The epic drama of the defeat of the Western Front in June 1941 became a textbook example after the war, along with the defeat of Samsonov's army in Prussia in 1914. Already on June 28, the Germans occupied Minsk. In two cauldrons near Volkovysk and Minsk, divisions from the 3rd, 4th and 10th Soviet armies were surrounded, 11 rifle, 6 tank, 4 motorized and 2 cavalry divisions were destroyed. The total losses in killed, missing and prisoners exceeded 300,000 people. The commander of the district - Colonel-General DG Pavlov paid for this with his life and was shot, together with him his fate was shared by a number of senior officers of the district headquarters, several corps corps and army commanders. The commander of the air force of the district, Major General I. I. Kopets, most likely would have repeated their fate, but he made his choice on June 22. Learning about the losses incurred by aviation, the general shot himself.
The personality of the commander of the ZapOVO, like a drop of water, reflected the entire Red Army of the 1941 model. He was a commander who was quickly promoted to the highest position due to the thinning out of the army of repression. But the version that he did not have sufficient training, which so easily explained everything and served as a reason for his execution in the future, is not true. By appointing only him responsible for what happened in June 1941, we thereby undertake to assert that another person in his place could have rectified the situation. As if the situation in which the Western Front would have withstood the attacks of the Germans does not even require proof. Some especially savvy experts argue that it was enough to set the existing T-34 and KV tanks in ambush, as General Katukov did later near Moscow and German tanks would have burned out even before Baranovichi. But such people are perplexed by the quite reasonable question "where to organize these ambushes?" Apparently, Pavlov should have known the exact routes of the offensive of the German troops. But he did not know, and when he found out it was already too late.
Before judging Pavlov, one must put oneself in his place and consider the events, taking into account the data that were at his disposal. The location of the Bialystok salient itself already presupposed an encirclement operation, and Pavlov knew this, of course. The whole point was that such an operation could be carried out in different ways, which presented difficulties for both the defenders and the attackers. The main issue for both those and others was the question of determining the point of convergence of the advancing tank wedges. A similar operation was expected from the Germans, but to a shallow depth, with an attempt to form a boiler in the Volokovysk, Baranovichi area.
Historical events, as it often happens, are pushed forward by chance. Something similar happened in 1941 in the Brest region. Taught by the bitter experience of 1939, then Gudarian was already trying to seize the Polish Brest Fortress, in the 1941 campaign he planned a double roundabout maneuver. Figuratively speaking, the fast Heinz "blew into the water", instead of throwing his tank group along the highway near Brest, he drove it into the terrain difficult for tanks to pass to the south and north of Brest. The infantry was to take the fortress and storm the city. And starting the morning of June 22 "for health", Gudarian finished it "for peace." The Germans captured many bridges, but many of them were suitable for infantry and light vehicles, not tanks. The Panzer Group spent the entire day of 22 June fighting the terrain, trying to get out onto the highway. By the evening of June 22, many units had not yet crossed the Bug. At the end of the day, units of the 3rd and 4th tank divisions of the 49th motorized corps of the Germans, which had left on the highway, buried themselves in the burned-out bridge over Mukhovets in the Bulkovo region. Gudarian was annoyed by this beginning, but it was this delay that played one of the key roles in the unfolding drama of the Western Front.
By the end of the day, Pavlov and his headquarters were assessing the events and trying to develop countermeasures. Pavlov did not know everything that we know today, he was guided by intelligence data. What did he see? The first reconnaissance report from 14:00 reported that the enemy was making every effort to capture Grodno, the second from 16:15 said that the main efforts of enemy aviation were being noted in the Grodno-Lida sector. The evening final reconnaissance report from 22 hours contained the following data. At dawn, German units in the size of up to 30-32 infantry divisions, 4-5 tank divisions, up to 2 motorized ones, 40 artillery regiments, about 4-5 air regiments, and one airborne division crossed the border of the USSR. And here the scouts made a slight mistake, the forces operating against the district were determined approximately correctly, it was especially emphasized that in the zone of action of the neighbor on the right, a tank group crossed the border, whose forces were estimated at 4 tank and motorized divisions.
But a completely different picture was in the distribution of these troops. So it was argued that 2 tank and 2 motorized divisions were attacking Grodno, in fact there was only one infantry. But already 2-3 tank formations remained in other directions automatically. The reconnaissance "found" another tank division on the southern face of the Bialystok salient, but there were no tanks either, only infantry reinforced by the Sturmgeshutz self-propelled guns. 1-2 tank divisions remained at Brest, it was a fatal miscalculation, an underestimation of the enemy's strength on the left flank.
There were quite objective reasons for this, the air reconnaissance of the front was weakened by the huge losses incurred during the day. It was also possible to take into account such a criterion as the depth of penetration of enemy units and the introduction of tanks into battle. It was in the Grodno direction that such a situation was noted. In the Brest region, Gudarina introduced his tanks into battle in roundabout ways and they have not yet been seen in Minsk. Later, as ill luck would have it, directive No. 3 of the General Staff came, which ordered, together with the North-Western Front, to inflict a counterattack on the flank of the Suwalki grouping of the Germans. This was quite consistent with what Pavlov saw; the enemy in the Grodno region represented the main danger. So the largest and most efficient mechanized unit of the front (6 mechanized corps) was thrown into battle near Grodno, where it was forced to ram the strong anti-tank defenses of the Wehrmacht infantry divisions. But the commander did not disregard the left flank in this direction, the infantry, the 47th rifle corps, consisting of 55, 121 and 155 rifle divisions, were brought into battle.
The saddest thing is that the front headquarters were unable to understand the situation even on the 23rd, still assessing the German forces operating on the left flank as insignificant. Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Group on June 23 crushed parts of the 4th Army of Korobkov. And in a day, its advanced tank units advanced 130 km, reaching the bend of the Shchara River. It was here that the meeting of the 55th rifle division and the tank divisions of the Germans took place. The fighting in the Shara bend lasted the entire next day on June 24. By stubborn battles, the division detained a German tank roller for a day, and the division commander, Colonel Ivanyuk, was killed in one of these battles.
But that was not the main point. In the battle, which took place in the early morning of June 24, the reconnaissance battalion of the 155th rifle division dispersed a motorized detachment of the Germans. In one of the cars, 2 maps were found, one of them with the printed situation. This map was immediately sent to the front headquarters, where it produced the effect of an exploding bomb, as if a veil had fallen from the commander's eyes. From the situation plotted on it, it was clearly visible that 3 German tank corps were operating against its left flank, one of them in the second echelon.
Then the time factor played its part. The map was captured at about 4 a.m. on June 24, it took some time to send it to the front headquarters, as luck would have it, on June 24 it was redeployed from Minsk to Borovaya, part of the time was lost here. But even with this in mind, the first decision, taking into account the data contained on the map, was made at 15:20 on June 25, about a day and a half passed. Perhaps the commander spent them on reinsurance, the data needed to be checked, at least now it was clear where to look.
General Pavlov was not bound by any orders to "stand to the death", did not ask for the rate, waiting for its decision, already on the 4th day of the battle he gave the order to the troops to withdraw. If successful, the troops of the front could avoid the inevitable defeat. The 6th mechanized corps turned 180 degrees to attack Slonim, it was supposed to become the vanguard and the main penetrating force of the retreating troops. But by giving this order, Pavlov eased the pressure on the German flank near Grodno. A little more than 2 days remained before the connection of the German tank wedges near Minsk.
