We live in a rapidly changing world. The political situation is changing. Only yesterday there were two blocs aimed at each other, but today one (the Warsaw Pact) is no longer there, and the other (NATO) has expanded at the expense of former members of the first and a number of former republics of the USSR. The threat of world war in its former understanding has ceased to exist. And what will happen tomorrow?
A series of local conflicts continues, and, apparently, they will continue for quite a long time. But is there any confidence that the threat of a general war (nuclear or conventional) has completely disappeared? We need serious scientific confirmation of any of the hypotheses for predicting the future. This will determine how we build our armed forces and how to equip them.
The development of science and technology made it possible to create new weapons systems that can shift the focus of the conflict from the zone of direct contact of troops (combat area) to large political, scientific and technological centers, which will allow inflicting irreparable damage to the enemy before the entry of troops and fleets into battle in the classic understanding it. This option of military operations is already adhered to by the United States. Sometimes, only the threat of irreparable damage is enough to achieve the set goals even before entering hostilities. In this regard, the information factor in the preparation and conduct of hostilities has grown enormously.
In addition, everything is moving towards removing a person from the zone of direct contact of troops. And if this is not possible at all, then it can be partially solved. Back in the eighties of the last century, experimental exercises were conducted in Russia using remotely controlled tanks. There were some groundwork in the creation of robotic systems. Remote-controlled vehicles have shown themselves well in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
Upgraded tank T-72BM "Slingshot-1"
Now let's see how the weapon system is developing in our time, and primarily the armored one. After all, until recently, we still consider tanks to be the main striking force of the ground forces.
Main battle tank T-80U
The confrontation between the two systems led to the fact that we had and still remains an unsurpassed armored "fist" from the T-55, T-62, T-72, T-80 tanks. The Soviet Union gathered this "fist" in order to march through all of Europe in a single combat impulse. When planning a future war, we used what was developed and applied back in the Second World War. Almost 60 years have passed since it. The nature of wars and military conflicts is undergoing significant changes, the means of waging war are changing. Now obsolete tanks, if they pose a threat, are no longer to the enemy, but to Russia itself. A huge number of them require disposal, but there were no funds for this, and no. In addition to the tanks themselves, ammunition for them is also subject to disposal.
Main battle tank T-80UM1 "Bars" with active protection complex "Arena"
Due to the fact that the tank is the main striking force of the ground forces, foreign states are rapidly developing and producing anti-tank missile systems (ATGM). By now, we can talk about the third generation, which uses the principle of "fire and forget": the operator only takes aim and, making sure that the homing head (GOS) has captured the target, launches. In this case, both thermal (IR) and radar seeker are used. These ATGMs include: "Maverick" AGM-65 (H, D, F, E, K), helicopter version "Hellfire L", ATGW-3 / LR, "Javelin" and others. European NATO countries. In particular, the joint program of Great Britain, France and Germany TriGat (in Great Britain - ATGW-3, in France - AC3G and PARS-3 - in Germany). For example, the ATGW-3 / LR ATGM missile has an IR GOS, a proximity fuse in the bow and a 155-mm tandem warhead. The mass of the ATGM is 40 kg, and the firing range is 5 km. She is capable of attacking tanks from above. The proximity fuse allows you to effectively overcome both standard and modernized types of dynamic protection.
Means are being developed that, acting on the engine power supply system with fuel and air, deprive tanks of mobility.
And these are only special anti-tank weapons, but one of the main means of fighting tanks is the enemy's tank. All tank-producing countries do not stop developing armored vehicles and modernizing existing ones, including ours. Our former allies - Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland - are doing the same.
Modernization and conversion of tanks into other vehicles in Russia have recently started. Examples are the BTR-T based on the T-55, the BMPT based on the T-72, the upgraded T-72M1, the T-80UM1 Bars and the Black Eagle. But this is exclusively the initiative of factories and so far only prototypes, which can lead to what happened in the USSR: how many factories - so many tanks and other armored vehicles, without any unification (T-64, T-72, T-80, BMP -1, 2, BMP-3, BMD-1, 2, 3).
Artillery, missile systems, air bombs, anti-tank mines, including remote mining, are used against tanks, and all this is constantly developing and improving. New methods of influencing the tank and its systems are being found. Consequently, almost all countries that have a modern army do not exclude a meeting with enemy tanks in the future, and they prepare or purchase armored vehicles for their armies.
Therefore, the question arose: are tanks needed today, and even more importantly - in the near future, and if so, which ones? There are two completely opposite points of view on this.
Some say that tanks are weapons of the past, and they are not needed in contactless wars. It would seem that it is clear to everyone that most of the tanks will be destroyed far beyond the boundaries of contact between the troops, since they do not have information support and protection against modern means of long-range destruction.
The second opinion is that armored vehicles will also be in demand in contactless wars. Indeed, for the final victory, general-purpose forces are needed, one way or another, but coming into direct contact with the enemy. The main weapon of contact combat for the coming years will remain armored vehicles capable of operating on the front line and possessing firepower and modern protection. And then - nobody canceled the nuclear war. And in its conditions, the tank is the most protected combat vehicle.
So what kind of armored vehicles do you need? This needs to be understood.
Heavy armored personnel carrier BTR-T, created on the basis of the T-55 tank
Combat vehicle support for BMPT tanks, created on the basis of the T-72 tank
Modern tanks were created 20 years ago, when almost all anti-tank weapons (PTS) acted on the tank head-on. Therefore, the strongest armor of a tank is frontal. Today, and even more so in the future, an increasing number of PTSs hit the tank from above, and in fact its horizontal section is the largest. The classic layout does not allow for good protection from above, from the sides, and even from below. Almost all tanks have a maximum weight. It does not allow to increase protection due to the traditional armor build-up. In the competition "projectile - defense" in the first place, almost always, - means of destruction. The survivability and protection of the crew is still low: it is located in one compartment and together with ammunition, the amount of which is designed for a long period of hostilities, and fuel.
Despite the high firepower of modern tank weapons, it cannot fight airborne weapons and high-precision weapons systems, especially in the upper hemisphere.
If our tanks are able to hit targets from a cannon - a launcher with a guided projectile at ranges of up to 5.5 km, the visibility of these targets at any time of the year or day is not always achieved due to the lack of modern reconnaissance and surveillance equipment.
Controlling tank subunits in conditions where it is necessary to quickly disperse and then take up battle formation in a certain place is difficult due to low command control. There are no means of receiving and displaying information from space and air navigation and reconnaissance means. As well as there is no high-quality connection.
This is all true. But what is better than a tank?
You can read in the press that, they say, outdated T-55 and T-62 tanks are used in Chechnya, and there are already new T-90s. But let's see what does not suit the T-55 tank in Chechnya?
The enemy is not armed with modern means of reconnaissance and destruction of tanks, and the tank has no targets to defeat which it is intended. Why then use new, expensive machines, of which there are still a few in our army, if they do not give the expected effect. Here the problem is different.
In 1994, tanks in Grozny, as well as in Moscow in October 1991, were introduced not to conduct hostilities, but to intimidate the population. And if in Moscow everything ended only with unanswered firing of some tanks at the "White House", then in Grozny - unanswered firing of the Dudayevites at the tanks, which led to their mass loss. That is, we are talking about an application problem. Operation Desert Storm is another matter, when in one sortie a pair of helicopters could destroy up to 15 tanks. This is already an example of the fact that tanks cannot operate without air cover. For local conflicts, other armored means are needed, which can be created on the basis of those tanks that we have in abundance. An example is a heavy armored personnel carrier (BTR-T) and a tank support combat vehicle (BMPT), which have already been shown at arms exhibitions in Omsk and Nizhny Tagil.
Another thing is hostilities that may unfold in the future in a conflict with a well-armed adversary.
The next collegium of the Ministry of Defense summed up the results of 2002 aroused wide public interest. It said that today we are in a state of war, and the result depends on the army. Even in a war with such an adversary as armed gangs in Chechnya and trained terrorists, it is clear that the main problem is the moral and physical aging of weapons. The army needs new equipment.
The second problem is the lack of staff. During the perestroika period, the links “school - university - production - science” were practically destroyed. The leaders of the Omsk region and the State Academic Bolshoi Theater tried to restore this connection. On their initiative, in October 2002, an interregional scientific and technical conference "Multipurpose tracked and wheeled vehicles: development, production, combat effectiveness, science and education" was held in Omsk. This is the first conference that brought together representatives of the higher military school, scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense, design bureaus, manufacturers and customers. One of the goals of the conference is to agree on the views of specialists in military science and the defense complex on possible methods of combat use of multipurpose tracked and wheeled vehicles (MG and CM) in future wars and military conflicts and possible directions of their development.
This conference is a huge step in uniting the efforts of all the links that create such machines. However, even such a forum was drowned in trifles. There was no place for the analysis of external threats and future means of warfare. So far, there is no common view on the most complicated problem. But a start has been made.
Back in the 70s, at the department of tanks in the academy of armored forces, there was a poster “What do the military want to see the tank of the future?”. So, in that picture, a certain object was depicted that unites a tank as it is now, a helicopter and a submarine … Analysis of modern, and not only future conflicts shows that the tank as a combat unit ceases to meet the requirements of the troops. You cannot embrace the immensity.
In order to work out the requirements for the tank of the present and especially the future, it is necessary to determine the threats, methods of warfare, means of destruction, to conduct a thorough analysis of the use of tanks in recent conflicts.
With all the diversity of views on the tank of the future - from complete rejection to leaving it as the main striking force of the ground forces - it will be necessary to create, in addition to the tank, a whole range of armored vehicles of equal security, mobility, maneuverability and information security. Only by possessing effective reconnaissance and surveillance equipment in combination with high capabilities of their information support (navigation, the position of opposing forces, a quick response to a threat, the accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets and their priority), will tank subunits retain their importance.
A tank with the means of warfare requires increased security, tactical and operational mobility, good command controllability, and high effectiveness of fire destruction of targets. It is necessary to search for new non-traditional and improve existing means of protection, such as active, electromagnetic, dynamic, based on new materials, etc. In addition, it is necessary to think over protection against means of destruction from which the tank itself cannot defend itself. Consequently, anti-aircraft installations of equal protection and mobility are needed, and possibly also unconventional means to detect danger and "cover" a tank from it. For the first time, we also have tank support combat vehicles (BMPT), which should make significant changes in the tactics of using tanks and ensure their protection in the close firing zone.
For the safety and survival of the crew, while it is in the tank, it must be isolated from ammunition and fuel. New layout solutions, modern crew equipment and appropriate camouflage are required.
The maximum speed of the complex of such vehicles should be within 100 km / h, and the mass of the tank should not exceed 40 tons, which will increase the operational mobility of units and unexpectedly and quickly concentrate them in the right place. In addition to speed, mobility requires fuel, and, consequently, armored vehicles for its delivery and refueling. Since the hostilities are being conducted in isolation from the rear units, the tanks must be followed by ambulances, repair vehicles and food supplies.
The main thing for a tank is its firepower, modern means of delivering ammunition to the target, which makes our tanks compare favorably with others. Already today, the range of destruction of a target from a cannon-launcher is more than 5 km. However, the lines of sight and firing are so low that it is almost impossible to see the target, let alone aim at such a range. Apparently, it is necessary to look for opportunities to raise observation, aiming and firing equipment over the tank. If we add to this modern television and thermal imaging, radar, communication and display facilities, then the range and accuracy of shooting day and night in any climatic conditions will indeed be more than 5 km.
This should also include the problem of supplying ammunition. Apparently, it makes no sense to have more than 20-25 shots on board. Other ammunition should be in a transport-loading vehicle of equal mobility, and possibly protection. And yet, a search for new unconventional means of throwing shells and hitting the enemy is needed.
Perspective Russian tank "Object 640" "Black Eagle"
So, we can conclude that, despite the significant development of anti-tank weapons, there is nothing to replace them in contact combat in the next 15-20 years. Robotic weapons are good where there is some certainty, but not in the battle on the battlefield, where it is difficult to do without a person.
Will the army need tanks for a long time? We would like to hear the opinion of our specialists.
