The experience of guerrilla warfare in the fascist rear has convincingly shown that planning the combat activities of guerrilla formations was one of the main factors of its high efficiency. The greatest successes were usually achieved by partisans in those cases when the efforts of individual detachments and brigades were united by a common plan, and their strikes were closely associated with the actions of regular troops.
Of considerable interest, for example, is the experience of planning combat operations of partisan units and formations located in the western Russian regions, which, together with the Belarusian and part of the Ukrainian partisans, successfully operated in 1941-1943. behind enemy lines. During these years, 13 partisan brigades and 4 separate detachments, which together numbered about 5, 5 thousand fighters, were located on the territory of the Kalinin region occupied by the Germans. In the Smolensk region, 127 partisan detachments (over 11 thousand fighters) fought in the enemy rear. Large partisan forces were based in the Oryol region. In total, 18 partisan brigades operated here, as well as several separate detachments, uniting more than 19 thousand partisans. In addition, on the border of the Oryol and Kursk regions, in the area of the Khinelsky forests, there were two Kursk partisan brigades consisting of 14 detachments with a total number of fighters of about 4 thousand people.
The leadership of the combat work of the partisan formations was carried out by the front headquarters of the partisan movement (SHPD), which received instructions in the form of directives and orders from the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement (CSHPD), as well as from the front-line military councils. Before their formation, missions to partisan detachments were occasionally assigned by the headquarters of search associations, in the bands of which they were based. For example, in April 1942, the headquarters of the Kalinin Front developed a Plan of Measures to Reduce the Maneuverability of the Enemy, Making it Difficult to Arrive and Evacuate During the Spring Thaw, which was designed mainly for performing private tasks and not associated with any specific operation.
With the growth of the partisan movement, it became necessary to more purposefully use the partisan forces, to clearly coordinate their actions with the general plan of armed struggle. Conducting coordinated strikes against German troops from the front and rear became possible on a large scale only in the fall of 1942, that is, after the Central broadband access was formed at the headquarters of the military-industrial complex, and front-line broadband access was formed in the field. From them, partisan detachments began to receive combat missions, taking into account the plans of front-line operations and the military campaign as a whole. This immediately affected the efficiency and purposefulness of the partisans' actions. Operational departments were created in each broadband access. Their responsibility was to develop both general, for a certain period, and private plans of action of the partisan forces in the interests of the front troops in various operations.
Among such documents related to the beginning of the front-line broadband activity, one can single out, for example, the "Operational plan of combat operations of partisan detachments and brigades for July - August 1942", compiled by the Kalinin broadband communication (chief of staff VV Radchenko). Work on it was carried out during the preparation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts for the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation. Proceeding from the general tasks of the front command, the Kalinin broadband communication tasked the partisan formations with disrupting the planned supply and command of the German troops (destruction of highways and communication lines, destruction of ammunition and fuel depots), as well as intensifying reconnaissance in the interests of the front - to clarify the forces, means and grouping of fascist troops in the front line. To this end, it was planned to organize observation of the movement, the nature of transportation and their direction, to carry out raids on headquarters and garrisons, to seize documents and prisoners. The plan provided for the redeployment of a number of partisan formations to areas from where it was more convenient to strike at the most vulnerable centers, road junctions and main German railways.
Similar plans were developed for other front-line broadband access. To coordinate the actions of partisan brigades and detachments, to quickly obtain information about their combat and intelligence work in the center of the base area of several partisan formations, leadership headquarters were organized (chief, commissar, deputy for intelligence, five messengers and two radio operators). Maintaining a stable connection with the front-line broadband access, they promptly assessed the situation, combined the efforts of subordinate formations (detachments) and assigned them combat missions. In different areas, these leadership bodies were called differently: operational centers, joint commands, operational groups, etc.
Experience has shown that the advance planning of guerrilla combat operations has significantly increased the effectiveness of their struggle. By stepping up their sabotage activities in the German rear of Army Group Center, the partisans provided significant assistance to the regular troops. The headquarters of Army Group Center, for example, reported on September 1, 1942: “On the Polotsk-Vitebsk-Smolensk line, the planned actions of the partisans, accompanied by explosions of trains, rails, overpasses, switches, dismantling rails and overturning telegraph poles, caused an almost complete disruption of traffic. At present, explosions have begun on such lines and sections, along which the movement passed without hindrances before”.
A significant role in the further improvement of the planning of partisan actions was played by the order of the NKO No. 139 of September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement." It assessed the results of the partisan movement, determined the ways of its development and set specific tasks for the partisan detachments. The requirements of the order, as well as the instructions of the TSSHPD and the military councils of the fronts, which developed the main provisions of this important document, formed the basis for the operational planning of partisan actions for a long period.
To convey the guidelines to all the registered partisan detachments, the front-line broadband lines sent their responsible workers and liaison officers to the territory temporarily seized by the enemy, who were instructed not only to familiarize the command of the detachments with the text of the order, but also to provide the necessary assistance in organizing its implementation. For example, the Bryansk ShPD sent a group of 12 officers to the rear of the enemy, headed by Chief of Staff A. P. Matveev. 14 communications officers, as well as a group of staff officers and workers of the Smolensk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), were sent from the Western broadband to the partisans' basing areas.
Based on the requirements of Order No. 189 and the situation at the front and in the enemy's rear, the TSSHPD began to systematically coordinate the actions of several partisan groups based in the zones of several fronts, which was of great operational importance. For example, on December 5, 1942, the head of the TSSHPD, Lieutenant General P. K. Ponomarenko approved the "Plan of combat and sabotage actions of partisan brigades and detachments operating on the Western and Bryansk fronts."The partisans were supposed to disrupt the systematic operational transportation of the fascists and thereby provide effective assistance to the Red Army, leading the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, and prevent the strengthening of the enemy grouping on the southern wing of the front. The plan provided for the organization of a number of massive raids on the most important enemy communications. So, the partisan brigades of F. S. Danchenkov, V. I. Zolotukhina, G. I. Kezikova, G. I. Orlova, I. A. Ponasenkov, A. P. Shestakov and separate detachments of M. I. Duka and M. P. Romashin was ordered to disable the railways of the Roslavl, Unech and partly Bryansk railway junctions by mining and blowing up bridges across the Navlya and Desna rivers, and D. V. Emlyutin and I. K. Panchenko to disrupt military and transport railway transportation on the routes Bryansk-Orel-Kursk, Bryansk-Navlya-Lgov and Bryansk-Pochep-Unecha.
As a result of deliberate attacks by partisans on railway communications, the carrying capacity of the railways that adjoined the Bryansk junction significantly decreased, and the enemy was forced to attract large forces of troops to protect them. The nature of planning partisan combat operations in the western Russian regions in 1943 was greatly influenced by the transition of Soviet troops to active offensive operations in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, an increase in the scope of partisan warfare, an improvement in the leadership system and an improvement in communication between partisan detachments and leadership bodies.
At the end of winter, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to conduct two major operations simultaneously: against Army Groups Center and North. The first was attended by the troops of four fronts: Kalinin, Western, Bryansk and Central. In accordance with the general plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters for the operation, the TSSHPD developed an action plan to intensify the combat activities of partisan formations operating in front of the indicated fronts for February 1943. Particular attention of the commanders of the partisan formations was paid to strengthening the sabotage work carried out on the railways. Particular tasks were also identified for the largest partisan groups and brigades. In total, it was supposed to blow up 14 railway bridges and destroy several stations. Front-line broadband access was required to concretize the tasks of the rest of the brigades (separate detachments), to organize interaction between them and to provide the ongoing operations with material and technical means.
In accordance with the general instructions defined in the plan of activities of the TSSHPD, the front-line broadband lines planned in more detail the combat activities of the subordinate partisan formations. Thus, the Kalininsky broadband network developed the "Plan of combat operations of the partisans of the Kalinin front for February - March 1943", in which each brigade identified specific road sections for sabotage. To assist the advancing Soviet troops in early February, the forces of all brigades and detachments were to carry out a simultaneous strike on four railway sections: Novrsokolniki-Sebezh, Nevel-Polotsk, Dno-Novosokolniki and Vitebsk-Smolensk. In total, it was supposed to make about seven hundred explosions on railway lines and to arrange more than eight hundred ambushes on highways.
In the conditions of constant fierce battles with punishers, despite the lack of explosives and mine-blasting equipment, the Kalinin partisans, for example, in February 1943 destroyed 71 bridges, of which 23 were railway, and in March, 79 and 30, respectively. train crashes were systematically arranged. The capacity of the roads controlled by the guerrillas has decreased significantly.
Western broadband access (chief of staff D. M. Popov), in connection with the prepared operation of the forces of the left wing of the Western Front in the Bryansk direction, in mid-February 1943, he developed a "Plan for an operation to defeat the rear of the Bryansk-Kirov enemy grouping." The plan determined the tasks for the brigades and detachments of mainly two partisan groups (Kletnyanskaya and Dyatkovo), whose efforts were concentrated on disrupting the enemy's railroad traffic. The main targets for the attack were railway stations, sidings and bridges. A characteristic feature of this document was that, in addition to the distribution of tasks between partisan formations, issues of communication and supply were developed. To improve the operational leadership of partisan brigades, a Southern Operational Group was formed under the 10th Army's military council, consisting of the chief, his assistant in the operational unit and 7 officers. The group had a radio station and other means of communication, and from February 15, 3 P-5 aircraft and a squadron of U-2 aircraft were assigned to it.
In connection with the formation of the Central Front on February 15, 1943 and a general change in the operational situation in the Oryol-Bryansk direction, the partisans of the Bryansk forests found themselves in the zone of operations of two fronts. Therefore, the tasks of the Oryol partisans were soon changed, and they began to act mostly in the interests of the Central Front.
By the joint efforts of the workers of the Bryansk broadband access and the headquarters of the Central Front, two plans for the interaction of the forces of the Central Front were developed: one with the partisans of the southern regions of the Bryansk forests, and the other with the northern regions of the Oryol region. The partisans were supposed to intensify their sabotage activities and disorganize traffic on the most important sections of the Bryansk railway junction, as well as on some highways. The forces of the partisan brigades of the Bryansk region were supposed to prepare and hold a defensive line on both banks of the Desna in order to ensure the successful crossing of the river by the advancing units of the Red Army.
Following the instructions of the military command, the partisans sharply increased the number of sabotage carried out on transport routes. Dozens of echelons with German military equipment and soldiers flew downhill. As a result of the explosions of railway bridges, the transfer and supply of the fascist troops were disrupted. For example, the explosion of the railway bridge across the Desna near Vygonichi station suspended the movement of transport on this most important highway for 28 days.
On the eve and during the Battle of Kursk, the front command, when planning partisan actions, paid special attention to receiving intelligence information about the enemy from the partisans. In this regard, the "Operational plan for April-May 1943" and "Operational plan for June, July, August 1943", prepared by the broadband communications and approved by the command of the Western Front (April 9 and June 16, respectively), are characteristic. An analysis of these documents shows that the partisans were required at that time to provide a wide range of information about the state and actions of the enemy. To strengthen the intelligence agencies of the partisans, highly qualified specialists, properly trained in the Soviet rear, were sent as deputy commanders of the partisan brigades and reconnaissance detachments. So, by the beginning of July 1943, the Western broadband had sent 11 reconnaissance commanders to subordinate partisan formations. To conduct briefings during a short-term training session of the leadership of the intelligence units, it was practiced to send workers from the broadband intelligence department to the enemy rear to the partisans.
Great attention was paid to intelligence and broadband access on the Central Front. In connection with the continued concentration of fascist troops in the Oryol direction and the important events upcoming there, he directed his main efforts at disrupting the systematic movement along the highways of the Bryansk railway junction and expanding the network of agent intelligence in cities and large villages. All these issues were reflected in the "Plan of combat, sabotage and intelligence activities and the growth of the partisan movement in the temporarily occupied areas of the Oryol region by the German invaders for the summer period of 1943", approved on May 18 by the head of broadband on the Central Front.
In addition to reconnaissance and sabotage against enemy communications, broadband also set other tasks, for example, to expand the partisan movement, improve the operational leadership of partisan detachments and their material and technical support. The plans for the combat activities of partisans in the western regions of the RSFSR, drawn up by front-line broadband communications for the spring and summer of 1943, were a new step towards improving the operational use of partisan forces. In particular, the tasks for the partisan formations were set on the basis of a comprehensive account of the situation and the nature of the goals facing the fronts. The plans reflected more specific tasks for conducting reconnaissance activities in the interests of regular troops. Much more attention was paid to improving the control of the actions of partisan groups, especially maintaining regular and reliable communication with them. An important place was given to the issues of providing material and technical means of planned operations.
The growth of the partisan movement and the centralization of leadership made it possible, along with the general plans for the combat activities of the partisans, to plan large-scale operations. So, by mid-July 1943, at the direction of the Headquarters of the military-industrial complex, the Central Broadcasting Company developed an operation to combat enemy railway communications, which was named "Rail War". Partisans of the Kalinin, Smolensk and Oryol regions were to take part in the first massive strike along with the Belarusian, Leningrad and Ukrainian partisans.
On the basis of the general plan of the operation, private plans were drawn up for all front-line broadband communications, which indicated: the sections of highways planned for destruction and their length; partisan formations involved in the operation; the degree of planned damage to railway tracks on these sections (for example, for the Kalininsky broadband access - 50%, for the West - 20%); the required amount of explosives and ammunition; the need for aircraft for the delivery of combat cargo; areas and places of cargo drop; airfields from which it was supposed to transfer cargo. Calculations were also made of the number of rails blown up in the first simultaneous impact, and the time for approaching the objects. In total, for the partisans of the western regions of the RSFSR, it was planned to blow up more than 49 thousand rails on sections of railways with a total length of 722 km. For this, the planes had to deliver over 12 tons of combat cargo to the partisan formations, including about 10 tons of explosives.
After the completion of the private plans of the operation "Rail War" in the front-line broadband access, the tasks were brought to the attention of the performers - partisan brigades and detachments. In the Western broadband access, 14 liaison officers were involved for this, who were sent to all large partisan detachments. The Kalinin and Bryansk broadband communications assigned tasks for most of the partisan formations through the chiefs of the operational groups. Thus, the head of the Southern Task Force, Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Gorshkov was summoned to the Bryansk broadband Internet, where he was given written orders and instructions for partisan detachments. The commanders of the Kalinin brigades received planning documents through Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Sokolov, head of the task force at the military council of the 3rd shock army.
Skillful planning, thoughtful preparation and timely supply of detachments with mine and explosive equipment predetermined the successful start and development of the "Rail War". Partisan attacks, which began on the night of August 3, 1943, were then repeated until mid-September. During this time, partisans of the western regions of the RSFSR killed 60, 4 thousand rails, exceeding the established norm by more than 20%. During the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the summer and autumn of 1943, the partisan forces of the western regions of the RSFSR, in addition to disrupting the transport of the enemy, were widely used for other purposes. On instructions from the military command, they prevented the enemy's organized withdrawal, attacked headquarters and command posts, seized bridge and ferry crossings and held them until the approach of the Red Army units. Having united with the regular troops, the partisans, as a rule, joined their composition.
Thus, a study of the plans for the combat activities of partisans in the western regions of Russia shows that as the partisan struggle unfolds behind enemy lines, a tendency is clearly traced towards a closer coordination of the actions of regular troops and partisans. So, if until the summer of 1942, the planning and coordination of the combat work of partisan formations, in accordance with the tasks solved by the Red Army, was carried out only sporadically, then, starting from the middle of 1942, with the creation of the Central and front-line broadband communications, this took on a systematic character.
Initially, plans were drawn up for relatively short periods of time: for one or two months or for the period of a front operation, later - for longer periods. They were developed by broadband access in close contact with the front-line military councils. When setting the missions, the situation and the nature of the objectives facing the regular troops were taken into account more fully. More attention began to be paid to the issues of operational leadership of individual partisan groups, maintaining stable and regular communication with them and logistical support. For a more specific management of the actions of brigades and individual detachments, front-line broadband access began to transfer operational groups to the German rear, which were created from staff members and provided with communications. The centralized control of the partisan movement allowed the Supreme Command Headquarters to assign the partisans the task of delivering massive strikes precisely along those railways along which the enemy feverishly transferred their reserves to the desired sector of the front.
The activities of the Central and front-line broadband access to implement the plans for the "Rail War" are an example of a well-thought-out and precise organization of interaction between partisans and regular troops on an operational-strategic scale. All partisan formations struck the first blow on the railroad communications on a common signal from the TSSHPD. Improving the operational planning of the actions of partisan formations affected the effectiveness of the struggle in the enemy rear, gave this struggle a more organized character, made it possible to direct the efforts of partisans at the right time to the most important targets, and helped to improve the interaction of partisans with regular troops.
