In a previous article, we touched on the question of how drones have become one of the main weapons of modern warfare. This was done through the prism of the confrontation between the Turkish UAVs and the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. In this article, the author will try to tell in more detail about the practice and tactics of using attack drones on the example of the conflicts in Syria and Libya, as well as analyze the capabilities of air defense to counter them.
Turkish UAVs in the battles in Idlib
The contribution of Turkish medium-altitude drones Bayraktar TB2 and Anka to the conflict in Idlib has certainly been decisive. Their use led to the loss of initiative by Assad's troops and the disruption of their further offensive.
The main task of the Turkish UAVs in Idlib was to scan the front line in order to provide intelligence in real time and adjust artillery fire both on positions and on Syrian columns along the front line and in the frontal zone. Based on the data obtained by the drones, Turkish Air Force planes were also attacked (without crossing the border). The result was the depletion of the Syrian troops, constantly exposed to pinpoint strikes and deprived of full supplies.
Turkish UAVs have also been used for strikes. Bayraktar TB2 with four rockets on suspension can stay in the air for more than 12 hours. They carried out constant watch in the air and, after identifying targets, quickly moved to the front line to launch missiles. The reaction time was much higher than that of aviation, which made it possible to effectively engage targets that were available only in a narrow time corridor.
In Idlib, Turkish UAVs were also used to suppress air defense systems, in particular, because of the "patchwork" placement of Syrian air defense systems, which made them vulnerable. Turkish electronic warfare ground stations and containers on the Anka UAV, according to the Turks, managed to "completely blind" the air defense missile system radar in Idlib, allowing Bayraktar TB2 to fly up almost close to the "Pantsir" and shoot them point-blank. This information is not in doubt due to the fact that the radar with PFAR on the Pantsir-S1 scans with only one beam and is vulnerable to electronic warfare.
As a result of the fighting in Idlib, Turkey has taken the use of drones to a new level. First, for the first time, attack drones were used against the regular army, not partisans. Secondly, for the first time they were used massively, by "squadrons". The press called this tactic "swarms," and so there were erroneous assumptions that they were not referring to the mid-altitude Bayraktar TB2 and Anka, but the mini-drones "kamikaze" (which were also involved). Thirdly, for the first time, UAVs carried out the suppression of air defense systems. From game they turned into hunters, while suffering minimal losses in Syria: two Anka and three Bayraktar TB2. All these innovations were then fully applied by the Turks in Libya.
Chinese UAVs in the Libyan Civil War
Supporters of Marshal Haftar were the first to use attack drones in Libya. From the UAE, they were supplied with the Chinese UAVs Wing Loong II (hereinafter referred to as WL II), which underwent significant refinement: they were equipped with Israeli OLS and the Thales communications system.
The practical flight range of the WL II is up to 1,500 km, the ceiling is 9,000 m. The control is carried out via satellite communications from the UAE. These UAVs are used very actively and with a wide range of bombs and missiles. The WL II can carry up to 12 bombs and rockets with a total mass of up to 480 kg, including the Chinese "Jdam" Fei-Teng (FT). The WL II cannot use the FT-12 with a jet booster (range up to 150 km) like another Chinese UAV, the CH-5, but is capable of carrying the FT-7 with a launch range of up to 90 km. The LJ-7 ATGM was actively used and plans were announced to supply the WL II with air-to-air missiles. It is to this UAV that Haftar owed much of its success.
The WL II operated from the highest possible heights inaccessible to the air defense systems of the armed forces of the Government of National Accord (hereinafter referred to as the PNS) opposing Haftar, therefore, only two such vehicles were lost from 2016 to August 2019. The most successful operation of these UAVs was the destruction of a hangar with Turkish drones in the summer of 2019.
Everything changed when the Turks clearly appeared on the scene in Libya - at the end of 2019, they used the Hisar and Hawk air defense systems, as well as the Korkut ZSU and the Koral electronic warfare station. The Turks managed to shoot down four WL II (as well as a pair of light WL I strikers), including with the help of the E-7 AWACS aircraft, the newest complex with radar with AFAR. By the way, the US Air Force will receive these aircraft only in 2035, which clearly shows the technological level of military equipment from the American arsenal available to the Turks. It is impossible to speak of any "backwardness" here. It is also symptomatic that a whole Boeing with up-to-date electronics was needed to fight the "corn workers". According to information in the press, the Chinese UAVs were shot down in Libya by the Hisar air defense system, a laser installation and an electronic warfare station.
At the moment, WL II continues to be actively used by Haftar, and Turkish air defense systems only created A2 / AD zones in part of the territory controlled by the PNS, and closed their access there. Prior to that, Haftar's UAVs flew everywhere and even appeared over the main strongholds of the PNS Tripoli and Misurata. WL II, due to their small number, were not massively used; attempts to suppress air defense systems by them are unknown.
Turkish UAVs in Libya
The first Turkish drone UAVs hit Libya in the summer of 2019. They were Bayraktar TB2, ordered by Turkey's ally Qatar and then transferred to the PNS. They did not make a significant contribution to the course of the battles, the turning point came only with the arrival of additional batches of these vehicles and the Turkish military. It was the massive, as in Idlib, the introduction of Turkish UAVs into battle (at the peak, the UAV group could number up to 40 units) predetermined the outcome of the decisive battle for Tripoli.
During the fighting, Haftar's forces lost a significant number of Pantsir-C1 air defense systems, destroyed by Bayraktar TB2, which, in turn, lost 19 units, which is certainly a lot compared to the campaign in Idlib. The reason for the high losses is that, unlike Syria, Bayraktar TB2 were used in Libya without the support of Anka UAVs (with AECM and SAR radar) and in most cases also without the support of electronic warfare ground stations. The Turks had to delegate to the UAV the tasks of destroying the identified targets (and, probably, simply by "attack"), which in Idlib were often solved from a safe distance by artillery and aircraft. The Firtina self-propelled guns in Libya, which have successfully operated in Idlib, are very rarely captured in the shot, and the Sakarya MLRS were first spotted only recently. The Turks have deployed a "limited contingent" in Libya. Given these circumstances, the work of Bayraktar TB2 in Libya should be assessed positively, especially given the fact that it is a light drone with a limited range of weapons and its use in Libya was limited by the lack of satellite communications. The Turks had to place repeaters in a very extensive theater of operations. Due to the lack of such a "long arm" as the Chinese WL II, Bayraktar TB2 was sent on missions to provide fire support to troops at low altitudes so that they could not be detected by air defense systems. The result was the loss of UAVs, even from machine gun fire. Tripoli was blocked by Haftar and surrounded by a chain of air defense systems, and the only airfield of Mitiga was attacked by WL II drones in an attempt to destroy Turkish UAVs, which had to be launched from the highway. The Turks did not try to attack the air defense system without the support of electronic warfare. Nevertheless, despite the losses, Bayraktar TB2 did their job, and as a result, the PNS forces broke through the ring and occupied the Al-Watia base, from where the WL IIs were launched). Here the Turks took advantage of the holes in the air defense of the Haftar army and destroyed a large number of Pantsir air defense systems with the help of UAVs. According to information in the press, Turkish drones were shot down in Libya by the Pantsir air defense missile system, the MZA and the Israeli anti-UAV anti-aircraft complex.
The capabilities of the air defense system to counter the use of UAVs
To analyze this issue, we will take the characteristics of the air defense systems available in the troops in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and the characteristics of medium-altitude UAVs, their OLS and radars, we will set according to the reference book "Introduction to modern electronic warfare systems" (DeMartino, Introduction to modern EW systems). The book is fresh, the second edition was published in 2018, but the technology is improving very quickly, and, probably, these numbers are somewhat outdated.
It should be noted right away that the military air defense has serious limitations in countering UAVs. The reason for this is very simple: OLS and UAV radars can scan the surface and track ground targets at a considerable distance.
With the help of SAR radars, UAVs can scan from distances from 55 to 75 km, which allows reconnaissance UAVs to comfortably patrol in the rear over the antennas of their electronic warfare ground stations. Unlike aviation, which appears sporadically in the air, UAVs can "hang" there all the time. Troops are constantly in need of supplies, trucks go to the front line, military equipment moves, and UAVs allow you to control all these movements. In this situation, it does not matter at all what kind of RCS the UAV has. You can take the RCS of the Anka drone used in Idlib in a configuration with electronic warfare and radar containers for 4 sq. m (according to data from the source mentioned above), and this will not in any way affect the ability to destroy it. At a distance of 55+ km from the front line, even the Buk M3 (not to mention the Pantsir, Thor and older versions of the Buk) with a missile range of up to 70 km (taking into account the placement of the latter in the depth of defense) will not reach it., missile and electronic warfare trajectories). You can develop the idea further to the S-300V and even to the S-400, and then propose to use the SBCh to blind the electronics of the "foe", but it's worth stopping in time. The conversation is about the confrontation at the tactical level. At the same time, the Buk M3 air defense system is in the troops in the amount of several dozen launchers, and by the time it is purchased in large quantities, the enemy will have already increased the capabilities of his equipment.
OLS UAVs can scan at a distance of 38 km (depending on the time of day, atmospheric interference, etc.). You can watch a video on Youtube where the Wescam station, similar to the one installed on the Bayraktar TB2, captures and leads with a day camera a convoy of smuggler trucks at a distance of 20 km. The resolution is excellent and you can see the smallest details. The range margin is clearly considerable.
It is easier to shoot down a UAV conducting optical reconnaissance, because it must come closer to the front line. But it is also not an easy task when you consider the distance to the target in tens of kilometers. Even if we take EPR entirely made of Bayraktar TB2 composites (configuration with OLS) for only 1 sq. m (in DeMartino's book, an average value of 1 sq. m is given for medium-altitude drones with OLS), it will not become an easy target, since it will be supported by an electronic warfare ground station and UAV AECM from the depth of defense.
Light UAVs used to deliver strikes are the most vulnerable category for air defense, but it is by no means easy to shoot them down. Light vehicles like the Bayraktar TB2, when working along the front edge, can go at a low altitude (several hundred meters), while remaining invisible to the radar. At the forefront, they can be opposed by Tunguska, Strela-10, Osa, MZA and MANPADS. Low-altitude flight is always a risk, and losses are inevitable here, but in some situations, such as in the case of the Bayraktar TB2 in Libya, in the absence of other options, such a risk is inevitable and justified.
Unlike light ones, heavy attack UAVs can carry several EW containers and high-precision bombs with a long launch range (like the Chinese CH-5 mentioned above). The promising Turkish UAV Akinci has the ability to use both conventional MK-82 bombs, equipped with the KGK ASELSAN kit, and high-precision bombs, gliding from a distance of up to 100 km, as well as missile launchers with a launch range of up to 250 km. It is extremely difficult to shoot down heavy UAVs with the help of air defense systems.
However, all these calculations refer only to the scenario of limited use of drones, when the enemy phlegmatically watches as his UAVs are shot down one by one by the air defense system. If the enemy acts decisively and uses UAVs massively, "squadrons", strives to destroy the air defense system, creating a large numerical superiority, then a number of problems arise, one of which is a limited air defense missile system. It is appropriate to recall here the "Pantsir" destroyed in Syria, which has exhausted its BC. The situation is no better with anti-aircraft artillery systems, since there is only enough ammunition for several tens of seconds of continuous fire. That is why laser systems are being actively developed in different countries to repel drone attacks.
To suppress air defense, during a massive attack, the enemy can launch, together with groups of medium-altitude and high-altitude UAVs (including UAVs equipped with AECW), decoys with integrated ADM-160 electronic warfare, small-sized drones, fire anti-radar missiles (HARM) at the radar and simply "throw bombs". Turkish F-16s in Idlib used bombs from a distance of 100 km. After spending the BC, destroying the air defense system is not a problem. In this situation, attack drones can also go at a height that is invulnerable to many air defense systems, for example, anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS.
Financial question
In the above-mentioned conflicts with the participation of UAVs, the Chinese WL II apparently "paid off" the fastest, because their cost before modernization did not exceed $ 2 million. Bayraktar TB2 cost the Turkish Republics about 4 million (this includes ground equipment, and the drones themselves are cheaper), which is also inexpensive compared to American "classmates". As a result, the cost of the drones of this model shot down in Libya is at the level of one fourth generation fighter.
UAVs are also much cheaper to operate than manned aircraft. For example, Bayraktar TB2 is equipped with a technologically simple and economical 100 hp engine, the cost of a flight hour is very low. For comparison: in the US Air Force, a flight hour of an MQ-1 UAV (with an engine of the same power) costs 6 times less than that of an F-16C.
In our opinion, it makes no sense to count how many UAVs were shot down or air defense systems destroyed, and only the outcome of the battle is important. And as a result, in Syria, Turkish drones deprived Assad's troops of the initiative, and in Libya they were able to seize the initiative from the enemy completely
Output
Attack UAVs have come to the battlefield for a long time. We can confidently assert that:
- UAVs will be used en masse with the support of electronic warfare, aviation and artillery, including against a high-tech enemy;
- SAMs cannot solve the problem of combating UAVs alone. Their capabilities can be significantly increased due to the use of electronic warfare stations, anti-jamming radars with AFAR with full-fledged scanning with several beams (and ideally with the LPI covert operation mode), both on ground and on AWACS aircraft (capable of directing missiles beyond the radio horizon), but it will still not be able to completely neutralize the work of the UAV;
- the attraction of manned fighter aircraft to destroy drones will give the enemy aircraft an advantage and cannot be considered as an effective measure;
- any modern army cannot do without such a tool as medium-altitude and high-altitude attack drones, which give significant advantages to the side using them;
- a collision in the air of attack UAVs of the opposing sides will inevitably lead to the emergence of UAV fighters capable of destroying enemy drones. It is possible to draw an analogy with WWI, before which aircraft were considered as reconnaissance aircraft and only during hostilities did fighters appear as a response to an obvious need. Already today, UAVs are equipped with powerful AFAR radars, similar to those of fighters, and air-to-air missiles.
