The previous article on the prospects of a heavy armored vehicle caused a heated discussion among the readers of the Voennoye Obozreniye portal: a lot of interesting opinions, questions and suggestions were voiced in the heated dispute. I thank everyone who took part in the discussion of this important and interesting topic about the protection of modern armored vehicles.
This time I would like to discuss the most interesting points of the recent controversy and try to dispel some of the myths regarding the creation of highly protected armored personnel carriers. Of course, the author reserves the right to his own point of view, therefore, relying on your comments, he will defend ideas that he considers correct for himself. Whether or not you accept his point of view is up to you. In any case, the author will try to present his thoughts and arguments as meaningfully as possible.
Some of the readers accused the previous article of incorrect comparisons and accused the author of an inability to think complexly. Any equipment is created for specific tasks: Soviet BMP-1 - for a quick breakthrough to the English Channel through Europe flooded and burned by nuclear fire. Israeli "Ahzarit" - for fighting against Palestinian militants in the narrow and dusty streets of the Gaza Strip. American M2 "Bradley" - for colonial conquests and battles in the desert.
In my opinion, one of the commentators spoke on this topic best of all: Different machines are needed for different tasks. But cars that become coffins are not needed a priori.
The idea of a classic infantry fighting vehicle (domestic BMP-1 or Swedish CV-90 is not the point) is a cruel mistake of the designers. Citing the definition of BMP: armored combat tracked vehicle designed to transport personnel to the front edge, increase their mobility, armament and security on the battlefield and joint actions with tanks. In other words, an infantry fighting vehicle is a light tank, inside which there are 10 people (crew + troops). Ten men, under the cover of "cardboard" armor, are sent to places where it is difficult for even ultra-protected main battle tanks to pass. Absurd! Or a crime?
Who first came up with the idea that a large BMP crew requires less protection than three or four MBT tankers?
An attempt to justify itself in the form of a statement about the higher mobility of the BMP (speed and maneuverability, positive buoyancy, air transportability) does not stand up to criticism: already the first results of tank battles in the Middle East clearly showed that mobility is far from the primary factor. Paradoxically, the heavier tanks, despite all the troubles in the form of quicksand and impassable stone rubble, showed better mobility compared to light vehicles: units equipped with French AMX-13 light tanks did not attack the enemy most of the time, but were looking for natural cover; the heavier tanks, on the contrary, acted much more confidently on the battlefield and boldly rushed forward.
Heavy armored vehicles can destroy any barricades, break through walls and concrete fences, while in terms of power density (hp / ton of mass) and dynamic characteristics, modern MBTs are by no means inferior to BMPs.
As for overcoming water obstacles by swimming - a skill, at first glance, useful, however, with a careful analysis of the situation, three interesting circumstances arise here:
1. The positive buoyancy of the vehicle is always in conflict with the provision of its security - the priority quality of any armored vehicle.
2. Where are you going to sail?
Infantry fighting vehicles were originally designed for joint action with tanks. The situation when tanks got stuck on the Rhine crossing, and infantry fighting vehicles with infantry are already storming the approaches to Paris is impossible in principle. It sounds a little strange, but, in fact, there is really no need to rush the BMP and show its excellent "seaworthiness" abilities. Infantry fighting vehicles do not operate in isolation from tanks, and where there are tanks, there are always bridges, pontoons and other specialized means.
The issue with the extreme crossing of water obstacles, in order to capture a bridgehead on the opposite bank and establish a crossing, is still open. Perhaps this is the only intelligible argument about the need for positive buoyancy in the BMP in a global war. This argument is also easy to question: given the capabilities of the classic BMP and its disgusting resistance even to the most primitive means of destruction *, it becomes unclear how this "coffin on tracks" can help the capture group?
How useful the "seaworthy" properties of combat vehicles in local conflicts is evidenced by the fact that in 1982 the "ferdinands" - BMP-2D, a special "non-floating" version of the vehicle for conducting combat operations in Afghanistan, went into production. The sides of the BMP-2D were additionally protected by steel screens, the weak point - the rear of the tower (about 10 mm thick - where is that good?) Was covered with an additional armor shield, the bottom in the area of the driver was reinforced. The total weight of the armor has increased by 500 kg (frankly, not so much for such a large vehicle). Despite a slight increase in protective properties, the soldiers still did not trust this "armor" -technique, preferring to sit astride the armor.
3. If the military really feel an urgent need to force water obstacles as soon as possible (I am sure that this is not the case), then why not turn to the experience of the past decades. Snorkel, what is not an option for you? Equipment for underwater driving of tanks allows you to overcome water bodies with a depth of 5-7 meters along the bottom. In the end, heavy armored vehicles are able to overcome a ford with a depth of 1, 5 or more meters without any preparation!
Summarizing all of the above: over the past 30 years, not a single significant case has been noted when domestic armored vehicles had to force water obstacles in combat conditions. However, even in the global war to capture Europe, BMP-1, 2, 3 would hardly have been able to realize their swimming abilities - there is nowhere to swim, there is no need and, frankly, useless, given the thickness of the BMP's "armor".
Neither in those days when the first BMP-1 was created, nor in our time - there was no reason for weakening the protection of armored vehicles for the sake of buoyancy.
To avoid accusations of Russophobia, I would like to note that all foreign "classic" BMPs (American Bradley, British Warrior or Swedish CV-90) are essentially the same rubbish, their designers repeated the mistakes of the BMP-1 creators. Even now, despite all the antics and attempts to improve security, these "cans" continue to ruin their crews. Loud statements by balabols from the Pentagon about a radical increase in the protective properties of the next modification of the Bradley should not be taken seriously: it is physically impossible to provide high protection for a 25-30 ton combat vehicle, where even 60 tonnes of the Abrams tank is not enough.
Everything mixed up in the Oblonskys' house
A feverish search for structures that can effectively withstand the most common anti-tank weapons (from the RPG-7 and above) led to the fact that the line between the armored personnel carrier and the BMP disappeared without a trace. The 60-ton Israeli Namer is designated as an armored personnel carrier, while the 18-ton BMP-3 and 35-ton M2A3 Bradley are infantry fighting vehicles (all of which are capable of carrying the same weapons - ATGMs and 30 mm automatic cannons) … In my opinion, the following is literally happening: there is a degradation and disappearance of BMPs as a class of armored vehicles. The functions of infantry fighting vehicles are transferred to armored personnel carriers, however, they have always duplicated each other.
It is worth noting that everything that was said about the BMP is true for the armored personnel carriers, respectively, everything that will be said below about the armored personnel carriers, in turn, is true for the BMP.
Many are still convinced that the armored personnel carrier is intended solely for the delivery of personnel of motorized rifle units to the place of the mission. This nonsense, invented by armchair theorists, wanders from one textbook to another, confusing young minds.
The range of use of armored personnel carriers is extremely wide: armored personnel carriers, along with infantry fighting vehicles, are used to escort and guard convoys, are used at checkpoints and to storm objects (who does not remember the terrible footage from Beslan - an armored personnel carrier, lined with sandbags, is moving towards the school building, followed by fighters "Alpha"?). For evacuation and successful actions in the event of an ambush - for all such cases, heavy booking is preferable … which, unfortunately, is not. The "armor" of domestic armored personnel carriers can hardly hold even automatic shots, a large-caliber machine gun certainly penetrates their 7 mm side from a distance of half a kilometer.
Here is an excerpt from the comment of one of the readers:
Always with a mixed sense of pride, pity and bewilderment I look at the pictures of our valiant motorized infantry, airborne troops and internal troops leaving on a combat mission … But according to the design and purpose of armored vehicles, everything should be exactly the opposite. They should not sit on armor, but in armor, which should protect them from the primary and secondary damaging factors of various weapons. The explanation is equally gallant for infantry and equally shameful for armored vehicle manufacturers and designers. The infantry prefers a glorious death from a bullet or a fragment of a painful death from barotrauma …
You can't say more precisely. Indeed, modern "classic" armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles are unable to protect the crew even from the most primitive means of destruction.
Monsters from the Middle East
The state of Israel went farthest in the creation of highly protected armored personnel carriers - having stuffed numerous "bumps" in the endless Arab-Israeli conflict, the military seriously thought about what could save the crew of an armored personnel carrier, for example, in the event of a mine explosion or when an RPG cumulative grenade hits - a common phenomenon in local ** wars? The result was the creation of a heavy armored personnel carrier "Akhzarit" on the chassis of a captured T-54/55 tank.
Yes, the 200 mm armor of the Akhzarit armored personnel carrier, reinforced with additional steel screens and dynamic protection (the weight of the body kit is 17 tons, more than the entire BMP-2 vehicle) is not capable of providing 100% crew safety. There are known cases when Hamas and Hezbollah militants used 1000 kg land mines to destroy Israeli tanks - no armor will protect them from such “gifts”. However, such things are rare - ordinary RPGs and improvised explosive devices of low power are much more common, from which the crew of the Akhzarit armored personnel carrier is reliably protected. I'm not talking about the DShK machine gun …
For 25 years of using the Akhzarit armored personnel carrier, the Israel Defense Forces have accumulated tremendous experience in operating such equipment. The experience, apparently, turned out to be successful - the Israeli industry began to create heavy armored personnel carriers based on other tanks: the 51-ton "Puma" based on the old "Centurion" and the 60-ton "Namer" based on the MBT "Merkava" Mk.4
Of course, one should not go to extremes: the incredible Namer is a vehicle for special operations and elite units of the army, it is unlikely that it will be able to become widespread, like the simpler and cheaper Akhzarit armored personnel carrier. In my opinion, "Puma" and "Akhzarit" are the very "golden mean" between security and other characteristics of the car (its cost, operating costs, cost of motor resources, etc.).
Unfortunately, many are still skeptical about the useful Israeli experience, the question is constantly asked: "For what tasks was this technique created?" I answer: the Akhzarit armored personnel carrier was created to wage war against numerous and ubiquitous opponents, whose combat units are extremely saturated with anti-tank weapons. And the climate of Israel has nothing to do with it.
In addition, there is every reason to believe that, created on the basis of the Soviet T-54/55, "Akhzarit" is in no way inferior to its progenitor in mobility and maneuverability. So there is no doubt about the possibility (and necessity!) Of using the Israeli experience in the Russian army.
An attempt to appeal to the size of Israel is untenable: no one will force domestic tanks and armored personnel carriers to make thousand-kilometer marches, Russia has a developed network of railways - heavy armored vehicles can be delivered to any point of our vast country without any problems (we will not go to the point of absurdity - tanks and armored personnel carriers have nothing do on Taimyr, although there, if desired, you can deliver tanks by sea).
The most important chapter
The story about the problems with the security of modern domestic armored vehicles does not pursue the goal of "throw mud" at the domestic tank building. Yes, this topic is not new - a wave of fair criticism periodically falls from the media on the heads of the designers of Russian armored vehicles and makes them look for ways to further increase the protection of armored vehicles.
But much more important is the fact that along with timid attempts to strengthen the booking of "classic" armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, work is underway in our country to create truly promising samples of highly protected armored vehicles. Back in 1997, a design team from Omsk demonstrated a heavy armored personnel carrier BTR-T on the chassis of a T-54/55 tank (something very familiar, isn't it?). Unfortunately, the useful vehicle never made it to the troops; throughout the Second Chechen War, Russian soldiers rode astride the armor of their "cardboard" BMPs.
The next attempt turned out to be more successful: in 2001, a heavy combat vehicle of BMO-T flamethrowers based on the T-72 main battle tank was adopted by the Russian army. Despite its name, BMO-T is a real armored personnel carrier, where, in addition to 2 crew members, 7 paratroopers can be accommodated (as well as a place for transporting 30 units of Bumblebee flamethrowers). For the convenience and safety of dismounting the landing, in addition to roof hatches, there is an additional hatch in the stern of the BMO-T. There is a remotely controlled machine gun for self-defense.
At the moment, there are about 10 vehicles of this type in service - too few to draw any conclusions. However, the very fact of the appearance of such armored vehicles suggests that the idea of a heavy armored personnel carrier has finally captured the minds of our designers.
