In order to determine the possible role of aircraft carriers in a large-scale non-nuclear conflict, let's try to figure out how much tactical aviation the Russian Federation and NATO will have in the very near future - say, by 2020. The author did not set himself the task of achieving absolute reliability in the calculation of the Air Force, collecting them from open sources, but should not be mistaken in the order of numbers.
The RF Aerospace Forces up to 2020 inclusive should have:
PAK FA - 12 pcs. These will be vehicles for trial operation in the troops, so it is unlikely that they should be taken into account in the total number.
Su-35S - approximately 98 vehicles. The contract for 48 aircraft has already been executed, the second one is being executed now, for 50 aircraft by the end of 2020.
Su-30 M2 / SM - according to rumors, it is planned to increase up to 180 machines by 2020.
Su-33 - it is not clear, we will leave 14 cars.
Su-27 SM / SM3 - 61 vehicles. In general, initially it was said that at least 100 vehicles would undergo modernization, but recently something has not been heard about the Su-27SM3. Perhaps the program has been curtailed?
MiG-35 - 30 vehicles
MiG-29SMT - 44 vehicles
MiG-29UBT - 8 vehicles
MiG-29KR - 19 vehicles
MiG-29KUBR - 4 vehicles
MiG-31 - 113 modernized by 2020
In addition, presumably the Russian Air Force will retain a certain number of non-modernized vehicles: 78 Su-27, 69 MiG-31 and 120 MiG-29.
As for the front-line aviation, everything is more complicated here:
Su-34 - 124 aircraft until 2020, but it is possible that their number will be increased further. Taking into account the fact that they are now produced at 16-18 aircraft per year, it is quite possible to bring the number of aircraft to 142 aircraft. So let's count.
Su-24 - 0 vehicles. Alas, according to existing plans, the Su-24 should be completely decommissioned from the Air Force by 2020. On the other hand, in the event of an aggravation of the international situation, this decision may be reconsidered. And, in fact, even if a decision is made to withdraw, it can be assumed that the modernized Su-24 will be mothballed and not destroyed. Let's leave about half of the current number of Su-24s in service - approximately 120 vehicles.
Su-25 - there can be up to 200 vehicles.
Tu-22M3M - it is planned to modernize 30 vehicles. Strictly speaking, these are long-range missile-carrying aircraft, not tactical ones, but they, with a high degree of probability, will be used to solve tactical aviation tasks, so we will take them into account here.
Of course, there are also the Tu-95 and Tu-160, which theoretically could perform non-strategic functions, but in practice, in the event of a conflict with NATO, they are unlikely to play this role.
Thus, we counted:
Fighters - 458 pcs.
Interceptors - 113 pcs.
Tactical bombers - 262
Long-range missile carriers - 30 pcs.
And in total, it turns out, 863 new or modernized aircraft and, in addition, 267 not modernized fighters and interceptors and 200 attack aircraft - only 1,330 aircraft.
It is clear that all these machines cannot take off at the same time, because no one canceled the need for maintenance and repairs. But today we are by no means the 90s in the yard, so we can safely assume that the number of non-combat-ready aircraft at any given time will be within reasonable limits.
And what about our opponents? Let's count the European NATO countries first
Germany. Formally, today the Air Force has 125 Eurofighters and 93 Tornadoes. In fact, 55 Eurofighters and 29 Tornadoes are capable of performing combat missions. Generally speaking, Germany planned to acquire 180 Eurofighters, but how long will it take, and how many will be on the wing by 2020? It is unlikely that by that date, the once mighty Air Force will be able to boast of at least a hundred combat-ready or undergoing maintenance aircraft.
France. 167 Mirages 2000s of various modifications, approximately 115 Raphales in the Air Force by 2020 and 44 Raphales in the Navy. A total of 326 aircraft. It seems to be a great force, but only about 40% of the aircraft are combat-ready.
England - 141 Eurofighter (232 ordered), 76 Tornadoes. The author does not know the schedule for the delivery of Eurofighters, for example, they will reach 160 aircraft, making a total of 236 aircraft. But there is no reason to believe that the situation with combat-ready aircraft is much better than in France or Germany.
Italy - 83 Eurofighter, 68 Tornado fighter-bomber, 82 light attack aircraft AMX ACOL and AMX-T ACOL
Spain - 86 F-18 and 61 Eurofighter.
Greece - 156 F-16, 22-Mirage 2000, 34 Phantom II and 34 Corsair attack aircraft
Turkey - 260 F-16s of various (including quite modern) modifications, 51 Phantom II, 35 old F-5s
Norway - 57 fairly old F-16s.
Netherlands - 63 old F-16s.
Belgium - 68 old F-16s
Denmark - The 30 old F-16s in service should be decommissioned by 2020. Let's leave them all the same
Portugal - 30 old F-16s
Hungary and the Czech Republic - 12 Swedish SAABs each, total - 24
Bulgaria - 15 MiG-29 and 14 Su-25
Romania - 12 F-16 and 36 MiG-21
Slovakia - 12 MiG-29
Croatia - 16 MiG-21
Poland - 48 F-16. There are also MiG-29 and Su-22, but they seem to be withdrawn from the Air Force.
And in total, it turns out 2,177 aircraft, of which no less than 814 (or rather significantly more) are already very old machines.
Since 2,177 are noticeably more than 1,330, it seems that the air forces of the European countries - NATO members are significantly stronger than the Russian Aerospace Forces. But if you dig a little deeper, then everything becomes completely different.
The first is, of course, the percentage of serviceable cars in their total number. Unfortunately, the author does not know this figure for new aircraft of the Russian Air Force. At the same time, there is data on the US Air Force, where the level of readiness of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft is 71-74% of the total number, and the A-10 attack aircraft - even 77%, and there is no reason to believe that ours is worse today.
Suppose that the% of serviceability of the RF videoconferencing system is at the level of 70%. At the same time, the owners of the most powerful air forces in Europe, equipped with the most modern aircraft - Germany, England, France - have extremely low percentages of serviceability at about 40%.
It turns out interesting. If we compare the total estimated number of the most modern aircraft of the Russian Federation (Su-35/30, MiG-35 / 29SMT / K), which, even without taking into account the modernized MiG-31BM, by 2020 there should be about 383 machines with the most modern NATO machines (440 "Eurofighter" maximum, plus 159 "Rafale", and a total of 599 cars), it turns out that the European NATO countries have more than a half-fold advantage. But if we compare the number of combat-ready vehicles (at 70% for the Russian Aerospace Forces and even 50% for NATO), we get 268 versus 299, i.e. almost parity.
If we assume that the percentage of serviceable aircraft on average in European NATO countries does not exceed 50-55% against 70-75% of the Russian Federation, then the ratio of combat-ready aircraft will be 1,088 - 1,197 NATO aircraft against 931-997 aircraft of the Russian Federation, that is, the superiority of European countries NATO is minimal.
But that's not all. After all, it is not enough to have planes, they also need to be controlled. And if the Russian Aerospace Forces are subordinate to a single command and are capable from the very beginning of the conflict to act as a single whole, then the air forces of the European NATO members (we have listed the air forces of 19 (!) Countries) do not represent anything of the kind. But this is very important. Of course, NATO countries conduct joint training of their air forces, but they are unlikely to be intense and massive enough to ensure the kind of coordination and interaction of aviation that is possible within the air force of one country.
Remember, too, that NATO pilot training is very heterogeneous. The author does not have accurate data on that score, but the training of Turkish or Bulgarian pilots is unlikely to be equivalent to French or English.
One should also take into account the relationship of countries in NATO itself. It is not so easy to believe that in the event of a serious local conflict, the European NATO countries, as one, will enter the war as a monolithic force. It is very difficult to imagine the Greek armed forces fighting to the last drop of blood for the interests of Turkey.
Again, it is extremely difficult to expect that even those countries that do get involved in a conflict will throw all their aircraft into battle. You can be sure, almost for sure, that in the event of some large-scale clash, for example, in Eastern Europe, neither Britain nor France will throw all the might of their air forces into battle, but will confine themselves to sending a "limited contingent". Of course, the Russian Federation has the same problem, because it is impossible to completely expose the Far East and the southern borders, but in general, the percentage of the total number of combat-ready aviation that will be able to bring the Russian Federation into action in any conflict may well turn out to be higher than that of European NATO countries.
Logistics issues. No, of course, Europe's airfield network is very large and includes over 1,800 paved airfields. But the fact is that after the end of the Cold War, the Europeans are saving a lot on their military budgets, which will create certain problems for them when trying to concentrate the power of their air forces, say, closer to Eastern Europe. It is not that the Russian Federation did not have such difficulties, but it is easier to cope with them within one country.
All of the above leads us to the fact that despite the listed air superiority of the European NATO countries over the Russian Federation, the actual balance of power in a suddenly flared up conflict may not be as brilliant for Europeans as it looks on paper.
And if you go beyond the air force itself, and remember such an important factor as air defense?
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have a very strong ground-based air defense system, significantly superior to that of the European NATO countries. Not that NATO has absolutely no ground-based air defense components, but earlier, in the days of
During the Cold War, they traditionally relied on their air superiority. And after the USSR collapsed and in Europe they began to cut military budgets everywhere, of course, they saved a lot on the development and updating of air defense systems. And did the NATO countries really need new versions of the same air defense systems at that time? In the "wonderful" 90s, if there was a sudden military conflict with the Russian Federation, the question was not how to defeat the Russian Air Force, but how to find them.
However, any disarmament policy is good only when the enemy is even weaker, if he suddenly begins to strengthen, then … Of course, no ground-based air defense, no matter how powerful it may be in itself, is not able to withstand the modern air force. But as one of the components of the balanced armed forces of the country, it is capable of greatly hampering the actions of enemy aircraft and seriously increasing its losses.
Until recently, NATO aviation had a certain superiority in tactical control, missile weapons and electronic warfare equipment, and, in addition, in the training of pilots. But it is well known that in the GPV 2011-2020. great attention has been paid to communications and command and control issues, so we can count on the fact that if we have not caught up on this issue, then at least we have reduced the lag. In terms of missile weapons, the situation is also gradually stabilizing, so, for example, by 2020, a noticeable amount of RVV-SD should be expected to enter the troops. As for the electronic warfare means, here the lag has been completely eliminated, and it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that NATO is now catching up. On the issue of combat training, the situation has also improved significantly - not only did the Russian Aerospace Forces begin to spend much more resources on training, but also the war in Syria allowed many pilots to gain combat experience. And although the "Barmalei", of course, are not a serious enemy for the Air Force, but still, at least, we can talk about "exercises close to combat conditions."
Taking into account all of the above, the author of this article can conclude that the Russian Aerospace Forces (provided there is a sufficient number of trained pilots) in the very near future can receive not only parity with the air forces of European NATO countries, but even good chances of gaining air superiority at the initial stage. hypothetical military conflict.
Of course, all this is true exactly until the moment when we remember the US Air Force. Even without taking into account the F-35, which, most likely, as of 2020 will remain in a semi-operational state, the US Air Force has 1,560 fighters (184 F-22; 449 F-15 and 957 F-16 of various modifications) as well as 398 attack aircraft, including 287 A-10 and 111 AV-8B. And that's not counting the 247 F-18, and 131 AV-8B of the Marine Corps, and the 867 F-18 carrier-based aircraft. The United States has at its disposal 3,203 tactical aircraft, and in terms of air power, the United States, perhaps, surpasses the European countries of NATO and the Russian Aerospace Forces combined.
Thus, we can say that the United States has an overwhelming superiority in the air. But … as one very wise proverb says: "if your pistol lies a millimeter further than you can reach, then you don't have a pistol."
Currently, the United States has deployed 136 F-15 and F-16 combat aircraft at European bases, not counting transport and reconnaissance aircraft. This air group cannot fundamentally affect the balance of power in Europe. Air superiority will depend entirely on the speed of the American air force's airlift from US territory to Europe.
It would seem, and what's wrong with that - refueled, sat down at the wheel, and flew across the Atlantic … But this happens only in third-rate action films. Even the most unpretentious combat aircraft require maintenance at the rate of 25 man-hours per flight hour. We need people, we need equipment, we need cover for airfields, where the air wings will be deployed, we need fuel, ammunition and much, much more. And the problem is that the Americans in Europe do not have any of this now. And the Europeans, who somehow maintain the percentage of serviceable cars at the level of 40-50%, do not either. And delivering all of this from the United States to Europe is not at all as easy as it might seem.
Recall Operation Desert Shield
The transportations continued from early August 1990 to mid-January 1991. 729 tactical aircraft and 190 aircraft of the Marine Corps were transferred, and in total, about 900 land-based tactical aircraft (729 + 190 = 919 aircraft, but part of the Harriers are naval infantry operated from the decks of landing ships), as well as 5 divisions, 4 brigades and 1 separate regiment of ground forces and marines. By the beginning of Desert Storm, this contingent was provided with all the necessary supplies for one month of combat operations. This is undoubtedly an outstanding result. But it took more than five months to create this grouping - the transfers went from August 7, 1990 to January 17, 1991!
Of course, we are talking not only about the transfer of aviation, but also about large contingents of ground forces, but in the event of a large-scale conflict, these very ground forces will be badly needed by the United States on the continent. The fact is that the European NATO countries have about the same problem with the ground forces as with the Air Force - it seems to be a lot on paper, but as long as you concentrate in the right place, the war will be over three times. We have already mentioned the state of the once formidable Bundeswehr, which today has only three divisions with 95 combat-ready tanks. France has two tank divisions with three regiments of special operations forces and also a foreign legion, but in the event of a sudden conflict, it will be very problematic to extract its parts from Tahiti, Djibouti and similar places. Italy has three divisions, two (and several brigades) - Great Britain … In total, the European NATO countries have very impressive ground forces by the standards of the XXI century, but only on one condition - if all of them are collected in one place, and with this in the event of a sudden military conflicts will be very big problems.
If the above reasons are correct, then in the foreseeable future the Russian Federation can achieve parity in the air with NATO in the event of a sudden large-scale conflict. And it will take the United States not even weeks, but months to realize its air superiority. It is quite another matter if the conflict is preceded by a long (several months) period of exacerbation of relations - in this case, the war may begin with one and a half, or even a double advantage of NATO in the air.
