In the comments to the article devoted to the possible confrontation between the Iranian Air Force and the US Navy AUG, led by the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, claims were repeatedly made that the author did not take into account the influence that the Iranian fleet could have in his layouts. Well, let's take a look at what the Iranian Navy is.
Submarine forces
Diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM - 3 units.
The basis of the submarine forces, as, in fact, and the Iranian Navy as a whole, is made up of three Russian-built diesel submarines of the 877EKM project. Tareg, Noor and Yunes entered service in 1991, 1992 and 1996. respectively. Interestingly, "Tareg" and "Noor" were founded in 1991.
Let's recall their main performance characteristics. Surface / underwater displacement 2,300 and 3,040 (3,076?) T, respectively. The speed, surface and underwater, is 10 and 17 knots (according to other sources - 19 knots). The cruising range in the submerged position on batteries, at a speed of 3 knots - 400 miles, under the RDP at a speed of 7 knots with an additional supply of fuel - up to 6,000 miles. The working depth of immersion is 240 m, according to other sources, it is still 250 m, the maximum depth is 300 m. The autonomy is 45 days. Armament - 6 bow 533-mm torpedo tubes, 18 torpedoes or 24 mines.
What are these ships capable of? Alas, it is impossible to give an unambiguous answer to this question.
Of course, three technically sound diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM with trained crews and modern torpedoes represent an extremely formidable force in naval combat. The ratio of low noise and detection range by standard SAC gives them the ability to detect and attack the vast majority of warships in the world, while remaining undetected until the very beginning of the attack. Apparently, from this point of view, the boats of this project can only be countered on equal terms by the most successful foreign diesel-electric submarines, and they are only surpassed by the nuclear submarines of the 4th generation.
On the other hand, we can safely say that the Iranian Navy did not receive modern Russian torpedoes. It is also extremely doubtful that Iranian submarines are equipped with any effective simulator traps - as far as the author knows, in the 90s of the 20th century, our fleet simply did not have such, which means it could not sell them to Iran. All this significantly reduces the combat potential of the Iranian 877EKM.
But most importantly, unfortunately, there is no reliable data on the technical condition of the Iranian ships of this project. Diesel-electric submarines were transferred to Iran in the 90s of the last century, their age reaches 23, 27 and 28 years. At the same time, it is unclear to what extent Iran's shipbuilding capacity is able to provide these ships with the necessary types of repairs. According to some reports, out of 3 diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM, as of 2014, only one is operational, but this may not be true. It is only known that in 2012 Iran successfully completed a major overhaul of the Tareg, with about 18,000 different components replaced, including an anechoic coating, some engine components, propellers and sonars. How long it took Iran to carry out this repair, after that the other two diesel-electric submarines received the same repair - alas, it is unknown. It can be assumed that the other two boats really need repair, and if the Iranians had put one more or both in order, they would certainly have trumpeted such a victory for their military-industrial complex in the media. Perhaps "Noor" and "Yunes" fall into the category of "limited suitability", that is, they are probably able to go to sea and try to solve combat missions, but have limitations on the technical condition of the equipment.
However, there is another point of view. In Internet publications, the opinion came across that problems with the technical condition of diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM arose in the early 2000s, and by 2011 they had been successfully overcome. What this confidence is based on is completely unclear.
And, finally, the professionalism of the Iranian submariners raises big questions. Modern submarine warfare is a very complex type of warfare, and a modern submarine is a real “gladiator of the depths”, capable of fighting even superior enemy forces in the most difficult conditions. But - only on condition of high qualifications of its commander and crew, and it is not entirely clear where this qualification could come from the sailors of Iran.
Thus, the assessment of the combat potential of diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM of the Iranian Navy is extremely difficult. Of course, 3 ships of this type, with qualified crews, are capable, with a certain amount of luck, to cause colossal damage to the US Navy, up to the incapacitation (and even scary to say - destruction) of the aircraft carrier "Abraham Lincoln". But there is no certainty that Iran has three such boats, and not one, and that the Iranian sailors have sufficient skill to effectively use such a complex weapon system.
Diesel-electric submarines of the project "Ghadir" (or "AL Ghadir") - 19 + 4 units.
Data on the performance characteristics of these submarines are very sketchy. Their displacement, most likely, can reach 120 tons, surface speed - up to 11 knots, and weapons are 2 * 533-mm torpedo tubes.
As a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult to talk about these diesel-electric submarines as warships. The first glance at them raises the only question: how did Iran come to such a life? And the box opens simply - after the Russian Federation, at the numerous requests of our American friends (well, we are friends, right?), Stopped supplying diesel-electric submarines to Iran, he had to somehow get out, despite the fact that Western technologies were not available to him. According to some reports, Iran, having sensibly assessed its shipbuilding capabilities, had to adopt the experience of such a country "advanced" in naval technologies, such as the DPRK.
Iran conducted trade operations with North Korea, but at some point the latter did not have the money to pay its debts. Then the leadership of the DPRK offered in payment of the debt 4 mini-submarines of the Yogo type, with a total of 90 tons of displacement and 2 * 533-mm torpedo tubes, as well as technologies for their manufacture. Iran agreed. Later, in addition to the 4 received boats, the Iranians built 19 more similar ships of the "Ghadir" project. The latter differed from their North Korean prototypes with a slightly increased displacement, the use of Iranian components, which could lead to significant design changes. However, it is extremely doubtful that all these changes could seriously increase the combat potential of this type of submarine.
Diesel-electric submarines of the "Nahang" project - 2 units.
This is the second type of diesel-electric submarines produced in Iran. The performance characteristics of the ship are as follows - surface / underwater displacement 350/400 tons, the speed is unknown, but it is armed … There is a small mystery here. It is believed that the main task for boats of this type is to ensure the operation of the Iranian special forces, and the torpedo armament is of an auxiliary nature and represents external containers attached to the hull of the boat. Thus, most likely, this type of boats is not intended for naval combat, but for special operations.
Diesel-electric submarines of the "Fateh" project - 1 unit
The third type of Iranian submarines, and the first Iranian submarine that really resembles a warship. Surface / submerged displacement 527/593 t, surface / submerged speed 11 and 14 knots, immersion depth - up to 200-250 m, autonomy - up to 35 days. Armament - 4 * 533-mm torpedo tubes, ammunition - 6 torpedoes or 8 min.
"Fateh" is an attempt by Iran to create a full-fledged combat submarine to solve the entire spectrum of tasks assigned to diesel-electric submarines. On the "Fateh" in the bow of the hull, a SAC of its own design is installed - at the same time, it is noted that, due to the general level of Iranian science, it is unlikely to be much higher than the level of Soviet and American submarines of the 60s. If it exceeds this level at all. And the same should probably be said about the low noise of the boat.
Also in service with the Iranian Navy there is one submarine of the "Al-Sabehat" type, incomprehensible to the author. It is only certain that it also belongs to the class of mini-submarines, and perhaps not “mini”, but “micro” - some sources indicate a displacement of a little more than 10 tons!
As for the armament of Iranian submarines, everything is very interesting here. It is known that Iran has mastered the production of at least two 533-mm torpedoes and the same number of 334-mm torpedoes. As for the 533-mm ammunition, it is possible that the Iranian ammunition is an analogue of the Soviet anti-submarine torpedo TEST-71 or its more "advanced" modification TEST-71ME-NK, which can also be used against surface ships.
Of course, today this is an outdated ammunition removed from service of the Russian Navy, but nevertheless TEST-71 is a remote-controlled torpedo with a cruising range of up to 20 km, and in skilled hands it can still pose a considerable danger.
The second type of 533-mm torpedo can be an analogue of the 53-65KE - a simple, cheap, but quite effective ammunition.
This torpedo does not have remote control, but is guided to the target by means of an acoustic seeker capable of guiding along the wake of the target ship and is designed to destroy surface ships. Its speed reaches 45 knots, the cruising range is 18-22 km.
And it is also very likely that Iran has managed to master the production of an analogue of the domestic "super torpedo" "Shkval". Domestic ammunition of this type moves at a speed of 202.5 knots. (375 km / h) at a distance of 7-13 kilometers, depending on the modification. The Iranians in 2014 reported that their naval ships were armed with a torpedo with a speed of 320 km / h. It is obvious that such technologies are beyond the capabilities of Iran, and, most likely, they simply reproduced the export version of our "super torpedo" "Shkval-E".
Interestingly, a number of sources claim the ability of Iranian submarines to use the C-802 anti-ship missiles. The author cannot confirm or refute this thesis.
Surface ships
Alvand-class frigates - 3 units.
Standard displacement - 1,100 tons, travel speed - 39 knots, armament 2 * 2 S-802 anti-ship missiles, 1 * 3 Sea Cat missiles (10 missiles ammunition), 1 * 114-mm, 1 * 2 35-mm and 3 * 1 20-mm Oerlikon assault rifle, 2 * 1 12, 7-mm machine guns, 305-mm Limbo bomb launcher.
According to the author of the article, the name "frigate" by these ships is completely undeserved, since in fact they are high-speed corvettes, whose fighting qualities are significantly reduced by the absence of a deck helicopter. Which, on the other hand, would be very difficult to "put" on a ship of only 1,000 tons displacement.
Of the weapons, it is worth noting only 4 Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles with a firing range of up to 120 km. As for the air defense, the Sea Cat air defense system proved to be a completely stupid means during the Falklands conflict. Of the 80 missiles fired, one possible hit, and after all, the British were not fighting against the air force of a first-class power, but only against the Argentine aviation with its free-fall bombs. Of course, there is no need to talk about the Oerlikons, perhaps the best air defense system is the 114-mm cannon, which, however, also did not prove itself in any way in the Falklands. Anti-submarine weapons are not enough even by the standards of World War II.
Moudge-type corvettes - 2 units.
Standard displacement - 1,420-1,500 tons, maximum speed - 30 knots. Armament - 4 C-802 anti-ship missiles (more precisely, its Iranian copy), 2 Mehrab SAM launchers (copy of SM-1), 2x3 324-mm torpedo tubes, 76-mm AU Fajr 27 (copy of the Italian Oto Melara 76/62 Compact), 40-mm AU Fath (a copy of the Bofors L / 70) and 2 light single-barreled 23-mm mounts, a helicopter.
Generally speaking, it would be more correct to call the series of these ships the "Jamaran" type, after the name of the head corvette. They are a project based on the "Alvand" class frigates built in England. However, the Iranians very creatively reworked the latter - a noticeable increase in the ship's air defense and anti-aircraft missile defense, and in general, the Moudge-class corvettes are quite balanced and high-quality warships. One of them heads the Caspian Flotilla.
Missile boats of the "Kaman" type - 10 units.
Displacement standard / full - 249/275 tons, maximum speed - 34.5 knots, cruising range - 700 miles at 33 knots. or 2,300 miles at 15 knots. armament 2 * 2 S-802 anti-ship missiles, 1 * 1 76-mm OTO Melara, 1 * 1 40-mm Bofors.
Boats built in France according to the project "La Combattante II" in 1975-78. Originally armed with anti-ship missiles "Harpoon", already in Iran re-armed with C-802.
Missile boats of the "Sina" type - 4 units
Iranian copy of the "Kaman" type, speed increased to 36 knots, on some ships the number of anti-ship missile launchers was reduced to two. All of them serve in the Caspian Sea.
Missile boats of the "Hudong" type - 10 units.
Displacement standard / full 175/205 t, speed 35 knots, armament 4 * 1 anti-ship missiles S-802 2 * 2 30-mm AK-230, 1 * 2 23-mm assault rifle. Purchased by Iran from China.
Air-cushion missile boats VN7 "Wellington" - 4 units
Weight - 60 tons, speed - up to 58 knots, armament - 2 * 2 C-802 anti-ship missiles, purchased in Great Britain.
Small patrol and missile boats are an extremely motley collection of various boats with a displacement of 14 to 98 tons, into which even a number of ekranoplanes and hovercraft have managed to get in. The data on these ships are extremely contradictory and unreliable: it is enough to point out that some sources in all seriousness claim that the patrol ekranoplanes "Bavar-2"
Capable of carrying C-802 anti-ship missiles!
Having tried to put together the disparate data, the author comes to the conclusion that Iran has at least 18 displacement ships carrying anti-ship missiles, and, most likely, all of them are armed with the C-701 Kowsar, which weighs 105 kg, and has a flight range of 15 km. speed - 0, 85M, warhead weight - 29 kg. The anti-ship missile system is equipped with a television seeker.
At the same time, 10 of the above boats also carry 2 324-mm torpedoes. In addition, there are 9 boats armed with MLRS, 48 artillery boats armed with 40-50 mm artillery and machine guns, as well as 10 torpedo boats armed with a pair of 533 mm torpedoes. There are also 92 unarmed patrol ekranoplanes and 3 diving boats armed with 324-mm torpedoes and capable of submerging under water before an attack.
In fact, the data on Iran's mosquito fleet is extremely contradictory. Additional confusion is caused by the fact that, in addition to the Iranian Navy, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) has its own combat boats, as a result of which it is very easy to miss some boats, or vice versa, to count them twice. So, for example, there is information that, in addition to all of the above, the Iranian fleet also has 74 small boats "Peykaap" with a displacement of less than 15 tons and armed with 2 C-701 Kowsar anti-ship missiles and 2 324-mm torpedoes. Not all boats are operational.
In addition to all of the above, the Iranian Navy has four British-built Hengan tank landing ships, three Iran Hormuz-24 landing ships; three small amphibious assault Iran Hormuz-21, two small amphibious assault Foke (MIG-S-3700), as well as six air-cushion landing boats Wellington (VN-7) and Yunis-6 (all highlighted in fleet reserve). Mine-sweeping forces are represented by three minesweepers, as well as auxiliary vessels. The auxiliary fleet consists of 7 tankers, 6 supply vessels, 12 auxiliary vessels and 1 training vessel.
Naval aviation
Includes:
1. 19 aircraft, including: Do-228 - 5 units, P-3F Orion -3 units, Falcon 20E - 3 units, Rockwell Turbo Commander - 4 units, F-27 Friendship - 4 units;
2.30 helicopters: RH-53D Sea Stellen - 3 units, SH-3D Sea King - 10 units, AV-212 - 10 units, AV-205A - 5 units, AV-206V Jet Ranger - 2 units.
Coastal defense
There are two brigades armed with anti-ship missiles N Y-2 "Silkuorm" (CSSC-3 "Siriker"), each of which is armed with four launchers (from 100 to 300 missiles)
and the same number of brigades armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles (total from 60 to 100 missiles).
So, we have listed the payroll of the Iranian Navy. But what are they really capable of?
The tasks that Iran poses to its navy
Like any self-respecting state, Iran has a military doctrine, according to which the Navy is obliged to solve the following tasks:
1. Conquest of dominance in the waters of the Persian and Oman Gulfs and the Caspian Sea by destroying enemy ships and aircraft and disrupting his communications;
2. Defense of the territorial waters and the sea coast of Iran, including the important administrative and political centers of the south of the country, economic regions, oil fields, naval bases, ports and islands;
3. Support for land and air forces in coastal areas;
4. Conducting amphibious assault operations and combating enemy amphibious assault forces;
5. Conducting continuous reconnaissance at sea.
Thus, we see that Iran, even conceptually, does not aim at domination in the Arabian Sea, here all its "ambitions" are limited only to the defense of the coast. But Iran wants to dominate the Persian and Oman Gulfs. How realistic is this?
The experience of the war with Iraq 1980-1988. and the famous "tanker war" showed that in the fight against the Arab countries the main emphasis will be placed not on "fleet against fleet" operations, but on the interruption of the enemy's transport communications. For all 8 years of confrontation, the Iranian Navy lost only 5 of its 132 ships and boats, Iraq - 16 out of 94. But as a result of the fight against shipping, the movement of tankers in the Persian Gulf was practically paralyzed for some time.
On the whole, perhaps we can say that it was the experience of the "tanker war" that determined the development strategy of the Iranian Navy. Without going deep into the analysis of the war years, we note that anti-ship missiles showed limited effectiveness - the tankers were too large to be sunk by one or more relatively light anti-ship missiles. The explosion on mines also did not always lead to the death of a large tanker, but still the underwater weapons turned out to be more formidable. In addition, the mine threat turned out to be more significant than the possible attacks of missile or artillery boats - when Iran began mine laying, before the arrival of the mine-sweeping forces, navigation was practically paralyzed.
As a result, Iran has paid a lot of attention to torpedo weapons. After all, what, in essence, are the same submarines of the "Ghadir" type? Even submarines of the "Baby" type during World War II even had twice, or almost twice, the displacement, and in fact they proved to be very limited combat-ready ships. Apparently, the main means of observation for "Ghadir" is the periscope, although it is possible to assume the presence of some kind of primitive sonar system, hardly at the level of submarines of the same World War II. In other words, "Ghadir" is not a means of naval combat, but, in fact, a mobile mine bank, whose task is to reach one of the transport corridors of the Persian or Oman Gulfs and wait for the appearance of tankers there. Once discovered, dive in and launch a torpedo attack.
As for the Iranian surface forces, they also have a pronounced "mosquito" character: excluding from the calculation, the ships of the Caspian Flotilla of the Iranian Navy have 4 corvettes (three of which are mistakenly named frigates) and 20 torpedo boats, 10 of which are over 40 years, and another 10 by design are good old Soviet RCA of project 205. This, in general, is enough to counter the fleet of any Arab state, especially taking into account the support of the numerous aviation of Iran.
All other "trifles" with a displacement of up to 100 tons is also a pronounced "anti-tanker" agent, of little use in a naval battle. Interesting is the massive revival in the Iranian Navy of such a long-forgotten class of ships, which is the torpedo boat. Such boats cannot in any way withstand modern warships, but are very useful in the destruction of civilian shipping. And the same applies to coastal missile systems - the maximum range of the C-802 of 120 km makes them a very formidable weapon of preventing navigation - let's not forget that the Strait of Hormuz in its narrowest part has only 54 km and can be shot through by Iranian ground complexes. Also, such anti-ship missiles are very useful in repelling attacks by enemy light forces on naval bases and other important facilities on the Iranian coast. But with all this, their range is completely insufficient to counter modern warships that want, for example, to bombard Iranian territory with long-range cruise missiles.
Could the Iranian Navy pose a threat to the American AUG?
This question should be answered unequivocally - Yes they can. But there are nuances here.
The degree of danger that the Iranian fleet can create for the AUG directly depends on how intelligently the American admiral will act. If, even before the outbreak of hostilities, he leads his ships deep into the Oman, or, even worse, the Persian Gulf, then, taking advantage of the absence of hostilities, the Iranian fleet will be able to control the movement of the AUG, deploy its own, albeit weak and technically imperfect, but numerous forces, place minefields and "Ghadir" on the possible routes of the American ships. And to deliver a concentrated strike at the very beginning of hostilities, with all the forces of the fleet and the navy - such a strike, perhaps, will, if successful, crush not only the AUG, but also the AUS, that is, a combination of two AUG.
But if the American admiral does not climb into the mousetrap of the bays, but starts hostilities while in the Arabian Sea, then only Project 877EKM submarines and, possibly, one Fateh diesel-electric submarine will be able to resist his ships there, although the author would not recommend anyone to overestimate the capabilities of the latter. …
So, in fact, the threat that our 3 export Halibut can create for AUG is very great. Recall that in the same Falklands conflict, the British squadron, consisting, in fact, of anti-submarine ships, could not prevent the actions of one single SSL of Argentina, "San Luis" and the last at least twice went to attack British ships - and after the first it was discovered and pursued by frigates and helicopters, but they did not achieve anything, and in the second case they did not even discover the fact of the attack.
But you need to understand that the degree of this threat is directly proportional to the technical state of the Iranian diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM and the quality of training of its crews. Alas, there are well-grounded doubts in both.
At the same time, if the Americans manage to neutralize the threat of diesel-electric submarines, then further assault on the bays for their carrier forces will not be difficult. Both the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf are not deep-water, and all of Iran's mini-submarines are easily detected using the equipment available on US Navy minesweeping helicopters - and then destroyed. And the same applies to the mosquito fleet - the Americans will have no difficulty in tracking it at their bases and on combat patrols, if they do not experience time pressure. In other words, if the Americans do not rush headlong into the Persian Gulf, but begin a systematic siege and destruction of the Iranian Navy, then in a few days they will reduce it to a negligible value. And there it will already be possible to enter the bays.
You also need to understand that the Iranian naval aviation, in fact, is only patrol and anti-submarine, neither fighters, nor strike aircraft are listed in it. And the material part and the level of training of the Air Force fighter pilots will not allow the Iranians to resist the American pilots in the air. When the author studied the capabilities of the Iranian Air Force, he assigned the Iranian fighters the role of "sacrificial pawn". It cannot resist carrier-based aircraft, but it creates a threat that cannot be ignored, and will distract the US Navy fighters, thus paving the way for Iranian missile-carrying aircraft. Accordingly, there is no point in hoping that the Iranian Air Force will be able to cover its "mosquito" fleet from air strikes, even if they focus on solving this problem. And the Iranian Air Force will have many other tasks in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.
