The first period of hostilities in Donbass was marked by the defensive tactics of the militia, but the turning point occurred after May 2014, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to iron cities with artillery and aircraft. In response, the self-defense forces organized a mass of raids at the enemy's locations, and also captured isolated positions of the troops (bases, military units, warehouses and border posts).
The undoubted advantages of the operational and tactical skills of the militia include the model of mobile defense they tested while defending the Donetsk urban agglomeration (with the highest population density in Eastern Europe). This territory had to be defended without aviation, long-range reconnaissance and radar equipment, as well as with an acute shortage of armored vehicles. The self-defense fighters had 5 BMDs and 1 self-propelled guns "Nona", which flew along the entire front, working in the hottest spots. In fact, the militia had no other option - with such resources, the lack of mobility in defense would have been suicide. There was no front as such at that time, no defense lines existed. Donbass fighters constantly ply through objects where the enemy was especially active, often leaving defense sectors without cover. Moreover, with a serious onslaught of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the militia could retreat with the entire unit with minimal losses, regroup and counterattack the invaders to their original positions. The losses of the Ukrainian troops and numerous volunteer battalions were significantly higher than those of the self-defense forces. But there were also exceptions to the rule - examples of passive, well-organized long-term defense of the militia. So, near Gorlovka, the militiamen set up positions with trenches in a full profile, with moves and messages between the entrenched units. They tried to lure the enemy into specially organized minefields (and often they succeeded).
Whenever possible, we tried to hinder the movement of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine along the front. For this, they even partially destroyed the dam of the Karlovsk reservoir. At the moments of artillery attacks, the fighters left their positions, leaving ambushes in case of an attack by enemy infantry.
Experts draw attention to the fact that the hostilities in Donbass bear little resemblance to the realities of the Second World War. The differences are primarily in the front, which is not continuous, but is represented by rare defensive points, most often ordinary checkpoints. Such a broken front line in the geographic conditions of Donbass was clearly visible, which practically excluded the passage of large forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces unnoticed. At the same time, the mobile DRG militia passed into the enemy's location, sometimes like a knife through butter.
To summarize, we can call the tactics of the militia a combination of partisan actions based on stationary fortifications and sabotage work. Since about the summer of 2014, the militia has actively begun to sabotage the supply routes of the Armed Forces. In Donetsk and Luhansk regions, railway bridges were blown up, shelling of freight trains near Kharkov began, and so on. Interestingly, at the very beginning, mining was carried out with the help of explosives used in mines, and later everyone switched to army charges.
On June 24, a railway bridge in the Zaporozhye region was blown up, and on June 1, two sections of the Donetsk railway were blown up, which led to a halt in transport links. On July 7, 2014, a railway bridge passing over the highway was blown up in the Novobakhmutka area, as a result of which the bridge structures and carriages partially collapsed on the road. A little later, two bridges were blown up in the Luhansk region across the Tepla River (railway) and across the Northern Donets (automobile). The main purpose of these acts of sabotage was to block the transfer of troops from the depths of Ukraine.
In the following years of confrontation, this practice was curtailed, because it was frankly similar to terrorist acts, which was not at all part of the plans of the LPRP political leadership. Now the DRGs, leaving behind enemy lines, were units of 10 to 30 fighters armed with small arms, grenade launchers, and sometimes light mortars. Saboteurs move in cars, less often on armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles. The groups' favorite tactics were lightning raids on checkpoints near settlements, followed by hoisting a flag on the administration building. This put the ATO leadership into a stupor, they hastily regrouped the troops, sent whole battalion groups to the "captured" villages, but the militia had already disappeared. So, at the end of August, the militias suddenly took Telmanovo and Novoazovsk, in which there was no Armed Forces at all - their main forces were grouped in the Dokuchaevsk - Starobeshevo - Amvrosievka area. This brought confusion to the plans of the command of the ATO troops, which later led to the notorious "Ambrosiev's cauldron".
Ground units and artillery are the two main "legends" of the war in Donbass. It has been said many times that the conflict has become a struggle for artillery superiority on the battlefield. It was artillery, not tank units, that became the decisive means of inflicting damage on the enemy, both from the side of the militia and from the side of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The first strikes in the course of the attack are delivered by field artillery, which plows the location of the Ukrainian troops, and only then the infantry finishes off the remnants and occupies the shot territory. Moreover, throughout the conflict, the few self-defense tanks of Donbass were used not at all for their intended purpose, but as heavily armored self-propelled guns. Full-fledged combat contacts with an outnumbered enemy, and even heavily armed, were ineffective for the militia, and sometimes deadly. Therefore, artillery units, especially MLRS batteries, moved at a comfortable distance from the battalion-tactical groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, regularly covering them with fire from closed positions. We must pay tribute to the extremely low training of the officers of the Ukrainian army and their excessive self-confidence in their forces, which allowed the militia to behave so "insolently".
At the very beginning of the war, control over the heights in the theater of operations became one of the key tasks for units on both sides of the front. They fought for Mount Karachun near Slavyansk, the Saur-Mogila mound and the heights on the right bank of the Northern Donets. Moreover, the style of warfare with predominant shooting from closed positions and general high mobility largely devalued the dominant heights. But this became clear much later; in the first stage of the war, clashes near the peaks were very bloody. Now, the real meaning of owning heights is only one: visual control over the terrain and adjusting artillery fire. They usually protect the heights with cross artillery fire and a small group of spotter cover. The paradigm of warfare during the Second World War with the installation of artillery batteries at heights did not find application here. In many ways, this understanding came only after the tragedies at Saur-Mogila.
The overall effectiveness of the militia's artillery as the main player on the battlefield was higher than that of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is due to the high qualifications of three key individuals: division commanders, battery commanders and senior battery officers. With their well-coordinated work, it was possible to open fire six to seven minutes after the detection of enemy units! The militias succeeded in changing their firing positions in time, which did not allow the counter-battery forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (if any) to retaliate. The rule for the artillery of Donbass was the implementation of no more than two combat missions from one position. On the side of the self-defense forces was the use of a wide range of artillery ammunition - from active-reactive to lighting and propaganda. Often the "gunners" had to work at night, as well as fire with high accuracy the mortar crews of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, located on the roofs of residential buildings.
The hallmark of the militia at the larger operational level of command was the maneuvers of deep bypass, coverage and encirclement of the enemy. During the encirclements (summer 2014 - February 2015), units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were cut off from the main forces and methodically put out of action. On average, 25-50% of personnel and up to 70% of military equipment were destroyed. A feature of such encirclements was the rather low density of militia troops around the "cauldron", which allowed the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and punitive battalions to break through to their own luggage. This was due to the lack of manpower to fully block large enemy groupings. Perhaps the only example of a classic environment according to all the rules of the Second World War was Ilovaisk in August 2014. It was then that it was possible to create a tight ring around the Ukrainians, through which neither the encircled units nor the troops sent to unblock the group could break through.
