For Russian historians-revisionists, the history of the "Lokotsky Autonomous Okrug" and the brigade of Bronislav Kaminsky formed in it has long become a kind of "Malaya Zemlya". Just as in the era of "stagnation" the actions of the 18th Army on the Novorossiysk bridgehead began to turn almost into the main event of the Great Patriotic War, in our time there is a clear tendency to view the creation of local self-government in the village of Lokot in the Bryansk region as an event of almost world-wide historical significance. as a kind of "alternative" to the struggle against the invaders who came to our land.
Of course, this point of view in Russian society is openly marginal; its supporters can be found only among the half-crazy "true Orthodox" sectarians celebrating Hitler's birthday neo-Nazis, grouped around the magazine "Posev" neovlasovites and pragmatically working out foreign grants "liberals". But in historiography, the apologetics of the "Lokot alternative" paradoxically turns out to be dominant - simply because it is almost exclusively revisionists who prefer to write about it. And they write actively: to date, four books and several dozen articles have been published about the Lokotsky District [96]. At the same time, however, there is no particular increase in factual information: in most cases, the collaborationist press published in Lokot and individual reports of Soviet partisans are used as the main source. Another sign of revisionist historiography is the almost complete refusal to study the crimes of the RONA formations committed during punitive operations against Soviet partisans. But the partisans in the works of the revisionists certainly appear as bloody bandits.
The published article does not claim to fully disclose all topics related to the history of the Lokotsky district of the Kaminsky brigade. The participation of the RONA brigade in the fight against the Belarusian partisans near Lepel, the participation of the "Kamintsev" in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising and many other no less interesting stories remain outside the brackets. Writing the complete history of the "Kaminsky brigade" is a matter of the future, albeit not so far. In the meantime, let's try to find answers to questions related to the so-called. "Lokotsky district". What was this administrative entity really? Were Kaminsky's formations, and not the Soviet partisans, really "masters of the Bryansk forests"? Did the Kamintsy take part in the Nazi genocide against the population of the occupied regions?
1. Operational environment
To begin with, let's clarify the situation in the Nazi-occupied Bryansk region. This territory was occupied at the beginning of October 1941. Having crushed the troops of the Bryansk Front, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army went further - to Tula and Moscow. And the commander of the rear of the army was faced with the difficult task of organizing an occupation order in the occupied territories.
An analysis of German documents carried out by American historians indicates that the main problem of the rear commander was the lack of troops. “After the advance of combat units further east, the responsibility for the management and security in this region was assigned to the command of the rear units of the second echelon. The forces at their disposal were barely enough to occupy large centers and protect the main lines of communication”[97].
The main lines of communication were, of course, the railways. There were many of them in the region. Two railways led from the west to the region: Gomel - Klintsy - Unecha - Bryansk from the southwest and Smolensk - Roslavl - Bryansk from the northwest. From Bryansk, the railways diverged in four directions. The railway line Bryansk - Navlya - Lgov - Kharkov ran to the south. From Lgov to the east, a railway went to Kursk. A railway to Orel ran to the southeast from Bryansk; to the north-east - to Kaluga, in the north - to Kirov and Vyazma. Another railway line directly connected Orel and Kursk.
The considerable length of the railways in itself made their defense quite difficult. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Bryansk region was covered with dense forests, in which the "encirclements" of the broken Bryansk front found shelter, as well as partisan detachments and sabotage groups organized by the local party authorities and state security agencies. According to the report of the head of the 4th department of the NKVD in the Oryol region, a total of 72 partisan detachments with a total of 3257 people, 91 partisan groups with a total of 356 people and 114 sabotage groups of 483 people were left in the occupied territory [98]. It was important that, unlike the partisans of the border regions, who were thrown behind enemy lines in the summer of 1941 with little or no preparation, the Oryol partisans had time to coordinate. More than half of them, moreover, were trained in special schools, primarily in the Operational Training Center headed by Colonel Starinov. The result was not slow to show itself: during October - mid-December, only 8 partisan detachments with a total number of 356 people broke up [99]. The rest continued to fight.
The commander of the 2nd Army could oppose little to the partisans: a part of the security division of the rear of Army Group Center, a guard battalion and a military police battalion. On October 29, a regiment from the 56th division was withdrawn from the front to help these forces [100].
In addition, subdivisions of Einsatzgroup “B” operated in the Bryansk region - first Sonderkommando 7-6, and then Sonderkommando 7-a (stationed in Klintsy) and Einsatzkommando 8 (operated in Bryansk) [101]. Their main task was to destroy "unwanted elements", first of all - the communists and Jews.
These units did not remain idle: almost immediately after the occupation in the area of the Bryansk-2 railway station, about seven thousand people were executed, a significant number of whom were Jews [102]. In Oryol, during the first month of the occupation, 1,683 people were shot and hanged [103]. Smaller-scale executions were carried out in other localities as well. “They shot in whole groups, [at] 30-50, arrests and executions, behind the oxygen plant, the corpses of the shot were lying around for several days,” later recalled a resident of the city of Bezhitsa (Ordzhonikidzegrad). - This went on throughout the 41st and the beginning of the 42nd year. It was enough just one statement of some devotee scoundrel, and the person ceased to exist”[104].
Mass shootings, as well as unpunished arbitrariness on the part of German soldiers (in full accordance with the famous decree "On military justice") [105] quickly turned the urban population against the occupiers. This can be clearly seen in German documents studied by American historians. In December 1941, one of the reports noted: "The cities are centers of partisans, which, as a rule, the rural population (peasants) rejects" [106].
The peasants were indeed somewhat more loyal to the occupiers than the city dwellers, for the simple reason that they had not yet had a chance to feel the Nazi occupation order on their own skin. But about the rejection of the partisans by the peasants, the authors of the report passed off wishful thinking. There was no total rejection; some peasants helped the partisans as "their own", some, fearing reprisals or disliking the Soviet regime, refused to help the partisans. There was no general pattern of behavior by the winter of 1941.
The lack of full support from the rural population did not prevent the Soviet partisans from actively acting. According to the 4th department of the NKVD of the Oryol region, by mid-December the Oryol partisans disabled 1 enemy armored train, 2 tanks, 17 armored vehicles, 82 trucks, killed 176 enemy officers, 1012 soldiers and 19 traitors. In addition, 11 wooden bridges, 2 railway bridges, 1 pontoon bridges were destroyed and 3 railway tracks were blown up [107]. Perhaps these data were somewhat overestimated (Suvorov's principle of "write more, which the basurman feel sorry for" has not been canceled), but there is no doubt that the partisans caused serious troubles to the invaders.
Indeed, otherwise the command of the 2nd Army would not have had to withdraw the regiment of the 56th division from the front.
By the end of 1941, the "partisan threat" to the invaders had increased. In the southern part of the Bryansk forests between the Bryansk-Navlya-Lgov railway and the Desna River, partisan detachments began to leave from the neighboring Kursk region and from the Ukraine (connections of Kovpak and Saburov). In the north of the region, Soviet troops liberated Kirov, thereby cutting off the Bryansk - Vyazma railway. A gap was formed in the front line through which aid to the partisans went. The concentration of partisans in the Bryansk region increased, and with it the activity of hostilities increased.
The number of German guard units became smaller, since after the defeat near Moscow, every bayonet was important at the front. A regiment of the 56th division was sent to the front on December 10; the tasks of protecting the occupied territory were entrusted to the regional administration based in Bryansk, which had at its disposal a guard battalion, a police battalion and several groups of the field gendarmerie [108]. The actual German units were supplemented by local collaborators: in the settlements of the Bryansk region there were burgomasters appointed by the Germans, and with them - small detachments of armed "militia" formed in the last months of 1941. One of the first such detachments was formed in the village of Lokot.
2. The beginning of "Lokotsky self-government"
Lokot is a small settlement in the Brasov region of the Oryol (nowadays - Bryansk) region. Before the war, the population of this village was several thousand people; about 35,000 more lived in the countryside adjacent to Lokot and the regional center of Brasovo. There were no large industrial enterprises here: the region was agrarian [109]. The only symbol of modernization was the railway separating Lokot and the regional center of Brasovo, which ran from Bryansk through Navlya, Lokot and Dmitriev to Lgov. Near Navlya, a branch off the railroad went through Khutor Mikhailovsky to Konotop. At Konotop, this branch was connected to the Kiev - Lgov - Kursk railway. Thus, the railways passing through the Brasov region were important communication lines connecting Bryansk with Kursk and Ukraine in the shortest possible way. And in the settlements adjacent to the railways, the occupation power, for obvious reasons, was established in the first place.
German troops entered the village of Lokot on October 4; on the same day they were offered their services by a physics teacher at a local technical school Konstantin Voskoboinik and an engineer at the Lokotsky distillery Bronislav Kaminsky. The offered services were accepted: Voskoboinik was appointed the head of the Lokotsky volost administration, and Kaminsky - his deputy. During the administration, it was allowed to have a detachment of "people's militia" of 20 people armed with rifles. Two weeks later, on October 16, the invaders allowed Voskoboinik to increase the detachment of the “people's militia” to 200 people, and to create so-called “self-defense groups” in the villages [110]. The reason why this decision was made is simple: to the west of Lokot, in the Trubchevsk region, German troops closed the cauldron, into which parts of the 13th and 3rd armies of the Bryansk Front fell. A strong detachment of "people's militia" in Lokot was necessary in order to catch the Red Army men who had escaped from the encirclement.
At the same time, on October 16, the occupation authorities officially approved the council of the Lokot volost, which, along with Voskoboinik and Kaminsky, included the former head of the Brasovsky district department of public education Stepan Mosin and the criminal Roman Ivanin who became the chief of police [111].
Having received recognition from the invaders, the head of the council, Voskoboinik, was filled with Napoleonic plans and on November 25 issued a manifesto in which he announced the creation of the Viking People's Socialist Party. The manifesto promised the destruction of collective farms, free transfer of arable land to peasants, and freedom of private initiative in the revived Russian national state [112].
By December 1941, 5 cells of the newly minted party were organized in the region; in addition, Voskoboinik sent his deputies Kaminsky and Mosin on propaganda trips to neighboring areas. According to legend, the head of the council admonished those leaving with the words: “Do not forget that we are working not for one Brasovsky district, but on a scale of all of Russia. History will not forget us”[113]. However, the propaganda of the "Manifesto" among the population was not the main goal of Mosin. His main goal was to meet with the leadership of the German rear services, which were to approve the creation of the party.
Judging by German documents, Mosin went to bow to the chief of the rear of the 2nd Army twice. According to the memorandum of the officer of the 1st division of the 2nd army headquarters, Chief Lieutenant A. Bossi-Fedrigotti, during the second visit, Mosin, on behalf of Voskoboinik, asked the army command for permission for the party's activities. Instead of permission, the German officers sent several questions for Voskoboinik, perfectly showing the priorities of the occupation authorities:
1. How does Voskoboinik relate to the partisans?
2. Is Voskoboinik ready to conduct propaganda against partisans?
3. Is Voskoboinik ready to take an active part in the fight against partisans?
Mosin answered all these questions positively and even promised to cooperate with the Abwehr command attached to the army [114].
Upon Mosin's return, Voskoboinik undertook several demonstrative anti-partisan actions. A trial was organized over a nurse at the Lokot hospital, Polyakova, who was accused of harboring medicines for partisans and was shot [115].
Several operations were also undertaken against the partisans. During one of them, a partisan was killed in the village of Altukhovo and 20 local residents were arrested; in the course of another, a partisan group was scattered not far from Lokot [116].
The Lokotsky detachment of the "people's militia" was hastily replenished, and the methods of recruiting the "militiamen" were very peculiar. These methods can be judged by the history of the head of the department of the Brasov district executive committee, Mikhail Vasyukov. Before the arrival of the Germans, Vasyukov, in accordance with the directive of the district committee, went into the forest to the partisans, but he could not get to the detachment and after two weeks of wandering he returned to his family in Lokot. Vasyukov was arrested, then he was allowed to go home, but on December 21 he was arrested again. “They put me in jail. By three o'clock in the morning, in front of my eyes, 3 people were shot in the cell. After the execution of these citizens, I was summoned to the chief burgomaster Voskoboinik, who said to me: “Did you see? Either work with us, or we will shoot you right now. " Out of my cowardice, I told him that I was ready to work as a foreman. To this Voskoboynik replied that now is not the time to engage in construction, but to take up arms and, together with the Germans, take part in the struggle against the Soviet regime and, in particular, against the Soviet partisans. So I was enrolled in a police detachment, in which I twice took part in punitive expeditions against Soviet partisans”[117].
The pinnacle of Voskoboynik's anti-partisan measures was the order sent to the surrounding villages for the partisans to surrender:
“I suggest that all partisans operating in the Brasov region and the immediate environs, as well as all persons associated with them, within a week, that is, no later than January 1, 1942, hand over all the weapons they have to the heads of the nearest villages, and appear themselves for registration in the Office of the district headman in the village. Elbow. Be in small groups - 2-3 people, call the guard fighter and inform him about the goals of your arrival. All those who did not appear will be considered enemies of the people and destroyed without mercy.
It is high time to end the disgrace and start organizing a peaceful working life. All sorts of tales about the return of the Soviet regime to the occupied regions are absurd unfounded rumors spread by malicious Soviet elements in order to disorganize citizens and maintain a state of disorder and uncertainty among the wider working population.
The Stalinist regime died irrevocably, it is time for everyone to understand and take the path of a calm working life. Rumors about the total extermination of partisans and communists are absurd. The danger can threaten only the most malicious representatives of the Party and Soviet apparatus, who do not want to themselves and do not allow others to take a peaceful labor path.
This order is your final warning.
In villages where this order was received with a delay, the registration of partisans may be postponed until January 15, 1942”[118].
It should be noted that until mid-December 1941 the Bryansk partisans did not pay much attention to the collaborationists, preferring to attack German units and garrisons. The already mentioned report of the head of the 4th department of the UNCDC in the Oryol region, according to which, by December 14, the partisans had killed 176 enemy officers, 1,012 soldiers and only 19 traitors [119] clearly testifies to the partisan priorities. However, the situation changed in December. The Germans tried to shift the burden of fighting the partisans onto the local formations, and the partisans, attacking the collaborators, tried to deprive the occupiers of this support. By December 20, the partisans of the Oryol region had already destroyed 41 traitors [120], and by May 10, 1942 - 1014 policemen and traitors [121].
It was the turn of the Lokotsky council, which was largely facilitated by the order of Voskoboynik to the partisans. The partisans did not surrender, but instead decided to defeat the garrison stationed in Lokot.
In the exposition of revisionist historians, the attack of the partisans on the Lokot council acquires a truly epic character. We are told that this attack happened because the Soviet authorities were afraid of the "Lokot alternative", that the partisans were commanded by the head of the operational group of the NKVD in the Oryol region Dmitry Yemlyutin, that the partisans suffered huge losses and that only an accidental bullet that struck Voskoboinik allowed the partisans to leave Lokot [122].
In fact, the attack on Lokot was not commanded by Emlyutin, but by the commander of the Ukrainian partisan unit, Alexander Saburov (also, by the way, a Chekist). Since December, Saburov purposefully beat the German garrisons and police strongholds in the south of the Bryansk forests. An extract from Saburov's combat operations journal has survived: “December 2 - the defeat of the police garrison in Krasnaya Sloboda. December 8 - kidnapping of the regional administration in the regional center Suzemka. December 26 - the defeat of the garrison in Suzemka. January 1, 1942 - The Selechno police station is destroyed. January 7 - a large garrison in the village of Lokot was liquidated”[123].
The attack on the Lokot administration was no different from the attack on the garrison in Suzemka; the partisans simply destroyed the collaborators.
It is also not true that the attack on Elbow turned out to be a defeat for the partisans. The memoirs of one of the partisans who participated in this operation are well known:
“The commanders of the partisan detachments For Motherland, named after Stalin and named after Saburov, agreed to conduct a joint attack on Lokot. Christmas Eve was chosen as the day of the raid, which was zealously celebrated by the Hitlerite bandits.
And on the night before Christmas, from January 7 to January 8, 1942, the combined partisan detachment on 120 sleighs set off on a journey. They made a halt in the village of Igritskoe. The frost was not Christmas, but Epiphany, the partisans were chilled. The residents of Igritsky warmed them up, fed them, and the detachment moved on through the villages of Lagirevka and Trosnaya. The frost was growing stronger, it was intensified by the blowing north-east wind. Chalk drift. In order not to get frostbitten, many partisans ran after the sleigh.
The enemy in Lokot was not expecting the partisans, so we drove into the village without firing a shot. The horses harnessed to the sleigh were put on a linden alley. The partisans immediately surrounded the building of the forestry technical school, where the main forces of the garrison were located, and the house of the burgomaster Voyskoboynik. They started shelling, grenades flew into the windows of buildings.
The invaders and policemen opened indiscriminate return fire on the partisans from submachine guns and machine guns. During the shootout, we saw how someone came out onto the veranda from the house where Voskoboinik lived and shouted: "Don't give up, beat them."
My fellow villager Misha Astakhov was lying next to me in the snow and firing from a light machine gun. I drew his attention to the veranda and told him to turn the machine gun there. After the second short line, we heard a body fall and people fidgeting on the veranda. Just at that moment, enemy fire intensified and this distracted us from the Voskoboinik's house.
The firefight continued until dawn. Together with A. Malyshev, I tried to set fire to the burgomaster's house. We dragged an armful of straw to the wall and began to light it. But the straw was wet and did not catch fire. Meanwhile it was getting light. The building of the forestry technical school was not captured, although it was riddled with bullets. The enemy began to press from other sides. And the command decided to end the combat operation on this. Without losing a single person killed and seizing several wounded, we left”[124].
Even if the losses of the partisans are understated by the memoirist, the attack on Lokot cannot be called unsuccessful. The partisans attacked the garrison and left before the main enemy forces approached. The final report of Saburov says about 54 killed policemen [125]. Not so little - after all, the number of "people's militia" Voskoboinik by that time was two hundred people. The death of the head of the council, Voskoboinik, albeit accidental, should also be recorded as an asset of the partisans.
3. The beginning of the reign of Kaminsky
The partisan attack on Elbow and the death of Voskoboinik turned into serious problems for his deputy Bronislav Kaminsky. The guerrillas have clearly demonstrated their strength; The Germans, dissatisfied with this obvious failure, could have refused to appoint Kaminsky to the post of head of the council. In order to get the appointment, it was necessary to prove their usefulness to the invaders.
The very next day after the partisan raid, Kaminsky announced his mobilization into the “people's militia”. Before that, the "militia" consisted of local volunteers who did not want to go to the prisoner-of-war camps "surrounded". Now, all men of draft age were called up under arms, and in case of refusal they were threatened with reprisals. “Voskoboinik was killed by partisans, and all power in the region passed to Kaminsky and his deputy Mosin, who on the same day announced the mobilization of men aged 18 to 50,” recalled Mikhail Vasyukov, who was already quoted by us. “By about January 20, 700 people were recruited, most of whom were mobilized by force, on pain of reprisals against them or their family” [126].
The threats were confirmed by illustrative examples: in revenge for the death of Voskoboinik, many hostages were shot from among the local residents [127]. Deputy
Kaminsky Mosin personally took part in the torture of the arrested former policeman Sedakov. Sedakov died under torture, and his corpse was hung in the center of Lokot [128].
After that, Kaminsky went to Oryol to the chief of the rear of the 2nd Panzer Army. Just at this time, collaborator Mikhail Oktan was at the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army, and in the future he was the editor of the Oryol newspaper Rech. “At the headquarters, I met Kaminsky, who had been summoned there in connection with the death of the head of the Lokotsky district, Voskoboinik,” recalled Oktan.- We lived in one room, and as an interpreter I was present at several meetings of Kaminsky with the commander of the rear … General Hamann. After receiving permission to return to the area, Kaminsky promised to bring it into line with the tasks of the German military administration: to militarize it in such a way as to ensure the protection of the rear of the German army and increase the supply of food for the German troops”[129].
In the face of the ever-increasing partisan threat, Kaminsky's promises looked tempting. Kaminsky was approved as the head of the district council and, returning to Lokot, continued the "militarization" of the district. In January 1942, the "people's militia" numbered 800 people, in February - 1200, in March - 1650 people [130]. The combat effectiveness of these units was at least dubious (even at the end of the year, German officers stated that "Engineer Kaminsky's militants could not repel major attacks" [131]), however, the involvement of local residents in the "people's militia" to a certain extent guaranteed that they would not leave to the partisans.
By the way, Kaminsky did not feel much confidence in the population of his district. This is clearly evidenced by the orders issued by the new head of the council.
One of his decrees, Kaminsky, banned movement between the villages of the district and introduced a curfew. According to another, residents of Lipovaya Alley and Vesennyaya Street, adjacent to the administration building, had to leave their homes within three days. In their place, Kaminsky settled policemen who were loyal to himself, thus insuring himself against a new attack by the partisans [132].
Shooting intensified in the building of a stud farm turned into a prison - to such an extent that a special executioner was needed. And he was found. In January 1942, an emaciated girl came to Lokot - ex-nurse Tonya Makarova, who had emerged from the encirclement near Vyazma. After many months of wandering through the woods, she, apparently, was a little moved by her mind. The Lokotsk "militiamen" gave the girl a drink, put her behind a machine gun and took the condemned to the courtyard.
Several decades later, Makarova, arrested by the state security authorities, will talk about her first execution. “The first time they took her out to be shot by partisans was completely drunk, she did not understand what she was doing,” recalled investigator Leonid Savoskin. - But they paid well - 30 marks and offered cooperation on a permanent basis. After all, none of the Russian policemen wanted to get dirty, they preferred a woman to carry out the executions of partisans and their family members. A homeless and lonely Antonina was given a bed in a room at a local stud farm, where she could spend the night and store a machine gun. In the morning she voluntarily went to work”[133].
Meanwhile, the partisans launched more and more daring attacks. On February 2, a compound of partisan detachments under the command of the already mentioned Alexander Saburov attacked the city of Trubchevsk and occupied it after an 18-hour battle. The partisans who left the battlefield counted 108 killed policemen; several hundred more simply fled. The local burgomaster fell into the hands of the partisans. After that, the partisans left the city, but on February 10 they returned and burned down the local timber mill [134].
Literally a few tens of kilometers from Lokot, on January 20, a German unit stumbled upon Emlyutin's partisan detachment. After a long battle, the Germans had to retreat. A few days later, another partisan detachment, also subordinate to Emlyutin, raided the Poluzhie station on the Bryansk-Unecha railway, defeated the local garrison and destroyed six wagons with ammunition. Here, however, the partisans' luck ran out: a train with German soldiers approached the station. In the ensuing battle, the commander of the detachment, Philip Strelets, was killed, and the remnants of the detachment were forced to retreat from the station [135].
The biggest trouble for the invaders happened in the north of the region: there the united forces of partisans liberated the city of Dyatkov and the surrounding areas, thereby creating a partisan land not controlled by the Germans [136].
As usual, there were not enough troops to fight the partisans.“Army Group hoped to eliminate the threat of the partisan movement as soon as the position at the front was consolidated,” Field Marshal von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, wrote at the end of February. “However, recent developments have shown that these hopes are groundless, since the tense situation at the front did not make it possible to withdraw formations belonging to the rear service from the front” [137].
Against this background, the situation in Lokot and its environs looked at least acceptable for the invaders. After the Christmas raid, no major attacks took place on this territory, and the forcible mobilization into the "people's militia" deprived the partisans of human resources and contributed to the separation of part of the population from the partisans.
In this regard, the command of the rear of the army decided to encourage Kaminsky and his comrades. On February 23, Kaminsky received two orders from the command of the 2nd Tank Army. According to the first, Kaminsky was allowed to appoint elders in the villages subordinate to him (earlier only the occupiers could appoint elders, which, by the way, puts an end to the reasoning of the revisionists about the "independence" of the Lokotsky district). According to the second order, Kaminsky received the right to reward those who distinguished themselves in the fight against partisans with land, giving out from two to ten hectares. The property could also be transferred to cows and horses [138].
Literally a few days after receiving these orders, Kaminsky was summoned to Oryol, where he was announced that the neighboring Suzemsky and Navlinsky districts were transferred under his control. Kaminsky came from Oryol full of bright anticipation.
“In February 1942, I went to Kaminsky’s office on business matters,” later recalled the head of the district forestry A. Mikheev. - In a conversation with me, Kaminsky said that he went to the German General Schmidt, who allowed him to expand the functions of the district council. First, transform the Brasovsky district into the Lokotsky district, and then consider the village of Lokot as a city. At the same time, Kaminsky said that the German occupation authorities agree to expand our functions up to the creation of a "Russian national state" if we actively help the Germans in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Kaminsky immediately expressed his opinion that in the current situation, as he said, there are chances for me - Mikheev, after the end of the war in favor of the Germans, to become the Minister of Forestry of the government that will be created in Russia … At the same time he told me about the goals and objectives of the anti-Soviet organization NSTPR and said that all members of this party will receive the appropriate portfolios, and whoever is against, he will be hijacked to Germany”[139].
Of course, Kaminsky saw himself as the head of the "Russian state" subordinate to the Third Reich. He even published an order in which he called himself burgomaster of the still non-existent Lokotsky district [140]. The greater must have been his disappointment.
In the first half of March, the Bryansk partisans struck a new blow. This time it was directed to the railways vital to the occupiers. The blow was crushing. "The railways Bryansk - Dmitriev-Lgovsky and Bryansk - x [utor] Mikhailovsky are out of order," Emlyutin and Saburov reported to Moscow. - All the bridges all along the way have been blown up. The railway junction x [utor] Mikhailovsky partisans destroyed. The Germans are trying to restore railway traffic on the Bryansk-Navlya section, but these attempts are thwarted by the partisans”[141].
German sources confirm this information: “In March 1942, the partisans stopped traffic on the Bryansk-Lgov railway and prevented the Germans from using the Bryansk-Roslavl railway line. On the main highways (Bryansk - Roslavl, Bryansk - Karachev, Bryansk - Zhizdra) the threat was so great that traffic on them could only be carried out in large columns”[142].
What happened was directly related to Kaminsky: the partisans paralyzed the very railway line that went through Lokot and the territories subordinate to him.
The time has come for Kaminsky to show the fighting efficiency of his formations.
4. Terror as a way to fight partisans
The fighting efficiency of the Lokot "people's militia" was not so great as to conduct independent anti-partisan operations. Therefore, Kaminsky's units acted in cooperation with the Hungarian units thrown into the fight against the partisans. Their very first joint operation turned into mass killings of civilians. The head of the forestry department Mikheev, who was already mentioned by us, spoke about this later: "In the spring of 1942, police detachments led by Mosin, with the participation of Magyar units, shot 60 people in the village of Pavlovichi and burned 40 people alive" [143].
On April 11, the village of Ugrevishche, Komarichsky district, was burned down, about 100 people were shot. In the Sevsk region, punitive forces destroyed the villages of Svyatovo (180 houses) and Borisovo (150 houses), and the village of Berestok was completely destroyed (170 houses were burned, 171 people were killed) [144].
The shown cruelty towards innocent people led to an increase in discontent in the ranks of the "people's militia". The "policemen" began to run over to the partisans.
From order No. 118 for Lokotsky district of April 25, 1942:
“… along with the fighters and commanders courageously fighting for their future, in some cases there were also elements of panic and cowardice, uncertainty and desertion, like the former head of the Shemyakinsky detachment Levitsky, and at times cowardice and desertion turned into open betrayal, as was the case on April 20 with. from the side of 4 soldiers-prisoners of war of the Khutor-Kholmetsk detachment. A similar betrayal was committed in the Svyatovsky detachment by the soldier Sergei Gavrilovich Zenchenkov, who on April 22 of this year. G. did not follow the orders of the commander and left the post on the railway bridge. By this he did a great service to the enemy, for which he was shot on the same day by order of the burgomaster”[145].
The culmination of this process was the uprising of the "militiamen" of the villages of Shemyakino and Tarasovka, which was brutally suppressed by Kaminsky with the help of Hungarian units. This episode is described in detail in the post-war testimony of the head of the Mikhailovskaya police M. Govyadov: “It was like this: in May 1942, a company of police stationed in the villages of Shemyakino and Tarasovka revolted - they killed their commanders, cut communications and went over to the partisans. In revenge for this, Kaminsky organized a punitive expedition, including the Magyars. This expedition was headed by the deputy. burgomaster Mosin, head of the military investigation department Paratsyuk and a representative of the newspaper "Voice of the People" - Vasyukov … "[146].
Punishers captured villages after stubborn battles with former policemen and partisans who came to their aid. After that, the massacre of local residents began. “Upon arrival at the scene, the punishers shot about 150 people, members of the families of police officers who went to the partisans, and some of the police officers who were captured in Shemyakino and Tarasovka,” said M. Govyadov. - Among those shot there were women, children and old people. In July 1943, by order of Kaminsky, a commission was created, chaired by Mosin, with the aim of excavating the grave of the Soviet citizens they themselves shot, in order to attribute these actions to the partisans and to embitter the RONA soldiers against the partisans. I know that this commission traveled, carried out excavations, drew up a corresponding act, which was published together with a large article in the newspaper “Voice of the People”, which indicated that the execution of these persons was allegedly carried out by partisans”[147].
There was nothing particularly specific about the actions of the Kaminets. Exactly the same crimes against civilians were noted by the Hungarian punishers operating in the neighboring Sevsk region. A large number of evidence of this has been preserved in Russian archives.
“The fascist accomplices of the Magyars entered our village Svetlovo 9 / V-42,” said the peasant Anton Ivanovich Krutukhin. - All the inhabitants of our village hid from such a pack, and they, as a sign that the inhabitants began to hide from them, and those who could not hide, they shot them, raped several of our women. I myself am an old man born in 1875 was also forced to hide in a cellar…. Shooting was going on throughout the village, buildings were on fire, and Magyar soldiers robbed our things, stealing cows and calves”[148].
In the nearby village of Orliya Slobodka, at this time, all residents were gathered in the square. “The Magyars arrived and began to collect us in one (nrzb) and drove us out to the village. Korostovka, where we spent the night in church - women, and men separately at school, - Vasilisa Fedotkina recalled. - On the afternoon of 17 / V-42 we were driven back to our village Orliya where we spent the night and tomorrow, that is, 18 / V-42, we were again gathered in a heap near the church where we were rearranged - the women were driven to the village. Orlya Slobodka, but they kept the men with them”[149].
On May 20, about 700 Hungarian soldiers left Orlia for the nearest villages. On the collective farm "4th Bolshevik sowing" they arrested all the men. “When they saw the men of our village, they said they were partisans,” said Varvara Fyodorovna Mazekova. - And on the same date, i.e. 20 / V-42 they seized my husband Mazekov Sidor Borisovich, born in 1862 and my son Mazekov Alexei Sidorovich, born in 1927, and tortured them and after these torments they tied their hands and threw them into a pit, then lit straw and burned in a potato pit. On the same day, they not only burned my husband and son, they also burned 67 men”[150].
After that the Magyars moved to the village of Svetlovo. The villagers remembered the pogrom organized by the chastisers some ten days ago. “When my family and I noticed a moving wagon train, all of us residents of our village fled into the Khinelsky forest,” Zakhar Stepanovich Kalugin recalled. However, it was not without murders here: the old people who remained in the village were shot by the Hungarians [151].
Punishers pacified the surrounding villages for a week. The inhabitants fled to the forest, but they were found there too. “It was in May, March 28, 42,” said Evdokia Vedeshina, a resident of Orlia Slobodka. - I and almost all the inhabitants went to the forest. These thugs also followed there. They are in our place, where we (nrzb) with our people, shot and tortured 350 people, including my children were tortured, daughter Nina 11 years old, Tonya 8 years old, little son Vitya 1 year old and son Kolya 5 years old. I remained a little alive under the corpses of my children”[152].
Those abandoned by the villagers were burned out. “When we returned from the forest to the village, the village was unrecognizable,” recalled Natalya Aldushina, a resident of the long-suffering Svetlov. - Several old people, women and children were brutally killed by the Nazis. Houses were burnt, cattle, large and small, were driven away. The pits in which our things were buried were dug up. There was nothing left in the village but black bricks. The women who remained in the village talked about the atrocities of the fascists”[153].
Thus, in just three villages, at least 420 civilians were killed by the Hungarians in 20 days. It is possible that there were more people killed - we do not have complete data on this score. But we know that these cases were not isolated.
The formations of Kaminsky, as we have already had the opportunity to see, acted in the same spirit as the Hungarians, often in close cooperation with them. Here is one more testimony: “In June 1942,” recalled the already mentioned M. Govyadov, “after the partisan raid on the village. Mikhailovka, when 18 policemen and 2 Germans were killed. Mikhail Berdnikov, at the head of a detachment of more than 100 people, arrived in the Mikhailovsky district and perpetrated a brutal reprisal against the civilian population. In the village of Mikhailovka, by order of Berdnikov, 2 people were hanged, 12 houses of partisans were robbed and burned. After the massacre in Mikhailovka, the detachment left for the village. Veretennikovo, Mikhailovsky district, where he shot up to 50 people from among the members of partisan families, almost the entire village was burned and cattle were driven away. On the same day, the detachment set fire to 15 houses in the village of Razvete and robbed the families of the partisans”[154].
There were also purely military successes. In May, the Kamintsy together with German and Hungarian units, after a two-hour battle, drove the partisans out of the villages of Altuhovo, Sheshuyevo and Krasny Pakhar. The partisans suffered serious losses, the enemy captured three anti-tank guns, two 76-mm guns, four Maxim machine guns, 6 company mortars, two 86-mm mortars and a lot of ammunition. The Germans, in turn, lost 2 tanks and one armored car [155].
German observers assessed Kaminsky's actions positively. “Kaminsky openly guarantees that without the consent of German officials, he will not turn his combat unit into a political instrument,” said Abwehr officer Bossi-Fredrigotti. - He understands that at present his tasks are purely military in nature. It seems that with skillful political processing, Kaminsky will be useful for the German plans for the reorganization of the East. This person can become a propagandist of the German “new order” in the East”[156].
This "new order" has already been fully experienced by the inhabitants of the villages destroyed by the Hungarians and the Fireplaces.
5. A new round of terror
The actions of Kaminsky's formations were aimed at splitting the population of the occupied territories, at inciting war between those who were mobilized into the “people's militia” and those who supported the partisans. This was very useful for the occupiers, and to a certain extent they succeeded.
“He [Kaminsky] created an island within a vast partisan region in the Bryansk-Dmitrovsk-Sevsk-Trubchevsk region, which prevents the expansion of the partisan movement, links the activities of powerful partisan forces and provides an opportunity for German propaganda among the population,” wrote the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army General Schmidt. - In addition, the area supplies food for the German troops. Thanks to the successful deployment of Russian troops under the leadership of Kaminsky, it became possible not to involve new German units and to preserve German blood in the fight against the partisans”[157].
It was decided to expand the territory controlled by Kaminsky; On July 19, 1942, Schmidt signed an order on the transformation of the Lokotsky district into a "self-governing administrative district consisting of Lokotsky, Dmitrovsky, Dmitrievsky, Sevsky, Kamarichesky, Navlinsky and Suzemsky districts" [158].
Looking at the map, it is easy to make sure that the territories around the railway branches Bryansk - Navlya - Lgov and Bryansk - Navlya - Khutor Mikhailovsky were given under Kaminsky's control. It was in these areas that the so-called "Southern Bryansk Partisan Territory" operated. Thus, the territories de facto controlled by the partisans were transferred to Kaminsky (in May-June, partisan sabotage once again stopped traffic on the Bryansk-Lgov railway line), but in connection with the railways passing through them, they are very important for the invaders.
The calculation was, in general, a win-win: Kaminsky will be able to establish control over the territories transferred to him - great. If it can't, it won't get any worse. True, the Germans did not particularly rely on the Kaminsky formations. On the eve of the creation of the Lokotsky District, the occupiers, by the forces of German and Hungarian units, carried out one of the first large-scale anti-partisan operations in the south of the Bryansk region, called the Green Woodpecker (Grünspecht). Kamintsy participated in this operation as an auxiliary force.
There is extremely fragmentary information about the results of Operation Green Woodpecker, however, most likely, it turned out to be quite successful for the invaders and their accomplices. Without this, the creation of the Lokotsky District would hardly have been possible.
It goes without saying that the German command did not let go of control over the Lokotsky district. The German Colonel Ryubsam was appointed military commandant of the district, whose task was to coordinate the hostilities of Kaminsky's formations with German and German units. Major von Weltheim was appointed directly to Kaminsky as a liaison officer and military adviser [159]. In addition, a security battalion, a communications point, a field commandant's office, a military field gendarmerie and a branch of "Abwehrgroup-107" headed by Major Greenbaum [160] were located in Lokot.
As already mentioned, most of the Lokotsky district was controlled by partisans. “Only 10% of the forest belonged to us,” recalled Mikheev, head of the forestry department. “The remaining 90% were controlled by partisans” [161]. Kaminsky tried to change the situation with brutal terror against the residents supporting the partisans. In early August, he issued a special appeal:
“Citizens and citizens of villages and villages occupied by partisans! Partisans and partisans still in the forests and individual settlements of the former Navlinsky and Suzemsky districts!
… In the near future, the German and Hungarian units, together with the Lokot Police Brigade, will take decisive measures to destroy the forest gangs. In order to deprive the bandits of an economic base, all settlements in which the partisans are located will be burned. The population will be evacuated, and the families of the partisans will be destroyed if their relatives (fathers, brothers and sisters) do not come to us before August 10 of this year. d. All residents, as well as partisans who do not want to lose their heads in vain, should not waste a single minute should come to us with all the weapons they have.
This appeal and warning is the last. Use the opportunity to save your life”[162].
Words were not at odds with deeds. “During the operation, which took place from October 11 to November 6, 1942, the 13th battalion of RONA, together with the Germans and Cossacks, carried out mass reprisals against the civilian population of the villages of Makarovo, Kholstinka, Veretenino, Bolshoy Oak, Ugolek and others, whose names I do not remember, - later told M. Govyadov. - I know that half of the village. Makarovo was burned, and about 90 people from the population were shot. The same number was shot in Veretenino, and the village was finally burned down. In the village of Kholstinka, part of the population, including women and children, were locked in a barn and burned alive. In the villages of Bolshoy Dub and Ugolek, civilians and mainly partisan families were also shot, and the villages were destroyed”[163].
In the villages controlled by Kaminsky, a real regime of terror was established; executions became very common. “At the end of 1942, 8 people from the residents of Borshchovo, Brasovsky District, were arrested on a denunciation,” recalled D. Smirnov, a member of the “self-government” court-martial. - From this group, I remember the chairman of the Borshchovo village council Polyakov with his daughter, a 22-year-old young woman Chistyakov, a resident of the village of Borshchovo Bolyakova, 23 years old, and the rest, I forgot their names. I know there were three women and five men. As a result of the trial, the chairman of the r / s was hanged, his daughter and Chistyakova were shot, and the rest were sentenced to prison terms. In addition, a young girl of 20-22 years old was hanged, I do not know her last name. She was hanged only because she was upset by the failures of the partisans and did not hide it. There were a lot of executions, but I don't remember the names of those executed now. All these victims were identified with the help of a whole staff of secret agents working under the self-government”[164].
Mass shootings in Lokot prison had already become commonplace by this time. “All those sentenced to death were the same for me,” said Antonina Makarova, who later served as the executioner. - Only their number has changed. Usually I was ordered to shoot a group of 27 people - as many partisans were contained in a cell. I shot about 500 meters from the prison near some pit. The arrested were put in a chain facing the pit. One of the men was rolling out my machine gun to the place of execution. At the command of my superiors, I knelt down and shot at people until everyone fell dead … I did not know those whom I was shooting. They didn't know me. Therefore, I was not ashamed in front of them. Sometimes, you shoot, come closer, and some still twitch. Then she again shot in the head so that the person would not suffer. Sometimes a piece of plywood with the inscription "partisan" was hung on the chest of several prisoners. Some sang something before they died. After the executions, I cleaned the machine gun in the guardroom or in the yard. There were plenty of cartridges … It seemed to me that the war would write off everything. I was just doing my job for which I was paid. It was necessary to shoot not only partisans, but also members of their families, women, teenagers. I tried not to remember this. Although I remember the circumstances of one execution - before the execution, a guy sentenced to death shouted to me: “We will not see you again, goodbye, sister!..” [165].
It is not surprising that the majority of the inhabitants of the Lokotsky district of Kaminsky fiercely hated. This fact is recorded in German documents. A report dated October 1942 states the following in this regard.
“People familiar with the current situation (Major von Weltheim, Major Miller, Chief Lieutenant Buchholz) independently agree not only that the population still respects Kaminsky's predecessor, who was killed by partisans, but also that they [local residents] hate Kaminsky. They "tremble" in front of him and, according to this information, only fear keeps them in obedience "[166].
Even reading the orders issued by Kaminsky, it is easy to notice that the sympathies of the population were not at all on the side of the Lokot council. On September 15, 1942 Kaminsky issues order No. 51:
“There are more cases when residents of under-forest areas go to the forest without the knowledge of local authorities.
There are cases when, under the guise of picking berries, preparing firewood, they meet with partisans in the forest.
On the basis of the foregoing, I order: Stop all walking into the forest of individuals, regardless of the reasons. If it is necessary to go out into the forest, such as sawing and harvesting timber and firewood, searching for missing animals, I allow access to the forest only in an organized manner, with the obligatory escort of police officers.
Any unauthorized walking into the forest will be considered as a connection with the partisans and will be punished according to the law of wartime.
I place the responsibility for the execution of the order on the volost elders, headmen and police officers.
The order to publish and bring to the attention of the inhabitants of the Lokotsky district”[167].
The order for local residents to go into the forest to get firewood exclusively accompanied by policemen speaks volumes in itself. However, order No. 114 of October 31 says even more:
“I order all elders, volost foremen and district burgomasters, upon the approach of the bandits, to immediately report this to the nearest telephone point, for which every village needs to have a horse with a rider.
I warn you that failure to comply with this order will be viewed as a direct betrayal and treason to the Motherland and the perpetrators will be brought to court-martial”[168].
As we can see, even the elders and burgomasters in power were in no hurry to report the partisans to the center; they had to be compelled to do so by the threat of a court-martial.
6. RON'S Brigade
For the German command, the hatred of the local population towards Kaminsky had absolutely no meaning. For them, it was only important how many soldiers Kaminsky could throw against the partisans and whether these units would achieve acceptable success. Simultaneously with the creation of the Lokotsky district, Kaminsky received permission to reorganize his units into a “police brigade”.
In the fall of 1942, Kaminsky announced mobilization in the districts transferred to him (in the "old territories", as we remember, mobilization had been carried out since January). There were not enough commanders for new units, and at the end of 1942 g. Kaminsky, with the consent of the German command, recruited several dozen officers in the POW camps [169].
Kaminsky's brigade received the pretentious name "Russian People's Liberation Army". As of January 1943, the brigade had 14 battalions with a total strength of 9828 people (see table). These forces were deployed across the territory of Lokotsky okrug. Battalions were stationed in large settlements. RONA received weapons from the Germans - as well as military uniforms. The food supply was provided at the expense of the population of the district [170]. Each battalion had a German liaison officer [171].
COMPOSITION OF RON'S BRIGADE AS OF JANUARY 16, 1943 [172]
In the spring of 1943, the RONA battalions were consolidated into five rifle regiments of three battalions:
1st Rifle Regiment of Major Galkin - 1st, 2nd, 11th battalions;
2nd Rifle Regiment of Major Tarasov - 4th, 6th, 7th battalions;
3rd Rifle Regiment of Major Turlakov - 3rd, 5th, 15th battalions;
4th Rifle Regiment of Major Proshin - 10th, 12th, 14th battalions;
5th Rifle Regiment of Captain Filatkin - 8th, 9th, 13th battalions.
Each battalion consisted of 4 rifle companies, mortar and artillery platoons. In service, according to the state, it was required to have 1-2 guns, 2-3 battalion and 12 company mortars, 8 easel and 12 light machine guns. However, in practice, there was no uniformity both in personnel and in the armament of individual battalions. As can be seen from the military note cited above, their number fluctuated between 300 and 1000 soldiers, and the availability of weapons depended mainly on the nature of the tasks performed. While some battalions even had armored vehicles, others were armed mainly with rifles and had almost no light and heavy machine guns. The armored division was armed with 8 tanks (KV, 2 T-34, ZBT-7, 2BT-5), 3 armored vehicles (BA-10, 2 BA-20), 2 tankettes, as well as cars and motorcycles. Other RONA units could also have armored vehicles, such as a fighter company that received two BT-7 tanks [173].
In the spring - summer of 1943, five infantry regiments were stationed: 1st regiment - settlement. Bee (34 km south of Navli), 2nd regiment - village. Bobrik (15 km south of Lokot), 3rd regiment - Navlya, 4th regiment - Sevsk, 5th regiment - Tarasovka-Kholmech (west of Lokot) [174].
The Germans were very skeptical about the combat effectiveness of the RONA brigade. “The robberies, despite the harsh prohibitions,” stated one of the German observer officers. “Since the officers were involved, it was completely impossible to keep the people under control. At night the guards left their posts for no reason”[175].
When in the fall of 1942 the partisans increased their pressure on the RONA units, General Bernhard was forced to state: "Engineer Kaminsky's militants cannot repel major attacks on themselves" [176].
The observers who came from the center also did not express admiration for the brigade. “Decker had the opportunity to inspect all battalions,” wrote the Minister of the Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg. “Four battalions are wearing old German uniforms. The rest of the battalions outwardly look like a wild gang …”[177].
The RONA units did not conduct large independent operations against the partisans, they were always supported by Hungarian or German units. This was the case during Operation Green Woodpecker in the summer of 1942, Operations Triangle and Quadrangle in the fall of 1942, Operations Polar Bear I and Polar Bear II in the winter of 1943, and Operation Gypsy Baron in the spring 1943. However, as auxiliary units, Kamintsy, who knew the area and the population, were effective and, most importantly, according to German estimates, they saved an entire division [178].
The main thing for the invaders was the constant loyalty of the RONA brigade. The best characteristic of this loyalty was the fact that when the Germans began to recruit eastern workers on the territory of the Lokotsky district, Kaminsky's units took a very active part in driving the peasants [179]. But the "recruitment of volunteers" was carried out so vilely that even the Baltic collaborators sabotaged such events in every possible way, saving their compatriots [180].
A similar situation was achieved by the incessant "cleaning of the ranks" of the RONA. However, the pro-Soviet sentiments among the "people's army" and the police were strong enough. This is evidenced by the following fact recorded in the report of the Brasov District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated March 1, 1943: “… when our plane appeared over the village of Lokot and began to drop leaflets, the police rushed to collect leaflets. The Germans opened rifle and machine-gun fire on the policemen. The police, in turn, opened fire on the Germans”[181].
Even among the leading workers of the district there were underground anti-fascist organizations. One of them included the head of the Lokotsky mobilization department Vasiliev, the director of the Komarich secondary school Firsov, the head. ammunition depot RONA Akulov, commander of the first battalion Volkov and others. In total, this organization numbered about 150 people, mainly RONA fighters. A plan was drawn up for an uprising in Lokot, on March 15, 1943, a group was created to assassinate the leading officials of the council, a plan was drawn up to seize tanks, explode fuel, troops and military cargo. The ultimate goal of the organization was to destroy the district administration and go over to the side of the partisans. However, the underground workers were not lucky. The captured partisan of the brigade "Death to the German invaders" under torture informed Kaminsky about the existence of Vasiliev's group, which was immediately arrested in full force [182].
The chief of staff of the RONA guards battalion, senior lieutenant Babich, tried to create an underground organization. However, during the recruitment of new members to the detachment, he was betrayed. Some of the RONA soldiers recruited by him were arrested, some managed to go to the partisans [183].
When, in 1943, the front approached directly to the Lokotsky district, the "people's army", despite the propaganda that the Reds would destroy all collaborators, began "with weapons in groups and subunits to go over to the side of the Red Army" [184]. Of course, this was done by those who were not involved in punitive operations against the population.
The Kaminsky brigade did not manage to cope with the partisans who controlled most of the territory of the Lokotsky district. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that during Operation Gypsy Baron in May 1943 the Germans had to throw against the partisans units from the 4th and 18th Panzer, 107th Hungarian Light Infantry, 10th Motorized, 7, 292nd and 707th Infantry and 442nd Special Purpose Divisions. 2 RONA regiments were only an insignificant part of this group, numbering about 50 thousand people [185].
However, it was not possible to completely defeat the Bryansk partisans even then, although they suffered serious losses.
7. Conclusions
The creation of the "Lokotsky self-governing district" became possible for several reasons, the main of which was the active combat activity of the Bryansk partisans and the lack of forces from the invaders to suppress them.
In order to save "German blood", the command of the 2nd Panzer Army agreed to allow Bronislav Kaminsky, who had demonstrated his loyalty to the invaders, to "militarize" the region under his control and fight the partisans - naturally, under German control. The Germans called this operation "Die Aktion Kaminsky" [186] and it must be admitted that it was quite successful.
Kaminsky's units created from mobilized peasants did not differ in particular combat capability, but they prevented the expansion of the partisan movement (people who could support the partisans were mobilized into anti-partisan formations) and allowed fewer German units to be diverted to fight the partisans. The brutality of Kaminsky's individual units, which were destroying the families of the partisans at the root, provoked retaliatory strikes by the partisans against the families of police officers and contributed to the incitement of internecine conflict, beneficial to the invaders.
In the Lokotsky volost, and then in the Lokotsky district, a brutal regime was established, the signs of which were the constant executions in the Lokotsky prison (after the release, pits with about two thousand corpses were found there [187]). Even German documents testify that the population of Kaminsky was afraid and hated. Kaminsky never managed to establish control over the entire territory of his subordinate district. Most of it was controlled by partisans, which the Kaminsky brigade could not cope with even with the active support of German and Hungarian units. When they write about Kaminsky as "the owner of the Bryansk forests", this is not even a poetic exaggeration, it is an elementary lie.
Nowadays, it comes as no surprise to anyone that private companies are involved in the fight against the insurgency in Iraq or Afghanistan, a significant part of whose employees, moreover, are recruited from the local population. Only propagandists are trying to draw far-reaching conclusions about the mood of the local population from this fact. However, from the fact that the German invaders managed, through an intermediary, to create a brigade of mobilized residents of the Bryansk region and use it against the partisans, for some reason the revisionists draw far-reaching conclusions about the population's hatred of the Soviet regime. However, in reality, the creation of the RONA brigade has nothing to do with the mood of the population.
Ultimately, the “Die Aktion Kaminsky” carried out by the invaders turned into a huge tragedy for the population of the Bryansk region. Only on the territory of the Brasovsky district, the Nazis and their accomplices-Kamintsy killed 5395 people [188]. The number of people killed throughout the entire territory of the Lokotsky district remains unknown to date.
97 Armstrong J. Guerrilla Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, 1941-1943 / Per. from English O. A. Fedyaeva. - M., 2007. S. 87.
98 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 88. D. 481. L. 104-106.
99 Ibid.
100 Armstrong J. Guerrilla Warfare. P. 87.
101 Chuev S. G. Special services of the Third Reich. - SPb., 2003. Book. 2. P. 33–34; Altman I. A. Victims of Hate: The Holocaust in the USSR, 1941-1945. - M., 2002. S. 261–262.
102 Altman IL. Victims of hate. S. 262–263.
103 "Arc of Fire": the Battle of Kursk through the eyes of the Lubyanka. - M., 2003. S. 221; Archive of the FSB for the Oryol region. F. 2. On. 1. D. 7. L. 205.
104 Ibid. S. 412-413; Archive of the FSB for the Oryol region. F. 1. On. 1. D. 30. L. 345ob.
105 Ibid. P. 221; Archive of the FSB for the Oryol region. F. 2. On. 1. D. 7. L. 205.
106 Armstrong J. Guerrilla Warfare. P. 146.
107 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 88. D. 481. L. 104-106.
108 Armstrong J. Guerrilla warfare. P. 87.
109 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet Disaffection // Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of V. I. Nikolaevsky - Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. P. 244.
110 Chuev S. G. Cursed Soldiers: Traitors on the side of the III Reich. - M., 2004. S. 109.
111 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S. I. Anti-partisan republic. - M., 2001. (Hereinafter, cited from the electronic version posted on the website rona.org.ru).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 247-248. For the position of A. Bossi-Fedrigotti, see: State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: Collection of documents (hereinafter - OGB). - M., 2000. T. 2. Book. 2. P. 544, 547.
115 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt: The Myth of the “Lokot Alternative” // Rodina. 2006. No. 10. P. 91; TsAFSB. D. N-18757.
116 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 248.
117 Warsaw Uprising of 1944 in documents from the archives of the secret services. Warsaw; Moscow, 2007. S. 1204; CA FSB D. N-18757. D. 6. L. 198–217.
118 A photograph of the leaflet was published in the book by I. Gribkov "The Master of the Bryansk Forests".
119 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 88. D. 481. L. 104-106.
120 Russian archive: Great Patriotic War (hereinafter - RAVO). - M., 1999. T. 20 (9). P. 109; TsAMO. F. 32. On. 11309, file 137, sheets 425–433.
121 RGASPI. F. 69. On. 1. D. 746. L. 2–4; Popov A. Yu. The NKVD and the partisan movement. - M., 2003. S. 311.
122 See, for example: Gribkov I. V. The owner of the Bryansk forests. P. 21.
123Saburov A. N. Conquered spring. - M., 1968. Book. 2. P. 15.
124 Lyapunov N. I. On Christmas Eve // Partisans of the Bryansk region: Collection of stories of former partisans. - Bryansk, 1959. T. 1. P. 419–421.
125 OGB. T. 2. Book. 2. P. 222.
126 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 89; TsAFSB. D. N-18757.
127 Ibid. P. 92.
128 Ibid.
129 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 249-250.
130 Gribkov I. V. The owner of the Bryansk forests. P. 33.
131 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 255.
132 Ibid. R. 250.
133 Tonka-machine-gunner (https://www.renascentia.ru/tonka.htm).
134 OGB. T. 3. Book. 1. S. 139.
135 Ibid. S. 139-140.
136 OGB. T. 3. Book. 1, p. 266.
137 Partisan Movement: Based on the Experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.: Military-Historical Essay. - M., 2001. S. 127.
138 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 251.
139 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 89; CA FSB D. N-18757.
140 A photograph of the leaflet was published in the book by I. Gribkov "The Master of the Bryansk Forests".
141 OGB. T. 3. Book. 1. S. 285.
142 Armstrong J. Guerrilla Warfare. P. 133.
143 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 92; CA FSB D. N-18757.
144 Partisans of the Bryansk region. - Bryansk, 196, pp. 41–42; Gribkov KV. Kh ozyain of the Bryansk forests. S. 36–37.
145 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. General Schmidt's children. P. 90; CA FSB D. N-18757.
146 Ibid. P. 91.
147 Ibid.
148 GARF. F. R-7021. Op. 37. D. 423. L. 561-561ob.
149 Ibid. L. 567.
150 GARF. F. R-7021. Op. 37. D. 423. L. 543-543ob.
151 Ibid. L. 564.
152 Ibid. L. 488-488ob.
153 Ibid. L. 517.
154 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 93; TsAFSB. D. N-18757.
155 Chuev S. G. Cursed soldiers. P. 127.
156 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 250–251.
157 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 252.
158 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 89; CA FSB D. N-18757.
159 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 250–251.
160 Dunaev F. Do not mess up the feat: An open letter to the candidate for a degree (https://www.admin.debryansk.ru/region/histoiy/guerilla/ pril3_collaboration.php).
161 Warsaw Uprising of 1944, p. 1196; CA FSB D. N-18757. D. 6. L. 198–217.
162 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 90; CA FSB D. N-18757.
163 Ibid. P. 93.
164 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. S. 92–93; TsAFSB. D. N-18757.
165 Tonka the machine gunner (https://www.renascentia.ru/tonka.htm).
166 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 259.
167 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S. I. Antipartisan Republic. - M., 2001.
168 Popov A. Yu. NKVD and the partisan movement. P. 234; RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 909. L. 140-148.
169 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 254.
170 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 91; CA FSB D. N-18757.
171 "Arc of Fire". P. 244; CA FSB. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 16. L. 94-104.
172 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S. I. Antipartisan Republic. - M., 2001.
173 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S. I. Antipartisan Republic.
174 Ibid.
175 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 255.
176 Ibid.
177 Chuev ST. Cursed soldiers. P. 122.
178 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 255-256.
179 Criminal goals - criminal means: Documents on the occupation policy of Nazi Germany on the territory of the USSR, 1941-1944. - M., 1968. S. 246–247.
180 Ibid. S. 254–259.
181 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S. I. Antipartisan Republic.
182 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S. I. Antipartisan Republic.
183 Ibid.
184 "Arc of Fire". P. 245; CA FSB. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 16. L. 94-104.
185 Partisan movement. P. 207.
186 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 387.
187 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 94; CA FSB D. N-18757.
188 Makarov V., Khristoforov V. Children of General Schmidt. P. 94; TsAFSB. D. N-18757.
