The Swedish plan for the capture of Novgorod by the army of Jacob Delagardie
The Time of Troubles brought Russia ordeals, misfortunes and disasters - a set of difficulties in which it is not easy to separate the primary from the secondary. Internal chaos was accompanied by massive foreign intervention. Neighbors of Russia, traditionally not distinguished by good-neighborly hospitality, sensing the weakness of the country, took full advantage of the opportunity. Against the background of a cruel, long and stubborn confrontation with the Commonwealth, where there was no place for dialogue, and the compromise looked more like a defeat, no less dramatic events, albeit of a smaller scale, took place in the northwestern regions of the country. Sweden, whose friendliness has always been in question, also sought to catch more fish in the huge lake of Russian turmoil.
At first, Tsar Vasily Shuisky, whose position was precarious and whose military strength was rather weakness than might, decided to turn to his northern neighbors for military assistance. The Swedes did not feel any special reverence for the Polish crown, despite the fact that the Commonwealth was ruled by a king from the Vasa dynasty. Long negotiations, which, on the order of the tsar, led by Prince Skopin-Shuisky, finally led to a definite result: Sweden pledged to provide a "limited military contingent" for military operations against the Poles with not entirely limited payment for labor - 100 thousand rubles a month.
For greater benefit and frankly taking advantage of the precarious position of Vasily Shuisky, who was actually locked up in Moscow, the partners in the agreement concluded on February 28, 1609 in Vyborg bargained for the city of Karela with the adjacent district. The inhabitants of Karela did not want to become a Swedish citizen, but no one asked their opinion. So the troops of King Charles IX, on a completely legal basis, ended up on the territory of the Russian state. Voivode Skopin-Shuisky endured many troubles with foreign allies. Although their commander, Jacob De la Gardie, was an outstanding personality, the majority of the Swedish contingent were mercenaries recruited from all over Europe, whose notions of discipline and military duty were very vague. For example, during the siege of Tver, foreigners began to express practical open dissatisfaction with the goals and duration of the company. They insisted on an immediate assault, wishing to improve their own financial situation by capturing prey. Only a tough will, combined with the talent of a diplomat, Prince Skopin-Shuisky, did not allow the not very clear line to blur, beyond which the troops of the Swedish allies would turn into another big gang.
The foreign contingent also took part in the ill-fated campaign of Dmitry Shuisky to Smolensk, which ended in a crushing defeat at Klushino. Last but not least, the outcome of the battle was played by the practically organized transition of a large number of German mercenaries to the side of the Poles. The winner, hetman Zolkiewski, was selectively merciful to the losers: De la Gardie and his colleague Gorn, along with the remaining combat-ready units, mainly consisting of ethnic Swedes, were allowed to return to the borders of their state. While the forced overthrow of the completely bankrupt Vasily Shuisky and the entry into the rule of the boyar committee took place in Moscow, far from the big and noisy events, the Swedes took a breath near Novgorod. The political situation was favorable for them. Tsar Vasily, on whose behalf the Vyborg Treaty was signed, was deposed, and now the agreement with the Russians could be interpreted solely in accordance with his own arrogance, the size of state ambitions and, of course, the size of the army.
How the allies became interventionists
While the Poles tried to remotely control the Moscow boyars from the camp near Smolensk, the Swedes in the northwest gradually concentrated their forces. In addition to the detachment of De la Gardie, who retreated after the defeat at Klushino, additional troops were sent from Vyborg. Under the conditions of the de facto anarchy that had developed in the Novgorod and Pskov lands, the Swedes from formal allies quickly and without too much straining transformed into yet another invaders. At first, attempts were made to take control of the Russian fortresses Oreshek and Ladoga, but their garrisons successfully repulsed attempts by too persistent guests to fulfill their "allied duty".
In March 1611, having received reinforcements, De la Gardie approached Novgorod and set up camp seven miles from the city. Just in case, the Swedish commander sent a message to the Novgorodians in order to find out their attitude to the observance of the Vyborg Treaty, which turned from a diplomatic document into an empty piece of parchment. The Novgorod authorities quite reasonably answered that it was not their competence to regulate this or that attitude to the treaty, but the future sovereign would deal with this issue. But with this there was a serious problem.
While De la Gardie was camped near Novgorod, emissaries from Lyapunov's first militia arrived there. The delegation was headed by the voivode Vasily Buturlin. At a meeting with representatives of the Swedish side, the voivode suggested that there was no particular objection to the king of Sweden sending one of his sons as the future king. They could not nominate a single Russian candidate - the Golitsins fought in this field with the Romanovs, and many saw a compromise option in the election of the Swedish prince to the Moscow throne. In the end, the choice between a Swede and a Pole was of fundamental importance only in the fact that there were no hostilities with Sweden and no battles were lost. But the negotiations dragged on, mired in details - the Russian throne was not enough for the proud Scandinavians, as a bonus they tried to bargain for territories and monetary rewards.
De la Gardie, whose army was languishing in idleness in the vicinity of Novgorod, soon became disillusioned with the negotiation process and began to hatch plans to seize Novgorod. If the Polish garrison is stationed in Moscow, why shouldn't the Swedish be stationed in a rich trading city? In addition, serious friction began between the city leadership and the governor Buturlin. In conditions of anarchy, the Swedes considered themselves entitled to interpret the Vyborg Treaty quite freely. On July 8, 1611, De la Gardie made an attempt to capture Novgorod, but unsuccessfully - having suffered losses, the Swedish army retreated. However, one of the captured Russian prisoners agreed to cooperate and suggested to the foreigners that at night the guard service was very mediocre. The traitor's initiative extended so far that he promised to lead the Swedes behind the walls. On the night of July 16, De la Gardie's soldiers managed to penetrate Novgorod with the help of a slave who had made his European choice. When the Russians realized what was happening, it was already too late - the resistance was episodic and localized. He was able to provide a detachment of the governor Buturlin, however, due to the obvious superiority of the enemy, he was soon forced to retreat beyond the walls of the city.
Seeing that there were no combat-ready troops left in Novgorod, the city authorities, represented by Prince Odoevsky and Metropolitan Isidor, began negotiations with De la Gardie. The Swedish commander demanded an oath of allegiance to Karl Philip, the younger brother of Gustav Adolf and the son of King Charles IX. It was the Swedish candidate for the Russian throne as opposed to Vladislav. Foreign powers and foreign kings divided the Russian lands among themselves, like robbers who quarreled over rich booty. De la Gardie pledged not to damage Novgorod and assumed all the supreme power.
While the Swedes mentally tried on the Monomakh hat on the head of Karl Philip, no less intense events took place in the conditions of the growing anarchy in the northeastern lands of Russia. At the end of March 1611, a certain man appeared in Ivangorod, who, without a shadow of embarrassment, confidently called himself once again the "miraculously saved" Tsarevich Dmitry, who was not killed in Kaluga (and before that even in a number of settlements) and to whom with the help of " good people”managed to escape. To celebrate, the townspeople swore allegiance to the adventurer. This is how False Dmitry III tried to make a political career. Having learned about the appearance of the "tsarevich", the Swedes at first considered him to be the "Tushinsky thief" who was left without work and patrons. People who personally knew his predecessor were sent to him as messengers. They made sure that this character is nothing more than a successful rogue - it was decided not to cooperate with him. The career of False Dmitry III was short-lived. In December 1611 he solemnly entered Pskov, where he was proclaimed "tsar", but in May, as a result of a conspiracy, he was arrested and sent to Moscow. On the way, the convoy was attacked by the Poles and the Pskov version of the "miraculously escaped Tsarevich" was stabbed to death by the Pskovites so that the raiders would not get it. It is unlikely that his fate, had he got to the thugs of Pan Lisovsky, would have been happier.
The Swedish occupation of Novgorod continued. An embassy was sent to Charles IX - on the one hand, to express their loyalty, and on the other, to find out the intentions of the monarch and his entourage. While the ambassadors were on the road, Charles IX died in October 1611, and negotiations had to be carried out with his successor to the throne, Gustav II Adolf. In February 1612, the new king, full of extremely modest intentions, told the Novgorod ambassadors that he did not at all strive to become the Novgorod tsar, since he wanted to be the tsar of the whole Russian. However, if in Novgorod they want to see Karl Philip above them, then His Majesty will not object - the main thing is that the Novgorodians send a special deputation for this. Meanwhile, the Swedes took control of the cities of Tikhvin, Oreshek and Ladoga, already considering them their own.
Swedish plans for the Russian throne
Significant events were taking place in the center of the Russian state at that time. The second militia of Minin and Pozharsky began their movement to Moscow. Its leaders did not have enough strength to simultaneously purge Moscow of the Poles entrenched there and sort things out with the Swedes. The leaders of the militia in such a difficult situation decided to try diplomatic methods of dealing with former allies. In May 1612, Stepan Tatishchev, an ambassador from the zemstvo government, was sent from Yaroslavl to Novgorod. He was instructed to meet with Prince Odoevsky, Metropolitan Isidore and the main, in fact, superiors in the person of Delagardie. The Novgorodians had to find out clearly how they were developing relations with the Swedes and what the situation in the city was. The letter to De la Gardie said that the zemstvo government as a whole is not against the Swedish prince on the Russian throne, but his conversion to Orthodoxy should be mandatory. In general, Tatishchev's mission was of an intelligence rather than diplomatic nature.
Returning to Yaroslavl from Novgorod, the ambassador said that he had no illusions about the Swedes and their intentions. The Swedish ones differed from the Polish invaders only in a lesser degree of violence, but not in their moderation in political appetites. Pozharsky openly opposed the accession to the Moscow throne of any of the foreigners. His intentions included the earliest convocation of the Zemsky Sobor with the aim of electing a Russian tsar, and not a Polish or Swedish prince. Gustav Adolf, in turn, did not force the events, believing that time was working for him - the army of Hetman Chodkiewicz was marching towards Moscow, and who knows if later there will be an opportunity not to negotiate with the Russians at all if the Poles gain the upper hand over them.
The convocation of the Zemsky Sobor and the election of the tsar in Yaroslavl had to be postponed, and the militia moved to Moscow. The Swedes, through their scouts and informants, closely watched the process of the expulsion of the Poles from the Russian capital. In April 1613 they learned about the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov as tsar. Having learned that the Moscow throne was no longer vacant, Gustav Adolf nevertheless continued his game and sent a message to Novgorod, in which he announced the imminent arrival of his younger brother Karl Philip in Vyborg, where he would await an official embassy from Novgorodians and all of Russia. Perhaps Gustav Adolf was absolutely sure that the position of Tsar Michael was too precarious and fragile, and the figure of a representative of the House of Vasa would be preferable for many representatives of the aristocracy.
Karl Philip arrived in Vyborg in July 1613, where he met a very modest Novgorod embassy and no representatives from Moscow. The Russians clearly made it clear that they had clearly decided on the election of the monarch and did not intend to organize a new "election campaign". Karl Philip quickly assessed the situation and left for Stockholm - the claims to the Russian throne remained only a subject for work on mistakes. But Swedish troops still held a large section of the northwestern lands of Russia. Novgorod was too big, too mouth-watering piece of Russian pie, and Gustav Adolf decided to go from the other side.
In January 1614, the new commander of the Swedish troops in Novgorod, Field Marshal Evert Horn, appointed to replace De la Gardie, invited the townspeople to swear allegiance directly to the Swedish king, since Karl Philip had renounced his claims to the Russian throne. This prospect was perceived by the Novgorodians without enthusiasm - the contours of state power in Russia were determined, the tsar was elected, and, despite the ongoing war with Poland, the future, compared to the recent past with its False Dmitry, seemed not so hopeless. Horn himself, in contrast to De la Gardie, who observed at least some framework, pursued a very tough policy towards the population, which did not add to the popularity of the Swedish military presence.
The ordering of the supreme power in the country had an encouraging effect not only on the Novgorodians. On May 25, 1613, in Tikhvin, local archers and nobles, with the support of the approaching detachment of D. E. Voeikov, killed a small Swedish garrison that had lodged here and established control over the city. The Swedish command immediately organized a punitive expedition, which burned the posad, but, breaking off its teeth on the Assumption Monastery, withdrew. Meanwhile, a detachment of Prince Semyon Prozorovsky, who took over the leadership of the defense, came to the aid of the defenders of Tikhvin. The Swedes still wanted a final solution to the "Tikhvin problem" and, having collected an army of five thousand, approached the city. In addition to foreign mercenaries, the troops included a certain number of Lithuanian cavalry, there were guns and engineers for siege work. The Assumption Monastery was subjected to massive shelling, including with red-hot cannonballs. The defenders of Tikhvin made sorties, alarming the enemy and preventing him from building fortifications.
The first assault was successfully repulsed in early September. Despite the arrival of reinforcements to the besiegers, the situation in the Swedish army deteriorated rapidly. And the reason for this was simple - money. De la Gardie, leading the siege, owed a salary to the mercenaries. One of the regiments left the position altogether, not wanting to continue to fight for nothing. Knowing that the defenders of the city were running out of ammunition, and seeing how their own forces were diminishing due to outright desertion, De la Gardie launched another assault on September 13, 1613. Even women and children took part in his reflection. Having suffered significant losses, demoralized, the Swedes left their positions and retreated.
For more active counteraction to the northern invaders, by order of Tsar Mikhail, a small army of Prince Trubetskoy was sent from Moscow in September 1613. The subjects of Gustav Adolf, who settled on Russian soil in an amicable way, did not want to leave - they had to be escorted out, as always.
Gustav Adolf on Novgorod land
The march of Trubetskoy's troops to Novgorod stalled at Bronnitsy. His army had a rather motley composition: it included both Cossacks and militias, as well as nobles, who were constantly sorting out relations with each other. The situation was aggravated by an almost complete lack of salaries and a lack of supplies. In early April 1614 Trubetskoy camped on the Msta River near Bronnitsy. His forces did not differ in a high level of combat capability due to numerous conflicts between different detachments and poorly organized supplies - the troops widely used extortions from the local population. Well aware of the enemy's state of affairs, Jacob De la Gardie, who had just arrived in Russia, decided to strike first.
On July 16, 1614, a battle took place near Bronnitsy, in which the Russian army was defeated and was forced to retreat to a fortified camp. Trubetskoy was blocked, and famine began in his camp. Fearing that he would lose the entire army altogether, Tsar Mikhail, through a messenger who had penetrated the Swedish lines, gave the order to break through to Torzhok. The Russian army managed to make a breakthrough, while suffering impressive losses.
The initiative in the theater of operations passed to the Swedes. In August 1614, Evert Horn approached Gdov at the head of the army and began a systematic siege of it. At the end of the month, Gustav Adolf himself arrived here to take command. The Russian defenders of the city fought back desperately and successfully repelled two enemy attacks, inflicting significant damage on the invaders. However, the intensive work of Swedish artillery and several successfully laid mines caused severe damage to both the city walls and the buildings of Gdov itself. In the end, the garrison was forced to accept the terms of surrender and retreat to Pskov with arms in hand. The campaign of 1614 was going well for the king, and he left for Sweden, intending to capture Pskov the next year.
The fact is that Gustav Adolf really did not want an escalation of the conflict with Russia. His ambitious uncle Sigismund III, king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, still claimed the Swedish throne, and the confrontation between the two countries continued. The settlement of the conflict was possible only if the intractable Sigismund recognized his nephew's right to be the Swedish king. The first part of the long Swedish-Polish war ended in 1611 with a fragile and unsatisfactory peace, and a new one could break out at any moment, since Sigismund was personally interested in uniting both kingdoms under his personal rule. To fight with two opponents - the Commonwealth and the Russian state - Gustav Adolf did not want to at all. He counted on taking Pskov not for further territorial expansion, but only in order to force Moscow to sign peace with him as soon as possible. Moreover, the king was even ready to sacrifice Novgorod, since he had absolutely no illusions about the loyalty of the inhabitants to the Swedish crown. De la Gardie received clear instructions: in the event of an open uprising of the townspeople or any military threat to the garrison, leave Novgorod, having previously ruined and plundered it.
The foreign policy situation spurred the king to untie his hands in the east. In 1611-1613. the so-called Kalmar War took place between Sweden and Denmark. Taking advantage of the neighbor's entanglement in Russian and Livonian affairs, the Danish king Christian IV with an army of 6,000 invaded Sweden and took possession of several important fortress cities, including Kalmar. Under the terms of the peace signed in 1613, the Swedes had to pay the Danes a million Riksdaler indemnity within six years. So the enterprising Christian somewhat improved the financial situation of his kingdom, and the abstained Gustav Adolf was forced to rack his brains in search of funds. One of the ways was seen in the victorious end of the war with Russia.
Drawing of the siege of Pskov in 1615
Pskov became the center of his efforts in 1615. This city has seen enemies under its walls more than once during the Time of Troubles. Since the Pskovites swore allegiance to False Dmitry II, they had to fight the Swedes fighting on the side of Shuisky already in 1609. Then they tried to force the city to take the oath to Karl Philip. Twice the enemy approached Pskov: in September 1611 and in August 1612 - and both times he left with nothing. The townspeople, as best they could, supported Gdov, besieged by the royal army, and in the summer of 1615 the Swedes again decided to seize Pskov. Now Gustav II Adolf Waza himself led the enemy army.
Preparations for the siege began in May 1615 in Narva, and in early July, after the king's return from Sweden, the army moved towards its goal. Of the total number of royal troops in Russia, numbering more than 13 thousand people, there were about 9 thousand in the army marching towards Pskov. De la Gardie was left in Narva to organize a reliable supply. It should be noted that for Pskov, the enemy's plans were not some big secret - the persistent desire of the Swedes to seize the city was well known. Boyar V. P. Morozov commanded the Russian garrison, which consisted of just over four thousand fighters. Sufficient supplies of food and other supplies were timely created, and shelter was provided to peasants from the surrounding area.
From the very beginning of the siege, the Pskovites unpleasantly surprised their opponents with the courage and decisiveness of their actions. On the way to the city, the Swedish vanguard was attacked by a cavalry detachment that went out on a sortie. In this clash, the Swedes suffered a great loss: Field Marshal Evert Horn, who had fought in Russia for many years and led all previous attempts to seize Pskov, was killed by a shot from a squeak. Another attempt to capture the city fortifications on the move failed, and on July 30 the Swedish army began a systematic siege. The construction of siege batteries and fortifications began. The garrison conducted sorties, and a partisan movement unfolded in the vicinity of the city. Ambushes were set up on enemy foragers and food gathering teams.
To completely blockade Pskov, by the second half of August it was surrounded by several fortified camps, but at the end of the month more than 300 soldiers under the command of Voivode I. D. sent from Moscow to unblock Pskov. However, on the way, Sheremetyev got bogged down in battles with the Poles and was able to allocate only a small fraction of his forces to help the Pskovites. Nevertheless, the arrival of, albeit small, but reinforcements, increased the morale of the garrison. The enemy, meanwhile, having finished the construction of the siege batteries, began an intensive bombardment of the city, making extensive use of hardened cannonballs. In addition, additional reinforcements demanded by him from Narva arrived to Gustav II Adolf.
Modern view of the corner fortress tower - Varlaam tower
On October 9, 1615, having fired more than seven hundred hardened kernels, the Swedes launched an assault. It was carried out from several sides at once in order to force the defenders to spray their forces. The soldiers of Gustav Adolf managed to capture a section of the wall and one of the fortress towers. The garrison did not lose its presence of mind, and the tower was blown up along with the Swedes who were there. By the end of the day, the attackers were driven out of all their positions. Despite the losses incurred, the king did not intend to surrender, but began preparations for a new assault.
On October 11, the bombardment resumed, but during the shelling, one of the guns exploded when fired - the fire caused an explosion of large stocks of gunpowder stored nearby, which was already barely enough. The monarch's perseverance and ambition alone were not enough to deal with the ancient walls and those who defended them. In the army itself, by this time, there was already a lack of food, the mercenaries began to habitually grumble and express dissatisfaction. In addition, a messenger arrived from Stockholm with alarming news: the metropolitan nobility began to worry unhealthily because of the constant absence of the king in the country, hinting that another monarch would be more home-loving - with him, life would be calmer and safer. On the 20th of October, the Swedish army, having lifted the siege of Pskov, which had not yet submitted to it, began to retreat towards Narva. The king left from under the walls of the city as a loser. The initiative in the war gradually began to pass to the Russian side.
Stolbovsky world
Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, like his Swedish opponent, did not express much desire to continue the war, let alone expand its scale. The main forces of the Russian state were involved in the struggle against the Commonwealth and the presence of a "second front" only diverted resources. Gustav II Adolf, who was striving to finally sort out his relationship with Sigismund III, also calmed down his frantic ardor. 1616 passed in general in the positional struggle and preparation for peace negotiations. They began with the mediation of the English merchant John William Merick and his Dutch craft colleagues, who were keenly interested in the resumption of very profitable trade with the Russian state.
The first meeting of the ambassadors took place in January-February 1616, consultations were resumed in the summer of the same year, and the whole process ended on February 27 in Stolbovo with the signing of another "eternal" peace. According to its terms, the northwestern Ladoga area with the city of Karela and the district remained in Swedish possession forever. Ivangorod, Koporye, Oreshek and some other settlements were also transferred to Sweden. Russia thus lost access to the Baltic for a hundred years. Everyone was given two weeks to move from their places of residence. The Swedes returned to Russia a number of cities they had occupied during the years of the Time of Troubles: Novgorod, Staraya Russa, Ladoga and others. In addition, the tsar paid an indemnity to Sweden in the amount of 20 thousand rubles in silver coins. This amount in the form of a loan was kindly provided by the Bank of London and transferred to Stockholm. The Stolbovo peace was difficult for Russia, but it was a forced measure. The fight against the Polish intervention was a more important military matter, especially in the conditions of the upcoming campaign of the king's son Vladislav against Moscow.
The Stolbovo peace conserved the borders between the two states for almost a hundred years, and both monarchs, on whose behalf the agreement was signed, could finally get down to business that they considered the main ones. Gustav Adolf returned to solving Polish problems, Mikhail Fedorovich, having concluded the Deulinsky truce with the Commonwealth in 1618, with the active help of his father, Patriarch Filaret, began to restore the Russian state after the Great Time of Troubles. The Stolbovo peace turned out to be as "eternal" as many international agreements: the next Russian-Swedish war happened during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. However, only Peter I managed to return the temporarily lost lands in the northeast to the Russian State.
