When we say that the main way in which the fleet accomplishes its tasks is to establish dominance at sea in designated areas, we must always keep in mind a few exceptions.
At first glance, amphibious operations are the obvious exception. They are a logical continuation of the establishment of dominance at sea, and occasionally can be carried out even before reaching such (for example, in Narvik in 1940). An amphibious operation can serve the cause of establishing dominance at sea, for example, if the army can destroy the enemy fleet in the base with a strike from land. But such an exception does not affect the theory of war at sea. In the end, for a full-fledged large-scale amphibious operation, supremacy at sea is necessary, and amphibious operations themselves are carried out after achieving this very supremacy, "according to Corbett" - as one of the ways to use this supremacy. And how many wars are waged on the seas, so many they end with the landing of troops on the coast - from antiquity, if not earlier. Landing operations have never given a new dimension to war at sea in the foreseeable past.
Over the centuries, the fleet has had only one fundamentally new group of tasks arising from its fundamentally new properties. Problems that require at least a mention in theoretical constructions. Tasks, the emergence of which finally proved that, in principle, the emergence of a new type of weapon can bring to life the emergence of a "new dimension" in strategy, its new section, if you like. We are talking about the appearance in service of the fleets of submarines armed with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and the strategic consequences of this.
Possibility of starting a nuclear war and its prerequisites
“Hotheads” among the patriotic community, as a rule, do not remember that, according to the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the prevention of nuclear war is one of the main tasks of the armed forces. There is no talk at all about making the "end of the world by hand" in response to any attack or in the course of a limited war.
The task of preventing a nuclear war is carried out by nuclear deterrence of a potential adversary, that is, by creating conditions when (at least theoretically), in the event of a sudden nuclear strike on Russia, retaliation against the enemy will be inevitable and either retaliatory-oncoming will be inflicted on its territory (our missiles were launched after that how the enemy's missiles were launched, but before they reached the target), or a retaliatory strike (our missiles launched after the enemy's missiles struck on the territory of the Russian Federation).
Such measures have proven their effectiveness over a long historical period. Today, experts are sounding the alarm - the number of deployed nuclear charges in Russia is significantly less than it was in the Soviet period, the missile attack warning system has actually been reduced to a radar (work is underway to restore the satellite component of the early warning system, but so far there are only three satellites in space), which makes the flight the time of enemy missiles from the moment they were detected by the radar, and until the strike on the territory of the Russian Federation, is approximately equal, and for some purposes - less than the time of transmitting the command to launch missiles through the combat control networks.
So far, we are still more or less reliably protected, but further reduction of the nuclear arsenal and improvement of the enemy's nuclear attack means will put this security into question. The enemy creates a missile defense system, deploys its elements on surface ships in order to concentrate missile defense systems in specified areas near the attacked country, learns to shoot down satellites from the ground and surface ships, and, which in our country few people think about among non-professionals - is actively improving the means of nuclear attack.
In 1997, the United States began the development of new systems for detonating the detonators of the nuclear charge of the warhead of the W76 ballistic missile, which in various modifications was installed on the Poseidon and Trident SLBMs. In 2004, the work moved to the stage of production of pre-series batches, and in 2008, the supply of devices to the US Navy began. A little later, the British Navy began to receive the same devices for their missiles.
What is the essence of the innovation?
First, let's see how the multiple warheads of a “conventional” SLBM “fit” onto the target.
As you can see, when trying to attack a point target (for example, a silo launcher of ICBMs), 3-5 warheads out of 10 are undermined near it. At the same time, do not forget about the circular probable deviation, and the fact that it can lead to such a spread of falling on the target warheads, in which the point target will not be hit at all. For this reason, SLBMs have always been viewed as a means of attacking dispersed ground targets such as cities. This made the missiles of submarines suitable only for a retaliatory strike (in such exotic and somewhat ridiculous situations as alert duty at the pier - also for retaliatory-oncoming ones, if the enemy did not destroy the submarines proactively, with his non-strategic weapons, at the time of the launch of his missiles).
New detonator initiation devices change the way warheads are detonated.
Now all combat units are detonated in the immediate vicinity of the target, and the CWO affects the probability of its destruction much less.
According to the US Navy's military leaders, the introduction of new detonation systems has improved the accuracy of the missiles so that they can now be used to strike small targets such as silo launchers.
The British Navy received the same opportunities.
All this is not very good for us, and here's why.
There are two main scenarios for a massive nuclear strike with strategic nuclear weapons - counterforce and countervalue.
Counterforce strike is applied to the enemy's strategic weapons and the infrastructure supporting their use - missile launchers, command centers, communications centers, leaders who are able to make a decision to strike (a “decapitation” strike is a kind of counterforce). A successful counterforce strike reduces the enemy's ability to retaliate to at least bearable in scale. Ideally - to zero.
Countervalue blow presupposes the destruction of defended targets - population, cities, industry, infrastructure facilities that are not of military importance, but have economic and social significance. Counter-value strike is an operation to genocide the enemy's population.
One of the problems of nuclear war is that the missiles carrying nuclear warheads cannot be quickly retargeted. Changing the aiming of a ballistic missile, especially a silo missile of a non-new model, is a technically difficult and time-consuming operation. The defending side is required to proceed from the fact that it will be able to counterattack the targets at which the missiles were initially aimed.
The only means of conducting a nuclear war that can, in theory, unlimitedly retarget from one target to another are bombers, and, in the absence of the technical ability to reload flight missions in flight into cruise missiles placed on board, these will only be bombers with bombs. This led to the active preparation of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the US Air Force for the use of free-fall nuclear bombs after the first wave of missile strikes.
The missiles will fly wherever they were aimed before the war.
And here the side that is defending is faced with a dilemma - where to aim its missiles. Should they be aimed at enemy military targets in advance as part of a counterforce strike? Or is it immediately on his "values" within the counter-value?
Elementary logic says that the maximum orientation towards a counterforce strike is meaningless for the defending side. After all, an enemy who understands the vulnerability of his ground-based weapons or uses them (ICBMs) or at least disperses them (bombers). The USAF conducts exercises on the rapid dispersal of bombers by the US Air Force on a regular basis, in contrast to the Russian Aerospace Forces. As well as practicing the use of free-falling nuclear bombs in the conditions of a partially surviving enemy air defense.
In addition, and this is the most important thing, the defending side does not know where the detected launched missiles of the attacking side are directed. What if it's an immediate counter-value blow? It is completely impossible to exclude such a blow, if only because such a strike is technically feasible. There is also the question of the proportionality of retaliation - the losses inflicted on the enemy's population in a retaliatory or retaliatory strike cannot be an order of magnitude less than their losses. And it is desirable not to be smaller at times. And ideally, taking into account the unequal population of the belligerents, inflict comparable demographic damage on the enemy, as a percentage.
This means that for a side that does not consider the possibility of a first nuclear strike, at least a significant part of its forces should be aimed at a counter-value strike. This means that giving maximum accuracy to all carriers of warheads is a senseless waste of money.
In contrast, for the attacking side, the accuracy of hitting targets is fundamental. It is critical for her to minimize her losses. At the same time, she does not have the opportunity to evacuate the population from dangerous places in advance, or to disperse material values - the opposite side, having discovered this, can simply strike first, regardless of the consequences, and, by and large, will be right from any point of view. Thus, it is critical for the attacking side to destroy the maximum number of forces capable of inflicting damage on it - silo launchers, submarines, bombers, warehouses with nuclear ammunition ready for use (bombs, shells). Otherwise, the attack becomes too expensive, and this cost makes a military victory meaningless in principle.
To go unpunished, the attacker must use every carrier of nuclear warheads. Modernization of SLBM warheads includes American SSBNs in the arsenal of means for the first counterforce strike, moreover, this upgrade simply does not make sense in any other case. But it is being carried out. This means that the first counterforce strike is considered by the US authorities as one of the options for action in the near future, and it is for it that the US is preparing. Otherwise, we must admit that the United States is deliberately throwing money down the drain.
It is worth noting that this program started immediately after Boris Yeltsin's "victory" in the presidential elections in the Russian Federation in 1996 - when all observers believed that Russia was over and it would not be restored. China as a problem for the United States did not exist then. And the old half-dead enemy, which would be nice to finish off, but who has nuclear weapons, was. The situation in those years was very favorable to the final solution of the "Russian question", especially since Russia willingly went to the reduction of nuclear weapons, reducing the number of targets to defeat.
The offensive arms reduction treaties between Russia and the United States and the mutual verification mechanism envisaged in them have led to the fact that the parties have the exact coordinates of each silo launcher with each other, and can periodically check them right on the mine covers. Also, the positional areas of the PGRK - mobile ground missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces of the RF Armed Forces - have become limited. Given the defeat of the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, the communications and control centers of the Strategic Missile Forces and the means of communication with the submarines of the Russian Navy, the United States today in theory can count on the fact that it will be able to destroy all silos and most of the PGRK in the first attack. The massacre of Russian SSBNs - missile-carrying submarines, will fall on the shoulders of the American submarine, and the latter has been fulfilling this task for many years, and, moreover, successfully and on a real enemy - on our submarines on combat patrol routes.
At the same time, the neutralization of the combat control networks will not allow the surviving PGRK to receive the launch command in a timely manner. This will give the United States the opportunity to try to destroy the PGRKs that were not destroyed by the missile attack. For this, B-2 bombers that were previously lifted into the air can be used. In other conditions, their stealth would not have helped them avoid defeat by Russian air defense and fighter aircraft, but after a massive nuclear strike missed, the ability of air defense and aviation to shoot down all American aircraft will be in question. Fundamental to the success of such a plan, if any, is the most powerful blow to the Russian strategic nuclear forces, which they cannot survive. The inclusion of SSBNs in the forces capable of delivering such a strike makes it absolutely real.
This, however, is not all.
PGRK that left the position area, or disguised in it, still need to be detected. At the moment, the Americans are working on ways to detect mobile missile systems. In addition to Russia, China and the DPRK have such complexes, and this makes the search for ways to detect them very popular. True to themselves, Americans are looking for a cheap, "budgetary" solution to the problem. At the moment, their task is to "teach" military computers to identify anomalies in satellite photos, which may indicate the presence of a camouflaged launcher on the ground. Most likely, they will achieve their goal sooner or later.
So, in the early nineties, they managed to find a way to identify railway missile systems on alert. One of the signs of such a complex was the discrepancy between the number of locomotives in a railway train and its length - if a certain train, when viewed from space, "shone" with locomotives like a freight train, but was like a passenger train in length, then it should have been examined visually in the photo. If by the composition of the cars it became clear that this was a complex (that is, along with several passenger and freight cars, there are also refrigerators with a short train length as a whole and two or more powerful locomotives), then the place where it is located became an object for a nuclear attack … Then, however, they did not have enough computing power to cover everything. Now there are enough of them, but the disguised PGRK is a more difficult target. Bye.
Special mention should be made of the development of the MTR of the US Armed Forces of nuclear sabotage. Despite the closed nature of the information on this topic, it is known that theoretical research on the combat use of "nuclear knapsacks" in the United States does not stop. The satchels themselves, however, have been removed from service and disposed of, which, however, is inaccurate in the first place, and can be quickly corrected in the second place. The Americans announced the withdrawal from service of those models that they had previously, nothing more. There is nothing in open sources about work on modern ammunition of this type, but there are a number of episodes with the military who let loose, from which it follows that such possibilities are being discussed.
There is one more argument in favor of the fact that knapsack charges are not a thing of the past completely. In the wake of post-Soviet "detente", the US Congress banned the creation of nuclear weapons with a yield of less than 5 kilotons. This immediately made it impossible to develop "nuclear knapsacks". However, in 2004 this ban was lifted by Congress. Some military experts are even considering the possibility of nuclear sabotage against the leaders of the state, who can decide on a retaliatory strike, and on the destruction of communication centers and command posts, which could slow down the passage of the command to launch missiles in the Strategic Missile Forces unit. Also, their objects can be an early warning radar, naval bases of the SSBN. It must be admitted that the deployment and detonation of such charges can really "decapitate" Russia and disorganize the command and control networks for a time that will be enough for ICBMs and submarines. Such a threat cannot be swept aside.
And finally, the ongoing work on the creation of an American missile defense system. For a long time, American officials have argued that missile defense work is not directed against Russia. After 2014, everything changed, and now no one really hides against which country, ultimately, the American missile defense is being created. And again the question arises - in what case would such a system make sense? After all, a priori no missile defense system will repel a massive first or retaliatory strike from Russia.
And if it is a weak retaliatory strike with the few surviving missiles? Then it turns out that the missile defense system works quite well, and all investments in it are not in vain and justified.
Moreover, for some strange reason, the United States' technical ability to equip some anti-missile missiles with a nuclear warhead is being ignored, which will increase their effectiveness by an order of magnitude. In addition, some missile defense components themselves can be quickly converted into a strike weapon
All of the above forces us to consider the nuclear aggression on the part of the United States as quite real. At least, preparation for such an aggression is the only consistent explanation of why the Americans need such a modernization of the W76-1 warhead fuses and, at the same time, what they are counting on in the case of missile defense, which, as it turns out, is still not against Iran.
There is another consideration related to the Royal Navy of Great Britain and their Trident missiles.
The combat patrol areas of the British SSBNs are much closer to the territory of the Russian Federation than the American patrol areas. They are close enough to carry out a salvo of their SLBMs along the so-called "flat" trajectory - an arc with a low apogee, when the missile rises to a much lower altitude than during an energetically favorable flight to the maximum range.
This method of shooting has a minus - the range decreases and decreases very much. But there is also a plus - at a short flight distance, the rocket spends significantly less time to cover the distance. The flight time is reduced, and by a significant amount in comparison with the "normal", that is, an energetically advantageous flight over the same distance. Time reduction can be up to 30%. And given that the boats themselves are closer to the target, that is, the distance to it is relatively small, the flight time turns out to be even less, and there are risks that with this method of launching a blow to Russia will be delivered before it is possible to give the command to counter-counter. It is not for nothing that there is an opinion that in the "Americans-British" link, the latter are responsible for the first strike.
The dominant morality in American society is also an important factor. At first glance, the typical American is a calm, even good-natured and friendly person. As a rule, he does not want his country to get involved in all sorts of wars. Reality is tough and cynical
The first problem for non-Americans is the origins of American culture. The American nation began to form in the course of the gigantic military expansion of the colonists throughout the North American continent, which was accompanied by a mass of violent clashes and wars, the massive expulsion of Native Americans from their land, and isolated acts of genocide. It was in the course of these events that the American archetype, partly culture and epic, was formed.
This birth trauma led to the fact that the average American does not feel internal protest when his society conducts military seizures and massacres somewhere, moreover, sometimes he cannot perceive them other than an act of heroism, because these are his roots, origins. This phenomenon is still waiting for detailed researchers, while it is worth recommending the work of the American sociologist and concurrently executive director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology John Tyrman, "Death of Others: the Fate of Civilians in America's Wars" (The Deaths of Others. The Fate of Civilians in America's Wars. John Tirman … You will need knowledge of English and some dollars), or his article Why We Ignore Civilians Killed in American Wars, where this issue is considered in more detail and with examples.
The second problem is the so-called Ideology of American Exceptionalism. Very controversial for non-Americans and indisputable for the mass of Americans, the doctrine, upon closer examination, is a completely banal and even boring subspecies of fascism. But the idea of the superiority of Americans over non-Americans is driving this doctrine firmly into American heads. Alas, there are followers of this quasi-religious doctrine in our country, and this is the reason for many of the problems of the Russian Federation.
The most striking example of how these features of the American mentality are manifested in wars is the Second World War. We used to treat the Americans positively in that war, because they were our allies, but in fact their methods of war were much more brutal than those of the Japanese and not much softer than those of Nazi Germany. Just one example - at the end of the war, in 1945, the United States began operations to destroy Japanese cities, which were a banal burning of thousands of residential areas in dozens of cities along with the population. Several hundred aircraft appeared over the city and covered densely populated areas with a carpet of incendiary bombs. There were many such episodes, and, as usual, the Americans were not puzzled even by calculating the enemy's losses, defining them today within the framework of 240-900 thousand people, almost all of them - civilians.
Studies of the American mentality should be left outside the scope of this article, we will only indicate the conclusion - the idea that their government will attack a country and kill millions of innocent people there does not cause any internal protest among a significant proportion of US residents … They don't care at best. This fully applies to a hypothetical nuclear war.
But what worries US citizens is their own losses. All American protests against the war in Iraq revolve around the dead US soldiers. The fact that they, generally speaking, are aggressors and attacked a country that did not threaten the United States, albeit with an ugly regime in power, is simply not remembered by anyone. The fact that Iraq has turned into a large cemetery is also generally of no interest. Likewise Libya.
It cannot be assumed that the Americans will not endure military losses - this is not so, they can endure a lot, no matter how much more we are. The question is that they categorically do not want to do this, and today it is the potential losses that are an effective deterrent factor for American aggression. But without this deterrent, they, in principle, are capable of almost everything that, for example, they remember well in the vicinity of the Vietnamese village of Song Mi.
And it cannot be denied that a certain proportion of US citizens, mainly from the upper strata of American society (but not only), are possessed by truly pathological hatred towards the Russian Federation, its culture, population, history, and, in general, is unhappy with the very fact of our existence.
This resonates with the work of the Western propaganda machine, which has achieved significant success in anti-Russian propaganda, including the "dehumanization" of the Russian population in the eyes of many ordinary people in Western countries.
Thus, the degree of danger from the United States for our country is constantly growing, and the danger in its extreme embodiment is in the form of the threat of a sudden destructive nuclear strike.
Does the US have a rational reason to do this to us, given the opportunity to do it with impunity or near-impunity? There is.
At present, the main problem that preoccupies American strategists is the question of America's subordination of China. It is China that Americans see as their main rival in this century. But, the question arises - why is China in the power to throw any challenge to the United States? After all, China is extremely dependent on the import of raw materials and resources, and in terms of its military power it is not even close to the United States. The Americans can arrange a blockade of China in any convenient way - along the so-called "first and second chain of islands", at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean, and even in the Persian Gulf. And this "Chinese miracle" may well end.
Naturally, this is a kind of extreme, extreme option, the United States will not just go for it, but they have such an opportunity.
But China has a back-up country behind its back. A country that will simply provide China with its land-based communications, with which the US cannot do anything outside of a nuclear war scenario. A country that can supply China with oil, gas, oil products and raw materials, and food. Yes, neither our economy nor the capacity of our cross-border communications will be enough to prevent China from feeling the sea blockade. But we will soften it to him very much. And, of course, the factor of military supplies should not be overlooked. Until Russia is neutralized, China will be able to receive weapons from there; let it be in insufficient quantities, but there will be a lot of it. If the United States can neutralize the Russian Federation, then China itself will carry out the command "to the foot" from Washington, even without pressure from the outside. With Russia, he is much less vulnerable.
Russia itself is too weak to claim world hegemony. Russia does not have an ideology that is attractive to a significant part of humanity. In this regard, Russia is not in the same "league" of players as the United States. Russia does not have an industrial and, more broadly, economic potential comparable to that of China. But Russia is that weight on the scales, which may well swing them in one direction or another. Unable to win much herself, she can determine who will do it. And this is a very dangerous moment, he is actually programming a war with that side of the US-China conflict, to which Russia will take an unfriendly position. Taking into account the events in Ukraine and Syria, it is clear that this will not be China. It will be the United States, and it might be tempting for them to remove the “weak link” - the Russians - from the scheme. As Napoleon once wanted to do, and as Hitler tried to do 129 years after Napoleon.
But we have nuclear weapons, so simply, in the usual way with Russia, apparently, we cannot fight, at least for destruction it is definitely not possible to fight. But if you catch the Russians by surprise …
If taken by surprise, the decline of American domination of humanity will turn into its endless dawn. The dreams of American science fiction writers about a future in which there are no non-English-speaking heroes will come true, the American social model will continue to subjugate one culture after another, the English language will continue to supplant national languages, and the US government will continue to transform itself into a global one at an accelerated pace. All other possible paths of development for humanity will be closed.
Forever and ever.
Defining a threat
At the moment, the United States is modernizing its nuclear weapons, which gives them the opportunity to dramatically increase the number of forces suitable for delivering a massive preemptive nuclear strike, but is useless to carry out tasks to deter nuclear aggression. At the same time, work is underway to reduce to zero the importance of the strategic nuclear forces of the opponents of the United States - by introducing into the practice of the US Armed Forces methods of detecting mobile ground missile systems, deploying anti-missile defense systems, removing restrictions on the design of ultra-small nuclear weapons that operated after the end of the Cold War.
These works also include the forces of the most loyal American ally - Great Britain, which, purely geographically, are in an advantageous position for a surprise nuclear strike against Russia.
All this activity bears clear signs of preparation for the first, unprovoked massive nuclear strike against the Russian Federation, using land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Such a blow can only be delivered if impunity for the attacking side is ensured, and if surprise is lost, the attacking side will abandon it (see the attitude of the Americans to their losses), which requires appropriate provision of surprise.
It should be especially noted that the prevailing moral paradigm in American society makes such a blow quite normal from an ethical point of view, and for some representatives of American society this is one of the most desirable options for resolving the "Russian question."
At the same time, the elimination of Russia will automatically resolve the "Chinese issue" that is urgent for the United States, which also gives rational reasons for a sudden nuclear attack. Such an attack, if successful, will be extremely beneficial for the United States of America, since in addition to neutralizing China, it also “freezes” the role of the United States as a world hegemon for an immeasurably long time.
For us, from all this, a simple conclusion is important - the role of nuclear deterrence in ensuring our security is not only decisive - it is also growing and growing continuously. The growth of the capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces, however, does not keep pace with the growth of their importance for the country.
This mainly applies to the navy.
Nuclear deterrence and the navy
In 2015, the Bear Spear command post exercise was held in the United States. According to the scenario of the exercises, the evil revanchist Russia began to terrorize its neighbors, attack them and deprive them of sovereignty, the United States intervened, and an escalation began. In the course of the ongoing escalation, the parties resorted to nuclear weapons, and the United States managed to get ahead of Russia and strike first. The population of Russia in the course of this strike was almost completely destroyed - only at the time of the attack, one hundred million people died. However, Russia fought back, killing tens of millions of Americans. What enabled Russia to strike back with sufficient force? The fact that during the first still non-nuclear battles, the US Navy missed several Russian submarines, the crews of which ultimately performed retaliation.
A one-sided game did not work, although the American planners foresaw everything, and even were able to "neutralize" almost the entire ground-based nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation.
This example eloquently shows what role the navy should play in theory in the system of nuclear deterrence.
With the appropriate types of support (anti-submarine sabotage, anti-mine and others), in the presence of a squad of anti-submarine forces covering the deployment of boats, including aviation, with the competent implementation of the isolation of combat areas (for example, mines), with the crew's readiness to resist enemy submarines and taking into account modern methods search by patrol aircraft, it is submarines with ballistic missiles that are becoming the most reliable deterrent.
First and foremost, unlike ground-based strategic nuclear forces, it cannot be quickly hit by strategic weapons such as ballistic missiles, even if its location is known
Second, it is mobile. The boat, barely creeping at 4 knots, will cover 177 kilometers under water in a day. At the same time, for new missile submarines (for example, Borey), the especially low-noise speed can be significantly increased.
Again in theory, at this level of mobility, it is very difficult to track. Its coordinates are unknown, like the silo. It cannot be calculated from satellite photos, like the PGRK. In theory, even if the satellite "catches" the emerging wake or "Kelvin wedge" or other wave manifestations, then on the basis of this information it is impossible to immediately use any weapon against the submarine.
It can be found from an airplane by wave trails on the surface of the water. But there are some ways to avoid this detection method. It can be detected by the secondary low-frequency vibrations of the water column generated by the moving volume of the boat's hull. But minimizing the size, reducing speed, taking into account hydrology and choosing the right depths can significantly reduce the likelihood of such a detection. A boat, the crew of which is acting correctly, the design of which meets modern requirements, and the combat cruise is carried out with all types of support, is still quite difficult to penetrate.
Finally, even when the enemy's PLS outfit reaches a distance of using weapons against the boat, the result, in the correct version, will be a battle, and not an unanswered strike, as is the case with ground-based strategic nuclear forces. And the boat, in theory, can win this battle. In contrast to the PGRK, attacked by a stealthy bomber in the electromagnetic chaos of the first hours after the start of a nuclear war, or generally fell under the second wave of a nuclear missile attack.
Correctly organized NSNF force the enemy to reveal their intentions during the deployment of anti-submarine forces and conduct operations to search for submarines, and give time for the deployment of PGRK, excluding their defeat by the first attack of the enemy.
However, in the case of the Russian Navy, this whole theory is significantly at odds with practice.
The Navy has now adopted a system of protected areas of combat operations - areas where all SSBNs should go during a threatened period and where they should be on readiness to deliver a nuclear strike against the enemy. These areas and the surrounding waters, through which the submarines are deployed, and in which the Russian anti-submarine forces operate, were given the name "Bastion" by NATO with a light hand. Russia has two such "bastions".
The following should be noted.
Combat operations inside these areas will be a complex of attempts by the enemy to carry out an operation inside the area to destroy SSBNs with its own submarines, relying on their low noise and range of weapons, as well as on the assault on the area from outside by surface and submarine forces and aviation. Since the task of the forces of the fleet in these areas will be to ensure the combat stability of the submarine forces, it becomes necessary for the fleet to achieve unconditional, complete dominance at sea in the indicated water areas. It is supremacy at sea, and, taking into account the power of the enemy's base patrol aircraft, also in the air, that can allow SSBNs to freely leave the bases, pass the route to the protected area of hostilities and take a position there, in readiness to use the main weapon.
However, at this point dilemma number two enters - the enemy is usually stronger than we are. And in fact, guarding the boats locked in the "bastions", the Navy becomes attached to them, concentrates its forces in a small water area, where they will have to fight against the enemy's superior in numbers and strength. In addition, this approach exposes the shores, making them vulnerable to the enemy. In fact, the "bastion" approach is somewhat similar to the history of the siege of Port Arthur. There, too, a highly mobile type of force (fleet) locked itself in a fortress, where it was later destroyed. Here is a similar picture, only the scale is different.
And this is even without taking into account the appalling state of the Navy in terms of the presence of anti-submarine forces.
During previous analysis of the options that a weak fleet can use to defeat a strong, it was shown that the response to enemy superiority at sea must be superiority in speed. And we are not talking about races at the maximum power of the power plant (although this will sometimes be necessary), but about being ahead in actions, in imposing a pace on the enemy, for which he, for one reason or another, is not ready.
Although the actions of strategic submarines during nuclear deterrence operations or in the course of an ongoing nuclear war have a radically different nature than the main way of solving problems by the fleet (seizing dominance at sea), the principle itself is also true here. The enemy must not have time to react, he must be late.
The clustering strategy in "bastions" cannot lead to such an effect. The fleet, no matter what task it performs, is an offensive weapon. They cannot defend themselves, they are technically impossible, they can only attack, and any defensive task can be effectively solved only by offensive actions. Thus, there is a conceptual mistake - instead of turning the whole world into an arena for a real or conditional battle with the United States, we ourselves are doing the enemy a favor by going to a small area, which can be hacked with the enemy's superiority in forces. We drive ourselves into a corner.
This is especially evident in the example of the Sea of Okhotsk. The conditions in it are very favorable for an American submarine that slipped into it to conduct long-term and covert surveillance of our strategic submarines. It is difficult to hide in it, it is a problematic water area by all conditions. But for some reason it is considered safe.
This state of affairs arose in the mid-eighties, when the United States, sharply, abruptly raising the effectiveness of its anti-submarine forces, were able to demonstrate to the military-political leadership of the USSR the absolute hopelessness of attempts to deploy NSNF in the open ocean without adequate support. And there were problems with the provision even then. The answer to this challenge should have been the same revolutionary growth in the secrecy of the submarine forces of the USSR, and their closer interaction with other branches of the forces, but the USSR could not give such an answer.
The technological backwardness of Soviet industry and the lack of imagination of those who determined the naval strategy ultimately led to the banal flight of the USSR Navy from the battlefield and the withdrawal of submarines into the notorious "bastions", which, even during the Cold War, were really completely permeable to the enemy.
Thus, the task of the future construction of NSNF will be to expand their presence in the World Ocean. The withdrawal from the "bastions" and the resumption of an active offensive strategy in spirit is a vital measure for the NSNF in terms of its level of combat effectiveness to keep up with the growing strike capabilities of the enemy.
There have been positive examples quite recently by historical standards. So in the mid-80s, a submarine detachment of the 25th division of the Pacific Fleet carried out a military campaign in the western part of the Pacific Ocean and deployed combat patrols near the Galapagos Islands. The detachment was covered by surface ships.
Today, there is a colossal problem in the way of such changes.
The Navy is simply not ready to carry out them, neither psychologically, nor financially, nor organizationally. So, for example, there is not enough aviation to support such military campaigns, and the one that is significantly outdated. The fleets themselves are subordinate to the military districts, and it will be very difficult to explain to the land general that it is more dangerous on its coast than somewhere far in the ocean. The command staff of the Navy is already accustomed to doing what he does (although voices demanding return to the ocean in the fleet are heard, and very high). There are also questions about submarines.
Our submarines are truly huge. And this is vulnerability to radar search for surface wave disturbances and a high level of secondary low-frequency oscillations.
The means of self-defense of our submarines are ineffective, there are either no anti-torpedoes on board, or almost no anti-torpedoes, torpedo weapons are outdated and in some conditions inapplicable.
This is superimposed on the training of SSBN crews, which for many years have been passively circling in the areas designated for patrolling, being technically unable to detect an American or British "hunter" who is attached to them.
Perhaps, having established interaction between multipurpose submarines and SSBNs, having worked out the tactics of action to detach from tracking, having studied in detail the methods of evading non-acoustic search, and avoiding tracking by enemy submarines, it would be possible to try to "go beyond" the supposedly safe "bastions" and start learning to "get lost" in the ocean, forcing the enemy to spend time, nerves and money looking for countermeasures.
In the future, it will be necessary to revise the approaches to the creation of new boats, in order for them to correspond to the new offensive strategy and in their design features.
In the meantime, it is critically important to restore the power of anti-submarine forces to values that would make it possible to establish dominance at sea (and, in fact, under the sea) in the "bastions". This should be the very first and most important task of the Navy. With this, his restoration as an effective combat force should begin. Both at the stage of withdrawal of the submarine from the base, and at the stage of its transition to the area of combat patrolling (and in the future to the area of separation from tracking), the anti-submarine forces of the Navy should completely exclude the presence of a number of foreign submarines, and together with naval aviation ensure continuous readiness to destroy anti-submarine enemy aircraft. Since we want the fleet to fight for supremacy at sea, it is logical to start with the communications used by Russian strategic submarines
Now there is nothing of the kind.
It would be logical to see the evolution of NSNF in the form of successive achievement of the following stages:
1. Restoration of anti-mine and anti-submarine forces to a level that would ensure a safe exit from the bases for SSBNs and the transition to the designated area of combat patrol. This will require the establishment of dominance at sea in each of the "bastions", which in turn will require an increase in the number of anti-submarine surface ships, and the modernization of diesel submarines, and the creation of a new anti-submarine aircraft, at least a small one, and a serious improvement in the tactical training of commanders and crews. ships. The accomplishment of this task alone would be a tremendous success.
2. Modernization of SSBNs with the elimination of critical deficiencies for their combat capabilities.
3. Commencement of operations to transfer combat patrols to the open ocean.
4. Development of the concept of submarines of the future, optimized for the new oceanic nuclear deterrent strategy. The beginning of the construction of boats according to a new concept.
5. The final transition to the deployment of NSNF in the open ocean.
The latter will not only make deterrence on our side more effective, but also, by pulling off a significant part of the enemy's anti-submarine forces to search for SSBNs, will indirectly contribute to the rapid and relatively safe deployment of the remaining forces of the fleet - which ultimately will help to protect the NSNF.
Conclusion
Nuclear deterrence, operations to disrupt the enemy's nuclear deterrence and prevent a nuclear attack by him, as well as the hypothetical waging of a nuclear war are the first fundamentally new, even from a theoretical point of view, tasks of the fleet that have appeared over many centuries. The emergence of ballistic missiles launched from under the water led to the emergence of a "new dimension" in war at sea, irreducible to the traditional and fundamental actions for any normal fleet to establish supremacy at sea.
For a long time, submarine missiles were not accurate enough to be used as a first strike weapon. However, since 1997, the US Navy has been modernizing its missile arsenal, after which American SLBMs can be used to deliver such a strike.
At the same time, the United States is working on the deployment of anti-missile defense systems, lifting the ban on the development and production of ultra-low-yield nuclear charges, including those that can be used for sabotage behind enemy lines and equipping the Navy of its British ally with modernized nuclear missiles.
The US missile defense systems are being mounted around the Russian Federation, although in words they were not directed against it for a long time (now it is argued that the missile defense elements in Japan are directed only against the DPRK).
The only consistent explanation for all these actions is the covert preparation of the United States to deliver a sudden, unprovoked massive nuclear strike against the Russian Federation.
An extremely intensive propaganda campaign is being waged against the Russian Federation, one of the goals of which is the so-called dehumanization of the enemy.
Ethically, such actions are completely acceptable to most American citizens.
From a rational point of view, the destruction of the Russian Federation will bring a lot of benefits to the United States, allowing it to actually colonize the entire planet on its own terms, without meeting any resistance anywhere.
Thus, it must be recognized that the risk of a sudden and unprovoked nuclear attack on the Russian Federation is growing
In such conditions, the importance of nuclear deterrence is also growing, and its effectiveness should grow following the threat.
The ground-based components of the strategic nuclear forces are extremely vulnerable due to their location known to the enemy in advance, the ability to continuously observe them with the help of reconnaissance satellites, the possibility of their destruction with strategic weapons from a long distance, and the very nature of a surprise strike, which may turn out to be faster than the passage of a command to deliver a response - counter strike.
In such conditions, the role of the naval component of the NSNF is growing, due to its difficult tracking and the impossibility of destroying submarines deployed at sea with strategic weapons.
However, the Navy uses a scheme for the deployment of NSNF inadequate to modern threats in the form of their presence in protected areas of combat operations - ZRBD. This is due to the inability of the Navy to withstand the anti-submarine forces of a potential enemy, which must be overcome.
A transition to an ocean-going deployment of NSNF is necessary, which will prevent the enemy from destroying all NSNF with a concentrated submarine attack on the air defense missile defense system, and will seriously increase the tension of its anti-submarine forces.
To do this, it will be necessary to revise not only the usual methods of combat use of submarines, but also the approaches to their design. With the highest possible degree of probability, the “ocean” NSNF will require other submarines than are currently available.
In the transition period from the "bastion" to the "ocean" deployment of the NSNF, the Navy must achieve the ability to establish absolute dominance at sea both in the "bastions" as a whole, and especially in the air defense missile systems located inside them.
Otherwise, the population and the leadership of the Russian Federation will have to come to terms with the continuously increasing risk of a nuclear attack, without countering this risk with anything really dangerous.
