New, 1917, found "Glory" on the roadstead of the Sveaborg fortress. The ship was undergoing repair work. It was there that the battleship met the February Revolution.
It must be said that the crew of the Slava, in comparison with other ships, met the revolution almost exemplarily (when compared with other battleships). The team rallied by the war did not descend to the massacre of officers and did not allow reprisals against them by "alien" sailors, not allowing the "landing" from the battleships "Andrew the First-Called" and "Emperor Paul I" to board the ship. But the revolutionary sailors of the latter went so far as to point the guns of their ships at the Slava. However, they achieved the opposite effect: people who fought with the superior forces of the Germans in Moonsund cannot be intimidated with a cannon, but there was indignation that someone was aiming at you who, all the time you fought, was in the rear and did not even smell gunpowder. Still, there were some casualties, the boatswain Vasilenko died. Interestingly, he was described as "the softest of all boatswains." In March, a new commander, V. G. Antonov, who had previously served on the "Slava" as a senior officer in the 1915 campaign and was respected among the sailors
But then it got worse. Part of the old-timers left the ship, instead of them a young replenishment arrived, already "corrupted" by revolutionary propaganda. Those who remained in the carriage at first had a restraining influence on them, but in the end they got tired of it, and they moved away from politics.
In general, we can say that, although revolutionary trends did not take on such ugly forms on Slava as on a number of other battleships of the Baltic Fleet, it is impossible to talk about a normal situation on the battleship. It is difficult to say how the exercises were conducted, because during 1917 the logbook was almost not kept, records were made from time to time. On the one hand, given the revolutionary fermentation, one can hardly expect that in 1917 the battleship would intensively support its own combat capability. But on the other hand, Vinogradov mentions that the bow turret of "Glory" has fired 34 practical shots since November 1916 (meaning not barrel, but full-fledged firing), which, generally speaking, testifies to very intensive training. In any case, discipline on the ship was never restored. So, for example, having received an order to return to Moonsund, the battleship team refused to do so, arguing that neither "Andrew the First-Called" nor "Respublika" (formerly "Emperor Paul I") went to Moonsund and did not participate in battles, so they and go. The situation was changed only by the statement of V. G. Antonov, that he would leave the traitor ship, which did not fulfill the combat order. The team then adopted a resolution that "with him, she is ready to go anywhere."
Before proceeding to the description of the battle, let's pay a little attention to the geography of the Moonsund archipelago in the old (pre-revolutionary) names.
From the south, we see Courland, located on the mainland, its northernmost point is Cape Domesnes. Between this cape and the small islet of Werder, located next to the mainland coast, the sea cuts inland, forming the Gulf of Riga. This bay is separated from the Baltic Sea by the island of Ezel, the largest island in the Moonsund archipelago. The southern tip of Ezel ends on the Svorbe peninsula, on which the southernmost point is Cape Tserel. The Irbene Strait is located between the Svorbe Peninsula and Courland. If we look at the northern tip of Ezel, we will see between it and the mainland the smallest island of the Moonsund archipelago - Moon. Between Moon and Ezel is the Small Sound, between Moon and Werder, respectively, the Big Sound - however, this channel can be considered large only in comparison with the Small Sound
North of Ezel is the third island of the archipelago - Dago. Dago and Ezel are separated by the Soelozund Strait, which widens sharply to the east, forming the Kassar reach. If you pass from the Gulf of Riga between Moon and Werder, a series of the Bolshoi Sound and further, with Dago on the left and the mainland on the right, then we will rest on the island of Worms. This island is located between the northern tip of Dago and the continent, but much closer to the continent - between Worms and Dago is the Moonsund Strait leading to the Gulf of Finland.
Two words about the main Russian bases. Ahrensburg was located on the Ezel Island, not far from the beginning of the Svorbe Peninsula. Kuivast was located on the eastern side of Moon Island, opposite Werder Island.
Actions of the German and Russian forces in the period September 29 - October 2, 1917)
We will not describe in detail Operation Albion undertaken by the Kaiserlichmarin in 1917, but will focus only on those aspects of it that are related to the defense of mine and artillery positions. The operation began on September 29 (old style) Of course, the fact that the Germans once again concentrated their naval forces, knowingly and overwhelmingly superior to the Russian Baltic fleet, and if in 1915 dreadnoughts of the first series ("Nassau" and "Helgoland") went to Moonsund then in 1917 these were the newest ships of the Bayern types (though there was no Baden), König and Kaiser.
Russian forces outnumbered those that tried to defend Moonsund in 1915 - 2 old battleships ("Slava" and "Citizen"), 3 cruisers ("Admiral Makarov", 3 gunboats, 26 large and medium destroyers, 7 small, 3 British submarines But now this fleet was revolutionary and fought not as commanders ordered, but at its own discretion.
Here, for example, are excerpts from the "Report on the actions of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga September 29 - October 7, 1917" for October 1, signed by the chief of the Naval Defense Forces of the Gulf of Riga M. K. Bakhireva:
“The Pripyat team treacherously, almost without risking, refused to carry out the minefield operation. Neither the commander's requests, nor his instructions on the extreme importance of the operation and on rarely favorable circumstances, nor the persuasion of two or three old sailors who retained their honor - nothing could induce people to fulfill their military duty."
Or:
“The head of the 5th destroyer battalion, Captain of the 1st rank Zelena, unauthorized, without warning, despite my order to stay until the last opportunity in the Ahrensburg patrol and support the land units with his artillery, removed the communications post in Ahrensburg and at about 19 hours with the Rider "and" Zabaikalsky "came to Kuivast."
The German plan was very different from what was planned in 1915. The previous time, it was planned to break through the large forces of the fleet into the Gulf of Riga, but only only, while in 1917 it was planned to capture the islands of Ezel, Dago and Moon, that is, in fact, the entire Moonsund archipelago. The goal is to provide the flank of the German troops and create an operational base for subsequent actions already in the Gulf of Finland.
Accordingly, the plan of the operation has undergone significant changes. In 1915, the Germans tried to cross the Irbensky Strait, the minefields of which were covered only by the forces of the fleet, but now everything has changed. Near Cape Tserel in April 1917, the construction of battery No. 43 was completed, which consisted of four newest 305-mm guns, similar to those with which the Sevastopol dreadnoughts were armed. These guns could fire at 156 kbt and almost completely blocked the Irbensky Strait, although, of course, the effectiveness of firing at such distances at a moving target is questionable. But in any case, a new assault on the Irbene Strait in the style of 1915 could have cost the Germans much more expensive than the previous one.
But the Germans were not going to beat their foreheads against the wall. Instead, they preferred to land a landing on Ezel, capture the island, including, of course, the Svorbe peninsula and Cape Tserel from land, and only then cross the Irbensky Strait. Nevertheless, they began to sweep minefields in Irbens already from September 29: but if in 1915 "Slava" immediately went out to defend the minefields upon the appearance of the enemy there, this time nothing like this happened. Destroyers went on patrol, and even M. K. Bakhirev checked the presence of German ships on the Bayan cruiser, going as far as the Domesnes position (that is, along the entire Irbensky Strait up to the coast opposite Ezel), but battleships were not involved in the defense of the position. Only on October 2, the "Citizen" (former "Tsesarevich") was sent to Cape Tserel, but he was also sent not for a naval battle, but for shelling the German ground forces moving towards Svorbe, i.e. for the defense of battery No. 43 from land. Why did the fleet defending the Irbens in 1915 take almost no measures to protect them in 1917? Apparently, there were two reasons.
First, battery No. 43 was presented to the commander of the Baltic Fleet and M. K. Bakhirev as the cornerstone of the defense of the Irbensky Strait. In fact, it was so - the four newest 305-mm / 52 guns were superior in efficiency to the main caliber of the "Glory" and "Citizen" combined. Accordingly, the stability of the Irben mine position entirely depended on the ability of this battery to fight the enemy.
At the same time, the main threat to battery # 43 did not come from the sea; it was there that the battery could fight with good chances of success against almost any enemy. The real threat was the attack from the land, where the Kaiser's troops were advancing. It was not possible to repel the landing on Ezel by the coastal defense forces, and it was hardly possible, because the defense of the Taga Bay, where the Germans landed, was frankly weak, respectively, all hope remained on the ground forces. And their replenishment and supply depended entirely on who controlled the Soelozund Strait (between Ezel and Dago) and the Kassar reach (also located between Ezel and Dago).
Therefore, the head of the Naval Defense Forces of the Gulf of Riga was forced to prioritize the defense of Soelozund and the Kassar reach, limiting himself only to destroyer patrols at the Irbene position.
On the other hand, Soelozund was impassable for German heavy ships. Should Slava be diverted to cover it, given that M. K. Bakhirev had a pretty impressive detachment of cruisers and destroyers? The vice-admiral himself later wrote in his "Report":
"Glory" was necessary in case of appearance on the Kassar reach of enemy destroyers in the overwhelming number."
And he informed the Comflot by yuzogram on October 2:
"Sozlozund distracts a large ship, boats and destroyers."
The author allows himself to assume that under normal circumstances "Glory" was not necessary for the defense of Soelozund. But the problem is that the situation on the ships of the Baltic fleet was anything but normal. M. K. Bakhirev was not, and could not be, confident in his crews, and the presence of a "large heavy battleship" could obviously have a positive effect on the mood of the teams: one could expect that they would act more boldly with the support of the battleship.
Consequently, the decision not to withdraw "Slava" and "Tsarevich" for the defense of the Irben position should be recognized as correct. The wrong thing in all this was the complete collapse of the spirit at battery No. 43, whose personnel thought much more about retreating than about fighting the Germans.
The Germans began sweeping the Irbensky Strait at the very beginning of the operation, on September 29, but already on September 30, the "Tserel battery" sent a yuzogram (a telegram transmitted by the Hughes system apparatus) addressed to the chief of the mine division. Asked:
"Immediately send several destroyers and transports, since despite the decision of the team to stand up to the last shell and render the cannons unusable, they will have to escape with our help."
A detailed description of what happened on battery No. 43 in the period September 29 - October 2 will require at least a separate article, if not a whole cycle. But, in a nutshell, the situation was like this: in the period from October 29 to October 1, the Germans trawled the Irbensky Strait unoccupied. By October 1, their ground forces had practically captured Ezel, and in its southern part they reached the Svorbe Peninsula. Ahrensburg was captured. To speed up the elimination of the Russian troops remaining on the peninsula, the Germans fired at battery No. 43 from the sea, using the battleships Friedrich der Grosse and König Albert for this (other sources mention that the Kaiserin also took part in the shelling, but this is most likely a mistake).
The battery responded and official Germanic history notes that
"The Tserel battery took aim very quickly and accurately, so the ships had to go scattered and constantly change courses."
If battery # 43 had fought in full force that day, it could have inflicted very sensitive damage on the German battleships. But alas: the servants of the two guns fled completely, at the rate of the third gun, only half risked fighting, so it only fired occasionally, and only one gun really fought. Nevertheless, even these one and a half guns forced the German ships to retreat. The battle was fought at a distance of 60 to 110 kbt, neither the Russians nor the Germans suffered losses during it.
Nevertheless, the morale of the "Tserel battery" was irreversibly undermined. At night they sent yuzograms from her and demanded the fleet, but even the appearance of the "Citizen" could not help, the calculations fled. The next day, October 3, German troops captured the Svorbe Peninsula, while battery No. 43 was disabled, and the 130-mm and 120-mm guns of the other two batteries located on the peninsula went to the Germans intact.
Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev described the abandonment of battery No. 43 as follows:
"The treasonous surrender of the 305-mm Tserel battery was of tremendous importance not only for the defense of the Gulf of Riga, but also predetermined the fate of Moonsund."
Why did "Slava" and "Citizen" not try to resist the breakthrough of the Germans through the Irbensky Strait after the battery fell? Both Bakhirev and Razvozov (the commander of the Baltic fleet) saw no point in defending a mine position, both shores of which were captured by the enemy, despite the fact that large (albeit light) enemy forces could break through to the Kassar reach and the Gulf of Riga through Soelozund at any moment. Therefore, it was decided not to engage in a decisive battle for the Gulf of Riga and focus on the defense of the Moonsund Strait, leading from the Gulf of Riga to the Gulf of Finland. On October 2, M. K. Bakhirev received a telegram from the fleet commander:
“In the event of the fall of Tserel, considering the Irben Strait strategically lost and not finding it expedient, having in the rear our developing ground operation on Ezele, to defend Irben by the forces of the Gulf of Riga, which is now impossible in the absence of a battery and observation, I order: by all means to strengthen the defense of the approaches to the southern the entrance to Moonsund; second, by minefields, by separate operations in the gulf, to make it difficult for the enemy to use the Gulf of Riga and the routes for feeding the expeditionary detachment on Ezel, forcing him to conduct operations across the open sea; third, to strengthen the defenses of Pernov with the help of obstacles; fourth, to help, as far as possible, from the sea by ships, the advance of our detachment along Ezel; fifth, certainly provide the inland waters of Moonsund. No. 1655. Rear-Admiral Razvozov.
This decision made sense: while maintaining control over the Moonsund Strait and the Great Sound, theoretically, it was possible to deliver reinforcements to all three Moonsund Islands, and in general, this water area was, in fact, the “last bastion” allowing hope to hold the archipelago. The Germans had already invaded the Gulf of Riga, but the absence of bases on the islands of the archipelago and the inability to control the Moonsund Strait forced them to withdraw. One could count on this even now.
The reasons why Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev made the decision to fight with an enemy that was many times superior in strength was perfectly described by him in his "Report":
“Despite the great disparity of forces, in order to maintain the spirit of the Moonsund garrison, counting on a minefield to S from Kuivast, I decided to accept the battle and delay the enemy's capture of the southern part of Moonsund as much as possible. If I succeeded and his appearance at Moonsund was fruitless, his position in the Gulf of Riga, if he decided to stay there for a while, without a base for large ships, with the existence of submarines in the sea and mine cans set up at night, would be risky. Moreover, the attacks of our destroyers were made very possible. With the departure of the German fleet from the Gulf of Riga and the slowdown in the capture of southern Moonsund, even for a short time, it was still possible to bring fresh infantry and cavalry units and artillery to Moon and through it to Ezel, and, therefore, there was still hope for an improvement in the situation. In addition, I believed that the withdrawal of naval forces without a fight would entail a rapid retreat of our unstable land units not only from Werder, but also from points to N and O from it and even from the island of Dago."
They had to fight in much more cramped conditions than was possible at the Irben position, but there was nothing to choose from. In order to pass to the Moonsund Strait, the Germans had to overcome the Great Sound, located between the islands of Moon and Werder, it was there that the ships of Bakhirev had to defend themselves. If you look at the map, there seems to be a lot of space, but the problem was that large ships could go along the Bolshoi Sound only in a very narrow fairway. Accordingly, if in the battles of 1915, "Slava" calmly moved along the minefields, then to the south, then to the north, here she had to fight almost at anchor.
On the other hand, from the side of the Gulf of Riga, the approaches to the Big Sound were covered by two minefields, placed one after the other with a small gap between them: closer to Moon and Werder, there was a barrier, exhibited in the past, in 1916, and a little more seaward - the second, which was installed in 1917 d. In order to break through to the Big Sound, both of them had to be overcome. But the Russians also had another advantage - Battery 36, located on the southern coast of Moon Island, which consisted of five 254-mm guns.
In addition, batteries # 32 and # 33, four 152-mm guns each, were also located on Moona and Werder.
Unfortunately, the Germans were already "knocking" on the rear of this position - starting from October 1, their destroyers, under the cover of heavy artillery of battleships, passed through Soelozund, and then on their own (battleships with Soelozund could not pass) and actively operated in the Gulf of Kassar. M. K. Bakhirev tried to fight them, involving not only destroyers and gunboats, but also the cruiser Admiral Makarov, as well as Slava itself. By October 3, in the north of the Moonsund archipelago, the picture was as follows - German troops almost completely captured Ezel and fought on the defensive Russian positions of Orissar. The importance of this position was difficult to overestimate, because it covered the dam connecting the islands of Ezel and Moon. It is clear that if the Germans invaded the Moon with ground forces and captured it, then the defense of the Great Sound would be extremely difficult, if at all possible, so that the ships of Bakhirev and the heavy guns at Kuivast supported the defenders of Orissar with fire. German destroyers, on the contrary, supported the troops, the attacking Orissar drove them away, but they returned again.
As for the situation near the Irbensky Strait, here by October 3 the Germans finally managed to wipe out the barriers. The entrance to the Gulf of Riga was opened.
Events of October 3, 1917
At 09.00, "Citizen" returned to Kuivast. British submarines deployed to positions in the Gulf of Riga, but the Russians did not approach, about which Bakhirev notified the fleet commander. It suddenly turned out that enough Russian troops had retreated to the southeastern coast of Ezel, and Bakhirev sent a detachment of light ships to help them gain a foothold and support them with fire. Then enemy destroyers appeared on the Kassar reach - our gunboats entered the battle with them, and Bakhirev sent destroyers to support them, and also ordered the cruiser Admiral Makarov "to approach the shallow water of the Kassar reach as far as its draft allows, take a roll of 5 degrees and be ready to support the destroyers with fire. Slava received a similar order.
At this very time, the fleet commander telegraphed Bakhirev that the Germans were preparing a night landing on the Moon from the Kassar reach. The head of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga was forced to prepare a plan for a night battle, suggesting that the German ships would be attacked with destroyers. But on the whole, the circumstances were such that the German ships operated quite freely at the entrance to the Small Sound from the side of the Kassar reach and it was not possible to expel them from there, even with the use of the newest "novik" destroyers. By evening, the fleet commander informed Bakhirev that the landing on the Moon had been postponed by the Germans. The Slava and batteries near Kuivast fired at the German troops on the other side of the Ezele dam that day.
While the Russian ships defended the Moon on October 3, a large German squadron crossed the Irbensky Strait. Despite the fact that the fairway was swept through, no one wanted to risk it, so 26 minesweepers and 18 minesweeping boats were in front, and in 6 cables behind them were the Kohlberg light cruiser, the König and Kronzprinz dreadnoughts and two more light cruisers, Strasbourg and Augsburg. Destroyers and transports held on five miles behind them.
Between 11 and 12 o'clock the squadron entered the Gulf of Riga, climbed north, past the Svorbe peninsula and stood within sight of Ahrensburg. Here at 13.30 the commander of the ship group in the Gulf, Vice-Admiral Benke received an order "to attack the Russian ships in Moonsund and the Gulf of Riga with all available forces." In pursuance of the order, Benke divided his forces - "Augsburg" and left the transports in the roadstead of Arensburg, and he himself, having 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 10 destroyers, 16 minesweepers and 9 minesweeping boats, together with their Indianola base, moved to Moon … They walked slowly, behind the trawl caravan, fearing mines, but because of this, the detachment became vulnerable to attacks from under the water. At 19.00, they came under attack from the British submarine C-27, which was torpedoing the Indianola. The base of minesweeping boats did not sink, but was forced to return to Ahrensburg.
Behnke did not expect to start the operation on October 3, but he wanted to get as close as possible to the Russian positions so as not to waste time on it the next day. The German squadron stopped for the night 35 miles from Moonsund in order to begin the operation at dawn on 4 October.
