Roman Skomorokhov asks the question: "Does it make sense for Russia to wage war at sea?" I, a person who has studied and trained in warfare at sea for many years, would like to comment on this article.
First, you need to agree with a number of critical opinions on the Russian Navy:
- the chatter and lies of our media, moreover, of the officials in the fleet;
- really very serious problems of the Navy, both with the ship and flight personnel, and combat training;
- huge, far from always justified investments in the fleet. First of all, this is the most expensive and controversial program in the modern history of Russia "Borey-Bulava", which became a weight on the neck not only of the Navy, but also of all the armed forces in their most difficult financial years;
- and most importantly: a conceptual dead end, as a result of which there are no normal tasks (and as the task is set, so it is carried out) and absolutely fantastic shipbuilding plans are announced, which are not even redrawn every year, but soon will be every month.
You need to start with the latter.
Real tasks of the fleet
Evil tongues say that the formation of our really rather strange conceptual documents of the Russian Navy had a hand in some persons previously noticed in the active development of budgetary funds through certain defense industry organizations.
In short, our fleet and ships (and naval aviation - especially) exist, in fact, not for the country, protecting its real interests and performing real tasks, but for the comfortable development of budgetary funds for them.
Only this sad fact does not negate the fact that there are real tasks for the fleet: there are actually ours, and the opposition is not ours.
Let's start from the opposite.
An opponent who surpasses us and has the initiative will not bluntly knock his forehead against a solid wall where we are strong, he will strike where we are weak. Alas, the weak link of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the fleet (and in the navy - naval submarine weapons)
Those. in the case of "zeroing" our fleet, this will be used with great pleasure by the enemy. Purely coastal systems (such as long-range coastal anti-ship missile systems (BPKRK) and over-the-horizon radars (ZGRLS)) have not so much limited capabilities (they are just great), but serious problems with combat stability as a system (with the reconnaissance subsystem disabled and target designation is of little use to long-range anti-ship missiles).
For example, an Ohio-class SSGN approaches the coast and fires a salvo of 154 cruise missiles (CR), and these missiles can have cluster submunitions and ensure the destruction of several targets. What kind of air defense is needed to contain such a (sudden - this is the key) strike, and how much can it cost?
However, things are much worse. At one time we abandoned Russian America out of fears of "the impossibility of holding back." We have Kamchatka "hanging" on sea communications (what is it like trying to replace them with planes, we understood in Syria, knocking out the resource of our military transport aviation), so we urgently start selling it?
And, by the way, who should we rent the Kaliningrad region to? Germany, EU or Poland? And “if something happens”, only the sea will remain for us, because the “Suvalka corridor” will be tightly “sealed” by an American division, and a non-combatant one (!).
In general, everything is clear with the thesis “let's hide from the sea”, this is from the category “into a white shroud and crawling into the cemetery”.
However, let's get back to our tasks.
1. According to the situation today (both in the short and medium term), the naval strategic forces (NSNF) are objectively indispensable in the system of strategic deterrence (primarily to prevent a "disarming" strike).
2. Provision of sea communications. This is not only the Pacific Fleet and the Baltic, but also Syria (and, if necessary, other countries).
3. The Syrian operation firmly outlined the need for effective expeditionary operational formations of the Navy, for the minimum participation of the fleet there occurred solely due to luck with the enemy. When Turkey entered the war, our air-land grouping there, without the support of an effective fleet (which we, alas, did not have) would inevitably suffer a quick and crushing defeat … In addition, the very status of the country obliges us to be able to respond harshly in situations such as “landing in Mogadishu In 1978
4. To "go to the seas and oceans", you must first get the right to go out there, incl. in a combat situation, in conditions of enemy opposition. Accordingly, the fleet begins with a minesweeper, from the near zone (including its anti-submarine defense).
5. Economic activity. Despite the fact that the active development of the shelf has been postponed, we will not get away from this. And if "economic desires" are not backed up by real force, "bad things can happen."
6. The political factor (here, to a large extent, and macroeconomics). Many people perceive the issues of showing the flag ironically, but it is a really effective political tool (the main thing is that what it was demonstrated on does not have to be sent to the museum yesterday). Even more effective is the demonstration of strength during exercises and firing.
For example, in 1999, NATO members were not afraid of our paratroopers in Pristina, but of the fact that behind them were our Topol, and our BDRs, and BDRMs of the NSNF.
And the "Russian bear" then, of course, was "lying", "knocked down", but "who is supposed to" understood perfectly well that he could get up and cut. And so that "it will not seem a little."
Military-political conditions
Taking into account the nuclear factor, the United States will avoid a head-on collision as much as possible (while having options for a disarming strike at the ready). However, there is a very bad precedent - the confrontation with England in the second half of the 19th century, which eventually ended in a devastating war with Japan (which England with great pleasure "put in place of itself"). The economic and military potentials of Russia and Japan were incomparable, only this enemy turned out to be extremely inconvenient for us. It seems that there is (was) a powerful army, but you cannot bring it to the theater of military operations through the "bottleneck" of the then Transsib. The fleet (on which the calculations were based) was openly preparing for anything, except for a real combat clash (there were only a few admirals who understood where everything was going).
What now?
After the amendments to the Constitution, Japan was left with the only option for the development of events in the Kuril Islands - force. Moreover, the main factor in this is not even us, but China, to counter which in Japan there is an extremely acute issue of complete "zeroing" of all military-political restrictions after the Second World War (flesh before nuclear status). All technical preparatory work for this has been carried out a long time ago. The question is a political decision, or rather, its passing through parliament. And the "little war" (preferably victorious) is very appropriate here.
Now the West. The war with Turkey, which we almost got in 2015 (and for which we were categorically unprepared then), prevented Erdogan's "miraculous rescue" during the coup attempt. Only the same thing can happen to Erdogan as to Anwar Sadat …
However, to the north, everything is much more interesting. The Western media hysteria about the Russian military threat to the Baltic states only at first glance seems like a collective insanity. If all this is compared with the military pumping up of Poland, including some of the most powerful tank fists in Europe and a serious ammunition load of long-range (and "back-office") JASSM-ER aircraft missiles, with which it can shoot through everything, up to Moscow and St. Petersburg, then the picture is not good.
Especially considering that ships in Baltiysk can be hit by long-range artillery from the territory of Poland (as well as a significant part of air defense facilities and airfields). At the same time, Poland also has in its "stash" what, as the Poles believe, can be a casus belli …
And here's a good question: is it only Poland? There is another country with a formal (and very strange) casus belli, and a very good question is how it will behave …
Now for the technical details.
I repeat: the key problem of our fleet is that it is treated like a feeding trough, and not like a tool.
Subplating
I have already cited an example many times, but it is worth reminding it again and again.
In 2008, "Omsk" came out of the restoration of technical readiness and after a serious emergency repair from the DVZ "Zvezda" a year earlier than the time planned by the fleet! Moreover, it was generally the first ship of the 3rd generation, which left the "Zvezda". And this is in the Far East, where, as they say, "all shipbuilding dies"!
It was just that then at Zvezda there was director Yu. P. Shulgan, who said he would do it by 2008, and actually ensured the implementation of this, despite the fact that the initial estimates of the volume of repairs turned out to be many times less than the real ones.
This is an example from the category that “in order not to do (or postpone), you can find 200,000 reasons”. And you can DO it.
There are no unsolvable problems in our submarine! Yes, there are technological limitations, but we still need to “get there”, and we constantly stumble upon “later”, “we will not conduct such tests”, “we will not eliminate the shortcomings”, “and so it will come down”, “wars will still not will …
Is it possible otherwise? Yes, and here is an example from distant 1981. The former head of the Navy's OPV, Captain 1st Rank R. A. Gusev in the book "This is a torpedo life":
The scandal was huge. R. P. Tikhomirov took the blow as a plenipotentiary representative of the leadership of the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor". Leaving his office after a meeting chaired by the Minister of the Sudprom, he called Leningrad:
- Radiy Vasilievich! They demand you personally, but don't come. Here you can enter the director's office, and leave as the youngest researcher.
- Maybe we should demand that …? I gave the command …
- None of this is needed anymore. We were given one month … ordered to finalize. I said it was unrealistic. Well, they made it clear to me that if this is unrealistic under the current leadership, it will have to be changed.
So, on June 26, 1981, Isakov gathered in his office specialists who, in his opinion, are capable of solving the task set by the minister …
And they did it! Not in a month, of course, in two. Maybe a little more."
When USC President Rakhmanov complains in the media about the suppliers of the 677 project, it looks extremely pitiful and ridiculous, because to use power not only in his capabilities, but also in his duties. The situation with project 677 is really ridiculous and shameful - it is the "mouse fuss" of our managers instead of tough and decisive measures to ensure that the "problematic materiel" is brought in as soon as possible.
Even the notorious problem of VNEU is not a technical one. We have no fundamental technical problems with VNEU, and a long time ago (here you can also recall the Soviet project 613E)! We have problems with their aggregate capacity. Well, that's what you need to proceed from! The same Baltic, with its shallow depths, is very problematic for Varshavyanka submarines …
Few of 8 torpedoes, like on 205 and 206 projects, do the Germans have? There is "Amur-950" with UVP for 10 "Caliber" and 4 torpedo tubes. In the Baltic, it can always fall to the ground and charge there, this is not the Pacific Fleet, where there will be a lot of where to carry it with its currents …
Arctic shooting? This is a question of six months, including the time for the necessary revision of the material part. But someone has to bang their fist on the table! The same goes for anti-torpedoes.
There are good reasons to believe that right now you can install a TPK with anti-torpedoes on the deck of the strategic Ryazan (old project 667BDR) and a diesel submarine of Project 877, go to sea and successfully shoot (from a laptop) with anti-torpedoes with the actual destruction of attacking torpedoes. Northwind and Ash? No, they cannot (without serious revision), although they are obliged (including under government contracts).
Aviation
Again, there are no fundamental technical problems (both with a backlog of promising means of searching for submarines, and with striking means), you just need to take and do …
Long-range anti-ship missiles on submarines are good, but they are even better (and many times) on airplanes. Incl. because submarines do not fly from navy to navy by air, but we, alas, have 4 separate theaters …
Instead, there are regular scams with ekranoplanes, seaplanes, attack helicopters (in the absence of a normal transport and multipurpose one), etc.
The experience of the Indian aircraft carrier contract has shown that we have no technical problems in order to have our aircraft carrier in good working order and combat readiness. Technical … For there are others, namely that an aircraft carrier is, first of all, the highest organization, it is a symphony orchestra, but we are used to playing three thieves …
The thesis about the exceptional high cost of an aircraft carrier is also far-fetched. More precisely, there is such a problem, but due to our lack of experience, and, accordingly, the ability of those who like to master budgetary funds unrestrainedly draw zeros.
We need experience in real, tough and intensive combat training of an aircraft carrier, an air group and the entire operational formation. And already on the basis of it, it is necessary to form the appearance and requirements for the future. Now society (and a number of people in the leadership) asks a completely logical question: what kind of new aircraft carrier can we talk about if the only existing navy could not bring it to a combat-ready state?
Combat ships
Creation of MRK project 22800 "Karakurt" showed that in spite of all the problems in our country, it is really possible to build ships quickly and inexpensively. An amazing fact, the construction period of the head "Karakurt" was even less than the same period for the head MRK project 1234 in the good times of the USSR!
Undoubtedly, it is positive that a series of frigates of Project 22350 was launched, moreover, with the improved anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) "Polyment-Redut".
The problem of gearboxes on them is being solved, but it takes too long. But again, the question is not technical, but purely organizational. If Zvezda-Reducer were transferred to the United Engine Corporation (UEC), then the issue with them would have been resolved a long time ago, in the form of a series.
A fleet for a country, not a country for a fleet
Of course, the construction of the Navy should take into account economic realities and opportunities. At the same time, you need to understand that resources are limited for everyone and always, both for the United States, and for the PRC, and even more so for us.
And in this regard, absolutely inadequate requests for the NSNF, and especially the second NSNF (the Poseidon submarine strategic system) are far beyond common sense and real concern for the country's defense and security.
You need at least:
1. To resolve issues with the near zone (generally "to get the right to go to sea"), to ensure the real combat stability of the NSNF.
2. Create (after leaving the repair "Kuznetsov") a real and effective operational formation of the Navy.
3. Eliminate serious shortcomings in serial projects of ships.
4. To restore strike aviation as part of the naval, to ensure the real effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare.
5. We need real tough combat training (with anti-torpedoes and hydroacoustic countermeasures and torpedo telecontrol, ice firing, adequate targets for air defense, electronic warfare equipment, etc.).
From an article by historian Sergei Makhov about Admiral Lazarev. I highly recommend what this historian wrote, especially the Lazarev cycle.
… the battle between steam-frigates on June 3, 1854 … The British (Close) for some reason designated this battle on June 11, but it also says that “the enemy had organized an excellent look-out service along the coast, and noted and reported every movement of the frigates”, but the battle was really on an equal footing. For - suddenly! - the sailors and captains did not know that the British could not be defeated, that, according to some, "Russia is not allowed to fight at sea in general", they just did what they knew how to do. What difference does it make who to shoot at? An Englishman dies in exactly the same way as a Turk.
We can when we prepare properly. And we can do it in the future.
If we prepare properly.
