This article is a continuation of the previously published material on the concept of a nuclear-powered multifunctional submarine cruiser (AMFPK): "Nuclear multifunctional submarine cruiser: an asymmetric response to the West."
The first article caused a lot of comments, which can be grouped in several directions:
- the proposed additional equipment will not fit into the submarine, because everything in it is already packed as tightly as possible;
- the proposed tactics grossly contradict the existing tactics of using submarines;
- distributed robotic systems / hypersound is better;
- own aircraft carrier strike groups (AUG) are better.
To begin with, let's consider the technical side of creating AMPPK
Why did I choose Project 955A strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs) as the AMFPK platform?
For three reasons. Firstly, this platform is in series, therefore, its construction is well mastered by the industry. Moreover, the construction of the series is completed in a few years, and if the AMFPK project is worked out in a short time, then the construction can be continued on the same stocks. Due to the unification of most of the structural elements: hull, power plant, propulsion unit, etc. the cost of the complex can be significantly reduced.
On the other hand, we see how slowly the industry is introducing completely new weapons into the series. This is especially true for large surface ships. Even new frigates and corvettes go to the fleet with a significant delay, I will keep silent about the construction time of promising destroyers / cruisers / aircraft carriers.
Secondly, an essential part of the AMPPK concept, the conversion of SSBNs from a carrier of strategic nuclear missiles to a carrier of a large number of cruise missiles, has been successfully implemented in the United States. Four nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs) of the Ohio type (SSBN-726 - SSBN-729) were converted into carriers of BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, that is, there is nothing impossible and unrealizable in this process.
Thirdly, Project 955A submarines are among the most modern in the Russian fleet, and accordingly, they have a significant reserve for the future in terms of tactical and technical characteristics.
Why not take the project 885 / 885M, which is also in the series, as a platform for AMPPK? First of all, because for the tasks for which I am considering the use of AMFPK, there is not enough space on the boats of the 885 / 885M project to accommodate the necessary ammunition. According to information from the open press, boats of this series are quite difficult to manufacture. The cost of submarines of project 885 / 885M is from 30 to 47 billion rubles. (from 1 to 1.5 billion dollars), while the cost of the SSBN project 955 is about 23 billion rubles. (0.7 billion dollars). Prices with a dollar exchange rate of 32-33 rubles.
The possible advantages of the 885 / 885M platform are the best hydroacoustic equipment, high speed of low-noise underwater movement, great maneuverability. However, given the lack of reliable information on these parameters in the open press, they have to be taken out of the brackets. Also, the re-equipment of the US Navy SSBN "Ohio" in SSGN with the ability to deliver reconnaissance and sabotage groups indirectly suggests that submarines of this class can effectively operate "on the front line."SSBNs of the Project 955A type should at least not be inferior to SSBNs / SSGNs of the "Ohio" type in their capabilities. In any case, we will return to the 885 / 885M project later.
Any promising platforms (nuclear submarines (PLA) of the "Husky" project, underwater robots, etc., etc.) were not considered for the reason that I have no information about the state of work in these areas, how long they can be implemented and whether they will be implemented at all.
Now let's consider the main object of criticism: the use of a long-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) on a submarine
Currently, the only means of countering aviation on submarines are portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) of the Igla type. Their use involves the emergence of a submarine to the surface, the exit of the MANPADS operator to the hull of the boat, visual target detection, capture with an infrared head and launch. The complexity of this procedure, coupled with the low characteristics of MANPADS, suggests its use in exceptional situations, for example, when recharging batteries of a diesel-electric submarine (diesel-electric submarine) or repairing damage, that is, in cases where the submarine cannot submerge under water.
The world is working on the concept of using anti-aircraft missiles from under the water. These are the French A3SM Mast complex based on MBDA Mistral MANPADS and A3SM Underwater Vehicle based on the MBDA MICA medium-range air-to-air anti-aircraft missile (SAM) with a firing range of up to 20 km.
Germany offers the IDAS air defense system, designed to engage low-flying, low-speed targets.
It should be noted that all of the above air defense systems, according to the modern classification, can be attributed to short-range complexes with limited capabilities for hitting high-speed and maneuvering targets. Their use, although it does not imply ascent, but requires ascent to periscope depth and the advancement of reconnaissance equipment above the water, which, apparently, is considered acceptable by the developers.
At the same time, the threat to submarines from aviation is increasing. Since 2013, the US Navy began to receive long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the new generation P-8A "Poseidon". In total, the US Navy plans to purchase 117 Poseidons to replace the fleet of the rapidly aging P-3 Orion, developed back in the 60s.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can pose a significant hazard to submarines. A feature of UAVs is their extremely high range and duration of flight, which makes it possible to control vast areas of the surface.
The US Navy also has the MC-4C Triton high-altitude long-range UAV in its arsenal. This aircraft can carry out reconnaissance of surface targets with high efficiency and in the future can be retrofitted to detect submarines by analogy with the naval version of the MQ-9 Predator B UAV.
Do not forget about the SH-60F Ocean Hawk and MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine helicopters with a descending hydroacoustic station (GAS).
Since World War II, submarines have been virtually defenseless against air attacks. The only thing that a submarine can do when detected by an airplane is to try to hide in the depths, to get out of the detection zone of an airplane or a helicopter. With this option, the initiative will always be on the side of the attacker.
Why, in this case, modern air defense systems were not installed on submarines before? For a long time, anti-aircraft missile systems were extremely cumbersome systems: bulky rotating antennas, beam holders of missiles.
Of course, there is no question of placing such a volume on a submarine. But gradually, with the introduction of new technologies, the dimensions of the air defense system have decreased, which made it possible to place them on compact mobile platforms.
In my opinion, there are the following factors that make it possible to consider the possibility of installing air defense systems on submarines:
1. The emergence of radar stations (radars) with an active phased antenna array (AFAR), which do not require mechanical rotation of the antenna web.
2. The emergence of missiles with active radar homing heads (ARLGSN), which do not require illumination of the radar target after launch.
At the moment, the newest S-500 Prometheus air defense system is close to being adopted. On the basis of the land version, it is expected to design a marine version of this complex. In parallel, you can consider the creation of a variant of the S-500 "Prometheus" air defense system for AMPPK.
When studying the layout, we can be based on the structure of the S-400 air defense system. The basic composition of the 40P6 (S-400) system includes:
- combat control point (PBU) 55K6E;
- radar complex (RLK) 91Н6E;
- multifunctional radar (MRLS) 92N6E;
- transport and launchers (TPU) of the 5P85TE2 and / or 5P85SE2 type.
A similar structure is planned for the S-500 air defense system. In general, the components of the air defense system:
- control equipment;
- radar detection;
- guidance radar;
- means of destruction in launch containers.
Each element of the complex is located on the chassis of a special off-road truck, where, in addition to the equipment itself, there are places for operators, life support systems and energy sources for the elements of the complex.
Where can these components be placed on AMFPK (project 955A platform)? First, it is necessary to understand the volumes released when replacing the Bulava ballistic missiles with the AMFPK arsenal. The length of the Bulava missile in a container is 12.1 m, the length of the 3M-54 missile of the Caliber complex is up to 8.2 m (the largest of the missile family), the P 800 Onyx missile is 8.9 m, the super-large missile range 40N6E SAM S-400 - 6, 1 m. Based on this, the volume of the weapons compartment can be reduced in height by about three meters. Taking into account the area of the weapons compartment, this is quite a flat, that is, the volume is significant. Also, to ensure the launch of ballistic missiles in SSBNs, it is possible that there is some specialized equipment, which can also be excluded.
Based on this…
SAM control equipment can be placed in the compartments of the submarine. About five years have passed since the design of Project 955A SSBNs, during which time the equipment has been changing, new design solutions have appeared. Accordingly, it is quite possible to find several cubic meters of additional volumes when designing AMPPK. If not, then we place the control compartment of the air defense missile system in the freed up space of the weapons compartment.
Weapons in launch containers are housed in a new weapons bay. To ensure that the air defense missile system can operate at periscope depth, of course, with the radar mast extended to the surface, the air defense missile system can be adapted for launching from under the water by analogy with the Caliber / Onyx missiles or in the form of pop-up containers.
All other weapons offered for AMPPK initially have the ability to be used from under the water.
Placement of the radar station on the lifting mast. Depending on the layout of the weapons compartment, two options for the placement of the radar can be considered:
- conformal placement on the sides of the deckhouse;
- horizontal placement along the hull (folded inside the weapons compartment);
- vertical placement, similar to the placement of Bulava ballistic missiles.
Conformal placement on the sides of the deckhouse. Plus: does not require massive retractable structures. Minus: worsens hydrodynamics, worsens the noise of the course, requires surfacing for the use of missiles, there is no possibility of detecting low-flying targets.
Placement horizontally along the body. Plus: you can implement a sufficiently high mast that allows you to raise the antenna at periscope depth. Minus: when folded, it can partially overlap the launch cells in the weapons compartment.
Placement vertically. Plus: you can implement a sufficiently high mast that allows you to raise the antenna at periscope depth. Minus: reduces the amount of ammunition in the weapons compartment.
The latter option seems to me preferable. As mentioned earlier, the maximum height of the compartment is 12.1 m. The use of telescopic structures will make it possible to carry a radar station weighing ten to twenty tons to a height of about thirty meters. For a submarine located at periscope depth, this will allow the radar station to be raised above the water to a height of fifteen to twenty meters.
As we saw above, the S-400 / S-500 air defense system includes two types of radar: search radar and guidance radar. This is primarily due to the need for missile guidance without ARLGSN. In some cases, as, for example, implemented in one of the best air defense destroyers of the Dering type, the radars used differ in wavelength, making it possible to effectively use the advantages of each.
Perhaps, taking into account the introduction of AFAR in the S-500 and the expansion of the range of weapons with ARLGSN, in the naval version it will be possible to abandon the surveillance radar, performing its functions as a guidance radar. In aviation technology, this has long been the norm, all functions (both reconnaissance and guidance) are performed by one radar.
The radar cloth should be stored in a sealed radio-transparent container that provides protection from sea water at a periscope depth (up to ten to fifteen meters). When designing a mast, it is necessary to implement solutions to reduce visibility, similar to those used in the development of modern periscopes. This is necessary to minimize the likelihood of AMPPC detection when the AFAR operates in passive mode or in LPI mode with a low probability of signal interception.
For missiles with ARLGSN, the possibility of issuing target designation from the submarine's periscope can be implemented. This may be required, for example, if it is necessary to destroy a single low-altitude low-speed target of the "anti-submarine helicopter" type, when it is impractical to extend the radar mast.
In any case, this will require additional interfacing of the air defense missile system with shipborne systems, but this is more efficient than installing a separate optical location station (OLS) on the mast or placing it (OLS) on the radar mast.
I hope the question “the proposed equipment will not fit into the submarine, since everything is already packed as tightly as possible in it”, is considered in sufficient detail.
The question of cost
The cost of the Project 955 Borei SSBN is $ 713 million (the first ship), the Ohio SSBN is $ 1.5 billion (in 1980 prices). The cost of re-equipping Ohio-class SSBNs into SSGNs is about $ 800 million. The cost of one S-400 division is about $ 200 million. Roughly from these figures, you can form the order of the price for AMFPK - from 1 to 1.5 billion dollars, that is, the cost of AMFPK should approximately correspond to the cost of submarines of project 885 / 885M.
Now let's move on to the tasks for which, in my opinion, AMPPK is intended
Despite the fact that the largest number of comments was caused by the use of AMPPK against aircraft carriers, in my opinion, the highest priority task of AMPPK is the implementation of anti-missile defense (ABM) in the initial (possibly middle) phase of flight of ballistic missiles.
Quoting from the first article:
The basis of the strategic nuclear forces of the NATO countries is the naval component - nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs).
The share of US nuclear warheads deployed on SSBNs is over 50% of the entire nuclear arsenal (about 800-1100 warheads), Great Britain - 100% of the nuclear arsenal (about 160 warheads on four SSBNs), France - 100% of strategic nuclear warheads (about 300 warheads on four SSBNs).
Destruction of enemy SSBNs is one of the priority tasks in the event of a global conflict. However, the task of destroying SSBNs is complicated by the concealment of the SSBN patrol areas by the enemy, the difficulty of determining its exact location and the presence of combat guards.
If there is information about the approximate location of the enemy's SSBN in the World Ocean, AMPPK can carry out duty in this area along with hunting submarines. In the event of the outbreak of a global conflict, the hunter-boat is entrusted with the task of destroying the enemy's SSBNs. In the event that this task is not completed or the SSBN began launching ballistic missiles before destruction, the AMPPK is entrusted with the task of intercepting the launching ballistic missiles at the initial stage of the trajectory.
The possibility of solving this problem depends primarily on the speed characteristics and range of application of promising missiles from the S-500 complex, designed for anti-missile defense and destruction of artificial earth satellites. If these capabilities are provided by missiles from the S-500, then AMPPK can implement a "blow in the back of the head" to the strategic nuclear forces of NATO countries.
The destruction of a launching ballistic missile at the initial stage of the trajectory has the following advantages:
1. The launching rocket cannot maneuver and has maximum visibility in the radar and thermal range.
2. The defeat of one missile allows you to destroy several warheads at once, each of which can destroy hundreds of thousands or even millions of people.
3. To destroy a ballistic missile in the initial section of the trajectory, it is not required to know the exact location of the enemy's SSBN, it is enough to be within the range of the anti-missile.
For a long time, the media have been discussing the topic that the deployment of missile defense elements near the borders of Russia will potentially allow the destruction of ballistic missiles at the initial stage of the trajectory, until the separation of warheads. Their deployment will require the deployment of a ground-based missile defense component in the depths of the territory of the Russian Federation. A similar danger to the naval component is posed by the US AUG with its Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke destroyers.
By deploying AMPPK in US SSBN patrol areas, we will turn the situation upside down. Now the United States will have to look for ways to provide additional cover for its SSBNs to provide a guaranteed nuclear strike capability.
The possibility of creating in Russia hit-to-kill warheads, which ensure the defeat of the target with a direct hit at high altitudes, is in question, although for the S-500 such a possibility seems to be declared. However, since the positional areas of US SSBNs are located at a considerable distance from the territory of Russia, then special warheads (CU) can be installed on AMFPK anti-missiles, significantly increasing the likelihood of hitting launching ballistic missiles. Radioactive fallout in this variant of the use of missile defense missiles will fall at a considerable distance from the territory of Russia.
Considering that the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces is the main one for the United States, the threat of its neutralization cannot be ignored by them.
The solution of this problem by surface ships or their formations is impossible, since they are guaranteed to be detected. In the future, the US SSBN will either change the patrol area, or, in the event of a conflict, the surface ships will be preemptively destroyed by the US Navy and Air Force.
The question can be asked: is it not reasonable to destroy the missile carrier itself - SSBN? Of course, this is much more effective, since in one blow we will destroy dozens of missiles and hundreds of warheads, however, if we find out the area of SSBN patrolling by intelligence or technical means, this does not mean that we will be able to find out its exact location. To destroy the enemy's SSBNs by an underwater hunter, he must approach it at a distance of about fifty kilometers (the maximum range of torpedo weapons). Most likely, there may be a cover submarine somewhere nearby, which will actively oppose this.
In turn, the range of promising interceptor missiles can reach five hundred kilometers. Accordingly, at a distance of several hundred kilometers, it will be much more difficult to detect AMPPK. Also, knowing the area of the enemy SSBN patrolling and the direction of flight of the missiles, we can place the AMPPK on a catch-up course, when anti-missiles will hit ballistic missiles flying in their direction.
Will AMFPK be destroyed after turning on the radar and launching anti-missiles at launching ballistic missiles? Possibly, but not required. In the event of a global conflict on missile defense bases in Eastern Europe, in Alaska and ships capable of performing missile defense functions, weapons will be struck with nuclear warheads. In this case, we will find ourselves in a winning situation, since the coordinates of the stationary bases are known in advance, surface ships near our territory will also be discovered, but whether AMPPC will be found is a question.
In such conditions, the likelihood of large-scale aggression, including the delivery of the so-called disarming first strike, becomes extremely unlikely. The very presence of AMPPK in service and the uncertainty of its location will not allow a potential adversary to be sure that the scenario of a "disarming" first strike will develop according to plan.
It is this task that is, in my opinion, the main one for AMPPK
List of sources used
1. Offer DCNS SAM for submarines.
2. The armament of the submarines will be replenished with anti-aircraft missiles.
3. France creates air defense systems for submarines.
4. Development of submarine air defense systems.
5. US Navy aircraft received a new anti-submarine aircraft.
6. A US drone first went out to hunt for a submarine.
7. The Triton reconnaissance UAV will see everything.
8. Anti-aircraft missile system of long and medium range S-400 "Triumph".
9. Anti-aircraft missile system S-400 "Triumph" in detail.
10. Anti-aircraft autonomous universal submarine self-defense complex.
11. Dragons in the service of her majesty.
12. Raise the periscope!
13. Unified periscope complex "Parus-98e".
14. The General Staff of the RF Armed Forces told how the US missile defense system can intercept Russian missiles.
15. The danger of the US missile defense for the nuclear potentials of the Russian Federation and China turned out to be underestimated.
16. Aegis is a direct threat to Russia.
17. European missile defense threatens the security of Russia.
