The tragic fate of the 2nd Army is known. It is widely believed that the attack on East Prussia was hasty, unprepared and simply suicidal. But is it? Was Samsonov really a mediocre general? Did Rennenkampf, out of personal dislike for Samsonov, really fail to help him at the decisive moment? Was the East Prussian operation really doomed to failure?
Chronicle of events
The East Prussian operation began on August 17 with a successful battle for the 8th German army at Stallupönen. And on August 20, the Gumbinen-Goldap battle took place, which in our historiography is interpreted as victorious. Indeed, the German army suffered greater losses than the Russian, but if the 8th Army retreated, it was not at all because Pritvitz considered himself defeated.
Russian historian S. L. Nelipovich sums up the results of the Gumbinnen battle:
By 20 o'clock the battle was over. The 8th German Army was unable to defeat the Russian troops with one blow. Her 17th Army Corps was defeated. But the flanking corps occupied an advantageous enveloping position. True, their flanks, in turn, could be threatened by a bypass by the Russian cavalry: the right flank of the 1st reserve corps was completely open, and the 1st cavalry division (left flank) would not present serious difficulties for the four cavalry divisions of Khan of Nakhichevan. The losses of the Germans for August 20 reached 1250 killed, 6414 wounded and 6943 missing (of the latter - according to Russian estimates - up to 4 thousand dead). True, more than 9, 5 thousand prisoners, 40 machine guns and 12 guns were captured from the Russians. (The numbers are controversial. - Approx. Auth.)
These circumstances made it possible for the German military council, assembled on the night of August 21, to speak out in favor of the renewal of the attack from 3 o'clock.
However, a powerful radio station in Königsberg at night intercepted the order to the troops of the 2nd Russian army to cross the German border to operate in the rear of the Pritwitz army. The headquarters of the 8th Army strongly spoke out in favor of a retreat across the Vistula River, as it was provided for by the defensive action plan. The opinion of the corps commanders was not taken into account:
In view of the offensive of large enemy forces from Warsaw, Pultusk and Lomza, I cannot use the situation on my front and begin to retreat beyond the Vistula. Transportation, if possible, by rail , - ordered Pritvitz.
The 1st Army Corps was ordered to go to Königsberg, and from there by rail to Graudenz, the 17th to retreat to the Vistula through Allenstein, the 3rd Reserve Division to Angerburg, the 1st Reserve Corps, the Landwehr and cavalry to cover departure at the turn of the Angerapp river. This decision was fatal for M. Pritwitz von Gafron. On the same night, Infantry General François complained to the Main Apartment that the army commander was leaving East Prussia to the Russians.
Pritvitz, if you look at it well, has done nothing reprehensible. According to pre-war plans, he attacked the weakest of the two Russian armies in the hope of victory. Victory did not work, and he ordered a withdrawal across the Vistula. But according to the testimony of Max Goffman, even before his removal from office, the commander began to work out a plan for the transfer of all forces to the south, as Hindenburg later did. Hindenburg's maneuver was not at all his personal genius find. The maneuver was practiced by the Germans during the command and staff exercises in 1894, 1901, 1903, 1905. Naturally, in Russia they knew about its existence. But not all. The commander of the 15th AK Martos knew. It is unknown whether Zhilinsky and Samsonov knew. But Samsonov, just in case, kept 1 AK at Uzdau. Let me remind you that it was there that 1 AK Francois soon hit.
Rennenkampf quite soberly assessed the result of the battle and at that moment did not yet consider himself a winner. Therefore, he stopped the troops to put in order for the day and naturally expected the continuation.
Pritvitz took advantage of this and pulled away. Numerous line cavalry did not reveal a withdrawal, because they did not know how to conduct deep reconnaissance, and there were no Cossack units at hand of Khan Nakhichevan.
Without waiting for a new battle, Rennenkampf decided that the enemy was from active operations and dug in on the Angerrap River. When he did not show up, and after a couple of days, Rennenkampf, together with Zhilinsky, were finally convinced of the retreat of the 8th Army. I think it is very likely that Russian intelligence learned about Pritwitz's order to withdraw and about the beginning of the movement of the corps. Probably the information came from the German General Staff. Hence the iron confidence of Zhilinsky, who watched the moment when the movement from retreat turned into a maneuver. As a result, Rennenkampf was ordered to besiege Konigsberg, which he did.
2nd Army actions
August 23. The 2nd Army stumbled upon the 20th German Corps covering the northern direction. As a result, a series of battles took place in the Orlau area. The battle ended in a draw. Both sides suffered casualties, but in the end, the 37th Infantry Division retreated in disarray. The result was the same as under Gumbinen: the enemy retreated, which testified to the local success of the North-Western Front, but in general it meant nothing.
24 August. 15 AK Martos continued pursuing the enemy. It is noteworthy that the 20th corps was retreating not to the north, as might be expected, but to the west, substituting the right fang of the 1st corps to Artamonov, who did not yet know that the 1st German corps of François was moving towards it.
25-th of August. As a result of the two-day battles, Zhilinsky gives the order to Samsonov to force the march and Samsonov fulfills the order. However, far-sightedly does not touch 1 AK and even strengthens it with a division of 23 AK. As a result, the gap between the 1st and the 15th AK did not pose a serious threat at that time.
Fulfilling Zhilinsky's order, Rennenkampf and Samsonov give orders intercepted by the Germans.
To the commander of the 13th corps.
After the battle at the front of the 15th corps 11 (24) Aug. the enemy withdrew in a general direction on Osterode; The 1st Army continues to pursue the enemy retreating to Königsberg and Rastenburg.
2nd Army - to advance on the Allenstein, Osterode front. 12 Aug corps to take the lines:
13th - Gimendorf, Kurken; 15th - Nadrau, Paulsgut; 23rd Mikhalken, Gross-Gardinen.
The bands are delimited: on the 13th and 15th by the line Mushaken, Shvedrich, Naglyaden; 15th and 23rd line Neudenburg, Witigwalde, lake. Shilling.
1st Corps - to remain in the occupied area, providing the left flank of the army.
6th corps - to move to the Bischofsburg, Rotflis area to secure the right flank of the army from the Rastenburg side.
4th cd, subordinate to the commander of the 6th corps - to remain Sensburg, scouting the strip between the lines Rastenburg, Bartenstein and Sensburg, Heilsberg. 6th and 15th cd continue to fulfill the task of directive # 4.
Ostroleka.
Samsonov.
General Aliyev. The army will continue to advance. 12 (25) Aug it should reach the line Virbeln, Saala, Norkitten, Klein-Potauren, Nordenburg; 13 (26) Aug - Damerau, Petersdorf, Velau, Allendorf, Gerdauen. Areas of the 20th and 3rd buildings are delimited by the river. Pregel. The areas of the 3rd and 4th buildings are delimited by the Schwirbeln, Klein-Potauern, Allenburg road, and the entire road is included in the area of the 3rd building. Khan Nakhichevan is advancing in the direction of Allenburg in front of the front of the army in the area between the r. Pregel and the Darkemen line, Gerdauen, Bartenstein; north of him - Rauch with his division, south of him - Gurko. Crossing the Pregel is the task of the 20th corps.
Rennenkampf.
Now, knowing the exact location of the 2A troops and knowing that the 1A was far away, Hindenburg could already confidently begin the operation.
The actual situation as of 26 August was as follows.
But from Samsonov's point of view, everything looked different:
- There is no enemy in front of 6AK.
- There is no enemy in the north. The occupation of Allenstein's 13th corps blocks the evacuation route of the 6th Landwehr Brigade from the Letzen Fortress.
- Shabby German 20th Corps deployed by the front to the east. Before him also suffered losses of 15 AK Martos, but also a fresh 2nd AP from 23 AK. And from his right flank a fresh 1 AK Artamonov.
That is, the situation looks very promising.
Further events rushed rapidly.
August, 26th. Mackensen's 17th corps and Belov's 1st reserve corps with the Landwehr brigade moved towards Allenstein. The right-flank 6th corps also advanced here. The commander of the 4th Infantry Division, the German corps were mistaken for those fleeing from Rennenkampf and immediately attacked. As a result, a counter battle took place near the village of Gross-Bessau, during which 6 AK lost more than 5 thousand people and retreated, leaving cover. At the same time, General Blagoveshchensky abandoned his troops and fled to the rear. But Samsonov did not receive information about this and on August 27 ordered the army to carry out the previously assigned task.
At the same time, Rennenkampf, following Zhilinsky's order, took Konigsberg into the ring. The army cut the railway to Memel and reached the Baltic Sea. But echelons from 1 AK have already proceeded to the south.
August 27. 1 AK Francois attacked 1 AK Artamonov, but was repulsed. There was even panic among the Germans. Artamonov reported success, but an hour later gave the order to retreat. However, Samsonov did not find out about this either. On the other hand, François did not believe the Russian withdrawal and ordered to dig in hastily, expecting a counterattack. He remained in place until the next day.
At the same time, 15 AK forces of one division pushed 20 AK and occupied Mühlen. Reserves were required to develop the offensive, but even this limited Russian success gave Hindenburg doubts about the possibility of encirclement.
Zhilinsky regains his sight and orders Rennenkampf to move to join the 2nd Army.
Samsonov, having received a message from Artamonov about repelling the attack, understood the situation and planned countermeasures. Since, as he believed, the two opposing first corps were holding each other back, he had an excellent opportunity, by turning 13 corps to the west with the forces of 2, 5 corps, with a flank attack, successively crushing the 20th, then the 1st German corps.
In my opinion, it is a very real task. In order to organize a counterattack, the commander in the evening of the same day left for Nadrau. There he gave the order to 1 AK to hold positions north of Soldau, to units of the 3rd Guards and 2nd divisions at Frankenau. The 6th AK (not knowing that he had retreated the day before) ordered to go to Passengheim. The 13th and 15th corps, under the general command of Martos, were given the task of advancing through Mühlen to Gilgenburg-Lautenburg in order to attack the enemy. The corps were to reach the flank and rear of the German troops, which attacked the 2nd Division and 1st Corps. That is, on the 28th, a success was planned, designed to decide the fate of the entire battle in East Prussia.
August 28. 13 AK advanced to join the 15th, leaving a weak screen in Allenstein. Reconnaissance found troops approaching from the east, but the corps commander considered it to be the Blagoveshchensky corps coming to the rescue and continued to move to the southwest.
At about 10 o'clock in the morning, Samsonov arrived at the headquarters of the 15th corps in Nadrau to coordinate the planned defeat of the 20th German corps. He no longer received Zhilinsky's order to withdraw. By his arrival, Martos defeated the 41st German division near Waplitz, taking 13 guns and more than a thousand prisoners. And then came the information about the 17th and 1st reserve corps heading for Allenstein.
By evening Samsonov gave the order to retreat.
August 29. 13, 15 and part 23 of the AK began to retreat through the forest, teeming with ravines and lakes, because of which the linear units and convoys crowded together on rare and narrow roads, interfering with each other. German troops, moving along the Neidenburg - Willenberg road, quickly cut off the path to retreat, and the 1st Reserve Corps hung on the shoulders of 13 AK. The flank corps were removed one and a half to two transitions, and the cavalry of the 1st Army 80-100 km and could not support the retreat.
August 30. 1 and 6 AK tried to come to the aid of the encircled corps, but were repulsed.
The battle ended there. Some of the troops were able to break through that tight circle of encirclement, but most of them turned out to be demoralized, ran out of ammunition and preferred to surrender. On the night of the 30s, General Samsonov shot himself.
August 31. The cavalry of Khan of Nakhichevan was already in Allenstein. Rennenkampf was one day late. But this event completely negates all allegations of betrayal or criminal inactivity of the commander of the 1st Army.
The battle ended there. Despite a number of defeats, on the whole the Germans were able to win, and the capture of two corps more than covered the losses they suffered.
Reasons for defeat
Commonly known reasons such as poor communications, poor intelligence, as a result of which erroneous decisions were made.
The 2nd Army Corps, seized from Samsonov, did not participate either in the battle of the 1st Army or the 2nd, but stomped in front of Letzen. That is, it was simply turned off. If he remained in the 2A, and together with 6 AK and 4 CD under Gross-Bessau, the troops could well have repulsed the attacks of 2, 5 German corps, giving Samsonov time to solve problems on the left flank.
This is a key miscalculation of the command of the North-Western Front, for which I cannot find a clear explanation, nullified all the previous successes of both armies.
But even without 2 AK Samsonov had chances.
If Zhilinsky, who was in a victorious euphoria, had come to his senses a day earlier, then 13 AK would have moved not to Allenstein, but to Hohenstein. Much smaller forces could cut the railway, for example, 2 battalions, as in real history. In this case, a joint attack through Mühlen in the direction of Gilgenburg on August 27 would have been more successful, would not have allowed François's corps to pursue Artamonov's corps and close the encirclement ring.
1 AK Artamonov was not supposed to retreat. Artamonov, although he showed personal courage, but as a commander, lost the battle. The Blagoveshchensky of 6 AK just got cold feet, but in front of him, at least, there were 2, 5 corps. And in front of Artamonov one, and that battered Rennenkampf. As a result, Samsonov's decision to counterstrike should not be considered a mistake. He was starting from the wrong data and still had a good chance of success.
When planning a retreat, Samsonov did not take into account that his troops would go through the forest, and Francois's corps cutting it off from the border along the way. That is, the Germans will always be ahead. This is Samsonov's personal mistake. He had to either break through the 1st and 20th corps, linking them in battle, or occupy a perimeter defense. But again, the decision was made without knowing the general strategic situation. There was no certainty that the Khan's cavalry would be in time.
Thus, even in the conditions of Hindenburg's secretive maneuver, the situation could go according to three quite probable scenarios:
1. There is no mistake with 2 AK, he covers the right flank together with 6 AK. In case of an unfavorable outcome of the battle, even a retreating corps would have stopped the threat of enveloping the right flank. In the center, the chances of our 2.5 corps against one battered 20th are greater than the chances of the Germans at Gross-Bessau. That is, 20 AK is guaranteed to be out of the game and against 1, 5 corps Francois Samsonov would have up to 4, not counting the cavalry. And that would be a complete victory.
The second option for the use of 2 AK would be its participation in the Battle of Gumbinenn. Had he been on the left flank of the 1st Army, the fate of the German 1st Reserve Corps would have been sad. Even breaking away from the pursuit, he would have been weakened so much that 6AK could have resisted, not allowing the encirclement to be closed around the central corps of the 2nd Army. Yes, and 2AK could have had time to help, because he would have been the closest.
2. In real history, there is no 2 AK on the right flank of the second army. But if Artamonov does not misinform Samsonov with a message about success in repelling the attack of François's corps, then Samsonov takes the central corps back in advance, gathers them into a fist and, without allowing encirclement, holds positions on the Uzdau-Ortelsburg line for 3 days. Really? More than, I suppose. And on the 4th day, Rennenkampf appears on the horizon. That is, it was Artamonov who made the key mistake, predetermining the general failure of the army.
3. Samsonov does not retreat, and even with the 1st reserve corps on his shoulders, he consistently attacks the German 20th and 1st corps. No doubt the losses will be huge, but no more than what happened in real history, given the prisoners. But the losses of the Germans will be similar. Indeed, in the battles of East Prussia, the Germans and the Russians suffered equal losses. Our 13th and 15th corps will be unfit for action, but the Germans will also lose the 20th and 1st corps. The encirclement will not occur, and within 3 days the cavalry of Rennenkampf appears in Allenstein. As a result, Hindenburg will simply have nothing to expel Rennenkampf and he will have to retreat beyond the Vistula.
The result of all options is the capture of East Prussia and the siege of Königsberg.
And although history went according to the fourth, the most unsuccessful scenario for us, the above considerations testify: there was no foregone defeat at all. Moreover, Hindenburg initially had little chances and rightly feared an unfavorable outcome for himself. Even Samsonov's mistake was caused by the lack of reliable information at the time of the decision, and not at all the initially hopeless state of affairs.
Results of consideration of myth number 3
1. Rennenkampf's accusations of treason are false. He did everything he could, and he did not have enough days. Another day, and he would have become a national hero.
2. Samsonov's mistakes were caused by inaccurate information he received from the front headquarters. He is accused of losing control of the army due to a trip to Nadrau. But if he found out about the real state of affairs only on the 28th, then it does not matter from what place the order to retreat was issued. This could not change anything. Unless he would have stayed alive.
3. The forces of the 1st Army were quite enough to withstand the attacks of Pritvits. The forces of the 2nd were sufficient to repel the attacks of Hindenburg. That is, the reason for the defeat lies in the confluence of circumstances, and not in the fundamental impossibility.
That is, there was a chance to win the battle in East Prussia. We missed it, yes. But he was.
But what would have happened if history had gone according to any of the first three scenarios and the pre-war strategic plan had been justified?
This will already be a pure alternative, the purpose of which is to substantiate the assertion that the world could well do without a four-year slaughter and little bloodshed. True, it would be a completely different world.
Read about it in the 3rd part.
