"Valentine" "Stalin" goes to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.
The history of Lend-Lease is mythologized by both opponents of the Soviet regime and its supporters. The former believe that without military supplies from the USA and England, the USSR could not have won the war, the latter - that the role of these supplies is completely insignificant. We bring to your attention a balanced view of the historian Pavel Sutulin on this issue, originally published in his LJ.
Lend-Lease history
Lend-Lease (from the English "lend" - to lend and "lease" - to lease) - a kind of credit program for allies by the United States of America through the supply of technology, food, equipment, raw materials and materials. The first step towards Lend-Lease was taken by the United States on September 3, 1940, when the Americans transferred 50 old destroyers to Britain in exchange for British military bases. On January 2, 1941, Oscar Cox, an employee of the Ministry of Finance, prepared the first draft of the Lend-Lease Law. On January 10th, this bill was submitted to the Senate and House of Representatives. On March 11, the law was approved by both chambers and signed by the president, and three hours later the president signed the first two directives to this law. The first of them ordered the transfer of 28 torpedo boats to Britain, and the second - to betray Greece with 50 75-mm cannons and several hundred thousand shells. This is how the history of Lend-Lease began.
The essence of Lend-Lease was, in general, quite simple. According to the Lend-Lease Act, the United States could supply equipment, ammunition, equipment, and so on. countries whose defense was vital to the States themselves. All deliveries were free. All machinery, equipment and materials spent, consumed or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment. The property left after the end of the war and suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid.
As for the USSR, Roosevelt and Churchill gave a promise to supply it with the materials necessary for the war immediately after the German attack on the Soviet Union, that is, on June 22, 1941. On October 1, 1941, the First Moscow Protocol on the supply of the USSR was signed in Moscow, the expiration of which was determined on June 30. The Lend-Lease Act was extended to the USSR on October 28, 1941, resulting in a loan of $ 1 billion to the Union. During the war, three more protocols were signed: Washington, London and Ottawa, through which supplies were extended until the end of the war. Officially, Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR ceased on May 12, 1945. However, until August 1945, deliveries continued according to the "Molotov-Mikoyan list".
Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR and their contribution to victory
During the war, hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Military historians (and, perhaps, all the others), of course, are most interested in allied military equipment - let's start with it. Under Lend-Lease, the following items were delivered to the USSR from the USA: light M3A1 "Stuart" - 1676 pieces, light M5 - 5 pieces, light M24 - 2 pieces, medium M3 "Grant" - 1386 pieces, medium M4A2 "Sherman" (with a 75-mm cannon) - 2007 pcs., medium M4A2 (with a 76-mm cannon) - 2095 pcs., heavy M26 - 1 pc. From England: infantry "Valentine" - 2394 pieces, infantry "Matilda" MkII - 918 pieces, light "Tetrarch" - 20 pieces, heavy "Churchill" - 301 pieces, cruising "Cromwell" - 6 pieces. From Canada: Valentine - 1388. Total: 12199 tanks. In total, 86,100 tanks were delivered to the Soviet-German front during the war years.
Thus, Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 12.3% of the total number of tanks produced / delivered to the USSR in 1941-1945. In addition to tanks, ZSU / ACS were also supplied to the USSR. ZSU: M15A1 - 100 pcs., M17 - 1000 pcs.; ACS: T48 - 650 pcs., М18 - 5 pcs., М10 - 52 pcs. In total, 1807 units were delivered. In total, 23, 1 thousand units of self-propelled guns were produced and received in the USSR during the war. Thus, the share of self-propelled guns received by the USSR under Lend-Lease is equal to 7, 8% of the total number of equipment of this type received during the war. In addition to tanks and self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers were also supplied to the USSR: the British "Universal Carrier" - 2560 pcs. (including from Canada - 1348 pcs.) and American M2 - 342 pcs., M3 - 2 pcs., M5 - 421 pcs., M9 - 419 pcs., T16 - 96 pcs., M3A1 "Scout" - 3340 pcs.., LVT - 5 pcs. Total: 7185 units. Since armored personnel carriers were not produced in the USSR, lend-lease vehicles accounted for 100% of the Soviet fleet of this equipment. Criticism of Lend-Lease very often draws attention to the poor quality of the armored vehicles supplied by the allies. This criticism really has certain grounds, since American and British tanks in terms of performance characteristics were often inferior to both Soviet and German counterparts. Especially considering that the allies usually supplied the USSR with not the best examples of their equipment. For example, the most advanced Sherman modifications (M4A3E8 and Sherman Firefly) were not supplied to Russia.
A much better situation has developed with the supply of aviation under Lend-Lease. In total, during the war years, 18,297 aircraft were delivered to the USSR, including from the USA: R-40 "Tomahawk" fighters - 247, P-40 "Kitihawk" - 1887, P-39 "Airacobra" - 4952, P-63 " Kingcobra "- 2400, R-47" Thunderbolt - 195; bombers A-20 "Boston" - 2771, B-25 "Mitchell" - 861; other types of aircraft - 813. 4171 "Spitfires" and "Hurricanes" were delivered from England In total, the Soviet troops received 138 thousand aircraft during the war. Thus, the share of foreign equipment in the receipts of the domestic aircraft fleet amounted to 13%. True, even here the Allies refused to supply the USSR with the pride of their Air Force - strategic bombers B-17, B-24 and B- 29, of which 35 thousand units were produced during the war, and at the same time it was precisely these machines that the Soviet Air Force needed most of all.
8 thousand anti-aircraft and 5 thousand anti-tank guns were supplied under Lend-Lease. In total, the USSR received 38 thousand units of anti-aircraft and 54 thousand anti-tank artillery. That is, the share of Lend-Lease in these types of weapons was 21% and 9%, respectively. However, if we take all Soviet guns and mortars as a whole (receipts for the war - 526, 2 thousand), then the share of foreign guns in it will be only 2, 7%.
During the war years of the USSR, 202 torpedo boats, 28 patrol ships, 55 minesweepers, 138 submarine hunters, 49 landing ships, 3 icebreakers, about 80 transport ships, about 30 tugs were transferred under Lend-Lease. There are about 580 ships in total. In total, the USSR received 2,588 ships during the war years. That is, the share of lend-lease equipment is 22.4%.
The most notable were lend-lease deliveries of cars. A total of 480 thousand cars were delivered under Lend-Lease (of which 85% were from the USA). Including about 430 thousand trucks (mainly - US 6 firms "Studebaker" and REO) and 50 thousand jeeps (Willys MB and Ford GPW). Despite the fact that the total receipts of cars to the Soviet-German front amounted to 744 thousand units, the share of Lend-Lease vehicles in the Soviet fleet was 64%. In addition, 35,000 motorcycles were supplied from the USA.
But the supply of small arms under Lend-Lease was very modest: only about 150,000 units. Considering that the total receipts of small arms in the Red Army during the war amounted to 19, 85 million units, the share of Lend-Lease weapons is approximately 0.75%.
During the war years, 242, 3 thousand tons of motor gasoline were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease (2, 7% of the total production and receipt of automobile gasoline in the USSR). The situation with aviation gasoline is as follows: 570 thousand tons of gasoline were supplied from the USA, 533.5 thousand tons from Britain and Canada. In addition, 1,483 thousand tons of light gasoline fractions were supplied from the USA, Britain and Canada. Gasoline is produced from light gasoline fractions as a result of reforming, the yield of which is approximately 80%. Thus, from 1483 thousand tons of fractions, 1186 thousand tons of gasoline can be obtained. That is, the total supplies of gasoline under Lend-Lease can be estimated at 2,230 thousand tons. During the war, the USSR produced about 4750 thousand tons of aviation gasoline. Probably this number also includes gasoline produced from factions supplied by the allies. That is, the USSR's production of gasoline from its own resources can be estimated at about 3350 thousand tons. Consequently, the share of Lend-Lease aviation fuel in the total amount of gasoline supplied and produced in the USSR is 40%.
622,100 tons of railroad rails were delivered to the USSR, which is equal to 36% of the total number of rails supplied and produced in the USSR. During the war, 1900 steam locomotives were delivered, while in the USSR in 1941-1945, 800 steam locomotives were produced, of which in 1941 - 708. If we take the number of steam locomotives produced from June to the end of 1941 as a quarter of the total production, then the number of steam locomotives produced during the war will be approximately 300. That is, the share of Lend-Lease steam locomotives in the total volume of steam locomotives produced and supplied in the USSR is approximately 72%. In addition, 11,075 cars were delivered to the USSR. For comparison, in 1942-1945, 1,092 railway cars were produced in the USSR. During the war years, 318 thousand tons of explosives were supplied under Lend-Lease (of which the USA - 295.6 thousand tons), which is 36.6% of the total production and supplies of explosives to the USSR.
Under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received 328 thousand tons of aluminum. If you believe B. Sokolov ("The Role of Lend-Lease in Soviet Military Efforts"), who estimated Soviet aluminum production during the war at 263 thousand tons, then the share of Lend-Lease aluminum in the total amount of aluminum produced and received by the USSR will be 55%. Copper was supplied to the USSR 387 thousand tons - 45% of the total production and supplies of this metal to the USSR. Under Lend-Lease, the Union received 3,606 thousand tons of tires - 30% of the total number of tires produced and supplied to the USSR. 610 thousand tons of sugar were supplied - 29.5%. Cotton: 108 million tons - 6% During the war years, 38,100 metal-cutting machine tools were supplied to the USSR from the USA, and 6,500 machine tools and 104 presses from Great Britain. During the war, 141 thousand m / r machines and forging presses were produced in the USSR. Thus, the share of foreign machine tools in the domestic economy amounted to 24%. The USSR also received 956,700 miles of field telephone cable, 2,100 miles of sea cable and 1,100 miles of submarine cable. In addition, 35,800 radio stations, 5,899 receivers and 348 locators, 15.5 million pairs of army boots, 5 million tons of foodstuffs, etc. were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.
According to the data summarized in diagram 2, it can be seen that even for the main types of supplies, the share of lend-lease products in the total volume of production and supplies in the USSR does not exceed 28%. In general, the share of lend-lease products in the total volume of materials, equipment, foodstuffs, machinery, raw materials, etc. produced and supplied in the USSR. Usually estimated at 4%. In my opinion, this figure, in general, reflects the real state of affairs. Thus, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that Lend-Lease did not have any decisive impact on the USSR's ability to wage war. Yes, such types of equipment and materials were supplied under Lend-Lease, which accounted for most of the total production of such in the USSR. But would the lack of supplies of these materials become critical? In my opinion, no. The USSR could well redistribute production efforts so as to provide itself with everything it needs, including aluminum, copper, and locomotives. Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease at all? Yes, he could. But the question is, what would it cost him. If there were no Lend-Lease, the USSR could go two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of those goods that were supplied under this Lend-Lease. The first way is to simply close our eyes to this deficit. As a result, there would be a shortage of cars, airplanes and a number of other types of machinery and equipment in the army. Thus, the army would certainly be weakened. The second option is to increase our own production of products supplied under Lend-Lease by attracting excess labor to the production process. This force, accordingly, could only be taken at the front, and thereby again weaken the army. Thus, when choosing any of these paths, the Red Army was a loser. As a result, the war is dragging out and there are unnecessary casualties on our part. In other words, although Lend-Lease did not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front, it nevertheless saved hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens' lives. And for this alone Russia should be grateful to its allies.
Speaking about the role of Lend-Lease in the victory of the USSR, one should not forget about two more points. First, the vast majority of machinery, equipment and materials were supplied to the USSR in 1943-1945. That is, after the turning point in the course of the war. For example, in 1941, under Lend-Lease, goods worth about $ 100 million were delivered, which was less than 1% of the total supply. In 1942, this percentage was 27.6. Thus, more than 70% of Lend-Lease deliveries fell on 1943-1945, and during the most terrible period of the war for the USSR, the allies' help was not very noticeable. As an example, in diagram # 3, you can see how the number of aircraft supplied from the United States changed in 1941-1945. An even more illustrative example is cars: as of April 30, 1944, only 215 thousand of them were delivered. That is, more than half of the Lend-Lease vehicles were delivered to the USSR in the last year of the war. Secondly, not all of the equipment supplied under Lend-Lease was used by the army and navy. For example, out of 202 torpedo boats delivered to the USSR, 118 never had to take part in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War, since they were commissioned after its end. All 26 frigates received by the USSR also entered service only in the summer of 1945. A similar situation was observed with other types of equipment.
And finally, at the end of this part of the article, a small stone in the garden of Lend-Lease critics. Many of these critics emphasize the lack of supplies from the allies, reinforcing this by the fact that, they say, the United States, given their level of production, could supply more. Indeed, the United States and Britain produced 22 million small arms, and delivered only 150,000 (0.68%). The Allies supplied 14% of the tanks produced to the USSR. The situation was even worse with cars: in total, about 5 million cars were produced in the USA during the war years, and about 450 thousand cars were delivered to the USSR - less than 10%. Etc. However, this approach is certainly wrong. The fact is that supplies to the USSR were limited not by the production capabilities of the allies, but by the tonnage of the available transport ships. And it was with him that the British and Americans had serious problems. The Allies simply did not physically have the number of transport ships necessary to transport more cargo to the USSR.
Supply routes
Lend-lease cargo entered the USSR by five routes: through Arctic convoys to Murmansk, across the Black Sea, through Iran, through the Far East and through the Soviet Arctic. The most famous of these routes is undoubtedly the Murmansk one. The heroism of the sailors of the Arctic convoys is praised in many books and films. Probably, it is for this reason that many of our fellow citizens have a false impression that the main supplies under Lend-Lease went to the USSR precisely by Arctic convoys. This opinion is pure delusion. In diagram # 4, you can see the ratio of the volume of freight traffic on various routes in long tons. As we can see, not only did most of the Lend-Lease cargo not pass through the Russian North, but this route was not even the main one, yielding to the Far East and Iran. One of the main reasons for this state of affairs was the danger of the northern route due to the activity of the Germans. In Diagram # 5, you can see how effectively the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine operated on the Arctic convoys.
The use of the trans-Iranian route became possible after Soviet and British troops (from the north and south, respectively) entered the territory of Iran, and already on September 8, a peace agreement was signed between the USSR, England and Iran, according to which British and Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Persia. troops. From that moment on, Iran began to be used for supplies to the USSR. Lend-lease cargo went to the ports of the northern end of the Persian Gulf: Basra, Khorramshahr, Abadan and Bandar Shahpur. Air and car assembly plants were set up in these ports. From these ports to the USSR, cargo went in two ways: by land through the Caucasus and by water - through the Caspian Sea. However, the Trans-Iranian route, like the Arctic convoys, had its drawbacks: firstly, it was too long (the route of the convoy from New York to the shores of Iran around the South African Cape of Good Hope took about 75 days, and then it took about 75 days for the cargo for Iran and the Caucasus or the Caspian). Secondly, navigation in the Caspian Sea was hampered by German aviation, which sank and damaged 32 ships with cargo in October and November alone, and the Caucasus was not the calmest place: only in 1941-1943, 963 bandit groups with a total number of 17,513 were liquidated in the North Caucasus human. In 1945, instead of the Iranian route, the Black Sea route was used for supplies.
However, the safest and most convenient route was the Pacific route from Alaska to the Far East (46% of the total supply) or through the Arctic Ocean to Arctic ports (3%). Basically, lend-lease cargo was delivered to the USSR from the United States, of course, by sea. However, most of the aviation moved from Alaska to the USSR on its own (the same AlSib). Nevertheless, along this path, difficulties arose, this time connected with Japan. In 1941-1944, the Japanese detained 178 Soviet ships, some of them - transports "Kamenets-Podolsky", "Ingul" and "Nogin" - for 2 or more months. 8 ships - transports "Krechet", "Svirstroy", "Maikop", "Perekop", "Angarstroy", "Pavlin Vinogradov", "Lazo", "Simferopol" - were sunk by the Japanese. The transports "Ashgabat", "Kolkhoznik", "Kiev" were sunk by unidentified submarines, and about 10 more ships were lost under unexplained circumstances.
Lend-Lease payment
This is perhaps the main topic for speculation by people trying to somehow denigrate the Lend-Lease program. Most of them consider it their indispensable duty to declare that the USSR, they say, paid for all the goods supplied under Lend-Lease. Of course, this is nothing more than a delusion (or a deliberate lie). Neither the USSR nor any other countries that received assistance under the Lend-Lease program, in accordance with the Lend-Lease law during the war, paid not a cent for this assistance, so to speak. Moreover, as already written at the beginning of the article, they were not obliged to pay after the war for those materials, equipment, weapons and ammunition that were consumed during the war. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used by the recipient countries. Thus, there were no lend-lease payments during the war. Another thing is that the USSR actually sent various goods to the United States (including 320 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as gold, platinum, wood). This was done as part of the reverse lend-lease program. In addition, the same program included free repair of American ships in Russian ports and other services. Unfortunately, I could not find the total amount of goods and services provided to the allies in the framework of reverse lend-lease. The only source I have found claims that this very amount was 2.2 million dollars. However, I personally am not sure about the authenticity of this data. However, they may well be considered a lower limit. The upper limit in this case will be the amount of several hundred million dollars. Be that as it may, the share of reverse lend-lease in the total lend-lease trade between the USSR and the allies will not exceed 3-4%. For comparison, the amount of reverse lend-lease from the UK to the United States is equal to 6, 8 billion dollars, which is 18, 3% of the total exchange of goods and services between these states.
So, there was no payment for Lend-Lease during the war. The Americans provided the bill to the recipient countries only after the war. The volume of UK debt to the United States amounted to $ 4.33 billion, to Canada - $ 1.19 billion. The last payment of $ 83.25 million (in favor of the United States) and $ 22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29, 2006. The volume of China's debt was determined at 180 million. dollars, and this debt has not yet been paid off. The French paid off the United States on May 28, 1946, giving the United States a number of trade preferences.
The debt of the USSR was determined in 1947 at 2.6 billion dollars, but already in 1948 this amount was reduced to 1.3 billion. Nevertheless, the USSR refused to pay. The refusal followed in response to new concessions from the United States: in 1951, the amount of debt was revised again and this time amounted to 800 million. was again reduced, this time to $ 722 million; maturity - 2001), and the USSR agreed to this agreement only on condition that it was granted a loan from the Export-Import Bank. In 1973, the USSR made two payments totaling $ 48 million, but then ceased payments due to the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement. In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the United States and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing the debt. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the amount was $ 674 million. At the moment, Russia owes the US $ 100 million for lend-lease deliveries.
Other types of supplies
Lend-Lease was the only significant type of allied supplies of the USSR. However, not the only one in principle. Before the adoption of the Lend-Lease program, the United States and Britain supplied the USSR with equipment and materials for cash. However, the size of these deliveries was rather small. For example, from July to October 1941, the United States supplied the USSR with cargo for only $ 29 million. In addition, Britain provided for the supply of goods to the USSR on account of long-term loans. Moreover, these supplies continued after the adoption of the Lend-Lease program.
Do not forget about the many charitable foundations created to raise funds for the benefit of the USSR around the world. The USSR also provided assistance to individuals. Moreover, such assistance came even from Africa and the Middle East. For example, in Beirut, the Russian Patriotic Group was created, in the Congo - the Russian Medical Aid Society.. Iranian merchant Rahimyan Ghulam Huseyn sent 3 tons of dried grapes to Stalingrad. And merchants Yusuf Gafuriki and Mamed Zhdalidi handed over 285 heads of cattle to the USSR.
Literature
1. Ivanyan E. A. History of the United States. M.: Bustard, 2006.
2. / A Brief History of the United States / Under. ed. I. A. Alyabyev, E. V. Vysotskaya, T. R. Dzhum, S. M. Zaitsev, N. P. Zotnikov, V. N. Tsvetkov. Minsk: Harvest, 2003.
3. Shirokorad AB Far Eastern Final. M.: AST: Transizdatkniga, 2005.
4. Schofield B. Arctic convoys. Northern naval battles in World War II. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
5. Temirov Yu. T., Donets A. S. War. M.: Eksmo, 2005.
6. Stettinius E. Lend-Lease - a weapon of victory (https://militera.lib.ru/memo/usa/stettinius/index.html).
7. Morozov A. Anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War. The role of Lend-Lease in defeating a common enemy (https://militera.lib.ru/pub/morozov/index.html).
8. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. Losses of the armed forces / Under total. ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. (https://www.rus-sky.org/history/library/w/)
9. The national economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Statistical collection. (Http://tashv.nm.ru/)
10. Wikipedia materials. (Http://wiki.lipetsk.ru/index.php/%D0%9B%D0.. BB%D0%B8%D0%B7)
11. Lend-Lease: how it was. (https://www.flb.ru/info/38833.html)
12. Aviation Lend-Lease in the USSR in 1941-1945 (https://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/lendl.htm)
13. Soviet Lend-Lease historiography (https://www.alsib.irk.ru/sb1_6.htm)
fourteen. What we know and what we don’t know about the Great Patriotic War (https://mrk-kprf-spb.narod.ru/skorohod.htm#11)
