We can talk for a long time about what the fleet should do, but another question is no less important - where the fleet will do it. If you look at the fleet as an instrument of foreign policy, then it should do what is ordered, wherever. It is necessary to provide convoys from the Baltic to Venezuela - it provides, it is necessary to ensure the blockade of the coast of Libya - it provides.
In the end, these local tasks also boil down to the fact that it is necessary first to establish dominance at sea in a given area for the required time, and then use it to solve the following tasks - some landing somewhere, for example. But such "expeditionary" actions will be limited in scope. It is easy to imagine a combat mission off the Libyan coast, which can be accomplished by an aircraft carrier (the same Kuznetsov, for example), a dozen frigates and a pair of submarines. But it is rather difficult to imagine there and against the same enemy a task that would require assembling four missile cruisers, BODs and heels of SSGNs in the same place - the Libyans do not have such forces there, and they will have to fight against NATO in a completely different way and deploy forces completely according to -other.
Therefore, when discussing the issues of expeditionary actions, it is worth starting from the fact that some forces, both water and submarine, the fleet should be able to deploy anywhere, and should be able to protect them from threats such as "breakthrough of a single diesel-electric submarine at a distance torpedo salvo ". Or from air raids, the strength of which was shown by the Argentines in the Falklands. As a last resort, you will have to destroy a few not the most powerful ships and old diesel submarines.
This is technically feasible even now and does not require a special discussion on the theoretical basis. Although you have to work.
Far more important are the fundamental questions - where are those water areas, the need to ensure dominance in which does not depend on the current foreign policy? In what zones of the World Ocean should the Russian Navy be ready to seize supremacy at sea and hold it for as long as desired, in any policy, in any relations with certain countries? There are answers, and they will be given.
Step 1. Areas of SSBN combat services
As stated in the article “We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence ", in order to prevent a sudden nuclear strike on the Russian Federation, the combat stability of the NSNF must be ensured - first in the form of the establishment by the Navy of dominance in the areas through which the SSBN is deployed for combat services, in which the combat services themselves pass, and in which there are protected areas of combat operations. In the notorious "bastions". Subsequently, after the possibility of deploying NSNF in the ocean is provided, the Navy will be required to protect some areas on the routes of SSBN deployment and to "intercept" those anti-submarine forces with which the enemy will try to disrupt the combat services of the NSNF.
In the first case, we will talk about absolute domination - no anti-submarine forces (PLC) of the enemy should be able to operate in the "Bastions".
In the second case, everything will be somewhat more complicated, and we will talk about actions in areas where the enemy, in theory, will be able to challenge supremacy at sea, but there the Navy's task will be more likely to knock the enemy's PLS off the track and let the boat "get lost", and do not keep the specified area "locked". Such operations will be more raids than regular efforts to establish naval dominance. But in the "bastions" - a completely different matter. The enemy has already trodden a path there, studied them as a home, and, given the fact that these areas have a limited area, they will have to defend themselves, defend themselves, and completely control everything.
We are looking at the map of "bastions" from the article on nuclear deterrence.
This is the first target for the fleet. In these zones, it is necessary to ensure supremacy at sea, and absolute, that is, such when the deployment of enemy forces in these areas against the will of the Russian Federation, and when the latter is ready to use force, will be impossible in principle.
Now there is no such thing.
What enemy forces are threatening the Navy in these areas? First of all, these are submarines. And it is anti-submarine defense that should become the basis for actions to establish and maintain dominance at sea in these areas. That is, it is fundamentally to have, firstly, anti-submarine ships, not necessarily very large and powerful, but necessarily numerous, secondly, their multipurpose submarines capable of resisting foreign ones, thirdly, anti-submarine aviation, not the same as now, but full-fledged, but fourth fighter aircraft, capable of protecting anti-submarine aircraft from enemy fighter-interceptors (from aircraft carriers deployed at a distance from the "bastions", for example, or bases in neighboring states) and "close the sky" for the enemy base patrol aircraft (BPA).
What if the enemy gathers a "fist" of surface ships and tries to neutralize the forces of the Navy? It must be met by our naval base strike aircraft, capable of hitting naval targets, and specially trained and equipped for this, as well as submarines operating from areas closed to the enemy UUV. This is the minimum to which we must begin to go right now. We have everything for this.
A separate topic is mine countermeasures, which in those specific conditions will be needed, including very far from their bases.
Having achieved the ability to establish supremacy at sea in these limited areas, it will be necessary, relying on the revived forces of the Navy, to take the next step - to ensure critical sea communications for the connectivity of the territory of Russia, on which we depend critically from this thought).
Step 2. Protecting our communications
At the moment, about 2.2 million people live in the territories of Russia, which on a significant scale can only be supplied by sea and are included in the national and global economy through sea communications. This is much more than in Iceland, for example. In these regions, there are such facilities as Norilsk Nickel, a gas liquefaction plant in Sabetta, a nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk, and ice-free ports that are rare for Russia.
Among the territories tied to the rest of Russia only through sea communications is the island of Sakhalin, the Kuril ridge, Kamchatka, Chukotka. Of the significant cities, one can recall, for example, Kaliningrad, Norilsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan. The Northern Sea Route and numerous settlements on Siberian rivers, and the coast of the Arctic Ocean are also there. There is also a very large share of domestic GDP, access to the Pacific Ocean, the shelf and fish of the Sea of Okhotsk, the economic importance and state of Vladivostok, the involvement of the Russian Federation in the Asia-Pacific region, where the "center" of the world historical process is transferred in this century, and much more.
These communications are critically important for the existence of the Russian Federation in its current form and for the preservation of its territorial integrity. Thus, the need to dominate them is non-negotiable.
Map.
It is easy to see that the “bastions” are located exactly on these lines of communication, and, accordingly, the tasks of domination on the lines of communication and in the “bastions” partly overlap. It is logical that by ensuring dominance in the "bastions", one can use the created forces and accumulated experience for further expansion. Thus, in the second phase of the revival of the Navy as an effective force, it must be able to ensure dominance in the following areas:
North - the entire NSR up to the Bering Strait plus the "bastion", through the area of which the connection between mainland Russia and our islands in the Arctic Ocean is provided.
East - the entire coastal zone along the Pacific coast, starting from the Bering Strait, and ending with Primorye, and the water area through which communications pass through all these lands. Including the entire Sea of Okhotsk.
Baltic - line of the Gulf of Finland - Kaliningrad region. Assurance of domination in the Gulf of Finland and the possibility of a complete blockade of the former Soviet Baltic republics must be guaranteed.
The Black Sea is the entire coastal zone from Abkhazia to Crimea, including the Sea of Azov and communications in it, especially the Novorossiysk line - the ports of Crimea.
It is worth stipulating right away that such an expansion of the zone of domination or, in peacetime, control, does not mean at all that it will be necessary to proportionally increase the number of the Navy's combat strength. For example, the areas of the Northern Sea Route east of the northern "bastion" may well be monitored remotely, with the help of underwater lighting systems, basic anti-submarine aircraft, literally one or two submarines, a couple of patrol icebreakers, the same border 97P. Doubling the area to be monitored, in this case, does not even come close to doubling the forces of the fleet, which are needed for this.
Although an increase in the number of ships compared to the first step, of course, will be necessary, but not at all gigantic. A certain number of corvettes, an extra regiment or two anti-submarine aircraft, more intense operation of existing submarines, a readiness to take aircraft from other theaters to airfields - something like this will look like an increase in the naval power of the Russian Federation on our communications. But what will have to be increased is the means of reconnaissance, both acoustic and satellite. But without this, in any case, we cannot.
Having occupied, in this way, those communications, control over which is vital for us, it is necessary to take the next step - to create an analogue of the ground "pre-field", a zone in which, if it comes to military operations, we will have to meet any enemy and in which we will have to fight him in order to prevent him from entering our communications.
Step 3. Expansion of the zone of domination and direction of expansion
If "Bastions" and communications should ideally be the zone of our absolute domination at sea, then here at least it will be necessary to at least come to the contested, when the enemy may sometimes be there for a short time - but at a high risk to himself. And, subsequently, of course, it is necessary to strive for the possibility of establishing absolute domination of the sea in these zones.
We look at the map.
As you can see, almost everywhere we are talking about domination at sea in the waters immediately adjacent to the areas in which our communications pass. The exception is the Mediterranean Sea. The reason is simple - it is from there that cruise missiles from ships and submarines can strike at our territory, and this means that the ideal of the enemy should be met there. In addition, one of our main historical enemies, Great Britain, has a vulnerable point there that they cannot help but defend - Gibraltar. This can be very important in the framework of the previously mentioned scheme of raider actions - the mere fact of the presence of Russian forces in the region will fetter a part of the British Navy forces near Gibraltar, even without conducting hostilities - which means that these forces will not appear, for example, in the Barents Sea …
At first glance, the idea of keeping a naval compound in the Mediterranean Sea seems "disastrous" - the Mediterranean OPESK of the Cold War times would be doomed, what can we say about our time? But the point is, political circumstances are changing. First, the first and successful steps have been taken to sever Turkey from NATO. If everything goes as it is, then one day the Black Sea will be a safe rear zone, and the transit of ships through the Black Sea straits will be ensured even during a hypothetical war. And secondly, today behind the back of the Navy there is a full-fledged naval base in Syria, backed up by a base of the Aerospace Forces - we did not have such trump cards during the Cold War.
The countries of Western Europe are critically dependent on gas supplies from Russia, and will not support the United States by force. And even outside the connection with the hypothetical "big war", the military presence of the Navy is now a necessary factor in politics in the region. Whether we like it or not, in Syria Russia crossed the Rubicon, and now we cannot leave from anywhere - we can only come somewhere. A permanent connection in the Mediterranean is thus a must from every point of view and in every political situation.
In the future, as the capabilities grow (let's hope for the best), the Navy will have to make continuous efforts to expand the zones where dominance at sea can be established, or at least where we can prevent the enemy from establishing such. In this case, the desired boundary is the launch line for Tomahawk cruise missiles across our territory. It is not a fact that it will ever be possible to do it in full (rather not even than yes), but firstly, it may turn out incompletely, and secondly, at least we will not allow the enemy to act calmly, which itself very good in itself.
It is worth noting that in some places the ground forces will have to work, for example, in case of war - in eastern Norway. As stated in the article “We are building a fleet. Attacks of the weak, loss of the strong The army can also help the navy in some ways. In any case, not only the navy can cover the army flank, but the army can also provide the “friendly shore” for the navy.
Directions for further "expansion of opportunities" are shown on the map.
Fundamental question
The fundamental issue in all this is the need for ships in the ocean zone. Oddly enough, but such a "defensive" nature of naval planning does not exclude the conduct of military operations in the oceanic zone. First and foremost, a maneuver between the theater of operations is not possible otherwise than through the oceanic zone, respectively, it is necessary either to fundamentally abandon the transfer of reserves from the fleet to the fleet, or still have a part of the ships capable of operating in the oceanic zone. And these should be strong ships, even if there may not be very many of them.
Likewise, it is impossible to imagine any limited operation off the coast of Venezuela or Cuba without such ships.
In the event of a major war, without such ships, active offensive actions are difficult. And with a blind defense against the strongest opponent, the weak side always loses.
Thus, in general, the defensive and not oriented toward expeditionary wars, the nature of naval development does not exclude the need to have combat ships of the ocean zone, moreover, they are still urgently needed, both for local tasks somewhere far away, and for defense. countries on their shores.
Sequential actions "from simple to complex" to gain the ability to establish supremacy at sea in these areas will become the process during which the fleet will regain the required combat capability and meaningfulness of its military programs - from shipbuilding to capital construction. It is this process that will be the restoration of Russia's naval power in its rational form.
