The 20th century is an era of extraordinary growth in the role and importance of railways - these arteries of state organisms and the armed forces. Cutting the railways means paralyzing the life of the country, the work of industry and the activities of the army.
Of particular importance is the uninterrupted operation of the railways during the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of armies, as well as during the implementation of each combat operation.
The vital importance of the railways for the armies was explained by the fact that, on the one hand, not a single strategic maneuver could do without the large-scale participation of the railways, on the other hand, the fact that the armies turned into eaters of ammunition, fuel, explosives and other means, without whose armed struggle has become inconceivable. The uninterrupted supply of enormous amounts of food supplies by rail has acquired no less importance.
After that, there is nothing surprising in the fact that one of the most fashionable trends in the General Staffs of foreign armies in the first quarter of the 20th century was the desire to find and prepare the most relevant means to "paralyze" enemy railway transport - and from the very first days of the war …
At the same time, the issue of ensuring uninterrupted operation of railways during the war was a far from resolved problem for many states.
“Uninterrupted railway transportation and unimpeded strategic deployment of troops, as in 1914,” wrote the German specialist Yustrov, “will turn out to be impossible in a future war. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the whole world is thinking about how to overcome these difficulties."
And Germany is trying to "overcome these difficulties" by intensifying the development and improvement of highways, the creation of an automobile corps with up to 150 thousand vehicles and a frantic pace in the development of aircraft construction.
Water transport does not satisfy the Germans - since transportation by waterways is done too slowly, and they based their success in a future war, first of all, on the lightning-fast transfer of troops along the railways.
As a result, they come to the conclusion that "there remains only road transport that can replace and supplement railroad transport."
All large states adhere to these conclusions.
As the experience of the First World War and the Civil War shows, cavalry was one of the most powerful means of "paralyzing" the railways.
You can recall the actions of the 1st Cavalry Army in 1920 - when it took to defeat the Kiev group of Polish troops for a long time to break the main communication line of the latter - the Kiev - Kazatin - Berdichev railway.
As a result of a deep invasion of the Polish rear, the 1st Cavalry Army by the end of the day on June 6 settled down in a fairly compact mass for the night in the Belopole-Nizhgurtsy-Lebedintsy area on both sides of the Kiev-Rovno railway - in the rear of the Poles.
The command of the 1st Cavalry Army decides to seize an important railway junction - Berdichev, in which, moreover, the headquarters of the enemy front was located. At the same time, it was decided to seize the administrative center - Zhitomir.
The execution of these tasks was entrusted to the 4th and 11th cavalry divisions.
The 4th Cavalry Division, having set out on the morning of June 7, was supposed to raid Zhitomir - to break the telegraph communication with the surrounding points, destroy the bridges closest to the city and destroy the property and stocks of those warehouses that could not be evacuated.
The 11th Cavalry Division was tasked with capturing an important railway junction - Berdichev.
The 14th Cavalry Division was supposed to prevent the enemy from rebuilding the railway destroyed the day before.
The 6th Cavalry Division was supposed to prevent the Poles from rebuilding the railway line to Kazatin.
On the morning of June 7, the 4th and 11th Cavalry Divisions began to carry out their assigned tasks.
Zhytomyr was captured (after some resistance from the garrison) at 6 pm on June 7 - and not only managed to solve all the problems, but also free about 7,000 prisoners of war and political prisoners.
Berdichev resisted more stubbornly. In it, a hot street fight ensued - as a result of which the Poles were driven out of the city. The railway junction was captured and destroyed, and, in addition, an artillery depot with 1 million shells was blown up.
Ultimately, the actions of the 1st Cavalry Army in the period under review led to a prolonged paralysis of the railway line of the Polish Kiev group, and then to the hasty withdrawal of the latter.
The command of the 1st Cavalry Army knew very well how exclusively the Polish army was dependent on the railways, and to what extent the Polish command was worried about the fate of the railway arteries.
The importance of cavalry as one of the means of "paralyzing" railway transport was determined by the duration of the interruption of rail and road communications.
The duration depended either on the effectiveness of the destruction of railway structures and the significance of the latter (in the given example, the actions of the 4th and 11th cavalry divisions) or on the time the cavalry held one or another railway point - in order to prevent the repair of the damage done (tasks of the 14th and 6th Cavalry Divisions).
The experience of the wars showed that the success of the destruction of railways was based mainly on the surprise of actions and the skillful choice of targets for strike.
Skillful selection of targets for strike was based on good knowledge: 1) the operational value of each railway line and its sections for the enemy and 2) those structures on these lines and sections, the destruction of which could give the longest period of paralysis of railway transport.
The success of the destruction of railway structures was strongly influenced by the degree of perfection and the number of technical means used by the cavalry to destroy railway transport, as well as the art of demolition.
Moreover, the small effect or handicraft in the subversive actions of the cavalry could not be compensated for by the subsequent retention of the destroyed railway structures by the same cavalry in order to prevent their restoration by the enemy. Such a measure, although it increased the period of paralysis of railway transport, required the presence of large masses of cavalry, separating them from other tasks. And on the contrary, the weak forces of the cavalry, although technically and properly provided, also could not "paralyze" the enemy's railway transport for a long time.
A striking example is the actions of the German cavalry in the Sventsiansk breakthrough of 1915.
The cavalry forces allocated by the German command in order to "occupy" the strategically important sections of the Russian railways were insufficient - which could not be compensated for by more significant and sophisticated means of destroying the latter.
And the German cavalry could not hold the destroyed structures in their hands due to weakness - and with heavy losses was forced to retreat without completing the main task. The Russians calmly rebuilt the destroyed infrastructure.
At the same time, technology and subversive work made it possible to achieve exceptional success in "paralyzing" rail and road transport.
Suffice it to mention the amazing results that the Germans managed to achieve during the destruction of the French railways in 1917. "The railways (French -.) Were brought into such a state," writes the engineer Norman in his book "Destruction and restoration of communication lines", - that it turned out to be more profitable to build new ones than to restore the destroyed ones."
German delayed-action mines also deserve mention - with the expectation of an explosion after 3 or more months. They were widely used by the Germans in 1918 - again with the destruction of the French railways.
These mines were placed under the bed of the French railways in order to prolong their "paralysis" for a long time, achieved by the destruction of various structures on the same line.
They tried to plant mines and carefully disguise them in places where the restoration of the path was difficult and extremely slowed down.
Usually these were high embankments - under which the explosion of a mine gave a funnel with a diameter of more than 30 m. Filling the latter usually required at least 3 days.
The process proceeded as follows. The French began long and strenuous work to restore the railway structures destroyed by the Germans. At this time, the German retarder mines were not yet in operation. But when the restoration work was completed on time, foreseen by the Germans, and the interrupted railway communication was resumed, mines began to explode every day - in the area of the already repaired tracks.
As a result, the time of "paralysis" of railway transport was artificially lengthened for a very long period (as noted, mines could explode in 3 or more months).
Undoubtedly, the presence of such means at the disposal of the cavalry could eliminate the need for it to spend large forces and time on holding in its hands certain sections of railway lines, junctions or structures in order to paralyze railway transport for the period required by the situation.
The cavalry, operating in any weather conditions and on almost any terrain, could quickly and permanently paralyze the work of railway transport - for the required time and in the required area.
Some figures show how important the effect of the destruction of the railway infrastructure was. The restoration of relatively small bridges (across the Meuse), blown up by the French with explosive charges during the German offensive in 1914, took: Oya - 35 days, Blangy - 42 days and Origny - 45 days.
And it was the mobile branch of the military, equipped with artillery, subversive weapons and all the necessary means of reinforcement, that could play a key role in this matter - which was shown by the events of the Soviet-Polish war, when the cavalry defeated the railroad.
