So, the first German breakthrough attempt was unsuccessful, Benke's squadron was forced to retreat to regroup. But it was in this phase of the battle, which was unsuccessful for the Germans, that two most important factors were determined that predetermined their future victory.
First and foremost: due to the fact that the Russians have only one battleship with long-range guns ("Glory"), the head of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga, M. K. Bakhirev was not able to interfere with the work of two groups of minesweepers at the same time. Concentrating fire on the minesweepers that broke through the minefields of 1917 from the west, he was forced to leave the ships that were bypassing the minefield from the east unfired. And they got the job done for the most part.
In fact, this work was greatly facilitated by two circumstances. The Germans had a map of minefields taken by them on the destroyer Grom (yes, the same one that was “heroically blown up” by the sailor Samonchuk. However, there can be no claims to him - this story was not invented by him). And - by the carelessness of the remaining unknown persons who forgot to remove the buoys that marked the edge of the minefield.
Second, the 305-mm bow mount was out of order on the Slava. The reason is the marriage of the Obukhov plant, which “casually made gears out of bad metal,” as a result of which the gun locks did not close. They tried to repair the damage, but, "despite the intensive work of the tower servants and locksmiths from the ship's workshop, nothing could be done." Thus, by the decisive moment of the battle, the Russians had two long-range guns against twenty German ones.
Ships M. K. Bakhirev's position before the start of the battle was as follows.
The seaward of all was "Citizen", two cables to the north - "Bayan", even further north, almost on the roadstead of Kuivast - "Slava". On "Slava" they decided to take a position closer to the enemy and gave a stern course (in the narrowness of the Big Sound it was unsafe to turn around), going down to Werder Island (dotted arrow).
At 11.30 M. K. Bakhirev ordered the ships to anchor. This was done only by "Citizen" and "Bayan", and "Slava", with riveted anchor chains, could not carry out the order of the vice admiral. At the same time, the Germans were preparing for a breakthrough. They strengthened the group of minesweepers to 19 ships, and now everything depended on their crews - whether they would be able to withstand Russian fire enough time to have time to clear the fairway for their battleships.
Fight 11.50 - 12.40
The classic description of the beginning of a battle looks like this. At 11.50, the Russian ships noticed the approach of minesweepers, and M. K. Bakhirev ordered to be removed from the anchor, which was done, however, the "Bayan" was delayed a little. From the flagship cruiser, the semaphore reported:
"If the minesweepers approach, open fire."
Nevertheless, the distance was still too great for the Citizen's guns, and he was forced to descend to the south, towards the enemy. Then the battleship turned to the left side to the enemy and opened fire. "Slava" was still completing its maneuver, backing towards the island of Werder, and was able to engage, firing at the minesweepers from a distance close to the limit (112 kbt) only at 12.10
But it was too late. At 12.10 the German battleships entered the well-trodden, buoy-marked fairway and, speeding up to 18 knots, rushed forward. At 12.13 the head "Koenig", having reduced the speed to 17 knots, opened fire when the opponents were separated by 90 cables.
Everything seems to be simple and clear … until you pick up a card and start counting.
It would be logical to assume that the "Citizen" opened fire on the minesweepers from the maximum 88 cables, maybe a little earlier or later, for the calculation we will take 85 kbt. It is unlikely that the German minesweepers went slower than 7 knots or faster than 12 knots. In this case, in 6 minutes from the moment of the first shot of the "Citizen" (12.04) and before the opening of fire by the "Glory" (12.10), they passed 7-12 cables and were approximately 73-78 kb from the "Citizen". If we take it for granted that Slava opened fire, being 112 cables away from the minesweepers, it is easy to calculate that at that moment about 34-39 kbt separated it from the former Tsarevich.
Alas, this is impossible geographically. In order to retreat such a distance, the "Citizen" had to descend very strongly to the south, leaving behind the boom line, which he obviously did not do. But even if we ignore the geography and take the assertions of the sources for granted, it turns out that the "Koenig" opened fire on the "Slava" from 90 kbt, when it was separated from the "Citizen" by some pitiful 51-56 cables! Is it possible to imagine that the Germans allowed a Russian battleship so close to them without opening fire on it?
Again, if Slava opened fire at minesweepers at 12.10 from 112 kbt, and Koenig at 12.13 (well, or at 12.15 according to Russian data) - at Slava with 90 kbt, then there is already one of two things: or "Koenig" overtook the minesweepers, which is absolutely impossible, or these same minesweepers, in order to stay ahead of the "Koenig", suddenly grew wings (underwater?) And overcame 22 cables in 3-5 minutes, that is, developed 26, 5-44 node!
For example, the "Koenig" opened fire not when the distance to the "Slava" was 90 kbt, but when there were 90 cables to the nearest Russian ship, that is, to the "Citizen". But then it turns out that "Koenig" fired at "Slava" from 124-129 cables (90 kbt from "Koenig" to "Citizen" plus 34-39 kbt from "Citizen" to "Glory")! Of course, the Koenig guns, which most likely had a real range of no more than 110 kbt, were obviously incapable of such feats.
In order to understand all these intricacies, work is needed in the archives and documents from the German side are needed, but, alas, the author of this article does not have anything of this. All that remains is to build all sorts of hypotheses: one of them, in no way claiming to be the ultimate truth, is offered to your attention. It is based on the following data.
First. Vinogradov, who gives perhaps the most detailed description of the battle on October 4, writes about "Citizen":
"Having turned to the left side to the enemy, at 12.04 he began to fire at 12-inch and 6-inch minesweepers."
If the "Citizen" opened fire at the maximum distance for him (88 kbt), then there was no point in firing from 6-inch cannons - their range hardly exceeded 60 kbt. This means that, most likely, "Citizen" opened fire from a much smaller distance, from where 152-mm artillery could hit the enemy.
Second. We also read from Vinogradov, who studied the magazine of the flagship German battleship, that the Slava was fired between 12.12 (typo? In other places, Vinogradov gives 12.13) to 12.39, despite the fact that the distance at that time changed from 109 to 89 cables. That is, "Koenig" opened fire when before "Glory" there were exactly 109, and not 90 kbt.
Based on the above, the author assumes that on the ships of M. K. Bakhirev was discovered too late by the German minesweepers, when they were already close enough to the Russian ships. “Citizen” descended to the south not in order to fire from 305-mm cannons, but in order to be able to activate 152-mm artillery. As for the Slava, it opened fire on the minesweepers not from 112 cables, but from a smaller distance. The battleship entered the battle only after it reached a position near the island of Werder (08/12) and led the enemy to a course angle of 135 degrees (which could have taken 2 minutes).
If the author is correct in his assumptions, then the beginning of the battle looked like this.
At 11.50, enemy minesweepers were sighted, and the ships began to weaken anchor, with the Bayan delayed, and the Citizen descending a little to the south in order to activate not only the main, but also the medium caliber.
At 12.04 "Citizen" from a distance of about 70 cables opened fire from 305-mm guns, and soon after that he put into action his six-inch guns. At 12.10, Slava joined them, positioned about two miles north of the Citizen. By this time, the minesweepers were approximately 65 cables from the "Citizen" and 85 cables from the "Slava". After "Slava", "Bayan" and destroyers opened fire on the minesweepers. Vinogradov describes this moment of the battle as follows:
“Following the battleships, the rest of the ships opened fire - the cruiser Bayan and the patrol destroyers Turkmenets Stavropolsky and Donskoy Cossack, which were stationed at the boom, the distance from which to the minesweepers did not exceed 65-70 kbt”.
At this time (12.10) "König" and "Kronprinz" just entered the fairway and began their "dash to the north". At 12.13 "Koenig" opened fire on "Slava" from the maximum distance for its guns of 110 cables. Accordingly, there were 90 cables between "Koenig" and "Citizen" at that moment. At the same time, the German minesweepers were already about 60 cables from the "Citizen". Accordingly, at 12.13 the German battleships lagged behind their minesweepers by about 30 cables, which allowed them to move forward at a 17-knot speed, without fear of "stepping on the heels" of their trawling caravan.
It is not known exactly when the "Slava" transferred the fire to the "König". Sources indicate that she opened fire from 112 kbt, so it cannot be ruled out that Slava fired at the German flagship battleship even before she herself came under fire. It can only be argued that the Slava almost did not shoot at the minesweepers, because almost immediately the fire was transferred to the leading Konig. Probably, it was at "Koenig" that "Slava" fired the entire battle until it was over.
At the same time, according to the logs of the battleships Kronprinz and Koenig, which Vinogradov cites, it is absolutely impossible to figure out who fired at whom. Even before joining the battle, at 11.55, the "Kronprinz" received an order from the "König":
“I intend to attack the Glory. Take a little to the side so that you can also fire."
At 12.15, after the "Koenig" had fought for 2 minutes, the signal "Open fire" was raised on it, and a minute later, at 12.16, - "Move fire to the right." It can be assumed that Benke wanted to destroy the Slava, the only Russian ship with long-range artillery, with the concentrated fire of his two dreadnoughts. But the instruction given by him at 11.55 allows a double interpretation: "also to be able to fire" does not specify the goal, but only speaks about the very possibility of shooting. Probably at 12.15 the Crown Prince nevertheless attacked the Citizen, but at 12.16 he received an order from the flagship to move the fire to the right: according to Vinogradov, from the position of the Germans, “Slava was just to the right of the Citizen.
What happened next is anyone's guess. On the one hand, in the hochseeflott they usually carried out the orders of their elders, and therefore the transfer of the Kronprinz's fire to the Slava was to be expected. But on the other hand, not a single source mentions that at the beginning of the battle, the "Citizen" remained unfired. It turns out that the "Kronprinz" fired at both "Glory" and "Citizen"? This is possible: the "Kronprinz" could distribute fire in the event that part of its guns could not shoot at the "Slava" due to restrictions on the angles of fire. The battle was fought at sharp heading angles and it is quite possible to assume that the aft towers of the Kronprinz could not shoot at Slava, so why not attack another target?
The battle of battleships began at 12:13 pm with a duel between Glory and Koenig. At 12.15 the Crown Prince attacked the Citizen, and at 12.16 he dispersed the fire between the Citizen and the Slava, and from that time 2 dreadnoughts fired at the Slava. From the very beginning, the Germans demonstrated excellent shooting. To avoid coverings, Slava made a small move, at 12.18, increased it to medium. "Citizen" remained where he was.
The German dreadnoughts, on the contrary, at 12.22 slowed down to low speed. It can be assumed that they approached the boundaries of the 1916 obstacle, and in addition, following at a speed of 17 knots for 12 minutes, they began to slowly catch up with the minesweepers.
At 12.25, three shells seriously damaged Slava and almost simultaneously two shells hit the Citizen. The latter, however, did not receive critical damage, but the Slava was doomed: two out of three shells caused severe flooding in the bow, so that the battleship could no longer return to the Gulf of Finland by the Moonsund Strait.
I must say that such a large-scale flooding should not have happened if the team had time to batten down the doors in the bulkhead of the turret compartment of the bow 305-mm installation. But people had to act very professionally and quickly, and in complete darkness (the electricity in the bow was cut off) and in rooms where water was quickly supplied. Unfortunately, the revolutionary sailors were categorically lacking in professionalism and composure.
As, in fact, and disciplines. Indeed, according to the charter of the Russian imperial fleet, the ship had to go into battle with sealed watertight hatches and doors, which was not done. If the door to the turret compartment had been battened down, as prescribed by the charter, then "Slava" would have received only 200-300 tons of water inside. In this case, even under the condition of counter-flooding to straighten the bank, "Slava" would still retain the ability to pass into the Gulf of Finland, and there would be no need to destroy the battleship that became famous.
But what happened happened, and as a result of the hits "Slava" took into the bow rooms 1130 tons of water. Taking into account counter-flooding (to straighten the heel) and subsequent filtration, the total amount of water entering the ship's hull reached 2500 tons. In this state, the Slava could not return to the Gulf of Finland by the Moonsund Strait and was doomed.
Having received the hits, the Slava turned to the north, so that Benke's dreadnoughts were right at her stern. "Citizen", carrying out the order of the commander of the ISRZ, still remained in position, being under fire from the enemy.
And here came, probably, the most heroic and at the same time tragicomic episode of the defense of Moonsund.
Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev understood perfectly well that the battle was lost. It was not possible to keep the enemy battleships behind the minefield, the Slava was knocked out and there was not the slightest hope that the Citizen, a Dotsushima-built squadron battleship, would be able to repel the attack of two first-class dreadnoughts, each of which outnumbered it by almost four times. Therefore, M. K. Bakhirev ordered to raise signals for "Citizen" to go into the canal and immediately, for "Slava": "Pass" Citizen "forward" - so that "Slava" would not accidentally block the passage. The "Citizen" zigzagged, knocking down the lead to the "Crown Prince", as far as the width of the Great Sound allowed him.
But Bakhirev himself stayed on the Bayan to cover the retreating battleships with fire. This is how the Bayan commander describes this moment:
“By this moment, wanting to divert enemy fire from the shot down" Citizen "until he leaves the sphere of fire, Bakhirev invited me to stay in position. The distance to the enemy large ships at this time was reduced to 90-95 cables, so that Bayan was able to open fire from its 8-inch artillery."
S. N. Timirev claims that "Bayan" for some time managed to divert the fire of the dreadnoughts to himself, so that no one fired at the "Citizen" anymore. Below we will try to figure out whether this is so.
Closer to 12.30, "König" and "Kronprinz" came out to the northeastern corner of the minefield of 1916 and stopped there, turning a log to the Russian ships. From this place they could fire at both the Kuivast raid and the parking lot near Schildau - the Russians, in general, had no places left where they could hide. Now only a general retreat could save the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga, so at about 12.30 (probably at 12.27-12.28) Mikhail Koronatovich raised signal "B", duplicating it on the radio: "ISRZ to withdraw." Almost immediately, at 12.29, the German dreadnoughts achieve two hits on Glory.
But the flagship cruiser "Bayan" continued to distract the German dreadnoughts on itself, "spinning with a snake" in front of them, so as not to hit the ship. S. N. Timirev writes:
"Fortunately for us, the machines worked without failure, and the large cruiser spun like a loach, completely preventing the enemy from taking aim."
According to S. N. Timireva, M. K. Bakhirev allowed the cruiser to retreat only after the "Citizen" left the island of Schildau, but this is a clear mistake - the ships reached Schildau much later. But at the moment of retreat, the cruiser became especially vulnerable to the enemy:
“The fairway in the north very soon narrowed, and it was necessary to immediately go to a constant course, which gave the enemy the simplest case of zeroing in. I ordered to develop the fullest possible speed in the shortest possible time … The enemy increased the fire and then, finally, he was lucky."
Unfortunately, according to the data available to the author, it is impossible to accurately reconstruct the current moment of the battle. The journal of the battleship "König" contains information that in the period from 12.12 to 12.39 the ship used up 60 shells for the "Slava" and 20 shells for the "Bayan". It is quite permissible to assume that Bayan was fired at exactly at the time when, trying to cover the retreat of other ships, it kept closer to the German dreadnoughts. As for the "Kronprinz", its log contains 4 hits on Russian ships, but … for some reason, after giving a brief description of each hit, the Germans did not specify which ship this or that shell hit. One of these hits, according to the description, is quite similar to hitting the "Bayan": "at 10.34 in the bow in front of the front tower" (German time was 2 hours behind ours). Kosinsky describes this episode of the battle as follows:
“The enemy stepped up fire on the Bayan, making at least eight volleys of three and four rounds in a volley within 13 seconds; at first there were two flights, after which the shells began to lay down at the very side and under the stern. At first, the cruiser went at the lowest speed, maneuvering so as not to interfere with our ships of the line leaving for the north, and only with the last volleys increased the speed to 15 knots, as a result of which undershoots began to be obtained."
Without a doubt, the description suffers from inaccuracies: both German battleships could not fire 8 volleys in 13 seconds, but nevertheless, according to Kosinsky, it turns out that Bayan held its position for some time and was under fire when the Citizen and Glory were already retreating.
In general, all this gives grounds to assume that after 12.25, both the "König" and the "Kaiser" really fired at the "Bayan". On the other hand, hitting the Slava at 12.29 suggests that they were shooting not only at the cruiser: it is likely that the dreadnoughts distributed fire, firing at both Slava and Bayan at the same time.
In any case, the actions of "Bayan", who tried to cover the retreat of the battleships and fought with the dreadnoughts with two of their eight-inch cannons (the third was open and was not sent to her), are worthy of the highest assessment. Those who fought on this cruiser should be called heroes without exaggeration. But, as you know, there is only one step from the great to the ridiculous …
According to the commander of the "Bayan" S. N. Timirev, the team, with the beginning of the battle, seemed to come to their senses and behaved as if there was no revolution at all:
"From the moment the enemy appeared on the horizon, I remembered the old-regime discipline and looked guiltily into the eyes of Bakhirev and me."
Such a change in mood, obviously, could not please the court committee, and with the beginning of the battle, instead of fulfilling his duties according to the combat schedule, he retired to a conference. Of course, six members of the ship committee and his associates "quite by accident" chose for their meeting perhaps the most well-protected room on the cruiser - the bow turret compartment. S. N. Timirev wrote:
“According to the team, which reacted to this 'rally' definitely negatively, the subject of discussion was the 'criminal' behavior of Bakhirev and mine, who entered the battle with the strongest enemy specifically in order to 'put to death', i.e. the shooting of the enemy artillery of several hundred "the best class-conscious comrades - the deepening of the revolution."
And it had to happen that a single shell hitting the "Bayan" hit exactly a handful of protesters, killing and mortally wounding all of them!
“This incident made a strong, overwhelming impression on the team, who spoke in one voice that“God has found the guilty”.
But back to the fight. All three large Russian ships were retreating, and the Bayan, which accelerated to 20 knots during the retreat, overtook the Tsarevich and approached the Slava. Unfortunately, the behavior of the Slava crew became a serious problem for Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev: despite the instruction to let the Citizen go ahead, the Slava continued to move to the Moonsund Strait first and did not react to the flagship's signals in any way.
It should be noted here that the commander of the Slava did the right thing: he brought the ship out of the range of German artillery fire, and brought it to the channel in the Gulf of Finland, but did not go into the channel itself, waiting for all the other ships to pass. But M. K. Bakhirev could not have known about this in advance, he saw only one thing - that the knocked-out battleship was moving quickly in the direction of the canal and could clog it. Understanding what the ship committees are really worth, M. K. Bakhirev could not be sure that the Slava crew would act as they should. Therefore, having overtaken the "Citizen" and approached the "Slava" on the "Bayan" raised the signal "C" (stop the car).
At 12.39, Slava received the last hits (either two or three shells), and the battle between the ships ended there. König and Kronprinz stopped firing at Slava at 12.40 at the latest.
At the same time M. K. Bakhirev notes that at about 12.40 the battery of the island of Moon entered the battle. "Koenig", having stopped firing at the ships, transferred fire first to the battery on the island of Werder, then to the Mononian battery and suppressed both of them.
The commander of "Glory" V. G. Antonov finally requested permission from the flagship "in view of the fact that the ship was heavily bowed, and the Grand Canal became impassable for the ship, remove people and blow up the ship."
At 12.43 (according to other sources, at 12.50), six German seaplanes raided the retreating ships of the ISRZ. To no avail.
This concludes the description of the battle on October 4. Glory damage and post-battle events are described in detail in the sources, and the author has nothing to add to them.
Consider the effectiveness of the fire of the parties.
Unfortunately, there is no way to accurately assess the performance of the German ships. The problem is that the expenditure of the Kronprinz's shells is unknown. There is such data on "Koenig", but the difficulty here lies in the fact that we cannot reliably assert that it was "Kronprinz", and not "Koenig" that got into the "Bayan" and we do not know how many of the 7 (or all 8) hits in "Glory" were achieved by the gunners of "König". Of course, the "Kronprinz" took into account their hits, and Vinogradov, analyzing their description, makes the assumption that of the four hits recorded by the "Kronprinz" observers, three hit "Glory". In the opinion of the author of this article, this is a mistake, because only one hit was recorded in the Kronprintsa magazine, the time and description of which roughly correspond to the hit to the Bayan. In the other three cases, the time of hits (12.20, 12.35 and 12.36) does not correspond to the actual one. According to Russian data, the shells hit the "Citizen" and "Slava" at 12.25, 12.29 and 12.40. It is likely that the Kronprinz's observers "saw" the hits, which in fact were not. This is normal in combat. On the other hand, the two shells that hit the "Citizen" at about 12.25 pm could only have been from the "Kronprinz", because the "König" did not fire at this Russian battleship at all.
But we also cannot assert that all the shells that hit the "Glory" were "König". Some of them could well have been from the "Crown Prince", but that they were not recorded in the journal - so what? "Seeing" the hits, which in fact were not, the observers of the "Crown Prince" could well have missed the hits that were. It should be remembered that the battle took place at a distance of 9-10 miles, at such a distance it is generally very difficult to see anything.
But in general, the shooting accuracy of German dreadnoughts should be assessed as extremely high. A total of 10 or 11 hits were achieved: 7 or 8 - in "Glory", 2 - in "Citizen", 1 - in "Bayan". Assuming that in the second phase of the battle, the Kronprinz spent the same amount of shells against the Citizen, Slava and Bayan as the König (80, including 60 for the Slava, 20 for the Bayan)) then we get a consumption of 160 shells for 10 or 11 hits, which gives a total hit percentage of 6, 25-6, 88%! But most likely it will be even higher, because the "Kronprinz" opened fire, at least not much, but still later than the "Koenig", and therefore it can be assumed that he used up fewer shells than we assumed in the calculation.
As for the accuracy of the Russian ships, everything seems to be clear with it - not a single hit. But if we take a closer look, then … Consider the shooting of "Glory".
In this battle, absolutely all the advantages were on the side of the German dreadnoughts. The quantitative superiority of the materiel: ten guns "König" and, probably, six "Kronprinz" against only two cannons "Glory". Qualitative superiority: the newest 305-mm Krupp SC L / 50 guns, developed in 1908, fired 405.5 kg shells with an initial speed of 855 m / s, while the 305-mm "obukhkov" model of 1895, which was armed "Slava" fired 331, 7 kg shells with an initial speed of only 792 m / s.
As practice has shown, for effective zeroing, it was required to fire volleys from at least four barrels, and the Koenig, which concentrated on the Slava, fired mainly with five-gun volleys. "Slava", whose bow tower never entered service, could respond with two-gun at best.
The German gunners had excellent optics at their disposal. The "Slava" has two "9-foot" rangefinders, analogs of those that were on the British battlecruisers in Jutland. Those same rangefinders, which are usually scolded for the inability to accurately determine the distance at long distances.
The Germans had very sophisticated fire control systems. Unfortunately, the author of this article did not manage to find out what kind of LMS was on the Slava, but at best it was the Geisler LMS of the 1910 model. Even in this case, it was still inferior in functionality to the German one.
The quality of the shells. There is nothing to talk about. If the German shells were quite ordinary, giving normal dispersion, then the "long-range" shells of "Glory" with ballistic tips were intended for firing at areal targets, they could hit an enemy ship, and even at a distance close to the limit, it would have been possible by chance.
Training and teamwork. On the German dreadnoughts, this was in complete order, but on the "Slava" … Report of the senior artillery officer, senior lieutenant Rybaltovsky, 3rd of October 8:
"In battle, the entire old team behaved perfectly, but some of the young ran with belts and screamed something in panic; there were up to 100 people like that."
But even that was not the most important thing. The German dreadnoughts practiced shooting at Russian ships for almost half an hour (12.13-12.40), while the Slava could only fire effectively for 12 minutes.
Let's remember the beginning of the battle of battleships. Koenig opened fire on Slava at 12.13, Slava responded at about the same time. It took the König gunners twelve minutes to get the first hit - three shells hit the Slava simultaneously at 12.25. Can we expect better accuracy from "Slava" than from "Koenig", despite the fact that its material part was inferior to the German ship in literally everything? Unlikely.
But immediately after receiving the hits, "Slava" lay down on course 330 and turned stern to the enemy. This was not a reaction to the German fire, it was just that the battleship entered the channel of the Bolshoi Sound, and Slava, naturally, could not move along it sideways. But now the "Koenig" was right aft and … in the 45-degree "dead zone" of the "Slava" rangefinders. In the last article, we mentioned that of the three range finders of the battleship, one at the stern was removed for the Tserel battery and, of course, did not return to Slava. In other words, starting from 12.25, the battleship lost the ability to measure the distance using rangefinders, and here, obviously, it was impossible to expect any kind of accurate shooting from it. And at 12.29, after another 4 minutes, the enemy shell put out of action the central post, so that the centralized control of the Slava's fire ceased to exist, control was transferred to the plutongs (that is, to the gunners of the aft tower). From now on, the cannons of "Glory" could only shoot "somewhere in that direction." Decades later, the excellently trained gunners of the Bismarck in its last battle, having much better materiel and from much smaller distances, could not hit either the Rodney or the Prince of Wells.
It is also worth noting that, taking into account the combat rate of fire of the Slava's guns, its stern turret in 12 minutes of firing could hardly have fired more than 10-12 shells - here even one hit would give 8, 33-10% of the total number of shells fired.
But with all this, several coverings were recorded on the "Koenig", when the salvoes of the "Slava" fell no further than 50 meters from the battleship. It should be understood that the skill of the naval artilleryman lies in choosing a sight in which the enemy ship will be in the "epicenter" of the shell dispersion ellipse. This is called a covering, and everything else is the will of the theory of probability. The gunner can aim correctly, but dispersal will scatter projectiles around the target. And the next volley with the same correct aim can give one, or even more hits. The lower the dispersion, the more likely it is that at least one projectile in a salvo will hit the target.
If the "Slava" had tower installations with a vertical guidance angle of 35 degrees, providing a range of up to 115 cables when firing conventional shells, then things could have turned out differently. Of course, under no circumstances could the Russians win the battle on October 4, but our gunners could well have put one or two shells into the König without letting the Germans win dry.
The end follows …
