Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4

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Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4
Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4

Video: Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4

Video: Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4
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Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4
Ship armor in the 21st century - all aspects of the problem. Part 4

Rockets

It is difficult to assess the ability of modern anti-ship missiles to hit armored targets. The data on the capabilities of the combat units are classified. Nevertheless, there are ways to make such an assessment, albeit with low accuracy and many assumptions.

The easiest way is to use the mathematical apparatus of the gunners. The armor-piercing capability of artillery shells is theoretically calculated using a variety of formulas. We will use the simplest and most accurate (as some sources claim) Jacob de Marr's formula. To begin with, let's check it against the known data of artillery guns, in which armor penetration was obtained in practice by firing shells at real armor.

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The table shows a fairly accurate coincidence of practical and theoretical results. The greatest discrepancy concerns the BS-3 anti-tank gun (almost 100 mm, in theory 149, 72 mm). We conclude that this formula can theoretically calculate armor penetration with a sufficiently high accuracy, however, the results obtained cannot be considered absolutely reliable.

Let's try to make the appropriate calculations for modern anti-ship missiles. As a "projectile" we take the warhead, since the rest of the missile structure is not involved in penetrating the target.

You also need to keep in mind that the results obtained must be treated critically, due to the fact that armor-piercing artillery shells are quite durable objects. As you can see from the table above, the charge accounts for no more than 7% of the projectile weight - the rest is thick-walled steel. The warheads of anti-ship missiles have a significantly larger share of explosives and, accordingly, less durable hulls, which, when they meet an excessively strong barrier, are more likely to split themselves than pierce it.

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As you can see, the energy characteristics of modern anti-ship missiles, in theory, are quite capable of penetrating thick enough armor barriers. In practice, the figures obtained can be safely reduced by several times, because, as mentioned above, an anti-ship missile warhead is not an armor-piercing projectile. However, it can be assumed that the strength of the Bramos warhead is not so bad as not to penetrate an obstacle of 50 mm with a theoretically possible 194 mm.

The high flight speeds of modern anti-ship missiles ON and OTN allow, in theory, without the use of any complex tweaks, to increase their ability to penetrate armor in a simple kinetic way. This can be achieved by reducing the proportion of explosives in the mass of warheads and increasing the thickness of the walls of their bodies, as well as using elongated forms of warheads with a reduced cross-sectional area. For example, reducing the diameter of the warhead anti-ship missile "Brahmos" by 1.5 times with an increase in the length of the rocket by 0.5 meters and maintaining the mass increases the theoretical penetration, calculated by the Jacob de Marr method, to 276 mm (growth by 1, 4 times).

Soviet missiles against American armor

The task of defeating armored ships is not new for the developers of anti-ship missiles. Back in Soviet times, warheads were created for them, capable of hitting battleships. Of course, such warheads were placed only on operational missiles, since the destruction of such large targets is precisely their task.

In fact, armor did not disappear from some ships even in the rocket era. We are talking about American aircraft carriers. For example, the onboard booking of aircraft carriers of the "Midway" type reached 200 mm. Forrestal-class aircraft carriers had 76-mm side armor and a package of longitudinal anti-fragmentation bulkheads. The booking schemes of modern aircraft carriers are classified, but obviously the armor has not become thinner. It is not surprising that the designers of the "large" anti-ship missiles had to design missiles capable of hitting armored targets. And here it is impossible to get off with a simple kinetic method of penetrating - 200 mm of armor is very difficult to penetrate even with a high-speed anti-ship missile with a flight speed of about 2 M.

Actually, no one hides that one of the types of warheads of operational anti-ship missiles was "cumulative-high-explosive". The characteristics are not advertised, but the ability of the Basalt anti-ship missile system to penetrate up to 400 mm of steel armor is known.

Let's think about the figure - why exactly 400 mm, and not 200 or 600? Even if you keep in mind the thicknesses of armor protection that Soviet anti-ship missiles could meet when attacking aircraft carriers, the 400 mm figure seems incredible and redundant. In fact, the answer lies on the surface. Rather, it does not lie, but cuts the ocean wave with its stem and has a specific name - the battleship Iowa. The armor of this remarkable ship is strikingly slightly thinner than the magic figure of 400 mm. Everything will fall into place if we remember that the beginning of work on the Basalt anti-ship missile system goes back to 1963. The US Navy still had solid armored battleships and cruisers from the WWII era. In 1963, the US Navy had 4 battleships, 12 heavy and 14 light cruisers (4 LK Iowa, 12 TC Baltimore, 12 LK Cleveland, 2 LK Atlanta). Most were in the reserve, but the reserve was there, in order to call in reserve ships in the event of a world war. And the US Navy isn't the only battleship operator. In the same year 1963, 16 armored artillery cruisers remained in the USSR Navy! They were also in the fleets of other countries.

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Battleship of the past and missile tin of the present. The first could have become a symbol of the weakness of the Soviet anti-ship missiles, but for some reason went to the eternal stop. Are the American admirals wrong somewhere?

By 1975 (the year the Basalt was put into service) the number of armored ships in the US Navy was reduced to 4 battleships, 4 heavy and 4 light cruisers. Moreover, battleships remained an important figure until decommissioning in the early 90s. Therefore, one should not question the ability of the warheads "Basalt", "Granit" and other Soviet "large" anti-ship missiles to easily penetrate the armor of 400 mm, and have a serious armor effect. The Soviet Union could not ignore the existence of "Iowa", because if we consider that the anti-ship missile system ON is not able to destroy this battleship, then it turns out that this ship is simply invincible. Why, then, did the Americans not put the construction of unique battleships on stream? Such far-fetched logic forces the world to turn upside down - the designers of Soviet anti-ship missiles look like liars, Soviet admirals look like heedless eccentrics, and the strategists of the country that won the Cold War look like fools.

Cumulative ways to penetrate armor

The design of the Basalt warhead is unknown to us. All pictures published on this subject on the Internet are intended for the entertainment of the public, and not to reveal the characteristics of classified items. For the warhead, you can give out its high-explosive version, designed for firing at coastal targets.

However, a number of assumptions can be made about the true content of the "cumulative-high-explosive" warhead. It is most likely that such a warhead is a conventional shaped charge of large size and weight. The principle of its operation is similar to how an ATGM or grenade launcher shot hits the target. And in this regard, the question arises, how is a cumulative ammunition capable of leaving a hole of a very modest size on the armor, capable of destroying a warship?

To answer this question, you need to understand how cumulative ammunition works. A cumulative shot, contrary to misconceptions, does not burn through armor. The penetration is provided by the pestle (or, as they say, the "shock core"), which is formed from the copper lining of the cumulative funnel. The pest has a fairly low temperature, so it doesn't burn anything. The destruction of steel occurs due to the "washing out" of the metal under the action of the impact core, which has a quasi-liquid (ie, has the properties of a liquid, while not being a liquid) state. The closest everyday example that allows you to understand how it works is the erosion of ice by a directed stream of water. The hole diameter obtained upon penetration is approximately 1/5 of the ammunition diameter, the penetration depth is up to 5-10 diameters. Therefore, a grenade launcher shot leaves a hole in the tank's armor with a diameter of only 20-40 mm.

In addition to the cumulative effect, ammunition of this type has a powerful high-explosive effect. However, the high-explosive component of the explosion when tanks are hit remains outside the armor barrier. This is due to the fact that the energy of the explosion is not able to penetrate into the reserved space through a hole with a diameter of 20-40 mm. Therefore, inside the tank, only those parts that are directly in the path of the impact nucleus are exposed to destruction.

It would seem that the principle of operation of cumulative ammunition completely excludes the possibility of its use against ships. Even if the shock core pierces the ship through and through, only what will be in its path will suffer. It's like trying to kill a mammoth with a single blow of a knitting needle. A high-explosive action in the defeat of the viscera cannot participate at all. Obviously, this is not enough to twist the insides of the ship and inflict unacceptable damage on it.

However, there are a number of conditions under which the above-described picture of the cumulative ammunition action is violated not in the best favor for the ships. Let's go back to the armored vehicles. Take the ATGM and fire it into the BMP. What picture of destruction will we see? No, we will not find a neat hole with a diameter of 30 mm. We will see a piece of armor of a large area, torn from the meat. And behind the armor, burned out twisted insides, as if the car had been blown up from the inside.

The thing is that ATGM shots are designed to defeat tank armor 500-800 mm thick. It is in them that we see the famous neat holes. But when exposed to off-design thin armor (like BMP - 16-18 mm), the cumulative effect is enhanced by the high-explosive action. There is a synergistic effect. The armor simply breaks out, unable to withstand such a blow. And through the hole in the armor, which in this case is no longer 30-40 mm, but the entire square meter, the high-explosive high-pressure front, together with fragments of armor and the products of the combustion of explosives, freely penetrates. For armor of any thickness, you can pick up a cumulative shot of such power that its effect will not only be cumulative, but rather a cumulative high-explosive one. The main thing is that the desired ammunition has sufficient excess power over a specific armor barrier.

An ATGM shot is designed to destroy armor of 800 mm and weighs only 5-6 kg. What will a giant ATGM weighing about a tonne (167 times heavier) do with the armor, which is only 400 mm thick (2 times thinner)? Even without mathematical calculations, it becomes clear that the consequences will be much sadder than after the ATGM hits the tank.

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The result of the ATGM hitting the infantry fighting vehicles of the Syrian army.

For thin BMP armor, the desired effect is achieved by an ATGM shot weighing only 5-6 kg. And for naval armor, 400 mm thick, a cumulative high-explosive warhead weighing 700-1000 kg will be required. Exactly this weight warheads are on Basalts and Granites. And this is quite logical, because the Basalt warhead with a diameter of 750 mm, like all cumulative ammunition, can penetrate armor with a thickness of more than 5 of its diameters - i.e. minimum 3, 75 meters of solid steel. However, the designers only mention 0.4 meters (400 mm). Obviously, this is the limiting thickness of the armor, at which the warhead of Basalt has the necessary excess power, capable of forming a breach of a large area. An obstacle already 500 mm will not be broken, it is too strong and will withstand pressure. In it we will see only the famous neat hole, and the booked volume will hardly suffer.

Basalt's warhead does not pierce an even hole in armor with a thickness of less than 400 mm. She breaks it out over a large area. The products of the combustion of explosives, a high-explosive wave, fragments of broken armor and fragments of a rocket with remnants of fuel fly into the resulting hole. The impact core of the shaped charge jet of a powerful charge clears the road through many bulkheads deep into the hull. The sinking of the battleship Iowa is the most extreme case of all possible for the anti-ship missile system Basalt. The rest of her goals have several times less booking. On aircraft carriers - in the range of 76-200 mm, which, for this anti-ship missile system, can be considered just foil.

As shown above, on cruisers with a displacement and dimensions of "Peter the Great", armor of 80-150 mm may appear. Even if this estimate is incorrect, and the thicknesses will be greater, no insoluble technical problem will appear for the designers of anti-ship missiles. Ships of this size are not a typical target for the TN anti-ship missiles today, and with the possible revival of armor, they will simply finally be included in the list of typical targets for the HE anti-ship missiles with HEAT warheads.

Alternative options

At the same time, other options for overcoming armor are possible, for example, using a tandem warhead design. The first charge is cumulative, the second is high-explosive.

The size and shape of the shaped charge can be quite different. Sapper charges that have existed since the 60s eloquently and clearly demonstrate this. For example, a KZU charge with a weight of 18 kg penetrates 120 mm of armor, leaving a hole 40 mm wide and 440 mm long. The LKZ-80 charge, with a weight of 2.5 kg, penetrates 80 mm of steel, leaving a gap 5 mm wide and 18 mm long. (https://www.saper.etel.ru/mines-4/RA-BB-05.html).

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Appearance of the charge of the KZU

The shaped charge of a tandem warhead can have an annular (toroidal) shape. In the center of the "donut", after the shaped charge is detonated and penetrated, the main high-explosive charge will freely penetrate. In this case, the kinetic energy of the main charge is practically not lost. It will still be able to crush several bulkheads and detonate deceleratingly deep inside the ship's hull.

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The principle of operation of a tandem warhead with an annular shaped charge

The penetration method described above is universal and can be used on any anti-ship missiles. The simplest calculations show that the ring charge of a tandem warhead applied to the Bramos anti-ship missile system will consume only 40-50 kg of the weight of its 250-kilogram high-explosive warhead.

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As can be seen from the table, even the Uranium anti-ship missile system can be given some armor-piercing qualities. The ability to penetrate the armor of other anti-ship missiles without any problems overlaps all possible thicknesses of armor, which may appear on ships with a displacement of 15-20 thousand tons.

Armored battleship

Actually, this could end the conversation about booking ships. All that is needed has already been said. Nevertheless, you can try to imagine how a ship with anti-cannon-resistant powerful armor could fit into the naval system.

Above, the uselessness of booking on ships of existing classes was shown and proved. All that armor can be used for is local booking of the most explosive zones in order to exclude their detonation in case of a close detonation of an anti-ship missile system. Such a reservation does not save from a direct hit by an anti-ship missile.

However, all of the above applies to ships with a displacement of 15-25 thousand tons. That is, modern destroyers and cruisers. Their load reserves do not allow equipping them with armor with thicknesses of more than 100-120 mm. But, the larger the ship, the more load items that can be allocated for booking. Why until now has no one thought about creating a missile battleship with a displacement of 30-40 thousand tons and armor of more than 400 mm?

The main obstacle to the creation of such a ship is the absence of a practical need for such a monster. Of the existing naval powers, only a few have the economic, technological and industrial power to develop and build such a ship. In theory, this could be Russia and China, but in reality, only the United States. There remains only one question - why does the US Navy need such a ship?

The role of such a ship in the modern navy is completely incomprehensible. The US Navy is constantly at war with obviously weak opponents against whom such a monster is completely unnecessary. And in the event of a war with Russia or China, the US fleet will not go to hostile shores for mines and submarine torpedoes. Far from the coast, the task of protecting their communications will be solved, where not several super-battleships are required, but many simpler ships, and at the same time in different places. This task is being solved by numerous American destroyers, the number of which translates into quality. Yes, each of them may not be a very outstanding and powerful warship. These are not protected by armor, but workhorses of the fleet debugged in serial construction.

They are similar to the T-34 tank - also not the most armored and not the most armed WWII tank, but produced in such quantities that the opponents, with their expensive and super-powerful Tigers, had a hard time. As a piece of goods, the Tiger could not be present on the entire line of the huge front, unlike the ubiquitous thirty-fours. And pride in the outstanding successes of the German tank-building industry did not help in reality the German infantrymen, who were carrying dozens of our tanks, and the Tigers were somewhere else.

It is not surprising that all projects for creating a super-cruiser or missile battleship did not go beyond futuristic pictures. They are simply not needed. The developed countries of the world do not sell to third world countries such weapons that could seriously shake their strong position as leaders of the planet. And the third world countries do not have the kind of money to buy such complex and expensive weapons. For some time now, the developed countries prefer not to arrange a showdown among themselves. There is a very high risk of such a conflict developing into a vigorous one, which is completely unnecessary and unnecessary for anyone. They prefer to hit their equal partners with someone else's hands, for example, Turkish or Ukrainian in Russia, Taiwanese in China.

conclusions

All conceivable factors work against the full-fledged revival of naval armor. There is no urgent economic or military need for it. From a constructive point of view, it is impossible to create a serious reservation of the required area on a modern ship. It is impossible to protect all vital systems of the ship. And, finally, if such a reservation does appear, the problem can be easily solved by modifying the anti-ship missile warhead. Developed countries, quite logically, do not want to invest forces and funds in the creation of armor at the cost of deteriorating other combat qualities, which will not fundamentally increase the combat capability of ships. At the same time, the widespread introduction of local booking and the transition to steel superstructures is extremely important. Such armor allows the ship to more easily carry anti-ship missiles hits and reduce the amount of destruction. However, such a reservation does not in any way save from a direct hit by anti-ship missiles, therefore, it is simply pointless to set such a task in front of armor protection.

Sources of information used:

V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky "The Navy of the USSR 1945-1991"

V. Asanin "Rockets of the domestic fleet"

A. V. Platonov "Soviet monitors, gunboats and armored boats"

S. N. Mashensky "Magnificent seven. Wings of" Berkuts"

Yu. V. Apalkov "Ships of the USSR Navy"

A. B. Shirokorad "The fiery sword of the Russian fleet"

S. V. Patyanin, M. Yu. Tokarev, "The fastest-firing cruisers. Light cruisers of the" Brooklyn "class

S. V. Patyanin, "French cruisers of the Second World War"

Marine Collection, 2003 №1 "Iowa-class battleships"

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