Weapons have always attracted attention and were not only a way to send a person to the next world, but also a source of pride.
Speaking about the brainchild of Ernst Heinkel No.219, we can definitely say that Mr. Heinkel had something to be proud of. The plane turned out to be very successful, moreover, I consider it the best of everything that flew in the night sky of World War II.
Small digression.
In general, at night over Europe, a lot of things flew and shot at each other. But for the most part, night fighters were alterations, often quite artisanal. The main inventors at the beginning of the war were the British, who had to somehow fight the German pilots, who also embarked on the path of night bombing.
Locators of that time simply could not be crammed into the first aircraft that came across, so the first night fighters were converted from bombers. Specifically, the British adapted the "Blenheims" and "Beaufighters".
The result is a kind of portrait of a night fighter, as a slow aircraft capable of being in a protected area for a long time.
In general, during the entire Second World War, one aircraft was created in the participating countries, which was developed as a night fighter and was used in the same way. It is clear that we are talking about the Northrop P-61 Black Widow fighter.
All the rest were alterations, including the hero of our story.
In general, in the Luftwaffe they improvised in the same way as in the Royal Air Force, with the only difference that, again, in my opinion, in Germany they could solve night problems at the initial stage of the war easily and naturally. But they drowned in undercover games for orders.
After all, already in 1941 it became clear that the Bf.110 was, to put it mildly, inadequate as a fighter. What is night, what is day. And they needed a more efficient aircraft capable of finding and attacking British bombers. And attack effectively.
Yes, the problem was partially solved by reworking the Ju.88, but by the summer of 1942 it became clear that the 88 was not a panacea, but rather a temporary solution. But the brainchild of "Junkers" will be discussed in the next article, but for now we start counting from the moment when "Heinkel" and "Focke-Wulf" were offered to work on the project of a night fighter.
The development of the Focke-Wulf Ta.154 was not put into service, and the He.219 proved to be one of the most effective aircraft of the Second World War.
One can only be surprised at the shortsightedness and stupidity of the Luftwaffe command, which did not give the plane the opportunity to prove itself to the fullest. Indeed, in the case of mass use, as envisaged in the original plans, this could well lead to a change in the situation in the night battles in the skies over Germany.
By the way, Heinkel did not particularly bother themselves and took advantage of the earlier project 1060, a multipurpose aircraft capable of performing the tasks of a long-range heavy fighter, reconnaissance aircraft, high-speed bomber and torpedo bomber.
The project was rejected due to … excessive sophistication and a large number of innovations, as they would say now.
Just imagine: a pressurized cockpit, a nose wheel, and remotely controlled defensive weapons in 1940. Most of all I did not like the "American" wheel in the nose and the project was rejected.
But in 1942, dust was shaken off him, and the process rushed. It rushed, because the British bombers had already become a real threat, and it was becoming more and more difficult to deal with them. Yes, the Bf.110s could still more or less effectively withstand the Wheatleys, Hempdens and Wellingtons, which they could catch up with and quickly gut from the available arsenal.
But the "Stirlings", "Halifaxes" and "Manchester", which, although in small quantities, but had already begun to appear in the skies over Germany, were really too tough for the 110th. The Bf 110C gave out a maximum of 585 km / h, and the Lancaster - 462 km / h. Halifax - 454 km / h.
There is a nuance here. The maximum speed is not an indicator, this is understandable. Especially when it comes to the fact that a fighter needs to catch up with a bomber that goes with an excess in height. Having supposedly a speed advantage of 100 km / h, in fact, the 110 simply could not catch up with the new British bombers, while gaining altitude. And that was the problem.
The second problem was the Ju-88, from which they made a pretty decent night fighter, but it did not work out en masse, because the 88 was needed on the fronts as a bomber. But we will sort it out, as promised, in the very near future, by cogs.
The smartest man Kammhuber, the head of the night air defense of Germany, having familiarized himself with the "1060" project, realized that this was "the same".
This is how He. 219 appeared.
The project was based on an aircraft with DB 603G engines, with a capacity of 1750 hp each, and even with turbochargers for higher altitude and an MW50 water methanol injection system.
To make a normal "night light" out of it, the He.219 was planned to be equipped with a FuG 212 Liechtenstein C-1 locator and armament from two 15-mm MG.151 cannons at the root of the wings and two 20-mm MG.151 cannons or one 30- mm MK.103 in the lower fairing.
To defend against the enemy from the project "1060" inherited two remotely controlled by the operator of the installation with a pair of MG.131 machine guns of 13-mm caliber.
It was painless to hang up to 2 tons of bombs.
All in all, it turned out to be a very impressive aircraft. But while developments were underway, the production of blueprints (some of them burned down as a result of the night bombing of the plant by the British), the transfer of production to Vienna (again due to the Allied raids), the German fighters had already met in battles with the Lancaster. And Kammhuber threw a tantrum at Heinkel, demanding that the first group armed with the No. 219 be ready by January 1943.
Heinkel protested because he was a realist. But "Owl", as He.219 was called, "flew in" from a completely different side. And, I must say, no less effective than from the bomb bays of Lancaster and Stirling.
Today, after so many years, it is very difficult to say why Milch did not like He.219. It was the head of the Technical Directorate of the Ministry of Aviation, Erhard Milch, who imposed a resolution prohibiting the serial production of He.219A, allegedly in order to reduce the number of types of machines produced. At the same time, Milch was really sure that the tasks assigned to the He.219A would be able to effectively perform the aircraft already being produced.
There can be versions here, from the struggle for orders of the same Messerschmitt and his undercover games, and to the trivially not the best personal relations with Heinkel and Kammhuber.
In the meantime, childhood illnesses hit the plane. It turned out that the remote-controlled units, which worked satisfactorily on the ground, did not behave in the air stream as they would like. There was clearly not enough power in the hydraulic system, as a result, the barrels were aimed at the wrong point at which the sight was looking.
The hydraulics clearly lacked the power for reliable and accurate targeting of weapons in high-speed airflow. As a result, the barrels were aimed at the wrong point to which the sight showed.
They lost the war on hydraulics at the Heinkel. But my personal opinion is even for the best. Innovations such as two twin mounts with large-caliber machine guns are more appropriate for a bomber, but how much they are needed for a fighter, and even a night one …
And the complex hydraulics also led to maintenance problems. Plus weight, aerodynamic drag … The question is, is this level of protection necessary for an aircraft whose destiny is an attack?
So in "Heinkel" they decided to remove these installations and replace them with one 13-mm machine gun to protect the rear hemisphere.
And the released weight (rather big, by the way) was filled with other weapons. Which was quite logical. So, to the two wing guns MG.151 added FOUR guns under the fuselage. Moreover, the container was made with the expectation that it would be possible to install different guns, from the MG.151 15mm caliber to MK.103 or MK.108 30mm caliber.
On March 25, 1943, the experienced He.219 took part in a training battle in Rechlin with Do.217N fighters and a Ju.88S bomber.
Do 217N lost without a chance at the very beginning of the fight. Bomber 219 also left no chance. And, as it turned out, the training battles brought their results. It was decided to increase the production of He.219 from 100 to 300 vehicles.
Not God knows what series, but nevertheless, even with such a volume of production at "Heinkel" they could not cope, because the British regularly struck at aircraft factories. The maximum that the Schwechat plant was capable of was 10 cars per month.
On the night of June 12, 1943, Not 219A-0, under the control of Major Streib, made its first sortie. During this sortie, Streib shot down at least five British bombers. True, upon returning, the flap extension system failed, and Streib crashed the plane very thoroughly.
Over the next 10 days after Streib's success, several He.219s from the headquarters of I / NJG 1 in six flights shot down 20 British bombers, including six Mosquitoes, for which there was no control at all.
The tests were considered successful, although Milch again tried to put sticks in the wheels of the He.219, but nevertheless authorized the release of 24 cars per month.
Again, it is not entirely clear, Milch could not help but know that Heinkel is unlikely to be able to produce more than 10 cars a month.
But production began, and in the process of it began the modernization of the aircraft. So already at the end of 1943, He.219A-2 / R1 appeared, in which the MG.131 machine gun was removed, because such an aircraft did not really need it. was filmed.
Some of the aircraft were equipped with the Shrage Music installation, but this installation was usually installed not in the factory, but in maintenance units.
Instead of the Liechtenstein C-1 locator, at the end of 1943, all vehicles were equipped with the Liechtenstein SN-2. There was no particular need to replace the radar in technical terms, but the British were able to counter the German radar, they had to develop new ones and put them on airplanes.
FuG-220, aka "Liechtenstein" SN-2, operated at frequencies of 72-90 MHz, and differed from its predecessor by an enlarged antenna system, which reduced the maximum speed by almost 50 km / h.
In December 1943, the Technical Department considered the production of He.219, since Heinkel could not provide even the minimum rate of delivery. By this time, General Kammhuber had left his post, and Milch practically did not meet with opposition to his idea to stop the production of He.219. The future of He.219 was rather bleak.
However, nothing terrible happened, and Heinkel, having recovered from the losses inflicted by the British, began to demonstrate the Stakhanovian pace of work. And the company's management promised to produce up to 100 cars a month!
Considering that the direct competitor to the Ju.88G had not yet been adopted for service, and its refinement was accompanied by a bunch of problems, the production of the He.219 continued.
They say that the main reason for Milch's antipathy to the He.219 was, allegedly, the narrow specialization of the aircraft, suitable only for the role of a night fighter.
To remove these objections, Heinkel proposed to the Technical Department options He.219A-3 and A-4. The first was a three-seat fighter-bomber with DB 603G engines, and the second was a Junkers Jumo 222 high-altitude bomber with increased wingspan. It was obvious that their release was possible only to the detriment of the main variant.
Neither the He.219A-3 nor the He.219A-4 were approved by the Technical Department. As a result, the release of the night fighter and only him continued.
The British also did not stand still, the losses that the bombers began to suffer led to a change in the tactics of the raids. Now, Mosquito night fighters were sent in ahead of the bomber squadrons to clear the sky. This, in turn, also led to an increase in losses from German "night lights".
It became clear that in the presence of "Mosquito" in the sky, the removed 13 mm machine gun on the He.219 is not such an unnecessary part.
However, a problem arose: the radio operator could not simultaneously observe the radar screen and watch the tail, he performed some of these two tasks poorly. Naturally, the solution was the placement of a third crew member. For this, the fuselage had to be lengthened by 78 cm.
The shooter's place was closed by a raised canopy, which had a ledge above the front cockpit to provide the arrow with a forward view.
The installation of a new cab led to a drop in top speed by 35 km / h, which was a very significant loss. Then another decision was made: to create a "mosquito" No.219A-6.
In fact, it was a lightweight He.219A for DB 603L engines. Armament consisted of four 20 mm MG.151 cannons. All reservations and some of the equipment have been removed. The DB 603L differed from the DB 603E in the two-stage supercharger and the MW50 and GM-1 forcing systems. Takeoff power was 2100 HP, and at 9000 m - 1750 HP. In reality, only a few of these machines were made, but the idea was quite good.
With the advent of the DB 603G engine, the production of the latest Heinkel model began: He.219A-7.
219A-7 did not become a real night monster. The booking was further strengthened, only the pilot was protected by a 100-kg frontal armor plate with bulletproof glass. Both crew members had ejection seats.
The equipment included the Liechtenstein SN-2 locators and the new FuG 218 Neptune, the FuG 10P and FuG 16ZY radios, the FuG 25a friend or foe transponder, the FuG 101a radio altimeter and the FuBl 2F blind landing system.
For combat, the pilot used two different scopes: Revy 16B for the main weapon and Revy 16G for Shrage Music.
Armament He.291A-7 made a monster out of the plane in the night sky. Judge for yourself:
- two 30-mm cannon MK 108 in the installation "shrage music";
- two 30-mm cannon MK 108 at the root of the wing;
- two 30mm MK 103 cannons and two 20mm MG 151/20 cannons in the lower fairing.
This is the basic minimum, so to speak. Because MG 151 could be replaced in the lower fairing by a pair of 30 mm MK 103 and a pair of MK 108 (A-7 / R2).
It is difficult to say how heavy the massive second salvo of such an aircraft was, but it is obvious that few aircraft had a chance to survive it.
How No.219 fought.
Since the planes were actually produced drop by drop, the only group of night fighters, I / NJG 1, was armed with them.
Despite the losses, the effectiveness of the group's actions was constantly increasing. But the combat losses were significantly less than the number of victories won, and did not even go in any comparison until the appearance of the Mosquito night fighters over Germany.
The appearance of the Mosquito night fighters somewhat complicated the actions of the He.219 pilots, but not critically. A certain parity remained between the Mosquito and the Owl, the heavier He.219 was faster, both in terms of maximum speed (665 km / h against 650 km / h) and in terms of cruising speed (535 km / h against 523 km / h), climbed to a great height (12,700 m versus 10,600 m), but the Mosquito was better in the vertical (615 m / min versus 552 m / min for He 219).
Data for Mosquito NF Mk.38 and He.219a-7 / r-1 are given.
One can argue about whose radar and radio equipment was better, personally I would have preferred Telefunken and Siemens.
Well, in terms of weapons, the He.219 was definitely better. The four Hispano-Suiza Mosquitoes were serious firepower, but the non-219 battery was definitely more effective.
In service with the I / NJG, I He.219A proved to be easy to maintain, as all units were easily accessible from the outset. Even large units were replaced in the maintenance parts.
Moreover, in the technical support units, 6 (SIX !!!) fighters were assembled from spare parts and assemblies by personnel. Yes, they seemed to go outside the factory program, but nevertheless, they flew and fought!
Even at full load, the He.219 had a surplus of power, especially when the Daimler-Benz engines with a capacity of 1900 hp appeared, so that engine failure on takeoff was not dangerous. In fact, there have been cases of takeoff on one engine with the flaps not fully extended.
Was it easy to fight on the Owl? Yes, the radars of that time were a very primitive matter, but German pilots left for the next world (who were unlucky) not with a short list of victories. Not like, of course, the inflated lists of the same Hartman, and the night fighters fought not against the Po-2, and died, of course. But they also strained the enemy in full, fortunately, the plane allowed.
Oberfeldwebel Morlock on the night of November 3, 1944, in just 12 minutes, reliably shot down six British aircraft and one presumably. It was simple: Morlock saw the British through the eyes of the radar, but they did not. But the next night this pilot was killed by the Mosquito attack.
A question of luck: they saw you first - you are a corpse. You were the first to see - "Abschussbalken" is ready.
By the end of 1944, the Luftwaffe had received 214 He 219 (108 from Schwechat and 106 from Mariene), but the adoption in November of the "urgent fighter program" meant the verdict on all twin-engine piston fighters with the exception of the Do.335 Strela.
Heinkel actually ignored the order and put into operation another He.219 assembly line in Oranienburg. Nevertheless, only 54 He 219 were produced, with which 20 fighters converted from prototypes entered the combat units.
By the time the "urgent fighter program" was adopted, several variants of the He.219 had been developed, and their production was even being prepared. But actually 6 units of the new project He.419 were produced. This high-altitude fighter first flew in 1944.
In the design of He.419A-0, the fuselage and empennage of He.219A-5 and two DB 603G engines were used. The serial model He.419A-1 was supposed to have a new tail section and a new empennage with one keel. But preference was given to the He.419V-1 / R1 with a fuselage from the He.219A-5 with a tail of the He.319 model, which was not planned for the series, but the groundwork was.
The wing had an even larger area - up to 58.8 sq. The DB 603G engines were planned to be installed with turbochargers. The armament consisted of two 20-mm MG 151 cannons at the root of the wings and four 30-mm MK 108 cannons in the lower fairing. The flight duration was estimated at 2, 15 hours at a speed of 675 km / h at an altitude of 13600 m. Six He.419B-1 / R1 were actually built using the fuselage He 219A-5, but their fate is not known.
What else can you say about this plane?
The He 219 was an outstanding aircraft in many respects, with virtually no operational problems unlike many other aircraft. Very powerful, with excellent weapons and radio components. Generally with a lot of innovations.
But he did not have to play a significant role. If we talk about the He.219 simply as an airplane, then we can say that Milch's obstinacy in particular and the vague fluctuations of the Technical Department in general, just screwed up a very, very good car.
However, if we take into account which side the car was fighting on, then everything should be fine with us.
But the plane was good. And if Heinkel was able to produce not three hundred, but three thousand of these aircraft, then many British crews really would not have reached their airfields.
LTH He.219a-7 / r-1:
Wingspan, m: 18, 50
Length, m: 15, 55
Height, m: 4, 10
Wing area, m2: 44, 50
Weight, kg
- empty aircraft: 11 210
- normal takeoff: 15 300
Engine: 2 x Daimler-Benz DB 603G x 1900 hp
Maximum speed, km / h: 665
Cruising speed, km / h: 535
Practical range, km: 2000
Maximum rate of climb, m / min: 552
Practical ceiling, m: 12 700
Crew, people: 2
Armament:
- two 30-mm cannon MK-108 with 100 rounds per barrel at the root of the wing;
- two guns MG-151/20 with 300 rounds per barrel and two MK-108 with 100 rounds per barrel in the lower fairing;
- two MK-108 in the "Shrage Music" installation.
