As you remember, about three weeks ago, Russian and foreign mass media were "blown up" by the news, which was at the same time positive for the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian Armed Forces, about the interception of the Israeli multifunctional fighter F-16I "Sufa" by the Syrian air defense systems, which is the second in terms of the technological level of the type of machines in the Hel Haavir fleet after the F-35I "Adir" stealth fighters that recently arrived at the Nevatim airbase. And no matter how high-ranking representatives of the Israeli Air Force command read to the media the same well-studied mantra "about the error of the pilots, which consists in excessive concentration on the work with the weapons control complex at the time of the sound and light warning of the onboard defense complex about the approaching missile defense system", there is a serious flaw in the Elisra SPJ-40 onboard electronic countermeasures system, which could not cope with the radio command guidance system of the C-125 "Pechora-2" anti-aircraft missile system or the semi-active radar guidance system of the "Cube" complex.
The opinion about the use of these particular air defense systems against the F-16I "Sufa" is based on the fact that after the moment of initiation of the high-explosive warhead of the interceptor missile in the single-engine fighter, not only the single-engine power plant, but also the elevators, as well as the mechanization of the rear wing edges. This indicates that there was a rupture of a warhead of average power weighing from 50 to 100 kg; 5V27DE anti-aircraft missiles with a warhead mass of 72 kg (Pechora-2M complex) fit perfectly into this range, as well as 3M9 anti-aircraft missiles with a warhead mass of 57 kg, which are part of the 2K12 Cub self-propelled air defense systems. This is evidenced by the elements of the hulls, wings and aerodynamic rudders that fell on the territory of Jordan and near the Golan Heights. As we have already considered in previous works, the guidance process during interception could be carried out through the optical-electronic sighting device 9Sh33A "Karat-2", the use of which removes the need to use the SNR-125M guidance radar. Result: complete inactivity of the SPS-3000 radiation warning station.
It is possible that during the launch site of the 5V27DE rocket, the pilots of the Israeli F-16I received a sound warning from the terminal of the infrared station for detecting attacking missiles PAWS-2, but immediately after the fuel of the combat stage burned out, the PAWS-2 indicator and sound devices were silent and the pilots did not even imagine about the approach of 5V27DE (after all, the sensors of the above infrared SOAP are guided exclusively by the rocket engine torch). This is approximately what the use of television-optical guidance modules, integrated into the control systems of anti-aircraft missile systems of the first and latest generations, consists in. It is extremely difficult to calculate their work by means of a conventional airborne STR, and only specialized electronic reconnaissance systems are capable of fixing the control channel of anti-aircraft missiles, which are not guided by radar, by means of a television-optical system. Such means include the AN / ALQ-227 (V) 1 integrated countermeasures against enemy communications, which is the second important EW means of the EA-18G “Growler” aircraft.
Against the background of the above information, the analysis of the anti-aircraft potential of the updated Pechora-2D anti-aircraft missile system (in several versions of ammunition), which is being modernized by the Ukrainian company Aerotechnika-MLT, will be very relevant. Within about a month after the appearance in the Ukrainian media of reports about successful fire tests of the deeply improved Pechora air defense system with the "2D" index (January 2018), the usual thoughtless and ironic discussion about terribly low fighting qualities of this complex. In particular, Alexey Zakvasin, one of the expert authors of the online edition of RT, published an article under the loud title "Cardboard Horror Story": why Ukraine is modernizing the Soviet Pechora anti-aircraft complex.
Firstly, the more correct classification is "anti-aircraft missile system" rather than "anti-aircraft complex". Secondly, the work cites a very erroneous opinion of the director of the Air Defense Museum in Balashikha, Yuri Knutov, who in an interview for Russia Today focuses on the impossibility of the modernized Pechora-2D air defense system to resist tactical aviation equipped with modern containerized and integrated (built-in) electronic countermeasures ("Khibiny" and "Himalayas" installed on the Su-24/30/34 / 35S, respectively). Mr. Knutov also points out that the updated Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile system cannot pose a threat to the 4 ++ generation fighters Su-30SM, Su-34 and Su-35S due to their high flight performance (obviously, it was about high maneuverable qualities). I would like to dwell on these positions in more detail.
Indeed, this anti-aircraft missile system is equipped with a fairly primitive radar FCR-125 for detecting, linking target trails (tracking), as well as targeting anti-aircraft guided missiles of the 5V27 family. The station is still represented by 4 antenna posts (with a lower central receiving-transmitting antenna of the UV-10 type for detecting and tracking the VTs, the upper central UV-12 for transmitting control commands, as well as two perpendicularly located receiving UV-11 for selecting low-altitude targets on the background of reflections from the earth's surface), which causes not the best noise immunity, especially when working with tactical aviation and cruise missiles operating in the mode of following the terrain. The integration of slotted antenna arrays into the FCR-125, of course, will help to improve the noise immunity, but bringing it to the level of radars with passive phased antenna arrays of the 30N6E type based on SHAR is unrealizable. Nevertheless, thanks to the use of slotted ARs, the power capabilities of the FCR-125 have increased by 1.49 times (the bearing range of a target with an RCS of 3 sq. M is about 90 km). Also, subject to the use of new 5V27D-M1 anti-aircraft missiles with semi-active radar seeker RGS-04R, the target channel can be increased from 1 to 3 simultaneously intercepted objects, and when using even more advanced 5V27D-M1 with ARGSN - up to 4 simultaneously destroyed targets; and these are already very serious indicators that cannot be ignored.
Suppose that the standard onboard and suspended container systems of electronic warfare "Gardenia", "Sorption", "Omul" and "Khibiny", intended for our 4th generation tactical aviation, suppress the semi-active guidance channel of the semi-active radar seeker RGS-04R and quickly re-intercept the jamming the target it will not be able to due to the difficulties of the antenna posts FCR-125 and combat control points ("digital cabins") UNK-2D. But what will happen after the "connection" of the optoelectronic complex of the "Karat-2" type (or a more advanced thermal imaging / television complex based on FPA and other matrices)? The aforementioned electronic warfare aircraft will become practically useless in the fight against the 5V27-M1 missile, guided by the TV / IR complex data. The Khibiny electronic warfare system, designed to effectively disrupt the "capture" of our tactical fighters by enemy airborne and ground radars, will also not play a role, since it is not intended to set up directed jamming at the source of radio command guidance of missiles. All of the above radio countermeasures are intended only to suppress the operation of radar detectors and illumination radars, and can be effective only at the moment when the 5V27D-M1 / 2 missiles use semi-active or active radar guidance, without the support of an optical channel. Consequently, the main countermeasures for the improved S-125-2D "Pechora-2D" air defense system are:
for the possibility of transferring target designation to the RVV-AE and R-73RDM-2 missiles, capable of destroying air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-ground missiles on approach (in the USA, AFRL / Raytheon is preparing to implement such an opportunity within the framework of the SACM-T project);
(Tu-214R aircraft, Sych radar reconnaissance containers, or ground-based self-propelled and portable radar reconnaissance equipment of the Aistenok, Credo-M types, etc.);
as well as suppression of these sources by means of attached electronic warfare modules (implemented in the AN / ALQ-227 (V) 1 complex of the EA-18G aircraft).
