A necessary foreword.
Soon, with varying degrees of probability, the country will try to celebrate the 75th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.
We have a definite advantage in this regard, we are all gathering here virtually, and no one can stop us from doing it.
First of all: the artillery preparation has already begun. Both on the Web and on TV screens "expert opinions" of people began to appear, sorry, not from a machine gun, who began to talk about "how it all was."
Everything that is thrown out can be perceived in two ways. But the main leitmotif is as simple as a land mine: the Germans had little equipment, but they knew how to fight, we had a lot of equipment and people, they did not know how to fight. Links, arguments - in stock.
Why is it twofold? Everything is simple. We have no distortions in any way. And if in Soviet times we were told about the "tank armada" of the Nazis and hordes of dive bombers over their heads, now the bias is going in the other direction. Yes, as "they filled up with corpses."
Truth is always in the middle.
My goal is pretty simple too. Show TU the version that can be as close to the truth as possible.
We have already sorted out the letters and came to the conclusion that the LaGG-3 was not a flying coffin, and the MiG-3 was not such a weakly armed aircraft. To the mutual delight of true connoisseurs of history and the vicious chugging of everyone, “we-know-corpses-Stalin-filled up”.
Do we continue, dear?
What did I want to start a conversation about? Of course, about airplanes!
Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov pushed me to this, he is a very respected person by me, his words should be treated with attention, but not axiomatically. Why? Because they helped Zhukov write. Someone from the heart, and someone censored and blotted out.
I was just wildly lucky, I have at my disposal the famous "ten", reprint # 10 of "Memories and Reflections", 1990, as close as possible to the original.
And I'll start with a quote from Marshal of Victory.
“According to the updated archival data, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received 17,745 combat aircraft from the industry, of which 3,719 were new types of aircraft … Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3 fighters, Il-2 attack aircraft, dive bomber Pe-2 and many others - only about twenty types."
Professionals and fans, do you feel like shouting “Stop!” Too? Yes me too.
I'll start with "about twenty types" of new aircraft. Alas, I think that here Zhukov was slightly framed by his assistants. Twenty or so new types - I can definitely say that our stunted aviation industry simply could not master such a series.
The real problem was the beginning of production of any aircraft, let alone engines for them … However, we will talk about engines a little below.
But really, what new we had?
Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Su-2, Pe-2, Il-2, Er-2, Ar-2, TB-7. Moreover, TB-7 / Pe-8 is very conditional, since they tortured them one by one in Kazan and tortured less than a hundred. Well, with Er-2 and Ar-2, one cannot say that they overstrained either. 450 and 200 pieces respectively.
Yes, for the sake of fairness it would be possible to add the Yak-2 (about 100 units) and the Yak-4 (less than 100 units). But the small-scale production of these aircraft simply does not give the right to say that they really could have had at least some influence on the course of the war.
I don't see 20 models. And you don't see.
There is, however, the idea that modifications were recorded in the "new" ones. Here, yes, there is where to roam. I-16 with M-62, I-16 with M-63, I-153 with M-63, Su-2 with M-88.
No, I agree with those who say that the I-16 with the M-63 was quite good. The pilots responded very positively, it is so. And in 1942 they even wanted to put it on stream again. But this is a huge BUT: it was an outdated aircraft in all respects, except, perhaps, maneuverability. And he simply could not compete with the new Bf.109F. There the difference in speed reached almost 100 km / h, so there was simply nothing to catch.
Somehow 3,719 of Zhukov's new planes are not drawn. No, it is possible to dial "by barns and bottom bays" by writing all the planes that I have listed above into the new ones. Another question, did they become new and formidable from this? I doubt.
But full freedom for those who want to show how we did not know how to fight.
Therefore, when in other sources, albeit less loudly sounding, I see a figure of 1,500 new aircraft - here, yes, I believe.
In addition, the number 1500 appears again in the case when it is said about the number of aircraft on the line of contact with the enemy. That is, in the western districts.
However, one should not forget that the planes entered not only regiments, but also training centers for retraining pilots. Yes, not very much, but a figure of 10-15% of the total is drawn. In addition, retraining means constant accidents, repairs and the need for new aircraft.
Meanwhile, in the center and in the Far East, pilots also had to be retrained for new equipment.
Now more about the quantity.
Yes, for 2, 5 years, our industry has produced more than 17 thousand aircraft of all types. And, it is possible (just below) that they all got into parts and connections.
A lot? Yes, I agree.
However, let's not forget about the expense.
First, the planes were hit (mercilessly) during training / retraining by young (and not only) pilots. Quite a lot of memoirs have been left about this, both those who beat and those who acted.
Secondly, do not forget that just before the beginning of this period there was a conflict on Fr. Hassan and the Spanish Civil War. There were losses, it was necessary to compensate them.
Then we have Khalkhin Gol and the war with Finland. Where there were also losses.
Plus the systematic decommissioning of old aircraft (I-5, R-5, I-15, and so on).
As a result, a natural doubt arises: how correct and honest is this figure to be accepted? Obviously, she is very dubious. More than 17,000 manufactured aircraft - this does not mean that they all stood in even rows at the "peacefully sleeping" airfields and waited for the Germans to bomb them. Doesn't mean at all.
I also have complaints about "1500 aircraft of new types" in the front-line districts. Zhukov gives this figure at home (on page 346, who is interested), moreover, he gives a link to the "History of World War II 1939-1945", but if someone meticulous goes to look further, where did the figure come from, then the detective begins …
In general, the work "History of the Second World War" was written for more than one year and was completed only in 1982. Starting with a four-volume edition, it ended up being a 12-volume edition.
So, this figure, which Zhukov also cites, is taken in such work as "Documents and materials of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense." There is (naturally) in the work an indication of the fund, an inventory, a file, pages are indicated.
Everything is spoiled by the official certificate that on April 13, 1990, the document was destroyed on the direct orders of our chief military historian, head of the Institute of Military History, Dmitry Volkogonov.
For what purpose Volkogonov ordered the destruction of a number of documents, today it is difficult to say.
My personal opinion is to confirm the myth that we had a huge number of aircraft on 1941-22-06. Sorry, I have no other explanation.
However, so much has been written about the role of Dmitry Volkogonov in "preserving" the historical heritage of the Great Patriotic War that there is simply no desire to repeat himself. And, alas, there has been no demand from Comrade Colonel General since 1995.
As there is no confirmation or denial of how many aircraft were actually at the disposal of the Red Army Air Force.
A separate question - how was it generally determined how many aircraft were in the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of the war?
A common table, which was published at once by several authoritative publications, and on which many authors of historical materials and research relied. I even got into school history textbooks.
As you can see, we have almost 11 thousand aircraft, the Germans have almost 5 thousand. If you don't want to, you will think about it. It is clear, of course, that if the Germans are all as one Me.109 of the latest modifications, and we have I-15, I-153 and "only" 1500 new ones, it would be difficult for us.
Although if you suddenly believe the memoirs of pilots who knew how to fly - that "messer" and on the "donkey" took not much sweating. And we had a lot of them.
You know, you can, of course, say that “the German aces were cooler than the wind,” but … But didn't they get away from ours in Spain? Yes, the Germans walked through Europe well, but, excuse me, is Poland a mighty air force? France … Well, yes, France. But France was broken on the ground. And they fought well with the British, but did they win? No, the "Battle of Britain" was left to the British pilots.
That question is also about the invincibility of the German aces. More precisely, very big doubts. Yes, I support those who believe that all their hundreds of accounts are fiction and nonsense.
Ours also did not pollinate the corn. Yes, there were few in Spain, but they fought with the Japanese and Finns. So if there were ours with less combat experience, then not much.
And the very number of aircraft at 22.06 also raises doubts with its fluctuation, although the fluctuation is quite normal. From 9 576 to 10 743. Ask why is it normal? Yes, just everything. different sources used different numbers.
The secret is simple: some authors used the number of aircraft accepted by military acceptance, others - accepted by units. Difference? There is a difference. Like between a launched ship and a ship that has entered service.
There is a big difference between the acceptance of the aircraft by the military representative at the factory and the actual delivery of the aircraft in part. Both in fact and in time.
The aircraft, which was flown by a military test pilot and for which, after testing, all financial documents were drawn up for settlement with the plant, already actually belongs to the Air Force. But he is still in the factory.
But when it is driven to the airfield by the unit, or, what is even more difficult, it is disassembled, packed, brought by rail, unloaded, reassembled, checked again and flown around, then it becomes an accepted unit and put into operation.
Considering our distances and the possibilities of our transport network in the 30s and 40s of the last century, as much time could pass.
Plus, the factory crew had to get to the plane in order to assemble it and hand it over to the pilots. Someone was lucky, and the brigades traveled together with the train carrying the planes, but some did not, the planes arrived in boxes and waited for the factory workers to free themselves and arrive.
Pokryshkin described it.
That is why the numbers differ somewhat, it all depends on at what point the information was taken and from what source. There are figures that are given as of June 30th. The end of the month is normal, the end of the half-year is also nothing like that.
However, here they are, the nuances: in July, two urgently formed special-purpose air regiments armed with MiG-3 fighters (commanders - test pilots S. Suprun and P. Stefanovsky), a regiment of dive bombers on Pe-2 (commander - pilot -test A. Kabanov), an assault aviation regiment on the Il-2 (commander - I. Malyshev).
Got it, right? The planes from the June (and what else!) Plan hit the front in July. Where and how were they taken into account? In the June plan, right. But they got to the front only after they were taken into account, as expected on 22.06. But in reality this was not the case.
Four shelves is solid. And these are just the regiments that were formed from experienced test pilots. And as it really was, we no longer know. But the fact is that many who wrote about the balance of power on 22.06 clearly neglected the fact that all data on the number of aircraft belonged to the end of the half of 1941, i.e. by June 30, and not by June 22, 1941, when the war began. And they used theoretical calculations on the number of aircraft.
Well, you must admit that the 4 regiments that went to the front on June 30 really cannot be counted on 06.22.
How could not be taken into account that were at the factories of the 1st Main Directorate of the NKAP on June 24, 1941 at least 449 combat aircraft. Although, according to other sources, this figure is even higher: 690 combat aircraft Pe-2, Il-2, Er-2, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1, Su-2 received by military representatives, but not sent to the unit …
And there was:
- 155 MiG-3 aircraft at plant number 1.
- 240 LaGG-3 aircraft at factories 21, 23, 31.
- 74 Yak-1 aircraft at plant number 292.
- 98 units of IL-2 at the plant number 18.
And it was on these planes that pilots of hastily formed militia special-purpose aviation regiments were planted from test pilots and the leading engineering staff of the Air Force Research Institute of KA, military acceptance, Air Force instructors, academies, partly factory test pilots and technicians.
These were pilots of the highest qualifications, who, being armed with the latest technology, could not help but offer real resistance to the enemy. But this will be a completely different story.
Well, you must admit that it is still absurd to consider these aircraft "in service" on 1941-22-06.
And if their 1,500 conventional aircraft of new designs are eliminated from what was not included in the unit, then the picture is not entirely rosy. For the calculator says that 1500-690 = 810 aircraft.
No, it's also a really good figure, but … 100 Yak-2, 100 Yak-4, 50 TB-7 and so on. In reality, the planes of new designs (which are confirmed by the same Pokryshkin, Golodnikov and many others) simply did not reach the parts and were "in service" only on paper.
In the six-volume edition of the history of the Great Patriotic War, in the first volume, figures are given:
In the first half of 1941, the industry gave:
- fighters of the new type MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1 - 1946;
- bombers Pe-2 - 458;
- Il-2 attack aircraft -249.
Add up, we get 2,653 aircraft. Converges. Reading on, you can find a very important remark that "some of the new machines were just beginning to enter service with factories."
So, in the first half of 1941, of the 2,653 aircraft, some were sent to units, and some were only planned for delivery. It is very logical that it was from the unsent vehicles that 4 air regiments were manned in July. The air regiment is about 40 aircraft. We can say that we have already found 160 aircraft that were not in units on 22.06.
Thus, out of 2653 aircraft of a new type adopted by military representatives in the first half of 1941, only a part entered service.
How many of these aircraft were actually delivered to the combat units of the Air Force?
The answer can be found quite simply in that part of the Air Force Directorate, which was engaged in retraining of flight personnel. It was called the "Directorate for the formation, recruitment and combat training of the Red Army Air Force", and its competence included keeping records of the actual delivery of aircraft to combat units.
During the war, this directorate was called the Main Directorate of Education, Formation and Combat Training of the Spacecraft Air Force. It was headed by the First Deputy Commander of the Space Force Air Force, Colonel-General of Aviation A. V. Nikitin.
The following can be extracted from the documents of this Office:
In total, by the beginning of the war, the combat units of the Soviet Air Force had 706 combat aircraft of a new type, on which 1,354 pilots were retrained. The retraining process went according to the approved schedules.
It was possible to find out that at the time of the beginning of the war, the units of the Air Force of the spacecraft had:
- MiG-3 fighters - 407 and 686 trained pilots;
- Yak-1 fighters - 142 and 156 pilots;
- LaGG-3 fighters - 29 and 90 pilots;
- bombers Pe-2 - 128 and 362 pilots.
There are no data on the Il-2, and accordingly, there were no planes.
And then the specifics began. Of the 1540 supposedly "combatant" aircraft, not even 810, as I counted before, remained, but 706. But this is for the entire spacecraft air force, and this, excuse me, is also the center of the country and the Far East too.
Specifically, the Air Force of the Western Border Districts had 304 fighters and 73 Pe-2s, a total of 377 aircraft of a new type.
And it turns out that in the combat units of the spacecraft air force by the beginning of the war there were not 2,739 units of combat aircraft, as it is "officially" considered to be, but 706 units, which is almost 4 times less.
Accordingly, in the five Western border districts there were only 377 of them, and not 1,540, as it is also "officially" considered, that is, also 4 times less.
On the whole, in my opinion, the picture is more or less clear. It remains to ask the very last question: why and who needed it, such a distortion of the picture at the highest level?
The fact that it was not a gag, a fact. I remember these numbers very well, from school. The stories that the Luftwaffe had all the planes was super (well, even if it does, it doesn't get any easier), and we had junk that was simply unrealistic to fight on.
Why then overestimate the figures, talking about the allegedly small number of aircraft of new brands, deliberately exaggerating 4 times?
A strange situation that requires a separate understanding, don't you think?
In general, we are already accustomed to the fact that, let's say, the merits of the Germans are somewhat exaggerated by those who received from them. The Tirpitz and Bismarck were such superblinkers that the King George 5 and the Yamato next to them were coal barges.
"Tiger" and "Ferdinand" - well, just awful. The best that could be, invincible and unkillable. The fact that the first were released in 1355, and the second and at all 91 pieces, does not bother anyone.
I am not talking about the 190th Focke-Wulf. Reading the British is a beast, not an airplane. How our people shot him down, I don't understand.
And so in everything.
As for 22.06, everything is more complicated. The Luftwaffe quite often did not have modern aircraft. There, the Germans themselves flew on such rubbish, well, "Stuck" - was it a modern plane? Do not make me laugh. Heinkel-51? Plus everything that they collected there from Europe …
Perhaps the readers will have their own versions, I will read it with pleasure.
It's not entirely clear to me why it was necessary to exaggerate the numbers of new aircraft models. Either just a careless attitude to the issue (with us it is possible), or some kind of malicious intent.
If we show that we have German aces on modern aircraft were met all the time I-15 and I-16 - so it was so. As you can see, the aircraft of the new generation were really nothing at all.
If you decided to show that the German military machine was so cool that it could grind one and a half thousand new planes once - well, yes, it is possible. We had many generals and marshals who simply needed to show that the enemy was not just strong, but almost invincible. Justifying their own cowardice and stupidity.
And perhaps the truth is somewhere in between. And it is possible that all versions have the right to life. We have the right to speculate, because we will never know who and why slipped Zhukov into incorrect numbers, why Volkogonov destroyed the archives, and so on.
And the further from 1941, the more difficult it will be to find out the truth. But we will try.
