"The presence of shells that pierce the armor of the KV "

2024 Author: Matthew Elmers | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 21:49

Stumbling ditch for tanks

Most of the failures of the Soviet troops in 1941-1942. in one way or another, they are connected with a sparse formation of formations, when divisions occupied zones much wider than the statutory norms. The accompanying blunders in determining the direction of the enemy's strike made the picture of events quite obvious and explainable.

The Crimean front was the exact opposite of all this: its troops occupied a defensive position on a narrow isthmus and had (at least in terms of statutory requirements) sufficient means for defense. It was almost impossible to miss the estimate of the direction of the enemy's attack on such a front. Accordingly, most often the defeat of the Crimean Front was associated with the activities of L. Z. Mekhlis and D. T. Kozlov. The first was the representative of the Headquarters in the Crimea, the second was the commander of the Crimean front.

Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command on the Crimean Front, 1st rank army commissar L. Z. Mehlis.

Is it possible to confirm this version 70 years after the war, having documents from both sides? Diving into details leaves more questions than answers in the canvas of the version about too active L. Z. Mehlis and "non-Hindenburg" 1st front commander D. T. Kozlov. Within the framework of the traditional version, it is completely unclear how the Crimean front was not defeated a month and a half before the fateful May 1942. For some reason, then the Soviet troops quite successfully repelled the blow of the 22nd German Panzer Division, which had just arrived in the Crimea from France. Already then decisive tasks were set for her - to cut off the main forces of the Crimean Front with a blow to the coast of the Azov Sea. The German counterstrike ended in complete failure and Hitler's demands to understand it personally.

The circumstances of the events were as follows. The next offensive of the Crimean Front began on March 13, 1942, but a decisive result was not achieved. After a week of fighting, the Soviet units were pretty battered and worn out. On the other side of the front, the situation was also assessed without much optimism. The command of the 11th Army and personally the commander E. von Manstein considered the situation of their troops extremely difficult. Upon arrival in the Crimea of the fresh 22nd Panzer Division, it was from the march, until the complete concentration of units was thrown into battle in the early morning of March 20, 1942. The counterstrike pursued ambitious goals - to cut off the main forces of the Soviet 51st Army by blowing through the village of Korpech to the northeast Crimean front.

Commander of the Crimean Front D. T. Kozlov.

Despite the initial success, a massive tank attack (about 120 tanks at a time - for the first time in the Crimea) forced the Soviet infantry to leave their positions, then events began to develop according to an extremely unpleasant scenario for the Germans. A stream that crossed the division's offensive zone, which the Germans considered surmountable even for the "kübelwagen" 2, was escarped and turned by Soviet sappers into an anti-tank ditch. German tanks huddled by the stream came under heavy fire from Soviet artillery. At that moment, Soviet tanks appeared.

It must be said that after a week of a difficult and unsuccessful offensive, the tank forces of the 51st Army were not in the best condition. They were represented by the 55th tank brigade of Colonel M. D. Sinenko and the combined tank battalion of the combat vehicles of the 39th, 40th tank brigades and the 229th separate tank brigade (8 KV and 6 T-60 on March 19).

By 5.00 on March 20, in the 55th brigade, there were 23 T-26 cannon, 12 flamethrower HT-133 in the ranks. This seemingly meager amount of armored vehicles finally turned the tide of the battle in favor of the Soviet troops. KV shot at German tanks, lighter vehicles dealt with the infantry. As noted in the brigade's report on the results of the battles, "flamethrower tanks were especially effective, destroying enemy infantry running back with their fire." The 22nd Panzer Division was put to flight, leaving 34 tanks of all types on the battlefield, some of them serviceable. The loss of life of the Germans amounted to more than 1,100 people.

Soviet heavy tank KV, knocked out on the Kerch Peninsula. May 1942 German soldiers examine through holes from 75 mm shells in the rear hull sheet.

The main reason for the failure was the unpreparedness of the fresh unit for the conditions of the war in the Crimea. In his report to the Supreme High Command of the Ground Forces, in hot pursuit of events, Manstein outlined its features in bright colors: “The high consumption of artillery ammunition, the constant attacks of very large aviation forces, the use of multiple launch rocket launchers and a large number of tanks (many of them are the hardest) turn battles into a battle of technology, in no way inferior to the battles of the World War "4. It should be noted here that the units of the Crimean Front operated under the same harsh conditions. If everything fit into the simple formula "Mekhlis and Kozlov are to blame for everything," a cross would have been raised on the Crimean front at the end of March 1942.

Preparing for the Bustard Hunt

During the preparation of Operation Hunting for the Bustard, the German command took into account all the lessons of the battles in January-April 1942. Keeping in mind the negative experience with the stream turned into a ditch, detailed information was collected about the anti-tank ditch in the rear of the Soviet positions. Aerial photography, interrogation of defectors and prisoners made it possible to evaluate this engineering structure and find its weaknesses. In particular, it was concluded that a breakthrough through heavily mined (including sea mines) crossings across the ditch was completely futile. The Germans decided to build a bridge across the moat after breaking through to it away from the crossings.

The main thing that was done by the German command was the concentration of forces and means sufficient to defeat the troops of D. T. Kozlov. One of the widespread misconceptions about the events of May 1942 in Crimea is the belief in the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops over the strike group of the Germans. It is a consequence of an uncritical assessment of the data of E. von Manstein, who wrote in his memoirs about conducting an offensive "with a 2: 1 ratio of forces in favor of the enemy."

Today we have the opportunity to turn to the documents and not speculate with Manstein about the "hordes of Mongols". As you know, by the beginning of the decisive battle for the Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean Front (with part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) numbered 249,800 people6.

In turn, the 11th Army on May 2, 1942, counting on the number of "eaters", totaled 232,549 (243,760 as of May 11) servicemen in army units and formations, 24 (25) thousand Luftwaffe personnel, 2 thousand people from Kriegsmarine and 94.6 (95) thousand Romanian soldiers and officers7. In total, this gave over 350 thousand people to the total number of Manstein's army. In addition, several thousand personnel of the imperial railways, SD, Todt's organization in Crimea and 9, 3 thousand collaborators, designated in the German report as "Tatars", were subordinate to her.

In any case, there was no question of the numerical superiority of the Crimean Front over Manstein's troops aimed at it. Strengthening went in all directions. The 11th Army was transferred to the VIII Air Corps, specially prepared for interaction with the ground forces of the Luftwaffe air force. At the beginning of May 1942, 460 aircraft arrived in the Crimea, including a group of the latest attack aircraft Henschel-129.

Another common misconception is the thesis about the front's offensive grouping, which allegedly prevented it from effectively defending itself. The documents available today indicate that the Crimean Front at the turn of April-May 1942, without any doubt, went on the defensive. Moreover, reasonable assumptions were made about the possible directions of the enemy's strikes: from Koi-Asan to Parpach and further along the railway and along the Feodosia highway to Arma-Eli. The Germans in the "Hunt for the Bustard" chose the second option and advanced in May 1942.along the highway to Arma Eli.

The main events on the Crimean Front with the participation of tanks in February-May 1942

Fast food ammunition

The long preparation of the operation allowed the Germans to choose a vulnerable defense sector of the Crimean Front. It was the strip of the 44th Army of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General S. I. Chernyak. The 63rd Mountain Rifle Division was in the direction of the planned main attack of the Germans. The division's ethnic composition was variegated. As of April 28, 1942, out of 5,595 junior command personnel and privates, there were 2,613 Russians, 722 Ukrainians, 423 Armenians, 853 Georgians, 430 Azerbaijanis and 544 people of other nationalities8. The share of the peoples of the Caucasus was quite significant, although not dominant (for comparison: 7141 Azerbaijanis served in the 396th rifle division, with a total number of 10,447 people in the division). On April 26, parts of the 63rd division participated in a private operation to improve their positions, it was not successful and only increased losses. The situation was aggravated by the lack of weapons. So, on April 25, the division had only four 45mm cannons and four 76mm divisional guns, heavy machine guns - 29 pieces. The "cherry on the cake" was the absence of a detachment in the division (they appeared in the Red Army even before order N 227 "Not a step back"). The divisional commander, Colonel Vinogradov, motivated this by the small number of units.

Shortly before the German offensive, on April 29, 1942, an officer of the General Staff in the 44th Army, Major A. Zhitnik, in his report to the chief of staff of the Crimean Front, prophetically wrote: “It is necessary either to completely withdraw [the division] … to the second echelon (and this is the best) or at least in parts. Its direction is the direction of the enemy's probable strike, and as soon as he accumulates defectors from this division and is convinced of the low morale of this division, he will strengthen his decision to deliver his strike in this sector. " Initially, the plan did not provide for a division change, only the rotation of regiments within the compound with a withdrawal to the second echelon for rest10. The final version, approved on May 3, 1942, assumed the division's withdrawal to the second echelon of the army on May 10-11, two days later than the start of the German offensive11. Major Zhitnik was heard, but the measures taken were late.

In general, the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division was one of the weakest formations of the Crimean Front. At the same time, it cannot be said that she was quite an outsider in terms of weapons. Poor staffing with 45-mm guns was a common problem for Soviet troops in the Crimea, their number in divisions ranged from 2 to 18 per division, on average - 6-8 pieces. Of the 603 "forty-fives" put by the state, the Crimean Front as of April 26 possessed only 206 guns of this type, out of 416 divisional 76-mm guns - 236, out of 4754 anti-tank rifles put by the state - 137212. The problem of anti-tank defense was somewhat mitigated by the presence of the Crimean Front in the composition of the four regiments of 76-mm USV cannons, but they still had to be in the right place at the right time. A massive enemy tank strike would be a big problem for any division of the Crimean Front. It is also often forgotten that in 1942 the Red Army was on a starvation diet, both in terms of weapons and ammunition. It was difficult to organize in the Crimea in May 1942 the Kursk Bulge in July 1943 by forces of four "forty-fives" and 29 "Maxims".

To a large extent (and this was clearly shown by the episode of March 20, 1942), the anti-tank defense of the Crimean Front troops was provided by tanks. By May 8, 1942, the front's tank forces had 41 KV, 7 T-34, 111 T-26 and flamethrower XT-133, 78 T-60 and 1 captured Pz. IV13 in service. A total of 238 combat vehicles, mostly light. The KV tanks were the core of the Crimean Front armored forces. In the band of the 44th Army, according to the plan, two brigades were involved with 9 KV. In case of an enemy offensive, a plan of counterattacks was developed according to several options, including an enemy strike in the zone of the neighboring 51st Army.

Tanks of the 22nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht on platforms. Crimea, March 1942 With the arrival of this unit, Manstein pinned his hopes for a radical change in the situation on the peninsula.

The trouble came from where they did not expect

Now is the time to turn to the folders with the gothic font on the covers. Yes, theoretically, the Crimean Front could repeat the success of March 20, 1942 with a tank counterattack, but only if the qualitative composition of the enemy grouping remains unchanged. It was she who underwent changes that had fatal consequences for the Soviet troops in the Crimea. The German command has strengthened the armored vehicles in the Crimea qualitatively. The 22nd Panzer Division received 12 newest Pz. IVs with a 75-mm long-barreled gun, 20 Pz. IIIs with a 50-mm long-barreled gun and a Marder self-propelled gun with a 76, 2-mm gun for the anti-tank division, the 190th assault gun division received 6 self-propelled guns with a 75-mm long-barreled gun14.

However, the German offensive began on the morning of May 8, 1942, not with a tank strike. It turned out to be atypical at all. The Germans refused from artillery and air preparation of the attack. The infantry attacked after a fire strike from rocket launchers, including those with an incendiary warhead. An attack by assault boats followed from the sea, bypassing the coastal flank of the Soviet positions. It was assault sapper boats that were used to cross rivers and build pontoon bridges. There was no opposition to this landing from the small ships of the Black Sea Fleet, but they would blame Mehlis for the failure.

Only after the start of the infantry offensive did artillery open fire, and aviation attacks began. As was later noted in the 11th Army's report on the breakthrough of the Parpach positions, "according to the prisoners, the enemy's telephone network was damaged so badly that the Russian command was in turmoil." Loss of communications due to massive artillery strikes was typical. Nevertheless, the tanks of the 44th Army were brought into battle according to the plan. However, the resistance of the attackers turned out to be stronger than expected.

After overcoming the ditch, the 22nd Panzer Division struck north, repulsed the counter-attacks of tanks and closed the encirclement of the main forces of the 47th and 51st armies of the Crimean Front. This decided the fate of the battle. As indicated in the report of the 11th Army headquarters on the results of the breakthrough of the Parpach positions, “the successes of the 22nd T [ankov] d [Ivision] in the breakthrough through the Parpach position and the advance through Arma Eli to the north were largely determined by the availability of new weapons. this weapon the soldiers had a sense of superiority over the Russian heavy tanks "16. Soviet sources confirm the qualitative change in the situation: "Of the new means used by the enemy, attention is drawn to the presence of shells that pierce the armor of the KV and set it on fire." It should also be noted that later, with the widespread use of the newest 75mm guns on the Soviet-German front, until 1943 they were often used with cumulative shells (as they were called in the Red Army, "termite"). In Crimea, the latest Wehrmacht technology used the most effective caliber armor-piercing shells.

The battlefield remained with the Germans, and they had the opportunity to inspect the wrecked vehicles. The conclusion was expected: "The bulk of the KV and T-34 was unambiguously destroyed by shells 7, 62 and 7.5 cm" 18. As for the impact on Soviet tanks from the air, Soviet data does not confirm the great success of the Khsh-129 anti-tank attack aircraft. Only 15 tanks fell victim to the air strikes, mostly T-26 from the 126th separate tank brigade19.

Summing up the above, we can state that the legend about the role of L. Z. Mekhlis and D. T. Kozlova in the history of the Crimean Front is somewhat exaggerated. The troops of the front suffered from problems common to the Red Army in 1942 with training and weapons. The conditions favorable for the defense of the narrow isthmus were parried by the Germans with the massive use of new types of weapons and the general concentration of forces and means to crush Soviet troops in the Crimea. Actually, it was the sharp change in the anti-tank capabilities of the German troops that became a big problem for the Red Army in the summer of 1942. Crimea became a testing ground for new technology, which was soon to be familiar to Soviet troops on the entire front from Rzhev to the Caucasus.

* The article was prepared within the framework of the project of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation N 15-31-10158.

Notes (edit)

1. In response to Mehlis's request to replace Kozlov, the Kremlin answered: "We have no Hindenburgs in reserve."

2. Army passenger car on Volkswagen chassis.

3. TsAMO RF. F. 224. Op. 790. D. 1. L. 33.

4. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). T312. R366. Frame 794176.

5. Manstein E. Lost Victories. M.; SPb., 1999. S. 260.

6. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses of the Armed Forces. M., 2001. S. 311.

7. NARA. T312. R420. Frames 7997283, 7997314.

8. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 52. L. 26.

9. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 22. L. 224.

10. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 47. L. 70.