The main goal of China's counterbalancing strategy was to catch up with the United States in the technology race as quickly as possible. This formed the basis of all Chinese activities in this race - industrial and technical espionage.
As stated in a recent report on China's industrial espionage, this thrust of China's counterbalancing strategy is "a deliberate, government-backed effort to reduce research spending, bridge cultural gaps, and move to higher technological levels by harnessing the creativity of other peoples." Senior officials in the US government recently reported that the Chinese had uncovered a US defense company’s network and obtained classified information on US naval submarine warfare. This is one of the most recent examples of one of the most widespread, successful and daring industrial and technological espionage programs in history.
This espionage activity is almost entirely dependent on the process defined in the Chinese documents by the term "civil-military merger" (deep integration of the civil and military sectors of industry), whereby Chinese officials work to facilitate the legal and illegal transfer of technology for military purposes through scientific and commercial interaction with the United States and other technologically advanced Western countries. According to the US State Department, this activity has been accelerated since 2009, and at the moment "a unified national strategy has been developed for the complete" merger "of Chinese military and civilian industrial complexes."
Chinese leaders are frank about the goals of this activity. Regarding the Chinese military-civil merger, the State Department recently officially announced: “The determining factor for the launch of this grandiose process was the acute awareness by the Chinese that the complete enslavement of their country in the 19th century was the result of military and economic backwardness, including in technological and doctrinal terms, that did not allow to take advantage of the fruits of the so-called "revolutions in the military sphere" that dominated and determined military actions throughout the 20th century … China is determined and will not allow lag in the next revolutions in the military sphere, which, according to Chinese officials, are already taking place. " …
In other words, the Chinese leadership views industrial and technical espionage and civil-military mergers as the main drivers of a jump-start for Chinese technological progress without investing in expensive research and development of new technologies. Research has shown that the transition from prototype to deployment of a complete system takes approximately the same time in both China and the United States. However, in the case of similar systems, industrial and technical espionage helped the Chinese military to reduce the time and cost in moving from concept to research and development of prototypes. As a result, illegal transfer of modern technology, reverse engineering, and civil-military mergers have allowed the Chinese to deploy advanced technical capabilities much faster than American intelligence structures originally anticipated. And the poet is hardly a coincidence that structurally the latest front-line fighters of the Chinese army are very much reminiscent of the American F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning II fighters, or that some of its drones are exact copies of the Predator and Reaper drones. As a result, through the theft and use of American and Western technical secrets, they were able to level the technological ground for the game with the American military in some key military capabilities in less than two decades, which is an instant by the standards of long-term strategic rivalry in peacetime.
Military action to destroy systems
The second line of action in China's counterbalancing strategy allows Chinese espionage activities to be directed towards specific missions and helps to prioritize the Chinese military's investment. This is stated in the concept of the Chinese army for high-tech military operations. There, "traditional" modern military operations are described as linear, with clear front lines. Likewise, the Soviet Union planned to conduct its operations against NATO, attacking and trying to break through and strike vulnerable rear areas of the enemy. But in high-tech warfare, attacks are not limited to geographic boundaries; combat operations are conducted simultaneously in space, on water, on land, in the air, cyberspace and in the electromagnetic field. In this multidimensional combat space, military action is less like a battle to destroy each other's opposing military forces and more like a battle of opposing "control systems" that Chinese strategists call "confrontation of systems." And "warfare to destroy systems" reflects the theory that the Chinese army will win over a high-tech opponent such as the United States.
American control systems or combat networks have four interconnected arrays. The multi-media multisensor array observes the battle space from the seabed to outer space; an array of operational control, communication and information collection (C3I) "comprehends" the results of observation and data coming from the sensor array, determines the actions necessary to achieve further goals of this campaign, develops and selects a sequence of actions and directs orders to an array of actions that applies kinetic and non-kinetic agents as indicated in the C3I array. The fourth support and recovery array supports all three of the aforementioned arrays and keeps them operational during combat operations. Working together, the sensory, C3I and impact arrays constitute a "chain of destruction" for a given theater of operations in order to find, capture and neutralize intended targets. As the planning structures of the Chinese army could observe during Operation Desert Storm and again in the skies over Serbia and Kosovo, the US military is assembling its various expeditionary combat networks and executive components in the area of operations and linking them through extended and broadband communication systems and architecture. data with percussion and logistics components collected from nearby bases. To make this concept as efficient and economical as possible, the US Armed Forces are concentrating elements of their combat networks. Such a centralized structure, although quite effective, consisted of many vulnerable single points, each of which China targeted with its advanced capabilities.
The Chinese realized that in order to have any hope of coping with the American invasion, especially at a time when the Chinese army was no doubt technologically lagging behind, they would need to paralyze the American military network. This is the main goal of military operations to destroy systems - to disable the operational system, command system, weapons system, enemy support system, etc., as well as internal communications within each of these systems. The destruction of these ties leads to the fact that the enemy, instead of coordinated military actions, begins to conduct separate, isolated operations, thus deteriorating its overall combat capabilities.
Should this campaign of annihilation be able to exert the strategic impact on the American military network, the Chinese can expect to achieve information superiority, which they regard as "the most important operational method of modern warfare" and the basic sine qua non for achieving air domination and superiority at sea. and on land. " This key and indispensable condition is so important that Chinese military theorists add a fifth network to their model of operational networks - the information warfare network. The purpose of this network, consistent with the general theory of war of destruction of systems, is to achieve and maintain the information superiority of its operational system while simultaneously searching for ways to degrade or destroy the enemy's operational combat system on the information battlefield. The information confrontation system consists of two main subsystems: an information attack system and an information defense system.
Due to its central position in the strategic thinking of the Chinese army, the war of systemic destruction has become a dominant impetus along with decisions to restructure the Chinese armed forces and priorities for modernization. This explains the large Chinese investments in countering the capabilities of the military network and the means of conducting "information warfare" - the use of electronic warfare, cyberattacks, attacks on computer networks, information operations and deception to destroy the integrity of any American military network. For example, the Chinese have devised a type of electronic warfare to threaten every American system and data link; can be assumed. that they also developed cyberattack tools. Building on the US reliance on space-based support for its expeditionary combat networks, the Chinese military has focused on the space company to “blind and defeat the enemy” as part of a major war effort to destroy systems. This helps explain China's massive investment in some anti-space weapons, including direct-launch missiles, directed energy weapons, and orbital weapons. The emphasis on war to destroy systems also helps to understand the rationale behind the establishment of the new Strategic Support Force in the Chinese army, a fundamental structure tasked with deeper integration of the capabilities of warfare in space, cyberspace and electronic warfare in the operations of the Chinese army.
Attack effectively first
The Chinese believe that the main operational approach in confrontation of systems should be long-range precision strikes with guided munitions from various environments, which would deprive the enemy of the ability to create a balanced defense. The third activity of the Chinese counterbalance strategy involves the development of doctrine, systems, platforms and weapons so that the Chinese army can effectively attack any opponent first.“Attack effectively (with maximum concentration) and do so first (through longer range weapons, maneuvering advantage or coordinated action based on well-conducted reconnaissance)” is the cornerstone of Chinese military thought and guided warfare. And this is the second dominant impulse along with the decisions of the Chinese army on the restructuring of forces and the priorities of modernization.
The general emphasis on effective preemptive attack explains the Chinese military's obsession with weapons that "outplay" their opponents - that is, have a long range. If we assume that the two opposing forces have equal reconnaissance capabilities, then the side with the longer-range weapons should be able to more often focus its fire on the units of the other side and thereby exert a stronger influence on it. And if one of the parties gains an intelligence advantage, then this impact will be even more powerful.
Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the Chinese counterbalance strategy focuses on weapons, which generally have a greater effective range than their American counterparts. For example, the standard American Harpoon anti-ship missile has a maximum range of about 75 nautical miles. Its Chinese counterpart, the YJ-18 missile, can hit targets at ranges of up to 290 nautical miles, nearly four times that. And if the Chinese army cannot surpass American weapons in range, then it seeks to achieve at least parity here. In a duel of guided munitions, she counts on equal rivalry, with which the Americans cannot agree in any way. As a result, the situation is currently unfolding very dynamically. For a long time, US combat aviation had a range advantage in air combat, armed with an AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) missile with a range of 100 nautical miles. However, at present, the new Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile has caught up with the American in range. Even that is enough to make the US Air Force combat pilots nervous. who were brought up with the confidence that they can safely launch missiles at the enemy without fear of retaliatory launch. And now they are demanding a missile that "surpasses the PL-15."
The Chinese emphasis on effective preemptive attack also explains why the Chinese military chose what has come to be known as the “missile strike strategy,” which is based on long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as opposed to the airborne capabilities of the US long-range strike concept. The Chinese have carefully taught the use of aircraft by the United States in Operation Desert Storm and in Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, the Chinese chose for themselves not creating a symmetrical, first-class air force, but creating a first-class missile force with an emphasis on mobile ballistic missile systems launched from transport launchers. From a Chinese point of view, this approach to structuring has a logical rationale:
- Ballistic missile units are less expensive to organize, train and operate than the first-class Air Force - America's primary long-range strike mechanism.
- The adoption of ballistic missiles is based on the so-called competitive asymmetry. Until recently, the United States was bound by the Intermediate- and Short-Range Missile Treaty, which limited the range of ground-based missiles to five hundred kilometers. Never being a party to this treaty, China has been able to develop and deploy a large number of ground-based missiles without any imposed range restrictions.
- In the competition to increase the range, as a rule, it is easier to increase the missile's range by making a larger body that can take more fuel than to increase (without refueling) the flight range of manned aircraft.
- It is easier and faster to organize massive missile strikes than air strikes, the preparation for which is also much more visible, which is the basis of the Chinese doctrine of effective pre-emptive fire.
- Mobile ballistic missile installations are much more difficult to find and destroy, in contrast to the large stationary air bases required to support long-term air operations.
China's commitment to its missile strike strategy was also reaffirmed at the end of 2015, when the missile forces were formed - the fourth service in the Chinese army, equal in status to the army, navy and air force. The PLA's missile forces were formed from the 2nd Artillery Corps, which since 1985 has been responsible for ground defense against intercontinental nuclear missiles. It is important that the created missile forces are responsible for delivering nuclear and conventional strikes against land and sea targets at medium distances in the zones of vital interests of China. The missile program of the Chinese army is considered the most active in the world; within its framework, several types of cruise and ballistic missiles of any army are currently being developed, which in their capabilities are not inferior to the most advanced systems of any army in the world. In addition, the Rocket Troops are relentlessly improving their combat prowess. According to the former commander of US forces in the Pacific, China launches more than 100 missiles a year for training and research purposes.
The emphasis on the use of ballistic missiles in an effective preemptive strike is also reinforced by another consideration. When using unguided weapons, most of which will be expected to miss their targets, you must rely on massive volleys in order to guarantee even a single hit. On the contrary, when using controlled systems, it is necessary to shoot only a sufficient amount to saturate the enemy defense; any single missile that breaks through the air defense line is likely to hit the target. Thus, protecting against any attacks of guided munitions imposes a very large responsibility on the defense, and it becomes even greater when protecting against weapons that are specially designed to break through the defense or that are inherently difficult to shoot down. Generally speaking, air defense experts believe that ballistic missiles are more difficult to hit than airplanes and cruise missiles. This is especially true in the case of advanced variants with multiple maneuvering warheads, decoys and jammers.
The Chinese are focusing on weapons that are likely to break through the defenses of American forces, expanding their arsenals not only with ballistic missiles, but also with supersonic missiles of all types. This explains China's purchases of Russian weapons such as the supersonic Mosquito (SS-N-22 Sunburn) and the more advanced Caliber anti-ship cruise missiles (SS-N-27B Sizzler), both of which were specifically designed to break through the latest Aegis combat system. American Navy. These Soviet-era missiles were followed by the Chinese YJ-12 long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missile in air and ship launch options. These supersonic missiles and other systems of this type are more difficult to intercept because they integrate elements that increase their chances of breaking through defenses at the end of the trajectory, such as active maneuvering in flight and advanced millimeter-wave homing heads, which American electronic suppression systems cannot deceive. The supersonic anti-ship missiles are used in combination with the world's first Chinese-designed DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, nicknamed the “Carrier Assassin,” with a range of nearly 1,000 miles and a maneuvering warhead. This ballistic missile will soon be joined by the even longer-range DF-26, capable of reaching the American base in Guam and threatening American aircraft carriers between the first and second chain of islands.
Undersecretary of Defense for R&D Mike Griffin told Congress in early 2018 that the Chinese are adding hypersonic and hypersonic gliders to their already impressive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons fly through "near space" not well covered by current American sensors or actuators. In addition, they can maneuver at speeds more than five times the speed of sound and, in the last leg of the trajectory, make a steep dive from different heights. All of these characteristics make hypersonic weapons a very difficult target for American combat networks.
Possession of weapons that exceed the range of the opponent's weapons in range and have a good chance of breaking through his defenses provides a potentially advantageous position in high-tech combat operations, characterized by intense duels of guided weapons. Such attacks are especially attractive against a more technologically advanced adversary such as the United States. Therefore, surprise strikes play a major role in the doctrine of the Chinese army. And whether it is a preemptive first strike or successive strikes, Chinese military doctrine always preaches powerful, concentrated strikes. Chinese officers harshly criticized Iraq in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm for firing "Scud rockets like pepperpots." On the contrary, they point to the need for "the concentrated use of advanced weapons to conduct focused, super-intense, surprise attacks in a limited space-time volume" and for such key targets as command centers, communications centers and information processing centers. Indeed, military action to destroy systems and an effective preemptive attack in China's counterbalancing strategy are essentially seen as two sides of the same coin.
Given the US leadership in guided munitions warfare in the late 1990s, the initial emphasis on war to destroy (destroy) systems made obvious sense from a Chinese perspective. If successful, this war would have prevented the American military network from effectively using its advantages in a high-precision long-range strike. However, the Chinese have always sought to defeat the Americans in a massive guided strike. Accordingly, while the emphasis is on destroying the United States' war networks in order to achieve decisive information superiority, the Chinese military hopes to defeat the opponent with guided weapons strikes. In fact, these two approaches mutually reinforce each other, since precision strikes against key targets of American combat networks only accelerate their destruction.
China's missile strategy has a negative impact on the US military in peacetime. First, an effective “financial burden” strategy forces the United States to develop and deploy extremely expensive missile defense systems to protect its military bases, both land and sea. Second, it forces the US military to think in an "overly defensive" manner, focusing on protecting advanced forces and assets from Chinese guided weapons, rather than adopting a more aggressive mindset in which the emphasis is mainly on using the enemy's assets. vulnerabilities.
