolodovich from the Mongol ambassadors in Suzdal, it is explained why the Hungarians (Magyars) were included in this list: “I learned that you keep the slaves of my Cumans under your protection; why I command you not to keep them with you, so that because of them I will not turn against you”(12).
The South Russian princes became enemies of the Mongols in 1223, intervening for the Polovtsians. Vladimirskaya Rus did not participate in the battle on Kalka and was not in the war with Mongolia. The northern Russian principalities did not pose a threat to the Mongols. The forest northeastern Russian lands had no interest for the Mongol khans. VL Egorov, drawing conclusions about the goals of the Mongolian expansion in Russia, rightly notes: “As for the lands inhabited by Russians, the Mongols remained completely indifferent to them, preferring the familiar steppes that ideally corresponded to the nomadic way of life of their economy” (13). Moving to the Russian allies of the Polovtsians - the Chernigov, Kiev and Volyn princes and further to Hungary - why was it necessary to make an unnecessary raid on North-Eastern Russia? There was no military necessity - protection against a flank threat - since Northeastern Russia did not pose such a threat. The main goal of the campaign, the diversion of forces to the Upper Volga did not help at all to achieve, and purely predatory motives could have waited until the end of the war, after which it would have been possible to devastate Vladimir Russia without haste, thoroughly, and not at a gallop, as happened in the current reality. Actually, as shown in the work of Dmitry Peskov, the "pogrom" of 1237-1238. it is greatly exaggerated by tendentious medieval pamphleteers like Serapion of Vladimir and historians who uncritically perceived his lamentations (14).
The campaign of Batu and Subudai to Northeastern Russia receives a rational explanation only in two cases: Yuri II openly sided with the enemies of the Mongols or Mongols in Zalesskaya Rus, the Russians themselves called in to participate in their internecine clashes, and Batu's campaign was a raid to help local Russians allies, allowing quickly and without great efforts to secure the strategic interests of the Mongol Empire in this region. What we know about the actions of Yuri II says that he was not a suicide: he did not help the southern princes on the Kalka, did not help the Volga Bulgars (VN Tatishchev reports this), did not help Ryazan, and generally kept strictly defensive. Nevertheless, the war began, and this indirectly indicates that it was provoked from within Vladimir-Suzdal Rus.
Secondly, the Mongols never launched an invasion at all without preparing it by decomposing the enemy from the inside, the invasions of Genghis Khan and his generals always relied on an internal crisis in the enemy's camp, on treason and betrayal, on luring rival groups inside the enemy country to their side. During the invasion of the Jin Empire (Northern China), the “White Tatars” (Onguts) who lived near the Great Wall of China, the Khitan tribes (1212) who rebelled against the Jurchens (1212), and the Chinese of the Southern Song, who had imprudently concluded an alliance with the invaders, went over to the side of Genghis Khan. During the invasion of Chepe into the state of Kara-Kitai (1218), the Uighurs of East Turkestan and the inhabitants of the Muslim cities of Kashgaria sided with the Mongols. The conquest of southern China was accompanied by the side of the Mongols of the mountain tribes of Yunnan and Sichuan (1254-1255) and massive treason by the Chinese generals. Thus, the impregnable Chinese fortress of Sanyang, which Kublai's armies could not take for five years, was surrendered by its commander.
The Mongol invasions of Vietnam were supported by the South Vietnamese state of Champa. In Central Asia and the Middle East, the Mongols skillfully used the contradictions between the Kipchak and Turkmen khans in the state of Khorezmshahs, and then between Afghans and Turks, Iranians and Khorezm warriors of Jalal ed-Din, Muslims and Christian principalities of Georgia and Cilician Armenia, Baghdad Idorians Mesopotamia, tried to win over the crusaders. In Hungary, the Mongols skillfully incited enmity between the Catholics-Magyars and the Polovtsy who had retreated to Pashta, some of whom went over to the side of Batu. And so on and so forth. As the prominent Russian military theorist of the early 20th century, General AA Svechin, wrote, the stake on the "fifth column" stemmed from the very essence of Genghis Khan's advanced strategy. “The Asian strategy, with a huge scale of distances, in the era of predominantly pack transport, was unable to organize a correct supply from the rear; the idea of relocating the basing to the areas lying ahead, only fragmentarily flickering in the European strategy, was the main one for Genghis Khan. The base ahead can only be created by political disintegration of the enemy; widespread use of funds located behind the enemy's front is possible only if we find like-minded people in his rear. Hence, the Asian strategy required a forward-looking and insidious policy; all means were good for ensuring military success. The war was preceded by extensive political intelligence; did not skimp on bribes or promises; all the possibilities of opposing some dynastic interests to others, some groups against others were used. Apparently, a major campaign was undertaken only when there was a conviction of the presence of deep cracks in the state organism of a neighbor”(15).
Was Russia an exception to the general rule that belonged to the main ones in the Mongolian strategy? No, it wasn't. The Ipatiev Chronicle reports about the transition to the side of the Tatars of the Bolkhov princes, who supplied the conquerors with food, fodder, and, obviously, guides (16). What was possible in Southern Russia is undoubtedly admissible for North-Eastern Russia. Indeed, there were those who went over to the side of the Mongols. "The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan by Batu" points to "a certain from the nobles of Ryazan," advising Bat that it is better to demand from the Ryazan princes (17). But in general, the sources are silent about the "fifth column" of conquerors in Zalesskaya Rus.
Is it possible on this basis to reject the assumption of the existence of Russian allies of the Mongol-Tatars during the invasion of 1237-1238? In my opinion, no. And not only because for any discrepancy between these sources and the conclusions of military analysis, we must resolutely reject the sources. But also according to the well-known paucity of sources about the Mongol invasion of Russia in general and the falsification of the Russian northeastern chronicles in this part - in particular.
As you know, the first predecessor of the “red professor” MN Pokrovsky, who proclaimed that “history is politics overturned into the past”, was Nestor the Chronicler. On the direct instructions of the Grand Duke Vladimir Monomakh and his son Mstislav, he falsified the most ancient Russian history, depicting it biased and one-sided. Later, the Russian princes became skilled in the art of rewriting the past; they did not escape this fate and the chronicles telling about the events of the XIII century. In fact, historians do not have the authentic chronicle texts of the 13th century at their disposal, only later copies and compilations. The most closely related to that time are considered to be the South Russian Arch (Ipatiev Chronicle, compiled at the court of Daniel Galitsky), Laurentian and Suzdal Chronicles of North-Eastern Russia and Novgorod Chronicles (mainly Novgorod First). The Ipatiev Chronicle brought to us a number of valuable details about the Mongol campaign in 1237-1238. (for example, the message about the capture of Ryazan Prince Yuri and the name of the commander who defeated Prince Yuri Vladimirsky in the City), but on the whole she is poorly aware of what was happening at the other end of Russia. The Novgorod chronicles suffer from extreme laconicism in everything that goes beyond Novgorod, and in the coverage of events in the neighboring Vladimir-Suzdal principality, they are often no more informative than the eastern (Persian and Arab) sources. And as for the Vladimir-Suzdal chronicles, then regarding the Laurentian one there is a proven conclusion that the description of the events of 1237-1238. was falsified in a later period. As G. M. Prokhorov proved, the pages dedicated to the Batu invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle were radically revised (18). At the same time, the entire canvas of events - the description of the invasion, the dates of the capture of cities - has been preserved, so the question naturally arises - what then was erased from the chronicle compiled on the eve of the Battle of Kulikovo?
The conclusion of G. M. Prokhorov about the pro-Moscow revision seems to be fair, but it needs a more extensive explanation. As you know, Moscow was ruled by the heirs of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his famous son Alexander Nevsky - consistent supporters of subordination to the Mongols. The Moscow princes achieved supremacy in North-Eastern Russia with "Tatar sabers" and servile obedience to the conquerors. The poet Naum Korzhavin had every reason to contemptuously speak about Ivan Kalita:
However, under Metropolitan Alexy and his spiritual comrades-in-arms Sergius of Radonezh and Bishop Dionysius of Nizhny Novgorod (the direct customer of the Laurentian Chronicle), Moscow became the center of national resistance to the Horde and eventually led the Russians to the Kulikovo field. Later, in the 15th century. The Moscow princes led the struggle against the Tatars for the liberation of the Russian lands. In my opinion, all the chronicles that were within the reach of the Moscow princes and subsequently the tsars were edited precisely in terms of depicting the behavior of the founders of the dynasty, who clearly did not fit into the blissful picture of the heroic struggle against the Golden Horde. Since one of these ancestors - Alexander Nevsky - had the posthumous fate of becoming a national myth that was renewed in Russian history at least three times - under Ivan the Terrible, under Peter the Great and under Stalin - everything that could cast a shadow on the impeccable figure of a national hero, was destroyed or discarded. A glimpse of the holiness and integrity of Alexander Nevsky, naturally, fell on his father, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich.
Therefore, it is impossible to trust the silence of the Russian chronicles
Let us take into account these preliminary considerations and proceed to analyze the situation and prove the thesis that the Mongol invasion in 1237-1238. to North-Eastern Russia was caused by the internecine struggle of the Russian princes for power and was directed to the approval of the allies of Batu Khan in Zalesskaya Rus.
When this article was already written, I became aware of the publication of A. N. Sakharov, in which a similar thesis was put forward (19). The well-known historian A. A. Gorsky saw in it "a tendency to debunk Alexander Nevsky, which turned out to be so contagious that one author came to the conclusion that Alexander and his father Yaroslav had conspired with Batu during the latter's invasion of North-Eastern Russia in 1238" (twenty). This forces me to make an important clarification: I am not going to engage in any kind of “debunking” of Nevsky, and I consider such assessments to be a burp of the politicized mythology of the past, which I mentioned above. Alexander Nevsky does not need defenders like A. A. Gorsky. In my principled conviction, the fact that he and his father were consistent allies of the Mongols and supporters of subordination to the Golden Horde can in no way be a reason for moral speculations of modern "patriots".
For the simple reason that the Golden Horde is the same our state, the predecessor of modern Russia, like ancient Russia. But the attitude of some modern historians of Russia to the Tatars as to "strangers", "enemies", and to the Russian principalities as "their own" - is an unacceptable mistake, incompatible with the search for truth, and an insult to millions of Russian people, in whose veins the blood of ancestors flows from the Great Steppe. Not to mention the citizens of the Russian Federation, Tatar and other Turkic nationalities. The recognition of the immutable fact that modern Russia is as much the heir to the Golden Horde as the ancient Russian principalities is the cornerstone of my approach to the events of the 13th century.
The arguments in favor of the assumption of the alliance of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich with Batu Khan as the reason for the Mongol campaign against North-Eastern Russia are, in addition to the above:
- the character of Prince Yaroslav and his relationship with his older brother Yuri II;
- the nature of the actions of Yuri II when repelling the invasion;
- the nature of the actions of the Mongols in the winter of 1237-1238, which cannot be explained without the assumption of the help of local Russian allies;
- the nature of the actions of the Mongols after the campaign in Vladimir Russia and the subsequent close cooperation with them Yaroslav and his son Alexander Nevsky.
Let's take a closer look at them.
Yaroslav Vsevolodovich is the third son of Vsevolod III the Big Nest, the father of Alexander Nevsky and the founder of the Rurikovich branch that ruled in Russia until the end of the 16th century. Since the descendants of his son became Moscow tsars, and Nevsky himself became a national hero and political myth of Russia, a glimpse of their glory involuntarily fell on this prince, to whom Russian historians traditionally have great respect. The facts indicate that he was an unscrupulous ambitious, a cruel feudal seeker of thrones, who had been striving for the highest power all his life.
In his youth, he became the main inspirer of the internecine war among the sons of Vsevolod III, which ended in the infamous Battle of Lipitsa (1216), in which his and his brother Yuri's army was defeated with huge losses. Mstislav Udatny's ambassadors to Yuri II, who before the battle tried to settle the matter peacefully, directly pointed to Yaroslav as the main reason for the war: your brother. We ask you, make peace with your oldest brother, give him the eldership according to his truth, and they told Yaroslav to release the Novgorodians and Novotorzhans. May human blood not be shed in vain, for that God will demand from us”(21). Yuri then refused to reconcile, but later, after the defeat, he recognized the correctness of the Novgorodians, reproaching his brother that he had brought him to such a sad situation (22). Yaroslav's behavior before and after the Battle of Lipitsa - his cruelty, expressed in the seizure of Novgorod hostages in Torzhok and in the order to kill them all after the battle, his cowardice helmet, later found by historians, after the battle he was the first of the brothers to surrender to the victors, begging forgiveness and volosts from his elder brother Konstantin, and from his father-in-law Mstislav - the return of his wife, the future mother of Alexander Nevsky), his merciless ambition (at the instigation of Yaroslav, Yuri gave an order to not to take prisoners to the battle; confident of their victory, the brothers divided all of Russia up to Galich among themselves in advance) - they allowed A. Zorin to call him “the most repulsive personality of the Lipitsk epic” (22).
His entire subsequent life before the invasion was a continuous search for power. Specific Pereyaslavl did not suit Yaroslav, he fought for power over Novgorod for a long time and stubbornly, because of his cruelty and stubbornness, a tendency to talk and arbitrary punishments, constantly causing uprisings against himself. Finally, in the early 1230s. he did establish himself in Novgorod, but the dislike of the townspeople and the limited rights of the summoned prince pushed him to search for a more attractive "table". In 1229 Yaroslav organized a conspiracy against his brother Yuri II, who in 1219 became the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The conspiracy was discovered, but Yuri did not want - or could not - punish his brother, limiting himself to external reconciliation (23). After that, Yaroslav got involved in the struggle for Kiev, which he even captured in 1236, but under pressure from the Chernigov Prince Mikhail was forced to leave and return before the invasion of Suzdal.
Here begins the chronicle riddles: the southern Ipatiev Chronicle reports about Yaroslav's departure to the north, VN Tatishchev writes about this, while the northern chronicles are silent and depict events as if Yaroslav returned to Zalesskaya Rus only in the spring of 1238 after the invasion. He accepted the inheritance of his deceased brother Yuri, buried those killed in Vladimir and sat in the great reign (24). Most historians lean towards the northern news (25), but I believe that V. N. Tatishchev and the Ipatiev Chronicle are right. Yaroslav was in North-Eastern Russia during the invasion.
First, it is obvious that the southern chronicler was more aware of South Russian affairs than his Novgorod and Suzdal colleagues. Secondly, it was Yaroslav's behavior during the invasion, in my opinion, that was the main object of correction in the Laurentian Chronicle: the version of Yu. V. Limonov about corrections associated with the reasons for Vasilko Rostovsky's non-arrival at Kalka (26) cannot be considered serious. Vasilko died in 1238, and the Rostov principality by the time the chronicle was edited had long been plundered and annexed to Moscow, and no one cared about the ancient princes of Rostov. Thirdly, the supporters of Karamzin's version of the coming of Yaroslav to Vladimir in the spring of 1238 from Kiev are not able to clearly explain how this could have happened. Yaroslav came to Vladimir with a strong retinue, and very quickly - when the corpses of the killed townspeople had not yet been buried. How this can be done from distant Kiev, when Mongol troops were moving along all the routes to Zalesye, leaving Torzhok in the steppe - it is not clear. Equally, it is not clear why his brother Yuri sent for help from the City to Yaroslav - to Kiev (27). Obviously, Yaroslav was much closer, and Yuri hoped that his brother's strong squad would have time to approach the gathering place of the grand ducal army.
Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, by his temperament, was capable of a conspiracy against his brother, attracting nomads for this was a common practice in Russia, he was at the epicenter of events and managed to get out of the war unharmed, saving the squad and almost the whole family (only in Tver his youngest son Mikhail died, which could well have been a military accident). The Mongols, always striving to destroy the enemy's manpower, contrived amazingly quickly and easily to find the camp of Yuri II in the Trans-Volga forests on the Sit River, did not pay any attention to Yaroslav's squad, who had entered Vladimir. Subsequently, Yaroslav was the first of the Russian princes to go to the Horde to Batu Khan and received from his hands the label for the great reign … over all of Russia (including Kiev). Considering that Batu handed out labels to Russian princes only for their own principalities, then the question naturally arises - why is Yaroslav so honored? Daniil Galitsky, too, did not fight the Tatars, but fled from them throughout Europe, but he was "granted" only his Galicia-Volyn reign, and Yaroslav became the Grand Duke of All Russia. Apparently, for great services to the conquerors.
The nature of these merits will become clearer if we analyze the actions of Grand Duke Yuri II to repel the invasion.
Historians accuse the prince of various sins: he did not help the Ryazan people, and he himself was not ready for the invasion, and he miscalculated in his calculations, and he showed feudal pride “even though the individual was scolding” (28). Outwardly, the actions of Yuri II really look like the mistakes of a person who was taken by surprise by the invasion and did not have a clear idea of what was happening. He could neither collect troops, nor effectively dispose of them, his vassals - the Ryazan princes - perished without help, the best forces sent to the Ryazan line perished near Kolomna, the capital fell after a short assault, and the prince himself, who had gone beyond the Volga to gather new forces, did not manage to do anything and died ingloriously on the City. However, the problem is that Yuri II was well aware of the impending threat and had enough time to meet it fully armed.
The Mongol invasion in 1237 was not at all sudden for the Russian princes. As noted by Yu. A. Limonov, "Vladimir and the Vladimir-Suzdal land were probably one of the most informed regions of Europe." Obviously, “land” should be understood as a prince, but the statement is absolutely fair. Suzdal chroniclers recorded all the stages of the Mongols' advance to the borders of Russia: Kalka, the invasion of 1229, the campaign of 1232, finally, the defeat of the Volga Bulgaria in 1236. V. N. Tatishchev, relying on lists that have not come down to us, wrote that the Bulgarians fled to Russia “and asked to give them a place. The great prince Yuri Velmi was glad of this and ordered them to be taken out to the cities near the Volga and to others. " From the fugitives, the prince could receive comprehensive information about the scale of the threat, which far exceeded the previous movements of the Polovtsians and other nomadic tribes - it was about the destruction of the state.
But we also have a more important source at our disposal, which directly testifies that Yuri II knew everything - right up to the expected time of the invasion. In 1235 and 1237. the Hungarian monk Julian visited the Vladimir-Suzdal principality on his travels to the east in search of “Great Hungary”. He was in the capital of the principality, met with the Grand Duke Yuri, saw Mongol ambassadors, refugees from the Tatars, encountered Mongolian travels in the steppe. His information is of great interest. Julian testifies that in the winter of 1237 - i.e. almost a year before the invasion, the Mongols had already prepared for an attack on Russia and the Russians knew about it. “Now (in the winter of 1237 - D. Ch.), being on the borders of Russia, we closely learned the real truth that all the army going to the countries of the West was divided into four parts. One part of the river Etil on the borders of Russia from the eastern edge approached Suzdal. Another part in the southern direction was already attacking the borders of Ryazan, another Russian principality. The third part stopped opposite the Don River, near the Voronezh castle, as well as the Russian principality. They, as the Russians themselves, the Hungarians and Bulgars, who fled in front of them, verbally conveyed to us, are waiting for the land, rivers and swamps to freeze with the onset of the coming winter, after which it will be easy for the whole multitude of Tatars to defeat all of Russia, the entire country of Russians”(29) … The value of this message is obvious because it indicates that the Russian princes were well aware not only of the scale of the threat, but also of the expected timing of the invasion - in winter. It should be noted that the long standing of the Mongols on the borders of Russia - in the Voronezh region - is recorded by most of the Russian chronicles, as is the name of the castle near which the Batu Khan camp was located.
In the Latin transcription of Julian, this is Ovcheruch, Orgenhusin - Onuza (Onuzla, Nuzla) of the Russian chronicles. Recent excavations by the Voronezh archaeologist G. Belorybkin confirmed both the fact of the existence of border principalities in the upper reaches of the Don, Voronezh and Sura, and their defeat by the Mongols in 1237 (30). Julian also has a direct indication that the Grand Duke Yuri II knew about the plans of the Tatars and was preparing for war. He writes: “Many pass it on for the faithful, and the prince of Suzdal conveyed verbally through me to the king of Hungary that the Tatars confer day and night on how to come and seize the kingdom of the Christian Hungarians. For they, they say, have an intention to go on the conquest of Rome and beyond. Therefore, he (Khan Batu - D. Ch.) sent ambassadors to the king of Hungary. Passing through the land of Suzdal, they were captured by the prince of Suzdal, and the letter … he took from them; even I saw the ambassadors themselves with the satellites given to me”(31). From the above passage, Yuri's efforts to diplomatically influence the Europeans are obvious, but for us it is more important, firstly, the awareness of the Russian prince not only about the operational plans of the Mongols (to attack Russia in winter), but also about the direction of their further strategic offensive (Hungary, which by the way fully corresponded to reality) … And secondly, his arrest of the Batu ambassadors meant the proclamation of a state of war. And they usually prepare for war - even in the Middle Ages.
The story with the Mongolian embassy to Russia has been preserved very vaguely, although it is of key importance for our topic: perhaps it was at this moment that the fate of Russia was being decided, negotiations were conducted not only with the Ryazan princes and Yuri II of Suzdal, but also with Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. In "The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan, Baty" says: "sent to Rezan to the Grand Duke Yury Ingorevich Rezansky ambassadors are useless, asking tithes in everything: in the princes and in all people, and in everything." The council of Ryazan, Murom and Pronsky princes gathered in Ryazan did not come to an unambiguous decision to fight the Mongols - the Mongol ambassadors were allowed to enter Suzdal, and the son of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich was sent to Batu with an embassy “for gifts and prayers by the great, so that the Rezansky lands would not fight "(32). Information about the Mongolian embassy in Vladimir, except for Yulian, was preserved in the epitaph to Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Laurentian Chronicle: "the godless Tatars, let go, they are gifted, byahu bo they have sent their ambassadors: evil and bloodsucking, the river - make peace with us" (33).
Let's leave Yuri's unwillingness to put up with the Tatars on the conscience of the chronicler of the era of the Kulikovo battle: his own words that Yuri dismissed the ambassadors by "gifting" them testify to the opposite. Information about the transfer of ambassadors during the long stay of the Mongols on the Voronezh River has been preserved in the Suzdal, Tver, Nikon and Novgorod First Chronicles (34). One gets the impression that, standing on the border of the Ryazan and Chernigov lands, Batu Khan and Subudai were solving the question of the form of "appeasement" of the northern border, conducting reconnaissance, and at the same time negotiating on the possible peaceful recognition of dependence on the empire by North-Eastern Russia. The Chinese worldview, perceived by the Mongols, excluded equality between the "Celestial Empire" and the outlying possessions, and the demands for recognition of dependence were obviously difficult for the Grand Duke of Vladimir to accept. Nevertheless, Yuri II made concessions, behaved purely loyal, and it cannot be ruled out that the Mongols would move towards their main goals - Chernigov, Kiev, Hungary - even in the case of a veiled refusal to immediately recognize vassalage. But, apparently, the work of decomposing the enemy from the inside brought a more profitable solution: to attack with the support of local allies. Until a certain moment, the Mongols did not tie their hands, leaving the possibility for any decision, while at the same time instilling in the Russian princes the hope of avoiding war through negotiations and preventing the unification of their forces. When is the winter of 1237-1238. chained rivers, opening convenient paths deep into Zalesskaya Rus, they attacked, knowing that the enemy was disunited, paralyzed by internal sabotage, and guides and food from the allies were waiting for them.
Only in this way can one explain why Yuri II, who was perfectly aware of all the plans of the Tatars, was nevertheless taken by surprise. It is unlikely that the negotiations by themselves would have prevented him from concentrating all the forces of Vladimir Rus for the battle on the Oka, but they were an excellent excuse for Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his supporters to sabotage the efforts of the Grand Duke. As a result, when the enemy rushed to Russia, the troops of Yuri II were not assembled.
The consequences are known: the heroic death of Ryazan, the unfortunate battle of Kolomna, the flight of the Grand Duke from the capital across the Volga and the capture of Vladimir. Nevertheless, the competent actions of Yuri II and his governor in this difficult situation should be noted: all available forces were sent to the Oka, to Kolomna, to the traditional and in subsequent centuries, the boundary of the meeting of the Tatar hordes, the capital city was prepared for defense, the grand ducal family was left in it., and the prince himself leaves for the Trans-Volga forests to gather new forces - this is how it will be in the XIV-XVI centuries. Moscow princes and tsars up to Ivan the Terrible to act in a similar situation. Unexpected for the Russian military leaders were, apparently, only the ability of the Mongols to easily take outdated Russian fortresses, and - their rapid advance in a forest unfamiliar country, provided by the guides of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich.
Nevertheless, Yuri II continued to hope to organize resistance, as evidenced by his call for the brothers to come with squads to his aid. Apparently, the conspiracy was never revealed. But Yaroslav, of course, did not come. Instead of him, the Tatars of Burundai unexpectedly came to the camp on the City and the Grand Duke died, not even having time to line up the regiments. The forests on the City are dense, impassable, Yuri's camp is not large, hardly more than a few thousand people, how armies can get lost in such thickets is not only the story of Ivan Susanin evidenced. In the XII century. in the Moscow region, the troops of the Russian princes lost each other against each other in an internecine war. I believe that without guides the Tatars would not have been able to carry out a lightning defeat of the troops of Yuri II. It is interesting that M. D. Priselkov, whose authority in the historiography of the Russian Middle Ages does not need to be spread much, believed that Yuri was killed by his own people. Most likely, he was right, and this explains the vague phrase of the Novgorod First Chronicle "God knows how he will die: they talk a lot about him."
It is impossible without the help of allies from the Russian population to explain the very rapid raid of the army of Batu and Subudai across Russia in 1237-1238.
Anyone who has been to the Moscow region in winter knows that outside the highways in the forest and in the field, with every step you fall half a meter. You can move only along a few trails trodden by someone or on skis. For all the unpretentiousness of Mongolian horses, even Przewalski's horse, accustomed to grazing all year round, will not be able to dig out the grass on the Russian edges from under the snow. The natural conditions of the Mongolian steppe, where the wind sweeps away the snow cover, and there is never a lot of snow, and the Russian forests are too different. Therefore, even while remaining within the framework of the estimates of the horde size of 30-60 thousand soldiers (90-180 thousand horses) recognized by modern science, it is necessary to understand how the nomads were able to move in a forest unfamiliar country and at the same time did not die of hunger.
What was the then Russia? In the vast area of the Dnieper and upper Volga basins, there are 5-7 million people (35). The largest city - Kiev - about 50 thousand inhabitants. Of the three hundred known Old Russian cities, over 90% are settlements with a population of less than 1,000 inhabitants (36). The population density of North-Eastern Russia did not exceed 3 people. per square kilometer even in the 15th century; 70% of the villages numbered 1-3, "but no more than five" yards, passing in the winter to a completely natural existence (37). They lived very poorly, every autumn, due to a lack of feed, they slaughtered the maximum number of livestock, leaving only working livestock and producers for the winter, who barely survived by the spring. The princely squads - permanent military formations that the country could maintain - usually numbered several hundred soldiers; across all of Russia, according to academician B. A. Rybakov, there were about 3,000 patrimonials of all ranks (38). Providing food and especially fodder in such conditions is an extremely difficult task, which dominated all the plans and decisions of the Mongolian commanders to an immeasurably greater degree than the actions of the enemy. Indeed, the excavations of T. Nikolskaya in Serensk, captured by the Tatars during their retreat to the Steppe in the spring of 1238, show that the search and seizure of grain reserves were among the primary goals of the conquerors (39). I believe that the solution to the problem was the traditional Mongolian practice of seeking and recruiting allies from the local population.
The alliance with Yaroslav Vsevolodovich allowed the Mongols not only to solve the problem of the collapse of the Russian resistance from within, guides in an unfamiliar country and the provision of food and fodder, it also explains the riddle of the retreat of the Tatars from Novgorod, which has occupied the minds of Russian historians for 250 years. There was no point in going to Novgorod, ruled by a prince friendly to the Mongols. Apparently, Alexander Yaroslavich, who was replacing his father in Novgorod, was not worried about the nomads who broke through to the Ignach-cross, since in the year of the invasion he was engaged in his marriage to the Polotsk princess Bryachislavna (40).
The problem of the retreat of the Tatars from North-Eastern Russia is also easily solved in the light of the concept of an alliance of the Mongols with Yaroslav. The raid of the nomads was swift, and immediately after the defeat and death of Yuri II (March 5, 1238), all Tatar detachments began to gather to leave the country. After all, the goal of the campaign - to bring Yaroslav to power - was achieved. Since Batu was besieging Torzhok at that time, it became a gathering place for the army of conquerors. From here the Mongols retreated to the steppe, moving not in a "roundup", as traditionalist historians claim, but in scattered detachments, preoccupied with the search for food and fodder. That is why Batu got stuck near Kozelsk, trapped in a spring thaw and a city heavily fortified by nature; As soon as the mud dried out, the tumens of Kadan and Storm came from the Steppe, and Kozelsk was taken in three days. If the movement of the detachments were coordinated, this simply could not happen.
Accordingly, the consequences of the invasion were minimal: during the campaign, the Mongols took three conditionally large cities (Ryazan, Vladimir and Suzdal), and in total - 14 cities out of 50-70 existing in Zalesskaya Rus. Exaggerated ideas about the monstrous devastation of Russia by Batu do not withstand the slightest criticism: the topic of the consequences of the invasion is analyzed in detail in the work of D. Peskov, I will only note the myth of the complete destruction of Ryazan by the Mongols, after which the city continued to remain the capital of the principality until the beginning of the XIV century. Director of the Institute of Archeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Makarov notes the flourishing of many cities in the second half of the XIII century (Tver, Moscow, Kolomna, Volgda, Veliky Ustyug, Nizhny Novgorod, Pereyaslavl Ryazansky, Gorodets, Serensk), which took place after the invasion against the background of the decline of others (Torzhok, Vladimir, Beloozero), and the decline of Beloozero and Rostov has nothing to do with the Mongol defeat, which simply did not exist for these cities (41).
Another example of the discrepancy between the traditional myths about the "Batu Pogrom" is the fate of Kiev. In the 1990s, works by V. I. Stavisky, who proved the unreliability of the most important part of the news about Russia by Plano Karpini concerning Kiev, and G. Yu. Ivakin, who simultaneously showed a real picture of the state of the city, relying on archaeological data. It turned out that the interpretation of a number of complexes as traces of disasters and destruction in 1240 rests on shaky foundations (42). There were no refutations, but the leading specialists in the history of Russia in the 13th century continue to repeat the provisions about Kiev, which “lay in ruins and barely numbered two hundred houses” (43). In my opinion, this is sufficient reason to reject the traditional version of the "monstrous invasion" and evaluate the Mongol campaign as no more destructive than a major civil war.
Downplaying the Mongol invasion of 1237-1238 to the level of feudal strife and an insignificant raid, it finds a correspondence in the texts of eastern chroniclers, where the siege of the city "M. ks." (Moksha, Mordovians) and operations against the Polovtsians in the steppes take up much more space than the fugitive mentions of the campaign against Russia.
The version of Yaroslav's alliance with Batu also explains the messages of Western chroniclers about the presence of a large number of Russians in the Tatars' army that invaded Poland and Hungary.
The fact that the Mongols widely recruited auxiliary units among the conquered peoples is reported by many sources. The Hungarian monk Julian wrote that “In all the conquered kingdoms, they immediately kill princes and nobles, who inspire fears that someday they may offer any resistance. Having armed them, they send warriors and villagers fit for battle, against their will, into battle ahead of themselves”(44). Julian met only with traveling Tatars and refugees; Guillaume Rubruk, who visited the Mongol Empire, gives a more accurate description using the example of the Mordovians: “To the north there are huge forests in which two kinds of people live, namely: Moxel, who have no law, pure pagans. They do not have a city, but they live in small huts in the woods. Their sovereign and most of the people were killed in Germany. It was the Tatars who led them along with them before entering Germany”(45). Rashid-ad-Din writes the same about the Polovtsian detachments in the Batu army: “the local leaders Bayan and Djiku came and showed submission to the [Mongolian] princes” (46).
So, auxiliary detachments recruited from the conquered peoples were led by local princes who went over to the side of the conquerors. This is logical and corresponds to a similar practice in other nations at all times - from the Romans to the twentieth century.
An indication of a large number of Russians in the army of conquerors who invaded Hungary is contained in the Chronicle of Matthew of Paris, which contains a letter from two Hungarian monks saying that although they are “called Tartars, there are many false Christians and Komans (i.e., Orthodox and Polovtsev - D. Ch.) "(47). A little further, Matthew places a letter from "Brother G., the head of the Franciscans in Cologne," where it is said even more definitely: "their number is increasing day by day, and peaceful people who are defeated and subjugated as allies, namely the great multitude of pagans, heretics and false Christians, turn into their warriors. " Rashid-ad-Din writes about this: “What has been added in this recent time consists of the troops of Russians, Circassians, Kipchaks, Madjars and others, who are attached to them” (48).
Of course, some insignificant part of the Russians could have been given to Batu's army by the Bolkhov princes in South-Western Russia, but the Ipatiev Chronicle, reporting on their cooperation with the conquerors in the supply of food, does not report anything about the military contingents. Yes, and these small owners of the Bug region were not in a position to expose those numerous detachments about which Western sources speak.
Conclusion: the auxiliary Russian troops were received by the Mongols from the allied Russian prince who submitted to them. Specifically from Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. And it was for this that Batu bestowed upon him a grand-ducal label for the whole of Russia …
The need and importance of Russian troops for the Mongols is explained by the fact that in the late autumn of 1240 the main forces of the invaders - the corps of Mengu and Guyuk - were recalled to Mongolia by the order of Ogedei Kagan (49), and the further offensive to the West was carried out only by the forces of the Jochi ulus and the Subudai corps. bagatura. These forces were small, and without reinforcements in Russia, the Mongols had nothing to count on in Europe. Later - at Batu, Munk and Khubilai - Russian troops were widely used in the armies of the Golden Horde and in the conquest of China. In a similar way, during the campaign of Hulagu to Baghdad and further to Palestine, Armenian and Georgian troops fought on the side of the Mongols. So there was nothing extraordinary in the practice of Batu in 1241.
The further behavior of the Mongols also looks logical, as if they forgot about the "conquered" North-Eastern Russia and went to the West without any fear of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, who had powerful enough forces that in 1239-1242. fight Lithuania and the Teutonic Order, and help his son Alexander win famous victories over the Swedes and Germans. The actions of Yaroslav, who in 1239 made campaigns not only against the Lithuanians, but also in South Russia - against the Chernigovites - look like simply fulfilling an allied duty to the Mongols. In the annals, this is very clear: next to the story of the defeat of Chernigov and Pereyaslavl by the Mongols, there is calmly reported about Yaroslav's campaign, during which that "city took Kamenets, and Princess Mikhailova, with a lot of it, was brought to her own si" (50).
How and why the prince of Vladimir could have ended up in Kamenets in the midst of the flames of the Mongol invasion of Southern Russia - historians prefer not to think. But after all, Yaroslav's war, thousands of kilometers from Zalesye, was against the Kiev prince Mikhail of Chernigov, who refused to accept the Tatar peace and the subordination offered to him by Mengu. The only Russian historian, as far as I know, thought about this, Alexander Zhuravel, came to the conclusion that Yaroslav was carrying out a direct order of the Tatars and acted as their assistant. The conclusion is interesting, and deserves to be quoted in its entirety: “Of course, there is no direct evidence that Yaroslav acted in this way at the behest of the Mongols, but it is quite possible to assume this. In any case, the capture of Yaroslav Mikhailova's wife is difficult to perceive otherwise than as a result of persecution, this is how A. A. Gorsky. Meanwhile, the Nikon Chronicle directly informs that after Mikhail fled from Kiev, “he was afraid of Tatarov for him and did not comprehend him and, capturing him a lot, Mengukak id with much to go to Tsar Batu”. And if so, was not Yaroslav one of those “Tatars” from whom Mikhail was forced to flee?
Is it because the unknown author of “The Lay of the Death of the Russian Land” so strangely, clearly violating the rules of etiquette, called Yaroslav “current”, and his brother Yuri, who died in battle, “Prince of Vladimir”, thus wanting to emphasize that he does not recognize Yaroslav as a legitimate prince? And is it not because the text of the Lay that has come down to us is cut off in words about the “current” Yaroslav and Yuri, because then the author talked about the true deeds of the “current” Yaroslav? The truth about the founder of the dynasty that ruled Vladimir and then Moscow Russia for the next 350 years was extremely inconvenient for those in power …”(51).
The events of 1241-1242 look even more interesting. when the Russian troops of Alexander Nevsky, consisting mainly of the Vladimir-Suzdal squads of his father Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, and the Tatar troops of Paidar defeated two detachments of the Teutonic Order - in the Battle of the Ice and near Lignitsa. Not to see in this coordinated and allied actions - as, for example, A. A. Gorsky (52) does - one can only not wanting to see anything. Especially when you consider that the auxiliary Russian-Polovtsian detachments fought with the Germans and Poles near Lignitsa. This is the only assumption that makes it possible to consistently explain the message of Matthew of Paris that during the further movement of this Mongol corps in Bohemia, near Olomouc, an English Templar by the name of Peter, who commanded the Mongols, was captured (53). As Dmitry Peskov notes, “The very fact of this message was practically not considered in historiography due to its apparent absurdity. Indeed, neither Genghis Khan's Yasa, nor the development of the rules of warfare reflected in Rashid ad-Din, even allow the thought of commanding an alien by the Mongolian troops proper. However, linking the message of Matthew of Paris with the news of the Russian chronicles, testifying to the practice of recruiting Russians into the Mongol army and Rashid ad-Din, we get a completely acceptable hypothesis, according to which a mixed Polovtsian-Russian-Mordovian corps operated under Olmutz. (And mind you, our consciousness is no longer so violently protesting against the picture of two Russian units fighting two units of Teutons at the same time)”(54).
The cooperation of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and Alexander Nevsky with the Mongols after 1242 is not disputed by anyone. However, only L. N. Gumilev drew attention to the fact that after the end of the Western campaign, the roles in the alliance of the Russian princes with Batu changed - Baty turned out to be more interested in helping the Russian princes. Even during the campaign to Russia, he quarreled out of drunkenness with the son of the great khan Ogedei Guyuk. The "Secret Legend", referring to Batu's report to the headquarters, reports this as follows: at the feast, when Batu, as the eldest on the march, was the first to raise the cup, Storms and Guyuk were angry with him. Buri said: “How dare to drink the cup before anyone else, Batu, who climbs to equal us? You should have drilled your heel and trampled down the foot of these bearded women who climb to equal! ". Guyuk also did not lag behind his friend: “Let's make firewood on the breasts of these women, armed with bows! Ask them!”(55). Batu's complaint to the great khan was the reason for Guyuk's withdrawal from the campaign; this turned out to be very successful for him, because at the end of 1241 Ogedei died, and the struggle for the right of inheritance in the empire began in Mongolia. While Batu was at war in Hungary, Guyuk became the main contender for the throne, and later, in 1246, he was elected a great khan. His relations with Batu were so bad that the latter did not dare to return to his homeland, despite the law of Genghis Khan, obliging all princes to be present at the kurultai, electing a new great khan. In 1248 Guyuk went to war against his rebellious cousin, but suddenly died in the Samarkand region.
Naturally, in 1242-1248. no one could have foreseen such a turn of events, but the reality was the confrontation between Batu, the khan of the Jochi ulus, with the rest of the empire. The balance of the Mongol forces proper was radically not in favor of Batu: he had only 4,000 Mongol warriors, while Guyuk had the rest of the imperial army. In such a situation, the support of the dependent Russian princes was extremely necessary for Bat, which explains his unprecedentedly liberal attitude towards them. Returning to the Steppe from the Western campaign, he settled in the Volga region and summoned all the Russian princes to Sarai, treating everyone extremely graciously and generously distributing labels to their own lands. Even Mikhail Chernigovsky was no exception, in 1240-1245. escaping from the Mongols as far as Lyon, where he took part in the Church Council, which proclaimed a crusade against the Tatars. But, according to Plano Karpini, the stubborn reluctance of the Chernigov prince to perform the rituals of submission angered the khan and the old enemy of the Mongols (Mikhail participated in the battle on Kalka) was killed (56).
The Russian princes immediately felt the reversal of roles and behaved quite independently with the Tatars. Until 1256-1257 Russia did not pay regular tribute to the Mongols, limiting itself to one-time contributions and gifts. Daniil Galitsky, Andrei Yaroslavich and Alexander Nevsky, before the accession to the Golden Horde throne of Khan Berke, behaved completely independently, not considering it necessary to travel to the Horde or coordinate their actions with the khans. When the crisis in the Steppe passed, the Mongols had from 1252 to 1257. actually re-conquer Russia.
Events 1242-1251 in the Mongol Empire, they were reminiscent of Yaroslav's conspiracy in Russia: it was a latent struggle for power, which broke through openly only with the beginning of Guyuk's campaign against Batu. Basically, it took place in the form of latent confrontation, conspiracies and poisoning; In one of the episodes of this battle under the carpet in Karakorum, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, the Grand Duke of Kiev and All Russia, allied to Batu, was killed and poisoned by Guyuk's mother, Regent Turakina. In Vladimir, according to the Law of the Ladder, power was taken by Yaroslav's younger brother, Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. However, the Mongols did not approve it, and, having summoned the sons of Yaroslav, Alexander Nevsky and Andrey to Karakorum, divided the power over Russia between them. Andrew received the great reign of Vladimir, Alexander - Kiev and the title of Grand Duke of All Russia. But he did not go to ruined Kiev, and without possessions an empty title meant little.
And in Russia, a new amazing story begins, traditionally hushed up by domestic historians. The elder brother - and the Grand Duke - but without power, Alexander dangled around the country for several years in the position of "not sewing a mare's tail", by his very appearance showing the beginning of turmoil and discontent. When the younger, Andrei, the Grand Duke of Vladimir, in agreement with Daniel Galitsky, organized a conspiracy against the Tatars, Alexander went to the Horde and reported on his brother. The result was the punitive expedition of Nevryuya (1252), which A. N. Nasonov considered the true beginning of the Mongol-Tatar domination over Russia. Most traditionalist historians vehemently deny the guilt of Alexander Nevsky in the invasion of Nevryui. But even among them there are those who admit the obvious. VL Egorov writes: “In fact, Alexander's trip to the Horde became a continuation of the notorious Russian civil strife, but this time perpetrated by Mongol weapons. One can regard this act as unexpected and unworthy of a great warrior, but it was consonant with the era and was perceived at the same time as quite natural in the feudal struggle for power”(57). J. Fennell stated directly that Alexander had betrayed his brother (58).
However, Nevsky himself could have thought otherwise: Andrei and Daniel spoke out too late, when the turmoil in Mongolia had already ended and friend Batu Munke was elevated to the throne of the great khan. A new wave of Mongol conquests began (Hulagu's campaigns in the Middle East in 1256-1259, Munke and Kubilai's campaigns in China at the same time), and by his actions he saved the country from the worst defeat.
Be that as it may, in 1252 the events of 1238 were repeated: the brother helped the Mongols defeat his brother and assert his rule over Russia. Subsequent actions of Nevsky - the reprisal against the Novgorodians in 1257 and the subordination of Novgorod to the Mongols - finally confirmed the Tatar rule over the country. And at a time when much weaker Hungary and Bulgaria retained their independence, Russia, with the hands of its princes, entered the orbit of the Golden Horde for a long time. Later, the Russian princes did not try to escape from the Mongol power even during periods of unrest and the collapse of this state, which allowed in the 16th century. Russia to act as the successor to the Chingizid empire in the Volga region and in the East.
The conclusion, in my opinion, does not admit of interpretation: the so-called "Mongol-Tatar yoke" was the result of the voluntary submission of a part of the Russian princes to the conquerors, who used the Mongols in internal princely disputes.
