In the two previous articles, we talked about the number and quality of aircraft on 1941-22-06. In one of the articles I promised to talk about the human factor.
Let's start at the bottom, with pilot training. In our difficult time, people publish just a mountain of information on how bad everything was in the Red Army Air Force in terms of pilot training. I have great doubts about the information that pilots were thrown into battle with 2-3 hours of flying time on a combat aircraft.
I will quote from such, if I may say so, exposing material. Spelling saved.
“Fighter pilot N. A. Kozlov, studying at the Chuguev aviation school in 1937-1939, received 25 flight hours on the I-16. Klimenko V. I. graduated from the Chuguev Air Force School in September 1940, having mastered four types of aircraft and having a flight time of 40-45 hours. Graduated in 1939. Kachin aviation school Pokryshkin A. I. flew to I-16 10 hours 38 minutes. Pilot Baevsky G. A. in the Serpukhov aviation school flew I-15bis 22 hours 15 minutes. Graduates of the Kachin school in 1940. Amet-khan S., Garanin V. I., Dolgushin S. F. received 8-10 hours of flight time on a combat aircraft. Let's compare: German pilots in their educational institutions received an average of 200 hours of training flight, plus another 150-200 hours in Luftwaffe units. The Americans had about 450 hours."
The fact that the numbers have come down to our times as much as the minute is, of course, great. And here we swoop down in the literal sense of the word on dualistic sensations.
On the one hand, oh, how regrettable it is! The Germans flew 200 hours, the Americans 450, and ours - nothing at all. Corpses filled up and all that.
Excuse me … Pokryshkin is three times Hero of the Soviet Union. Sultan Amet Khan - twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Dolgushin - Hero of the Soviet Union. Garanin - Hero of the Soviet Union.
It's kind of weird, isn't it? 10 hours of Pokryshkin and 200 hours of Hartman - are these different clocks obtained? They allowed one of them to become one of the most useful (namely useful, not effective) pilots of the Second World War, and the other - to draw through and through false "Abschussbalkens" and cling to trinkets.
Oh yes, such non-punctual Germans have lost Hartman's flight book … Apparently, so that it does not get to Zadornov.
By the way, in vain. So many Russians could have been killed. Laughing would burst, reading the works of Hartman, well, to hell with him, hello to the special cauldron of the Luftwaffe in hell.
I deliberately do not bring the author of that scribble, simply because it is in bulk on the Internet. But that Belarusian wrote, somewhat not understanding the essence of the numbers, alas. And the numbers speak of very interesting things.
Hartman's 200 hours of training allowed him to shoot down more than 100 aircraft without actually fighting (attacks from behind the clouds and other "cunning" Hartman maneuvers do not need such preparation). Pokryshkin's 10 hours of training allowed him to shoot down 59 aircraft and cover the bombers and attack aircraft from Hartman throughout the war.
And here is the paradox, Hartman Pokryshkin could not do anything!
And yes, all this crowd of Luftwaffe aces for some reason did not allow Germany to win the war in the air. It's a shame, probably, the "Abschussbalkens" painted, flaunted with crosses, but nevertheless, Germany lay in ruins, the Soviet attack aircraft did what they wanted with the front line of defense from Konigsberg to Constanta, and from Pokryshkin in the air, the sphincters relaxed among the most experienced aces …
For some reason, we did not announce the presence of Hartman or Rall in the sky. And even if they did, it would be as if untrained "Ruspiloten" would come running with the intention of checking how tough the German aces are. Checked the same. Repeatedly.
You know, it's obvious not how many hours were spent on pilot training, but how those hours were spent. Here, obviously, the essence can be revealed. You can spend 500 hours on pilot training, but it will work out, excuse me, Rudel. You can spend 20 hours and get a pilot who will calmly drive Rudel into a coffin.
It's a matter of purely quality.
Further, I will cite as proof a certain Walter Schwabedissen, who has piled up an opus called "Stalin's Falcons". In general, the book is informative in terms of aviation, since Schwabedissen knew what he was writing about. Technically speaking. But the rest is still a cocktail, because what only Schwabedissen did not command. I sat in the anti-aircraft corps, and the regiment of night fighters, and in the headquarters. But he did not fly, he did not approach the Eastern Front for a shot, but he wrote about our pilots. Nobody will forbid, right?
“But there is another truth - about thousands and thousands of unknown pilots who died in air battles, whose names no one will ever know or remember. It was they, somehow trained, poorly trained, having almost no flying experience (not to mention combat), who covered tens of thousands of bodies and, in the end, buried the German aviation. They were thrown into battle to certain death by the illiterate, mediocre and, in fact, the criminal high command of the Red Army."
Heartbreaking. “The Luftwaffe was covered with tens of thousands of bodies” - that's a lot. I did not understand a little how it is. Did they ram, or what? Falling from above?
Okay, that's not the point. The point is in another story of Schwabedissen. Having discussed the bad Soviet planes, about how no command the Red Army Air Force had, the German suddenly gives out this:
“One could often observe how the Il-2 attacked its targets, while German fighters could not even take off due to bad weather … Soviet attack aircraft flew in any weather, including rain and snow, and neither wind nor storm, rain or low temperatures did not interfere with their actions … Soviet attack pilots were courageous and aggressive, and their characteristic weak features of the Russian character were manifested to a lesser extent than in fighter pilots … Soviet attack aircraft turned out to be much more effective than it was assumed before the beginning of the campaign … By the end of 1941, flight personnel training had reached a commendably high level."
That is, the Il-2 terrified the Germans already in 1941, and, despite the scanty training, Soviet pilots flew when the German aces did not even think about flying, because it was too dangerous?
In general, yes, we can say that the Russians flew because they did not understand that it was impossible to fly. Dangerous. From lack of preparation.
Funny, isn't it? Experienced and trained Germans sit on airfields and drink schnapps, because the weather is not flying, and inexperienced Soviet pilots fly and arrange a hard life for the German infantry.
Excuse me, did I understand everything correctly? Did inexperienced pilots with 10 hours of training calmly fly in rain, fog, poor visibility, find German positions and work on them? And the German flyers with 200 hours of training were sitting on their tails exactly?
I just want to say: "On the contrary, it would be necessary …"
To say that on 22.06 the Germans did not have an advantage in preparation is definitely impossible. Yes, it was, but not so fatal. A pilot who has 200+ hours behind his back is a piece goods, whatever one may say.
But let's see if everything was so sad with us?
Not by that much. Yes, they did not have time, but: at the March 1940 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - and this, forgive me, is the level - new guidelines were adopted in training flight personnel.
The Red Army Air Force also organized a multi-stage training system, some not very conscientious researchers are trying to present a picture that was sent from the flying club to the front. As with the front in reality - in general, the conversation is special, but after flying in the flying club for 20-25 hours, a person ended up in a military school for flight personnel, where his training continued.
Military schools have already given specifications, trained pilots for fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. The latter were abolished in 1941. As part of the military school program, a fighter pilot received another 24 hours of flight time, a bomber - 20 hours.
And only then there was a higher command school. There, the training program defined up to 150 hours of training.
It is clear that "before" is both 50 and 100 hours. But in general, yes, on paper, the program looked no worse than that of the Germans. There was a question of implementation, but I don't think it was that significant. The veterans themselves said in their memoirs that 10 hours was more than enough to understand the plane. And for an experienced pilot, moreover, who went through the I-16 school, the question of retraining to another model was not at all.
On the issue of mass character. The number of educational institutions was increased, if in 1937 there were 12 of them throughout the country, then at the beginning of the war - 83. The number of training aircraft also increased, from 3007 in 1937 to 6053 in December 1940.
They did not have time to fully implement the program, but nevertheless, in 1941, the Germans were not met in any way by the cadets of the flying clubs with 2-3 hours of flying on the I-15.
There were losses at the beginning of the war, the losses were huge, but: the merit of the Luftwaffe aces here is not as great as the scribblers from history show. Many pilots simply perished in the encirclement, boilers, landed on the forced on the enemy territory.
In previous articles, I made a statement (and I believe that I have proved it) that, in technical terms, the Red Army Air Force was much inferior to the Luftwaffe. But not in terms of training pilots, because what, excuse me, then explain the very impressive losses of the Germans?
The statement that for 1 shot down German aircraft there were 6 destroyed Soviet aircraft for the initial stage of the war, it makes sense. Not shot down, but destroyed. Fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, bombs, abandoned at airfields due to lack of fuel, and so on.
However, then everything leveled off. Soviet schools and colleges continued to take personnel from flying clubs and teach them. Yes, there were also accelerated courses, but these are 10 and 6 months, respectively. Plus ZAPs, plus training shelves where training continued.
And you can criticize the training system of the Red Army Air Force and praise the German one for as long as you like, but … Why did the Germans run out of pilots? Why did the Ases end up in the ground?
After all, in theory, the aces of the Luftwaffe should have been picking their teeth with one left, right, knocking down these heaps of unprepared Soviet pilots who climbed in thousands … well, not on embrasures, let's say, on the trunks of Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs.
But it didn’t happen. And somehow the aces began to … end … Moreover, on all fronts.
And in 1943, the Germans had no advantage in the quality of flight personnel training. This is noted by those who fought, shot down and themselves remained "alive, whole, eagle" from among our pilots. And they, you know, know better.
So all these fantasies about the "cool German training school" of the Luftwaffe and none of the Red Army Air Force are nonsense. It turns out quite the opposite, the Soviet school turned out to be cooler, because it was the Luftwaffe that ended. And in 1945, already among the Germans, green newcomers meant something there. And in fact, the air war was lost by the Germans in the East, and in the West, and over Germany.
In general, the defeated have always had a tendency to tell how tough they were and what prevented them from winning.
But the Luftwaffe also had strengths, especially at the beginning of the war, which led to its success. This should be noted. As I said, great tactical coordination and the ability to create a strategic advantage.
Given the completely different structure of the air forces of the two armies, at the initial stage, the Germans could very nicely create an advantage not only in aircraft in an important direction, but also qualitatively in terms of personnel. Squadrons of aces as well. And yes, here they got the full advantage.
Plus more modern tactics, which I also talked about. An echeloned six of fighters, having communication with ground forces and their own command, will work out the area much more efficiently than a trio of aircraft without any communication at all.
However, Pokryshkin has written everything about this perfectly. As soon as ours changed their approach to tactics, when the flightless blockheads of the Kraev type were replaced by normal combat pilots of the Pokryshkin type, the Germans generally became sad.
And it was then that the search for excuses began, such as "corpses filled up" and the demonstration of exaggerated accounts. From my point of view, exaggerated people who want to pray for them - please, but it's not about numbers.
It's the bottom line. The fact is that at the end of the war, Luftfaff, where there were perfectly trained free hunters Hartman and company, all like that in crosses and "Abschussbalkens", but their army, which was pressed by the Red Army Air Force, howled and swore, but the Hartmans could not do anything.
Why, all of Germany groaned under American and British bombs, but alas, nothing more could be offered to the Germans by the Luftwaffe.
And the result is sad: 1945, ours are also in the stars on the fuselages, but the Germans fly only when they can, and not when they need to carry out tasks.
The different concept of the use of the Air Force by the USSR and Germany led to different patterns of actions in the air and different final indicators for downed enemies. But if the Germans made it a priority, then the main thing for us was to complete the combat mission. Therefore, Alexander Pokryshkin, dripping saliva on the floor, continued to cover the attack aircraft, looking after the dumping Eric Hartman.
And thanks to such tactics and strategy of the Red Army Air Force, its strategic task of destroying the combat force of Germany fulfilled, and the Luftwaffe … And the Luftwaffe completed its task of shooting down planes!
Successful work on the enemy's ground forces was at the forefront of our work, of course, the Red Army Air Force suffered losses in the air both from enemy fighters and from air defense, but this is normal and justified by the task performed!
In the initial period of the war, given the completely outdated tactics and the minimal desire of the Soviet commanders to change at least something, the Germans, yes, had an advantage.
And here the main drawback of the leadership of the Red Army Air Force, I consider the complete absence of any initiative and desire to think. You can talk as much as you like about how the bloody Stalin repressed the poor generals from the aviation, but here the clearest example is General Kopets.
Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union (for battles in Spain), chief of the Air Force of the Western OVO, who threw bombers at the Germans during the day without fighter cover (despite the presence of the 43rd fighter aviation division in the district) and lost 738 aircraft in June 22, 1941 (526 on the ground), shot himself on the evening of June 23, 1941.
The rest were arrested and interrogated later. Many were shot. Did it help? I don’t know, or rather, I don’t presume to judge, but everything was shown in 1943. Battle in the skies of the Kuban, when the Luftwaffe began to lose. When the planes went massively, not inferior to the Germans, when those who in June 1941 met the aces in the air began to appear in command positions.
And - crackled …
A lot can be said about the shortcomings in the system of the Red Army Air Force and about the lack of the proper level of competence of the command. And you can build many versions of what gave the Germans such a huge advantage at first.
My final list looks like this:
1. Insufficient level of training of commanders of the army and divisional level.
2. Insufficient level of training of commanders of air regiments.
3. Complete lack of coordination between commanders of different types of troops.
4. Lack of communication at all levels.
5. Lack of operational management in a changing environment.
6. The ability of the Germans to create a tactical advantage in a certain sector of the front and make the most of it.
7. The Germans have a definite advantage in modern aircraft models.
Everything. Enough. This list was enough for the Red Army Air Force to lose the first stage of the air war with a bang. However, the main reasons for the defeat on 22.06 were corrected. Yes, over time, but corrected, so much so that by 1944 our aviation surpassed the German in all respects, from quantity to quality.
And not a word about the training of pilots. Here it is axiomatic for me that our pilots were in no way inferior to the Germans.
Want an example?
On June 26, 1941, near the Moldovan town of Ungheni, a pair of Me-109E discovered a lonely Soviet plane. The leader of the pair was Walter Bock, an experienced pilot who had 4 victories in France and 2 in Poland.
Our plane was piloted by a young lieutenant who was decommissioned the day before for color blindness, who was carrying documents on his I-153 to the headquarters of the air division.
Easy prey? Well, yes, Me-109E against I-153, 200 hours of Bokkh training, combat experience, downed British, French and Polish planes …
Well, you understand that everything went slightly not according to the plan of the Germans, right? The "Seagull" spun around like a turpentine snake, spat out bursts of two of its ShKASs (very fatal for the 109th), but, as a result, having circled the Germans and hitting an advantageous position, the Soviet pilot fired the missiles he had.
And I got it.
The wingman did not seek further adventure and left. And Bokh … Well, it happens … But he did not suffer.
This is how Grigory Rechkalov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, began his military career.
In general, I have nothing more to add on this issue.
