So, the battle on August 3 for the Germans turned out to be a failure - they could not break through to Irbens. It can be assumed that our opponents appreciated the actions of the only Russian battleship that dared to block the path of the Kaiser's dreadnoughts. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the dispatch on the night of August 4 of the two newest destroyers to the Gulf of Riga to search for and destroy the "Slava". Fortunately, the V-99 and V-100 could not find the "Slava", although they were moving the right way - after passing the Irbens, they turned to the Arensburg Bay. But in the Irbensky Strait the Germans had short-term contact with the Russian destroyers Okhotnik and General Kondratenko, and upon entering the bay - with the Ukraina and Voiskov, and the German ships received several hits. This convinced the German commanders of the futility of further searches, and they tried to retreat, but were intercepted by Novik. In a short artillery battle, the Russian destroyer won a convincing victory over them, and the V-99, trying to escape, was blown up by a mine, thrown at the Mikhailovsky lighthouse, where it was blown up by its own crew.
And then morning came.
Third battle (August 4, 1915)
At 05.03 "Slava" moved into position. The battleship was escorted by the 8th destroyer battalion. However, this time the main enemy of "Glory" was not the German ships, but … the weather. Even yesterday, the Russian battleship could perfectly see enemy dreadnoughts, even at 120 kbt, but on August 4, visibility deteriorated so much that it did not exceed 40-50 cables west of the Slava.
The worst thing for the Russian sailors was that a heavy fog, limiting visibility, thickened to the west. Accordingly, the Kaiser's ships could observe the "Glory", while remaining invisible to her signalmen. In addition, the Germans guessed to adjust the fire from the Mikhailovsky lighthouse, located on the southern bank of the Irbensky Strait, and thus received an additional advantage.
At 07.20, when the German guns thundered, the Slava saw only flashes of shots, but not firing ships. Enemy shells fell near the destroyers accompanying the Russian battleship. In response, the Slava raised top flags, turned south, moving perpendicular to the German course, and prepared for battle. Apparently, the commander of the "Slava", Sergei Sergeevich Vyazemsky, considered that the Germans, moving from west to east, were about to show themselves, and would be within the reach of the guns of the Russian battleship, because at least visibility to the east was better than on west, but still it is unlikely that the Germans would have been able to see "Glory" at a distance of more than 8 miles.
However, these calculations were not justified - at 07.45 the enemy fired 5 volleys at Slava, while he himself was still invisible. This forced the battleship to retreat east.
Unfortunately, the sources do not give a detailed change in the state of the weather, but it is known that at 08.40 Slava found enemy minesweepers and destroyers at a distance of 85-90 cables south of the Mikhailovsky lighthouse, but still could not open fire on them. Then the battleship went towards the enemy and, after some five minutes, came under heavy fire from German dreadnoughts. It is not known for sure whether the Nassau and Posen were observed from the Slava, but in any case, due to limited visibility or due to long distances, the Russian battleship could not respond to them with fire. At 08.50, almost immediately after the dreadnoughts fired at the Slava, she stopped approaching and again laid down on a course perpendicular to the German one - the battleship turned north.
And at that moment, three 280-mm shells hit the "Slava" almost simultaneously.
The battleship received moderate damage - one shell did not damage anything at all, flying over the upper deck, pierced the half-frame and bed nets on the starboard side and flew away without breaking. But two other hits caused fires, and - with the threat of detonation of the powder magazines of the 152-mm turret, and also damaged the steering. Nevertheless, the battleship, still unable to respond to the enemy with fire, did not turn off the combat course, but instead proceeded to repair the damage, which was quickly localized by the competent actions of the crew. At 08.58, "Slava", continuing to go north, went out of sight or firing range of the German dreadnoughts, and they ceased firing.
It is unlikely that anyone would have reproached the commander of the "Slava", Sergei Sergeevich Vyazemsky, if he retreated at that moment. Not only did the Germans have an overwhelming numerical advantage, not only did they also have a decisive superiority in the range of fire, they were now also invisible! But instead of retreating "Slava" turned west and moved towards the enemy.
It is difficult to say how it would have ended, but the actions of the Russian battleship were watched "from above". As soon as the damaged ship moved towards the enemy, the battleship received a signal (by a searchlight) from the chief of the Naval Defense Forces of the Gulf of Riga: "Go to Kuivast!" S. S. Vyazemsky tried to act in the best traditions of Nelson, in a similar situation he applied a telescope to the absent eye, and with good reason declared: "I do not see the order!". The commander of the "Slava" preferred not to notice the order given to him and continued to approach the Kaiser's ships, but then the order was re-transmitted to him from the escort destroyer, and it became impossible to "ignore" it. "Glory" did not leave the Ahrensburg raid, and her participation in the defense of the Irbene position on August 4 ended there.
For the entire time of the battle, "Slava" did not use up a single shell - the enemy was either not visible, or was too far away to fire.
After the failure of August 4, the battleship seemed doomed to perish. The Germans finished trawling the Irbenskiy irrigation on August 4, and the next day brought their heavy ships into the Gulf of Riga. "Slava" did not have a single chance either to escape to the Gulf of Finland (too large draft) or to break through the Irbensky Strait in battle due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy forces. She could only die with honor. Therefore, on August 6, the Amur minelayer set up a minefield between Moonsund and the Gulf of Riga, and Slava prepared to take its last battle at this mine and artillery position, maneuvering between Kuivast and Werder Island.
In fact, on 5 and 6 August, "Slava" was rescued only by the fact that the Germans prepared for the operation very badly, had not previously reconnoitered the basing system of the Russian fleet in Moonsund and simply did not know where to look for the Russian battleship now. But the German plan envisaged blocking the passage from the Gulf of Finland to Riga, and, having started to carry out this plan, the Germans would inevitably collide with the "Slava". It would seem that a tragic denouement is inevitable, but here accidents inevitable at sea and … the British intervened.
The fact is that the foggy Albion transferred several submarines to the aid of the Russian imperial Baltic fleet, operating in the Baltic with a truly deadly efficiency many times greater than the achievements of Russian submarines. And it so happened that while the Germans invaded the Gulf of Riga, their battle cruisers, still cruising on the Gotska Sanden - Ezel line, awaiting the release of Russian dreadnoughts, were attacked by His Majesty's submarine E-1, which managed to torpedo " Moltke ". In the evening of the same day, the destroyer S-31 was blown up and sank by mines, and the next day in the Gulf of Riga, German observers found the submarine "Lamprey"
All this created an extremely nervous atmosphere at the German headquarters. The fact is that, contrary to the original idea of joint actions of the German army and the Kaiserlichmarin, the Germans did not go over to the offensive on land, and without this the operation to break through into the Gulf of Riga was largely meaningless. Now, being in a small and shallow bay, among mines and submarines (of which the Russians had only three, and those were outdated, but fear had large eyes), the German command was extremely unnerved, as a result of which Erhard Schmidt ordered to interrupt the operation and the German fleet retreated …
What conclusions can be drawn from the battle on August 4, 1915? There are few of them. This time weather conditions were added to the unfavorable balance of forces and the quality of the materiel - under the circumstances, the continuation of the battle with the "Glory" could only lead to a senseless death of the battleship. There was no way Slava could defend the Irben position, but there was no point in going “to the last and decisive” on August 4, either. S. S. Vyazemsky, the commander of the "Slava", acted bravely, leading his battleship towards the many times superior enemy, but the chief of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga acted wisely by recalling him. Since the Germans were destined to break into the Gulf of Riga, then the "Slava", with some correct actions of the enemy, was doomed. And if so, then the best time and place for the last fight should have been chosen. The Irbensky Strait on August 4 was neither one nor the other: retreating and giving battle at a new mine and artillery position near Moonsund, "Slava" got much better chances to inflict at least some damage to the enemy, even if at the cost of its death.
Of course, it is completely pointless to talk about the accuracy of the Slava's gunners in the battle on August 4 - the battleship did not manage to fire a single shot that day.
Preparing for future battles
The next battle of battleships at the mine-artillery position took place two years and two months after the previous invasion of the Gulf of Riga by Kaiserlichmarine ships.
Of course, during this time, the experience of confronting the "Glory" with the German ships was thoroughly studied and certain conclusions were drawn. The range of the battleship's guns was found to be categorically insufficient, and measures were taken to increase it, as a result of which Slava was able to fire at a distance of 115 kbt. But what were these measures, and when were they taken?
If it was possible to increase the elevation angles to 35-40 degrees and thereby obtain the above increase in range, then it would be great. Alas - although the vertical aiming angles of the Slava were corrected, but not as much as we would like. The author came across various data on the angle to the horizon the battleship barrels could rise - 20 degrees, 22, 5 degrees or 25 degrees (the latter is most likely), but one thing is certain - the Black Sea battleships "Slava" remained very, very far away. But then how did you manage to increase the range to 115 kbt?
The fact is that the firing range depends not only on the elevation angle, but also on the length of the projectile. Both the Baltic and Black Sea battleships fired a lightweight 331.7 kg projectile with a length of 3, 2 caliber of the 1907 model. In addition to this type of shells, a new, weighted and longer 470, 9 kg projectile of the 1911 g model was produced in the Russian Empire for 305-mm guns of the latest dreadnoughts … Unfortunately, its use on battleships was completely impossible, because the design of the feed mechanisms and chargers did not provide for the work with such massive projectiles, and their alteration was too complicated and expensive. Here, however, usually remember the famous shelling of "Chesma" from "John Chrysostom" - the Black Sea battleship then fired "heavy" shells mod. 1911 But you need to understand that the rate of fire did not matter when such firing was carried out, so there was no need to use the standard means of lifting shells from turret compartments, etc. Those.shells could simply be "rolled" into the towers, and the loading was done with the help of some temporarily installed hoists.
On the other hand, it was pointless to load the domestic industry, which could not cope with the production of shells for the front, with the production of a new type of heavy shell.
A way out was found in special ballistic tips made of brass and screwed onto the projectile (before that, of course, it was necessary to cut a thread on the projectile body). With such a tip, the mass of the projectile increased to 355 kg, and its length - up to almost 4 calibers. But due to the fact that neither the storage devices nor the armadillo feed devices were designed for "turning" such long projectiles, these tips had to be screwed on immediately before loading, which reduced the rate of fire by three times. Nevertheless, they were still ready to go for it, so as not to be completely unarmed in front of the German dreadnoughts.
And here, most likely, it worked "I do not make it out well, but here I will make it out, since it comes to the loop." The fact is that the sailors of "Slava" in the period from July 26 to August 4, 1915 had the "pleasure" to feel all the feelings of an unarmed man who is being shot from a safe distance with large calibers. How can we not recall the wonderful impromptu one of the officers of the Port Arthur squadron, which he said when the Japanese battleships got into the habit of shelling the water area with impunity, where the Russian ships were stationed with throw-over fire:
“Isn't it boring?
Sit and wait
When they start throwing at you
Heavy objects from afar"
But the battleship, obviously, also understood that such a sharp (threefold!) Drop in the rate of fire reduces the benefits of increasing the range to almost zero. Therefore, on "Slava", ship means (!) Managed not only to equip 200 places for storing shells with screwed caps, but also to alter the feed so that "new" shells could be fed to the guns and loaded without any problems.
This raises two questions. The first is rhetorical: how did it happen that the crew of a warship managed to do what specially trained gentlemen ship engineers considered impossible? The second one is more interesting - if the Slava managed to ensure the storage and supply of such ammunition, then maybe everything was not so hopeless for the newest shells of the 1911 model? Of course, high-explosive shells arr. 1911 g were longer (5 calibers) but armor-piercing - only 3, 9 calibers, i.e. in terms of geometrical dimensions, they fully corresponded to the "new" projectile arr. 1907 with ballistic tip. Of course, the armor-piercing projectile was heavier (470, 9 kg versus 355 kg), but was this an insurmountable obstacle? Alas, we can only guess about this now. But if Slava had such shells in its last battle … But let's not get ahead of ourselves.
Thus, we can say that the battleship's crew did everything in their power (and even a little more) to meet the enemy fully armed in the next battle. Alas, this was not enough.
The fact is that the new "miracle projectiles" with ballistic tips had one fatal flaw: their dispersion significantly exceeded that of conventional 305-mm projectiles. In essence, ballistic-tipped projectiles were specific ammunition for shooting across areas. As L. M. wrote in 1916. Haller (at that time - the flagship artilleryman of the 2nd battleship brigade):
"Ships … being equipped with a long-range projectile, get the opportunity, without being exposed to the fire of the main forces of the enemy, to shoot minesweepers with impunity: the destruction of minesweepers under such conditions makes any attempt to break through the barriers very risky …"
That is, it was assumed that by shooting at an area target, which is a dense formation of minesweepers, high-explosive shells exploding from impact upon contact with water, it is possible to achieve severe damage or even destroy the minesweepers, without achieving direct hits, but only due to the high-explosive and fragmentation action shells. Moreover, as noted by L. M. Haller ballistic-tipped projectiles were considered essential:
"Only from the point of view of shelling a specific point, but not shooting in a squadron battle"
In other words, despite the above measures, "Slava" never received a weapon that could reliably hit enemy warships at a distance of over 90-95 kbt.
We have described two measures to increase the battleship's firing range, but it should be borne in mind that they were carried out in reverse order. The Slava received shells with ballistic tips by the end of 1915, but the command considered the presence of the battleship in the Gulf of Riga so necessary that it did not even dare to withdraw it with the onset of cold weather. "Slava" hibernated in 1915-1916 at the entrance to the Moonsund Strait, opposite the Werder Lighthouse and entered the 1916 campaign without returning to Helsingfors. As a result, it was possible to carry out factory repairs of the ship, replacing and increasing the elevation angles of 305-mm guns only at the end of 1916. "Slava" left the Gulf of Riga on October 22, passing through the deepened Moonsund Strait, through which the oldest, but at the same time the shallowest Russian battleships, "Tsesarevich" and "Slava", could pass.
One can only be glad that the Germans did not dare to invade the Gulf of Riga with large forces in 1916. In this case, Slava would have to fight in approximately the same conditions as before - having the ability to fire conventional shells at 76-78 kbt (cannons were also shot, so the achievement of even 78 kbt probably turned out to be questionable) and long-range shells for firing in areas - 91-93 kbt. Or, with an artificial roll of 3 degrees - respectively 84-86 kbt and 101-103 kbt, which would not be enough to resist the dreadnoughts of the Germans.
Nevertheless, the remnants of 1915 and 1916 passed relatively calmly for the battleship. "Slava" fought, supporting the coastal flank of the army with fire and achieved considerable success in this. For example, Vinogradov points out that the German offensive launched by them on October 17 initially led to success, and that it was thanks to the Slava's heavy cannons that our troops were able to restore the situation. The Germans tried to counter the battleship using field artillery, seaplanes and zeppelins. They could not seriously damage the heavily armored ship, but they still achieved some success. So, on September 12, a German 150-mm projectile hit the edge of the reflective visor of the conning tower, killing almost everyone present in it, including the commander of the Slava, Sergei Sergeevich Vyazemsky.
And then came the February revolution
