Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted on November 5 that the first Indian SSBN Arihant has successfully completed its first entry into service. They say that now India has its own, full-fledged strategic nuclear triad, which will become an important pillar of international peace and stability. With which Modi and congratulated the nation.
There seems to be a lot of wishful thinking in this statement. India has a certain triad, but which one? Certainly not strategic.
So, what does India have in terms of nuclear missiles? Let's start with the marine component. Obviously, we should start with the Arihant SSBN itself and its origin.
Modi's statement was followed by articles in the Indian press about how important this event (the first SSBN combat service) is for a country that has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, and how it will be analyzed by analysts and the military "all over the world" (!). I am sure that in both nuclear superpowers in the upper headquarters they did not pay much attention to this epoch-making event. And in general, they say, in the opinion of the authors of such publications, the Arihant SSBN is an excellent example of the implementation of the principle "produce in India" (there is such a propaganda thesis there). Yes, indeed, the example is just great. Roughly the same as the construction of the first Indian aircraft carrier (from which teams of specialists from Russia did not get out), the assembly of T-90S tanks or Su-30MKI fighters. By the way, a typical example is that as an illustration to one of such laudatory articles in the Indian Express edition … the multipurpose nuclear submarine of pr. 971I "Nerpa" (in the Indian navy referred to as "Chakra", like the first rented nuclear submarine) is cited. Apparently, "Arihant" looks pale in comparison with our sea predator. Moreover, on the Internet, instead of photographs of "Arihant" in Indian sources, you can find anyone with this signature, but more often either, again, a Russian "predator" such as "Bars" pr. 971, a little less often - "Borey" our other projects, even the first Chinese SSBN of the "Xia" type (the one that has never been in combat service in its entire life) has been encountered. Then, infographics, diagrams and everything else are made using such "reliable photos".
SSBN "Arihant"
Let's note for a start that there is not much Indian in it, except for the place of construction. The Indians drew the project of their first nuclear submarine, or rather, SSBN, based on the Soviet SSGN, project 670M, which they had in lease in the 80s. Of course, taking into account the past decades, various systems of national and not very national development and the fact that instead of 8 mines with the Malakhit P-120 anti-ship missile system, there are 4 silo launchers for the K-15 SLBM. Moreover, the actual SLBM K-15 is placed in silos for 3 pieces, so there are 12 of them (like on our APRK pr. 885 / 885M, only there - anti-ship missiles and KR), and the mines themselves were designed for a larger SLBM K-4, which not yet. In fact, their nuclear submarine in India has been designed since 1974, but the work went on in the classic Indian style (when the very process of "national development" is important, and no one really needs the result), and even after receiving a combat-ready Soviet submarine, the speed was not has grown very much. Probably, Russian specialists were also involved in the adaptation of the project (although the Indians most likely developed the missile compartment themselves - nonproliferation is nonproliferation). During the construction of "Arihant" and the subsequent submarine "Arighat", teams of specialists from the Russian Federation were also constantly present, and up to 40% of the equipment comes from Russia (something, perhaps, is bought somewhere else). The Arihant project itself was reworked many times - either the requirements changed, or it was necessary to stretch the legs over the clothes - the capabilities of the national industry did not allow even the level of the Soviet nuclear submarine of the 2nd generation to be realized, not to mention the 3-4th generations. It’s hard to say how the Arihant and Arighat’s have unmasking factors, such as the noise level, but hardly comparable even with the Chinese submarines, which are also created with the technical assistance of Russian friends and allies, but there are problems there as well.
"Arihant" on trials, 2014
The "Arihant" itself was built with songs and dances since 1998, launched in 2009, but only reached sea trials in 2014. And the transfer itself to the fleet took place in 2016, but on paper (they are not the first - not they and the last, this is what the Americans sin regularly, and it happened to us). The "Arihant" almost never went to sea - the list of shortcomings was eliminated. In 2017, a new misfortune happened on the Arihant - brave Indian submariners flooded the reactor compartment. Fortunately, the matter did not come to water entering the core and other horrors, but a considerable part of the pipelines and valves and cables had to be changed. How did they manage to do all this in a little over a year and a half and kick the stubborn SSBN out of the base on a combat patrol so that Modi could then brag about it on Twitter - this is only known to the Indian gods. Well, and those who helped Indian builders in this labor feat. But they are unlikely to be giving interviews.
How such a perfectly built and trained atomarina could carry out combat service there is also unknown. Most likely, it was important just to hold out in a given area of the Bay of Bengal (it is known that she patrolled there) for a set time without incident - and that's it. Well, the trouble is the beginning, as they say.
For now, the point is, at the end of 2017, the Arighat was also on the water, laid down after the Arihant was launched, but it will take a long time to complete it too. Although clearly not as long and not as dramatic as the firstborn. The official date of acceptance according to various sources - either the end of this year, or the spring of the next, but this does not mean anything in Indian conditions - then there will be another couple of years to eliminate imperfections and problems. 2 more SSBNs of this project are under construction, albeit modified, so on the last boat of the silo series there will be 8, not 4 carry double the number of silos and more advanced equipment, but if these plans were, they were transferred to the next boats. In addition, the third boat of the project is now called "Aridaman", perhaps someone got it wrong. But until now in many sources "Arighat" carries 8 silos and in the drawings too (there were no photographs of the missile compartment). A similar confusion was with our "Borey", when at one time, being designed for the R-39UTTH "Bark" SLBM, it was designed for 12 missiles, then, with "Bulava", there were 16 of them, and until the very descent of "Yuri Dolgoruky "and even after that, many have argued about 12 mines and discussed this perceived deficiency. Then speculations about 20 silos on the improved Borey-A were born somewhere, and until the launch of the lead cruiser, these speculations were circulating in some places.
An image of the Arihant-class SSBN taken from photographs by the famous underwater explorer H. I. Sutton, next to it are K-15 and K-4 SLBMs and 533mm torpedoes.
There are plans to build another series of S5 SSBNs, no longer 6 thousand tons of underwater displacement, but more, up to 13,500 tons, with a new nuclear power plant, and with 12 silos for new generation SLBMs. With 7 SSBNs, India will formally take 3rd place in the world, although this is only formally. For example, 4 French SSBNs have a much higher combat value and real potential than anything that can be built in India in the next 15 years.
Now about the missiles on Indian SSBNs. The first Indian solid-propellant SLBM K-15 "Sagarika" has a range of only about 700-750 km, that is, it is less than that of the first experimental Soviet SLBM. True, this is with a SBC weighing 1 ton with a total weight of 7 tons. A number of Indian sources claim that there is also a lightweight version of the warhead (perhaps even a non-nuclear one), which allows the rocket to fly almost twice as far - but such an option has not been tested, and it is not known whether it exists at all, given the problems of the Indians with the miniaturization of charges, completely natural - statistical test data is too small for this. The power of this one-ton SBS is unknown, for example, the notorious H. Christensen estimates it at 12 kt, that is, there is an ordinary nuclear warhead, but why only 12, and not 20 or 30 or even something else, is unknown. Considering how this gentleman freely draws conclusions on various topics, it is difficult to believe the information about the power of the charges of Indian SBCs. And in Indian sources, you can find any numbers. But it seems strange that Christensen and for SSBNs, and for OTR, and for MRBMs names figures characteristic of purely nuclear charges (12-40 kt and so on) as capacities - tritium reinforcement in India should have been mastered, it was in the DPRK have mastered, and their "nuclear experience" is much less. Moreover, Indian missiles have problems with accuracy, despite various laudatory statements about the CEP at 50 m (as it was said in the well-known anecdote, "and you say you can").
BPRL K-15 when launched from an underwater pontoon. The moment of retraction of the fairing, with which the rocket leaves the silo, is clearly visible.
The missile has been tested from land and submersible (pontoon) platforms since the second half of the 2000s, at present 13 launches have been completed, most of them successfully. Sagariki had very few launches directly from the submarine - exactly two, and one was a throwing one. With this approach, it is impossible to be confident in the weapon, because a pontoon is a pontoon, and a boat is a boat, and many of the nuances on a pontoon cannot be fully worked out.
A land version of the Sagariki is also planned, which, in general, is not the smartest decision. The fact is that SLBMs are too different in layout and other solutions to become good land-based ballistic missiles, and vice versa - all the more so, which is why the advertised unification of Bulava and Topol-M with Yars is expressed in rocket fuel, separating warhead, warheads and a complex of means of overcoming missile defense, which is already a lot. With a missile of such a range as that of the Sagariki, Indian SSBNs can only contain Pakistan, and then they will not be able to shoot through its territory along its entire length. There is nothing to say about China - the Indian SSBN's campaign to the Chinese shores in this situation is simply unscientific fantasy, there is nothing to ensure its combat stability, its secrecy hardly allows it to act alone, and experience too. The new K-4 SLBM is a much more solid rocket, weighing 17-20 tons and carrying a warhead weighing 1-2 tons (data differ according to different sources) for a range of up to 3000-3500 km. A sort of analogue of the old American "Polaris", or, if you like, the new North Korean "Polaris" (the North Korean series of MRBM / SLBM "Pukgykson" is translated into English in this way). But it is still very far from the series - the first launch was planned for 2013, but took place only in March 2014 from an underwater pontoon (it is possible that there were earlier ground tests, but they were not reported or were taken for tests of the MRBM type " Agni "), declared successful - the range was about 3000 km. In the spring of 2016, 2 more launches took place, one from the pontoon, which was declared a "tremendous success", the second took place from the Arihant, but the range was only 700 km do not miss the missile with the national tracking means, everything is usual with them). Perhaps it was planned, but perhaps not, but officially also "success". Moreover, information about a target hit (more precisely, an area in the ocean) was spread with an error supposedly close to zero, but this raises doubts. The next launch was supposed to take place last year, but ended in an accident. Perhaps, soon after that exit, Indian submariners sank the reactor compartment. The new launch was planned for 2018. at the beginning, but did not take place due to both the unavailability of the rocket and the boat that was under repair. No new ones have been reported yet.
[media = https://www.youtube.com/watch? v = A_feco6vn7E || First launch of K-4 SLBMs from an underwater pontoon]
Having received the K-4, albeit only 4 missiles on board, it will already be possible to talk about the normal defeat of Pakistani territory from a convenient for defense patrolling area in the control zone of its fleet, and about striking retaliation against China, although it will be more difficult here, with the range in 3 thousand. km. By the way, regarding the concept of only a retaliatory nuclear strike, this is not just a kind of pacifism, but a forced step. A counter and retaliatory strike is not available as an option to the Chinese nuclear forces due to the still sufficient preparation time for launch on both stationary and mobile platforms and the underdevelopment of an early warning system. However, the Chinese comrades can partially solve the last problem with the help of Russian friends - in any case, a number of steps by the Chinese to deploy their nuclear forces near our border under the "umbrella" of not only our early warning system, but even air defense, suggests that this is being done with the knowledge and approval of the Kremlin and the Frunzenskaya embankment.
But the Indian submariners are planning not only the sea containment of Pakistan and China, but also the United States. The planned K-5 and K-6 SLBMs with ranges of up to 6-7 thousand km and a payload of the same 1-2 tons, for future S5-type SSBNs, appear to be intended not only for China as one of the main rivals, but also for the United States. … As a matter of fact, the fact that ICBMs are also being developed in India clearly speaks of the same thing. Yes, India is not hiding that there is a desire to have the "potential of influence" on the American partners living "behind a big puddle". Who have been vigorously sucking up to New Delhi lately, but, obviously, they are on their minds there and do not intend to be friends with Washington more than necessary. It should be noted that there is not a word about Russia in India's nuclear plans, obviously, they understand perfectly well that, despite our strategic alliance with Beijing, we will not get into the Indian-Chinese "showdown", and we do not pose a direct threat to India either., and Russia's policy is very different from that of another nuclear superpower.
But the Indian deterrent potential, even if it does not draw on the strategic triad, is still a regional triad, and about other branches of the Indian nuclear missile tree - in the next part of this material.
