Perhaps the format will be somewhat unusual, but the story itself without the technical details of this aircraft is worthy of a separate story.
Many people mistakenly believe (and I myself did not speak quite correctly about this aircraft several times) that the Tu-2 was adopted during the Great Patriotic War. On the one hand, this is all true, but from the moment of the first flight to the start of full-fledged operation, three years have passed, which is a bit too much in general.
Who is guilty? Honestly I do not know. It turned out that still a detective story, it is not possible to unravel even today, because the real participants in the story have all already left this world, and, alas, one cannot call the other world.
So, excuse me, - only speculation and facts that can be gleaned from the memories of past eyewitnesses …
Our history begins in 1938, when such a phenomenon as the Special Technical Bureau (OTB) was born under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
The Bureau was headed by Major of State Security V. A. Kravchenko, Senior Lieutenant of State Security G. Ya. Kutepov, who later also headed the OTB, became his deputy.
Engineers of various specialties worked in the OTB: aircraft builders, engine builders, artillerymen, shipbuilders. In general, this structure will be a separate discussion, because as a lot of materials have appeared, there is something to think about and something to discuss.
Now, under the abbreviation OTB we mean the department that was engaged in development in the field of aviation, which was later renamed TsKB-29.
After the arrest, all aviation specialists ended up in the OTB and became a "special contingent". Actually, no one began to invent anything new, the bureau was divided into departments called STO (Special Technical Department) and assigned numbers to them.
Service station No. 100 consisted of employees of Petlyakov's design bureau (yes, and the fighter "100", the future Pe-2, from the same place), the second arrived employees of the Myasishchev design bureau, of whom was created service station No. 102, the third were Tupolevs. They got the service station # 103. The last one was created by STO №101, from KB Tomashevich. Apparently, it took a long time to collect, and the room was reserved in advance.
Each service station quite expectedly became a design bureau, and quite independent. Nominally, the service station was led by chiefs with the rank of lieutenants of state security, who, oddly enough, did not get involved in the design bureau's affairs, since they did not understand anything about aviation technology. But they solved all the issues related to equipment, supplies, related organizations, security and other issues.
Yes, these lieutenants signed all the technical documentation prepared by the engineers of the "special contingent". Such a delicate question, isn't it? That is, in fact, these people bore all responsibility for the equipment developed in the service station. Probably, it was not the most convenient place to work for both bosses and subordinates.
In general, there was enough madhouse, on the other hand, in this regard, we always had complete order. But more on that below.
When the OTB grew to a fairly decent size, it was transferred from Moscow to Bolshevo. And in the fall of 1938, Tupolev was brought to Bolshevo.
From this moment, the adage ends, and our story begins. That is the history of the Tu-2.
Initially, Tupolev had the idea of a heavy attack aircraft. The project was called ANT-58 and, according to the plan, was supposed to have the speed at the level of modern fighters, be able to dive and be able to carry the heaviest bombs. The crew was supposed to consist of three people. Small arms were also planned to be very weighty: in the bow, a battery of four ShKAS and two ShVAK cannons in the root parts of the wings. The pilot was shooting from all this.
The navigator and radio operator were also armed with machine guns to protect the rear hemisphere.
There was a very long bomb bay under the cockpit, into which the largest Soviet bomb FAB-1000 at that time could be placed. According to Tupolev's calculations, with two 1500 hp engines. the plane could reach speeds of over 600 km / h.
But these plans were not destined to come true. Tupolev was summoned to Moscow, listened to his report on the ANT-58 and said approximately the following: all this is good, but we need another plane. And they issued the terms of reference.
The assignment, I must say, was terrible. PB-4, high-altitude long-range four-engine dive bomber. The adversary against which this bomber would have to work is Great Britain and its fleet.
The bomber was supposed to fly at an altitude of about 10,000 meters, out of the reach of the ship's air defense, have a flight range of about 6,000 km in order to fly, for example, to Scapa Flow and return back. And this rather big, let's say, plane had to be able to dive! From 10,000 meters it is virtually impossible to hit a ship with a bomb, let alone a maneuvering ship.
Digress: Hitler also at one time had a plan in his head for something similar, huge, four-engined and diving. In general, it was a general tendency that if with bombs, he had to dive for accuracy. But the war showed that carpet bombing from a horizontal flight is no less productive than the pinpoint injections of dive bombers.
The Germans at one time somehow unscrewed from the creation of a four-engine diving monster, and Tupolev had to do the same. True, it was more difficult for the patriarch.
No matter how strange it may look, but Tupolev and his plane were saved … by the Germans. More precisely, the Junkers team. When World War II began on September 1, 1939, information immediately began to come in about the more than successful work of the Ju.87 and Ju.88 bombers.
The situation has changed radically. The war with Great Britain gradually faded into the background, Britain was still far away, but Germany, which actively began to dominate the European theater, somehow found itself very close.
Tupolev assessed the threat and began to insist on continuing work on a massive aircraft for action on the front line and in the immediate rear. It should not be a high-altitude one with a pressurized cockpit, it should not be a huge four-engine, but it should have a speed equal to or greater than the speed of modern fighters, i.e. about 600 km / h. Of course, he must be diving. The perfect front-line bomber.
And, besides, one should not forget that even in the conditions of “sharaga” a twin-engine aircraft could be developed much faster than a four-engine one. And the point is unnecessary to wind? There was only one way out - through the delivery of the aircraft project. And over PB-4 it was possible to sit for more than one year, if that. But a small front-line bomber weighing 15-18 tons could be designed, built and tested in a year.
And in Moscow the plan was approved. The project was assigned the code "FB" and was allowed to continue work in parallel with the "PB-4" project, which had been approved shortly before.
Demonstration digging began on the "PB" project and shock work on the "FB". And then Tupolev went for a trick, proposing to develop two options at once. The main one was a four-engined car, the spare was a two-engined one. At the same time, the design was supposed to allow the transition from the first option to the second with a slight change.
As a prototype for the main version, Tupolev decided to use the ANT-42 (TB-7) aircraft. The four-engine "PB" could have become a natural modification of the TB-7.
An interesting point: there were no scopes in the country at all, allowing accurate dive bombing. In parallel with the creation of the aircraft, all the necessary equipment was created. And the sight was developed by the prisoner G. S. Frenkel, navigator and mathematician. He received the code PFB-100 (the sight of the FB aircraft, designed in the service station - special technical department).
The technical design of the PB was ready and on September 29, 1939, it was discussed in the OTB with representatives of the UVVS and the RKKA Air Force Research Institute. Conclusion and memo of the head of GUAS KA P. A. Alekseev, the People's Commissar of Defense put an end to work on the four-engine version of the "PB".
And it was possible to concentrate all efforts on FB. The plan of Tupovlev, who conceived to build two aircraft at the same time, using one base, was fully justified.
On February 1, 1940, a joint meeting of representatives of the UVVS and OTB of the NKVD was held to consider the first draft design of the FB dive bomber with two M-120 engines. We listened to and discussed the report of A. N. Tupolev.
Tupolev's reputation as a designer gave the military every reason to trust his calculations, which spoke of the excellent flight performance of the aircraft being designed.
The prototype commission, having considered the layout of the aircraft "103", a twin-engine dive bomber with two M-120 TK-2 engines designed by OTB N / S6D, unanimously recognized that the proposed type of aircraft with the declared flight data is very relevant and necessary for the Red Army Air Force and what is necessary to speed up the construction of prototypes of the aircraft for their early presentation for state tests.
True, the M-120s were not yet ready, so the first aircraft had to be installed with the engines that were actually available. AM-35 was installed on the first copy, AM-37 on the second. It was generally difficult with engines, the leadership of the Central Design Bureau turned to the People's Commissar Shakhurin himself with requests for the fastest delivery of engines for testing.
Shakhurin resolved the issue, and on January 29, test pilot Nyukhtikov performed the first flight. On this day, a group of leading sabotage engineers led by Tupolev was delivered to the airfield. Factory tests were underway until the end of May 1941.
In June-July, the aircraft underwent state tests, which showed that the aircraft "103" with AM-37 engines has outstanding characteristics. However, it was not possible to complete the tests - the war prevented.
Tests of the aircraft "103" showed that the car was a success. Therefore, without waiting for the end of the tests, in February 1941, without a decision from above, the Tupolev team began preparations for mass production. Of course, with the knowledge of TsKB-29, but without waiting for all permits and approvals.
They decided to build the car in Voronezh, at the plant number 18, and they decided, again, without receiving a decision in Moscow. And since the NKAP was still determining which car to start building, "103U" or "103V", the Tupolevs went for another trick: they prepared a list of large units that go unchanged on both "103U" and "103V".
Think for a second: on June 17, 1941, five days before the start of the war, the NKAP order # 533 appeared:
In pursuance of the government decree of June 10, 1941, I order:
- Head of the 10th Main Directorate, Comrade Tarasevich, and Director of Plant No. 18, T. Shenkman, to immediately begin preparations for putting into production the aircraft "103", proceeding from the fact that Plant No. 18 should produce … in 1942, 1,000 aircraft "103" and 400 Er-2 aircraft.
To the director of plant No. 156, t. Lyapidevsky, together with the head of the NKVD OTB, t. Kravchenko:
a) to develop serial drawings for transfer to plant number 18 in the period from August 15 to September 15, 1941 …
b) send a group of specialists from the OTB NKVD in the amount of 20-25 people headed by Comrade Tupolev and 40 people of civilian designers to plant number 18 no later than October 15, 1941 … (further tasks are given to many supplier plants).
Signature: Shakhurin.
The war broke out five days later. There was nothing to think about building aircraft at a plant in Voronezh. Plant No. 18 began production of Il-2 attack aircraft, and soon it was moved to Kuibyshev, where it continued the production of Il-2.
Tupolev was assigned a factory # 166 in Omsk for launching a 103U aircraft with AM-37 engines. The reason for this was the order of the USSR GKOK dated July 27, 1941 on the launch of the "103" aircraft into serial production.
The huge problem was that the factory # 166, as such, existed only in projects. It just wasn't there.
Roughly like the plant in Kuibyshev, where, at the cost of terrible efforts, the plant was moved from Voronezh.
But in Kuibyshev it was easier: one plant was moved there. And in Omsk, something completely out of the ordinary was happening.
Plant No. 166 in Omsk consisted of:
- employees of the plant No. 156;
- employees of the plant # 81 from Tushino;
- part of the collective of the plant No. 288 from Kimry.
All that the Omsk Regional Committee had at its disposal was two sites.
The first is the site of a car assembly plant with an area of 49 hectares. It had an industrial building of 27,000 square meters. m.
The second is the site of the plant of caravans. Comintern, located at a considerable distance from the first site, with an area of 50 hectares. Its production area was 13,900 sq. m.
This was all that Tupolev and his engineers had at their disposal. Some of them had already been released, some were still spending the night in prison, under guard.
Essentially, emptiness. And the enthusiasm of the Tupolev employees.
Many people said that the Old Man / ANT / Tupolev was a peculiar and harmful person. But it is unlikely that many could, throwing themselves into an open field, start building a plant. More precisely, the Plant, since only production buildings required about 30,000 sq. m, and also the plus of auxiliary production with an area of more than 10,000 sq. m, and also an airfield …
Plus, they needed living quarters for workers, heat, water, electricity, sewage, a canteen, a hospital.
And the planes should be produced.
It is clear that Tupolev alone could not do this, all the members of his design bureau worked like damned, the factory bosses, of course, the regional committee of the party. In the Omsk regional committee, a person in charge of aviation construction was appointed, who, together with Tupolev, visited the construction site almost every day and solved all the issues that he was able to solve.
Tupolev, by the way, was non-partisan. But in the regional committee he was accepted, moreover, in spite of all the vicissitudes, ANT was on an equal footing with all party members.
This is a lyrical digression, excuse me, solely for the sake of simply giving a picture that when trouble came, it does not matter who you are, party, non-party, ex-convict and so on. We did one common thing.
Yes, despite the really heroic efforts, it turned out to be impossible for the plant to fulfill the production program set by the decree of the Defense Committee.
The Defense Committee has set the following number for the release of "103": October - 10 pieces, November - 15 pieces, December - 20 pieces.
In total, for the last quarter of 1941, the plant was supposed to hand over 45 vehicles.
But the first production vehicles "103BC" left the assembly shop in March 1942. No one was punished, no one was shot, no one was sent back to prison or sharaga. I emphasize.
In the same month, the order of the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin No. 234 dated March 28, 1942 was issued:
"In pursuance of the resolution of the State Defense Committee of March 26, 1942 No. 1498" On the designation of aircraft DB-ZF and "103" I ORDER:
1. Aircraft DB-ZF henceforth referred to as "IL-4"
2. Aircraft "103" henceforth referred to as "Tu-2"
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A. Shakhurin.
This is how the Tu-2 appeared.
The beginning, I must say right away, was not very pleasant.
In May 1942, the first three vehicles were transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for testing. On May 23, aircraft No. 100102, piloted by Senior Lieutenant Mayorov, crashed while turning, on the run after landing. As it turned out, this was just the beginning.
The second car, driven by the pilot Ishchenko, crashed on May 26 during a mileage flight. The pilot and navigator were killed, the shooter was seriously wounded. The emergency commission could not determine the cause of the crash: it is possible that the left engine failed, perhaps there was an error in piloting.
And only the third aircraft continued operational tests at the Air Force Research Institute near Moscow.
In June 1942, flights on the Tu-2 had to be banned due to the increased incidence of accidents when turning, on the run after landing. They led to damage to the chassis, engine nacelles, wing consoles. Sometimes there were "successful" turns, without breakdowns, even up to 720 degrees! But other things also happened. The plane, piloted by the pilot Polevoy, was destroyed during a turn on the landing and burned down, the crew, fortunately, escaped.
During acceptance tests on July 7 and 15, two Tu-2 aircraft, piloted by pilots Kotyakov and Vakin, crashed at the plant. Again, when turning on the run after landing. Both crews were unharmed.
Flights and assembly were suspended, and a special commission was sent to plant No. 166 to investigate.
With your permission, I will quote the conclusion of this commission in full, because here we have another round of the plot.
GENERAL CONCLUSION of the NKAP Commission on Tu-2 aircraft
The Tu-2 aircraft, designed by A. N. Tupolev, is in full-scale serial production at plant No. 166 with the production of up to 1 aircraft per day.
Based on the materials reviewed by the commission, it can be seen that the Tu-2 aircraft surpasses modern serial Soviet and foreign bombers in its flight and tactical data.
The Tu-2 aircraft has powerful defense and attack weapons and has a range of at least 2000 km, with a weight of 1000 kg of bomb load being carried.
The production of the Tu-2 at plant No. 166 is sufficiently equipped and is preparing for a larger production of serial aircraft.
In view of this, the commission believes that when eliminating the main defects noted in its memorandum, the Tu-2 aircraft has all the data to go to supply the Air Force and successfully carry out its combat missions.
Plant No. 166, from the point of view of the Commission, has every reason to expand its production capacity and to produce large series of Tu-2 aircraft.
Chairman of the Commission / POLIKARPOV / members …"
The commission was really able to understand the cause of the accidents. The fault was the weight distribution of the entire structure and the tail wheel, which, with a normally loaded plane, began to "walk".
At the request of the commission, a number of flights were carried out with a completely locked tail wheel. The flights confirmed the strong stabilizing effect of the locked wheel. The possibility of safe landings was found out even with asynchronous action of the brakes.
A number of measures have been proposed to improve the weight distribution of the aircraft.
The commission left. All the measures she proposed and agreed with the production and design bureau were quickly implemented. The accidents stopped, the production of the Tu-2 was resumed.
A small digression.
All this turned out to be simple and possible thanks to Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov, who was the chairman of the commission.
Meanwhile, the relationship between Polikarpov and Tupolev was, to put it mildly, strained. In the early 30s, Polikarpov headed the brigade No. 3 in the Tupolev Design Bureau. The head of the OKB pursued a tough policy to build only all-metal aircraft. Polikarpov considered it more correct to develop mixed designs. He also disagreed with Tupolev's constant interference in design issues.
As a result of the conflict that arose, Polikarpov in November 1931 was removed from his post as brigade chief. He was transferred to check projects, analyze the results of static tests, that is, he was removed from the meaning of life - design. Nikolai Nikolaevich assessed the situation as follows: "Clamp in TsAGI, displacement in November 1931, withdrawal of the program (scouts, fighters), forced idleness until July 1932."
Could Polikarpov, in the spirit of the times, speak of Tupolev in such a way that he would be immediately sent to prison or worse? I think he could. But Polikarpov is not just not “drowning” the former leader, but, on the contrary, is looking not for the guilty, but for ways to solve the problem. And he finds it.
In a similar delicate situation before the flights of Chkalov and Gromov to America on Tupolev planes, the pilot Levanevsky in front of Stalin accused Tupolev of sabotage, sabotage and the release of unreliable aircraft.
So, the Tu-2 went into production.
At the same time, also in the spirit of the times, the Design Bureau began to search for new options for weapons. Three such proposals were sent to the Air Force for consideration. In mid-August, the deputy commander of the spacecraft air force approved one of them with some changes. It was proposed to remove the stationary machine guns in the nose of the fuselage as ineffective, not to place four RS-82s along the fuselage for firing back, both because of the deterioration of aerodynamics, and in connection with the sufficiency of three firing points for the defense of the rear hemisphere.
The proposal to replace three ShKAS machine guns defending the rear hemisphere with Berezin heavy machine guns was approved. At the same time, the Air Force was asked to remove the sliding lantern fairing from the radio operator. For from the moment of takeoff to landing, the radio operator flies with an open flashlight, and his weapon is always in a combat position. The lantern should be replaced with a visor, which, without reducing the angles of fire, would protect the radio operator from blowing and would not worsen aerodynamics. In addition, the installation should be equipped with a power drive to reduce efforts when transferring the machine gun from side to side. All the wishes of the Air Force were fulfilled.
The future of the Tu-2 seemed cloudless enough. The plant began to steadily produce aircraft. But no, fate was preparing another blow, and this blow was stronger than a burst from an air cannon.
The order of the NKAP # 763 of October 10, 1942 came:
“In pursuance of the GKO decree in order to increase the production of fighter aircraft, I ORDER:
1. Director of the plant No. 166 comrade Sokolov:
a) stop production of Tu-2 aircraft at plant No. 166. The equipment, fixtures and technical documentation for the Tu-2 aircraft available at the plant should be retained in full;
b) to supply the production of Yak-9 aircraft at plant No. 166.
6. To the director of the plant No. 381 t. Zhuravlev:
a) to stop production of Il-2 aircraft at plant # 381;
b) to supply the production of La-5 aircraft at plant # 381.
Signature: / Shakhurin /.
It was overwhelming. A year of labor in appalling conditions, a factory built from scratch, well-organized production of much-needed (and, most importantly, modern) bombers …
But orders of this level are not discussed. The production of Tu-2 at plant No. 166 ended in October 1942. In total, from March to October 1942, the plant produced 80 aircraft.
Tupolev was very upset about what was happening, tried to turn to Stalin with a proposal to organize the production of fighters on the already prepared and working area of the former trailer plant.
This could have saved the release of the Tu-2, but Stalin, alas, did not react to the desperate efforts of Tupolev. One gets the impression that someone was deliberately skewing towards the production of fighters. Or, as they say today, he lobbied.
The question is, of course, interesting, who was this person or, most likely, a group of people.
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin left several memories on this topic.
According to his memoirs, it turns out that the commander of the aviation of the Kalinin Front and the former head of the Flight Research Institute, General MM Gromov, was in charge of the military tests. In principle, there is no better candidate. Mikhail Mikhailovich is the best person for such work as evaluating the use of a new aircraft.
Shakhurin:
“Almost every day I called the commander of the division in which the Tu-2s were being tested on the phone, inquired about their participation in battles. I was told that the pilots speak highly of the aircraft, the combat and flight qualities of the bomber are good, it not only accurately strikes targets, but also successfully fights enemy fighters.
But Stalin did not receive any messages. For some reason, what I said did not convince him. The situation on the fronts was at that time acute, and since the tests were delayed, he began to insist on withdrawing the Tu-2 from production."
Doubtful situation, right? Stalin, who does not believe the words of his People's Commissar, is somehow not very good. In theory, there simply should not be a more authoritative and trusted person in the NKAP. Nevertheless, Stalin does not believe Shakhurin's words, but … Is he waiting for Gromov to speak out? But Gromov is already accountable to Shakhurin.
Strange situation. Remove the Tu-2 and Il-2 from the stream and instead start producing the Yak-9 and La-5. Lavochkin's candidacy for the role of a behind-the-scenes intriguer is not even worth considering. Lavochkin has never been particularly popular. Yakovlev … also doubtful. The Deputy People's Commissar was already being watched with three eyes.
A very strange situation, and, unfortunately, it will hardly be possible to clarify it. The participants, you know, left us at best memoirs. To summon the spirit of Stalin from the afterlife in order to find out why he did this - well, it's stupid!
Shakhurin:
“The production of Tu-2 was stopped and they began to prepare for the release of fighters, as always, when there is a solution, at a very high pace. And twenty days later, an act on the front-line tests of the Tupolev bomber comes - a voluminous laced book with a stamp "Top Secret" … The aircraft's rating is very high.
At about five or six in the evening I was summoned to see Stalin. I go into the office. Stalin is alone. On a long table covered with blue cloth is a copy of the Tu-2 test report.
- It turns out that they praise the car. Did you read?
- Yes, I did. In vain they took the plane out of production. And how many reproaches I received from you.
“And yet you did the wrong thing,” Stalin said suddenly.
- In what?
"You should have complained about me to the Central Committee … In the Central Committee, no one complained about Stalin, as you might guess …"
If I understand correctly, this is tantamount to the fact that Stalin admitted that he was wrong. After all, it was he who gave the order to curtail the production of the Tu-2 and replace it with the Yak-9.
From the dialogue it is clear that Stalin admitted the fallacy of the decision to remove the car from production.
Yakovlev. Deputy Shakhurin. A man who left behind many memoirs. Probably, Alexander Sergeevich can become a worthy witness.
Yakovlev:
“True, in April-May 1942 the situation with fighters began to improve gradually. Factories evacuated to the east increased the production of machines every day. In addition, our large fighter factories, located in the east of the country and which did not have to be evacuated, have significantly increased aircraft production compared to the pre-war level.
But with the bombers, the matter was still unimportant, since the factories producing them, relocated to the east, have not yet restored the pre-evacuation daily production of aircraft."
Hmm … But after all, the Tu-2 began to be produced just in March 1942 …
Yakovlev:
“In April 1942, the People's Commissar, Ilyushin and me were summoned to headquarters … Stalin asked us whether it was possible to equip fighters with bombing weapons by hanging bombs under their wings. The task was to make up for the shortage of bombers in our aviation at least for a while”.
Good. In April, there are not enough bombers and attack aircraft, the holes are plugged with the help of outdated fighters and so on. Although, no. I'm not right.
Yakovlev:
“Already in 1942 the aircraft industry of the USSR surpassed the German one. In 1942 the factories of Germany produced 14, 7 thousand aircraft, and the factories of the USSR - 25, 4 thousand."
“By the summer of 1943, our Air Force possessed powerful equipment. The saturation of fighters has become sufficient …"
And here is a complete misunderstanding. If in 1942 we produced 10,000 more aircraft than the Germans, the saturation of fighters became sufficient, in April 1942 there were so many fighters that Stalin proposed to adapt them for bombing. Because there are no bombers.
And in October, for a completely incomprehensible reason, instead of the Il-2 and Tu-2, two factories are ordered to produce fighters. So that, obviously, there was something to convert later into bombers. Or because these fighters disappeared somewhere.
By the way, factories # 166 and # 381 could not have had any noticeable impact on the production of fighters by 1943. The order came in October 1942. We wouldn't have had time.
In general, Yakovlev has been caught more than once. No, not on the distortion of facts, but, how to put it, on some understatement. Well, it’s not very logical for the deputy commissar, not very much.
But the result I see is this: having released 10, 7 thousand more aircraft than the Germans, who in 1942 fought in Africa and the Mediterranean, we suddenly felt such a need for fighters that we decided to release them from attack aircraft.
Which was definitely either stupidity or sabotage. Either all at once. Stalin was clearly cheated by someone, it would be interesting to know exactly who.
But, in principle, it is enough that the merits of the IL-2 in that war are not subject to criticism and that the Tu-2 was the only front-line bomber that easily took three FAB-1000 and really posed a threat to all types of ships (for example) and armored structures, and objects.
Of course, the FAB-1000 could have taken the Pe-8 on board. But, let me remind you, only 79 units were produced (Tu-2 - 2257 units) and the use of these monsters was episodic.
Of course, the truth has triumphed, and it is wonderful that so quickly. It would be simply unrealistic to wage a full-fledged war only with Il-2 (400 kg of bombs) and Pe-2 (600 kg) strike aircraft, since in any case, it is not the objects that are picked up by the bombs, but vice versa.
Strange story, isn't it?
But you must admit that the whole history of the Tu-2 is full of oddities, incomprehensible moments and outright adventures.
Nevertheless, this aircraft fought with dignity, completing the tasks. And he was loved by the crews, although he dived, perhaps, not as well as the Pe-2. But comparing these machines is an interesting affair, albeit somewhat inappropriate. But - let's take a chance.
And after the war, Tu-2s served quite normally before being replaced by jet aircraft, not only in our country. It was a good plane. But with a very strange fate.
