Recently, against the backdrop of the successes of the Syrian government forces in the fight against various armed Islamist groups, American and Israeli air strikes continue to strike targets in Syria. There are various reasons for this, from the protection of civilians from "chlorine attacks" to the fight against terrorism and the destruction of warehouses with weapons of the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.
In order to understand what the Syrian air defense forces are at the moment and to what extent they are capable of countering modern means of air attack, let's go back to the past. The formation of a centralized air defense system in the Syrian armed forces began in the 60s, during the period of active confrontation between the Arab countries and Israel. At the time, a number of Middle Eastern states such as Syria, Egypt and Iraq were receiving massive economic and military aid from the Soviet Union. In parallel with the supply of small arms, artillery systems and tanks, the most modern jet combat aircraft, anti-aircraft guns with radar guidance, anti-aircraft missile systems and air monitoring radars were sent to the Arab countries. Since the Arab air defense crews were not highly qualified, Soviet military advisers were always next to them, and often anti-aircraft missile battalions covering the most important objects were fully staffed with Soviet troops.
But we must pay tribute to the Syrians, of all the armies of the Arab coalition, they turned out to be the most persistent soldiers, and after undergoing training in Soviet training centers, the Syrian air defense calculations showed a good level of training. The Syrian air defense system, built according to Soviet patterns, was constantly under pressure from the Israeli Air Force. I must say that this confrontation went on with varying success. As you know, in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, the ground forces of the Arab coalition, despite the surprise of the attack and the initial success of the operation, lost talentlessly to the Israelis. At the same time, the Syrian air defense forces performed excellently. The mobile medium-range air defense systems "Kvadrat" proved to be especially effective, which became an extremely unpleasant surprise for the Israeli pilots. In Israel, like the United States, from where the supply of aviation equipment and weapons was mainly carried out, at that time there were no active jamming stations capable of counteracting the Kvadrat mobile anti-aircraft missile system, which is an export modification of the Kub air defense system. Although the Arab armies were defeated in 1973, Israeli aircraft suffered heavy casualties in the conflict. According to various sources, in 18 days of active hostilities, from 100 to 120 Israeli combat aircraft were shot down, about two dozen more heavily damaged fighters and attack aircraft were written off as unrecoverable after returning to their airfields.
However, the Israelis quickly drew the right conclusions and took appropriate action. In June 1982, during Operation Medvedka 19, the Israel Defense Forces managed to defeat the Syrian air defense forces deployed in Lebanon, which included 24 anti-aircraft missile divisions: S-75, S-125 and Kvadrat. At the same time, the Israelis widely used the Scout and Mastiff UAVs, which conducted reconnaissance and observation of Syrian airfields, air defense missile systems, opened the location of radar posts and control points, and acted as decoys. Anti-radar missiles of American production AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard ARM were widely used to defeat the radar surveillance of the air situation and anti-aircraft missile guidance stations, and those air defense systems that could not be destroyed were suppressed by active interference. Israeli electronic warfare systems were also able to disrupt the work of radio networks, through which the control and coordination of the combat work of the Syrian air defense was carried out. Syrian anti-aircraft missile battalions within range have come under massive Israeli artillery fire. After that, about a hundred fighter-bombers inflicted strikes on anti-aircraft gunner positions and radar posts. In the first two hours of the operation, the Israelis were able to destroy 15 Syrian air defense systems, which predetermined the further course of hostilities.
After the defeat in June 1982, the Syrian air defense forces were strengthened by new supplies of equipment and weapons from the USSR. In particular, four S-200 long-range air defense missile systems were sent to Syria. At the first stage after the deployment of "two hundred" on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, they were controlled and serviced by Soviet soldiers of anti-aircraft missile regiments, which had previously been deployed near Tula and Pereslavl-Zalessky. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, Soviet calculations, in cooperation with Syrian air defense units, were supposed to reflect Israeli air raids. After the S-200 divisions were deployed in positions, and the target illumination radars began to take Israeli aircraft to escort, the activity of Israeli aviation in the affected area of the complexes sharply decreased.
For that time, the long-range air defense system of the export modification S-200VE was a fairly effective means of combating air targets. Its strong point is its immunity to electronic interference, effective against the S-75 and S-125 complexes. Thanks to the use of anti-aircraft missiles with a semi-active seeker as part of the S-200 air defense system, the radio interference previously used to blind the guidance stations of complexes with radio command missiles became ineffective against it. It is even easier to work with an aerial target, which poses a powerful noise interference. In this case, it is possible to launch the rocket in a passive mode with the ROC turned off. Taking into account the fact that the S-200 air defense systems were usually part of the mixed-strength anti-aircraft missile brigades with the S-75 and S-125 radio command units, this circumstance significantly expanded the range of combat capabilities of the brigades' fire weapons. The S-200 complexes deployed in Syria made it possible to hit air targets over most of the country and beyond. The range of destruction of targets flying at medium and high altitudes with V-880E (5V28E) missiles is 240 km. The maximum reach in height is 40 km, the minimum height of destruction is 300 m. In total, from 1984 to 1988, the Syrian air defense forces received 8 S-200VE air defense systems (channels), 4 technical positions (TP) and 144 V-880E missiles (5V28E). Export-modified Vegas were deployed at positions in the vicinity of Homs, Tartus and Damascus.
The S-75M / S-75M3 Volga medium-range complexes were very numerous in the air defense forces of the SAR. Until 1987, the Syrian anti-aircraft missile forces received 52 S-75M and S-75M3 air defense systems and 1918 B-755 / B-759 anti-aircraft missiles. Although by the beginning of the civil war the age of the newest "seventy-fives" had exceeded 20 years, thanks to good care, timely maintenance and repairs, they were in good condition, which was largely due to the dry climate. As of 2011, about three dozen S-75M / S-75M3 anti-aircraft missile battalions were on alert.
As part of military-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union, Syria received 47 divisional sets of S-125M / S-125M1A air defense systems and 1,820 V-601PD air defense systems. Approximately 10 years ago, an agreement was reached that some of the most recent low-altitude systems will be modernized in Russia to the level of C-125-2M "Pechora-2M", which will extend the operational life and significantly increase the combat potential. Deliveries of the Pechora-2M air defense system began in 2013. In total, 12 such systems were transferred to the Syrian air defense forces.
According to the data provided by the Military Balance, as of 2011, Syria had two separate air defense regiments armed with long-range air defense systems C-200VE and 25 brigades that are armed with stationary air defense systems C-75M / M3 and C-125M / M1A / 2M. Another 11 brigades were equipped with self-propelled air defense systems "Kvadrat" and "Buk-M2E". Three brigades were armed with self-propelled short-range air defense systems "Osa-AKM" and "Pantsir-S1" air defense missile systems. The information on the number of mobile systems is rather contradictory. Until the mid-1980s, more than 50 batteries of the Kvadrat air defense missile system were delivered to Syria from the USSR.
The battery consisted of one self-propelled reconnaissance and guidance unit, a target designation receiving cabin, four self-propelled launchers and auxiliary equipment. At a time when air defense systems of the Land Forces of the Soviet Army began to receive air defense systems of the new generation "Buk", export "Squares" and new anti-aircraft missiles of the 3M9 family continued to be sent to Syria.
Apparently, some of this equipment was lost during the fighting in the 70s and 80s and was written off due to wear and tear. According to information provided by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as of 2012, there were 27 Kvadrat anti-aircraft missile batteries in Syria. However, this amount may be overestimated, or part of the air defense system with a depleted resource was "in storage". In the 21st century, the outdated Syrian "Squares" were planned to be replaced with new complexes "Buk-M2E".
According to data published by SIPRI, according to a contract signed in 2008, Syria was to receive 8 Buk-M2E batteries and 160 9M317 missiles, which were transferred to the Syrian side in the period from 2010 to 2013. In total, the Syrian armed forces before the start of the civil war had more than 200 launchers of mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition to the medium-range air defense systems "Kvadrat" and "Buk-M2E", this number included short-range complexes "Osa-AKM" and "Strela-10", which, according to various sources, were from 60 to 80 units. In the 70s, Syria received a number of short-range air defense systems "Strela-1", which, along with the ZSU-23-4, were equipped with anti-aircraft battalions of motorized rifle regiments. However, at present, there is no mention of these outdated complexes based on the BRDM-2 in the reference books and they are not used by the Syrian army.
The 2006 contract provided for the delivery of Pantsir-S1E anti-aircraft missile and cannon systems to the SAR. In the period from 2008 to 2011, 36 air defense missile systems and 700 9M311 missiles were sent to the SAR.
To increase the combat capabilities of the on-site air defense and replace outdated anti-aircraft systems (primarily the S-75M / M3), a contract was signed in 2010 for the supply of the S-300PMU2 anti-aircraft missile systems. According to American and Israeli data, Russia should supply four divisions worth $ 400 million and prepare Syrian calculations. However, under pressure from the United States and Israel, the fulfillment of the contract was stopped. According to V. Putin's statement in an interview on September 4, 2013, individual components of the air defense system were delivered to the CAP, then the contract was canceled, and the advance was returned to the customer.
To protect small units from low-altitude air attacks, the Syrian armed forces in 2011 had about 4,000 Strela-2M, Strela-3 and Igla portable anti-aircraft missile systems. At present, due to the low noise immunity of the Strela-2/3 MANPADS, they no longer meet modern requirements, but due to their large numbers, in case of mass use, they are still capable of posing a threat to low-altitude air targets. The number of heat traps on a combat aircraft or helicopter is limited and at the necessary moment they can simply be used up, and by and large it does not matter how old the missile that hit a modern aircraft is. However, at the moment, most of the MANPADS manufactured in the USSR in the 70s and 80s are most likely inoperable. This is due to the fact that the shelf life of disposable electric batteries, activated before starting, is long overdue. Simultaneously with the deliveries of the Buk-M2E, Pechora-2M and Pantsir-S1E air defense systems, several hundred modern Igla-S MANPADS were purchased in Russia. In addition to complexes with guided anti-aircraft missiles, the Syrian army had about 4,000 anti-aircraft machine gun and artillery installations of 14, 5, 23, 37, 57 and 100-mm caliber. The most valuable of them were the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", towed 23-mm twin ZU-23 and 57-mm guns with radar guidance S-60.
Control of the air situation over the territory of Syria, the issuance of target designation of air defense systems and the guidance of fighter aircraft until mid-2011 was carried out by more than 30 radar posts, 2/3 of which were deployed in the southwestern part of the country and along the coast. These were mainly old Soviet-made radars obtained in the 70-80s: P-15, P-14, P-18, P-19, P-37, PRV-13 and PRV-16.
As part of the program to modernize the air defense system before the start of the civil war, several modern three-coordinate 36D6 radars were delivered to Syria. Most of the radar stations, as well as anti-aircraft missile systems, were located on the most likely flight routes of the Israeli aviation.
The central air defense command post of the SAR is located in the vicinity of the Saigal airbase near Damascus. The Syrian air defense command and control scheme repeated the Soviet model adopted in the mid-1980s. The headquarters of the air defense zones (North and South), control points of anti-aircraft missile formations and units were combined into a single network. Information exchange between headquarters, command posts, anti-aircraft battalions and radio engineering units is carried out via VHF and HF radio channels. Before the beginning of the internal armed conflict, equipment for tropospheric, radio relay and wire communication was widely used.
Despite the unprecedentedly high density of placement of anti-aircraft missile systems of various types and two or three-fold overlap of the radar field in the south and east of the country, the combat capabilities of the Syrian air defense forces in the 21st century no longer met modern requirements. The existing radar reconnaissance means are not able to function in the common information space due to the absence of a single automated center for collecting and processing information. The collection and processing of information about the air situation by the methods adopted by the USSR Air Defense Forces in the 1980s leads to large inaccuracies and delays in the transmission of data on air targets. This is due to the hopeless obsolescence of the automation and combat control systems and the low noise immunity of radars for monitoring the air situation and communications equipment. In addition, by 2011, many Syrian air defense systems and radars had exhausted their resource, and about a third were not ready due to equipment malfunction. There were big problems with the detection of air targets flying at altitudes of 100-200 m. Even in the most important directions, the ability to fix low-altitude targets was of a focal nature. Without exception, all radar systems of the Syrian air defense, with the exception of the Buk-M2E air defense missile system and the Pantsir-S1E air defense missile system, are poorly protected from passive interference and practically are not protected from active interference, do not have special modes of operation when the enemy uses high-precision weapons. Although the Syrian air defense forces had modern models of equipment and weapons, their share by the time the internal armed conflict began was no more than 15%. In general, already at the end of the 90s, the ground component of the air defense system of the ATS did not meet modern requirements and could not on equal terms withstand the continuously improving Israeli and American air attack weapons.
As of 2011, the Syrian Air Force had three dozen MiG-25PD interceptors, fifty MiG-23MF / MLD and about forty MiG-29A. Also, about a hundred hopelessly outdated MiG-21bis light fighters could be involved in intercepting air targets. The media published information about the modernization of part of the Syrian MiG-29A. However, a number of reputable foreign sources believe that the modernization disguised the supply of the MiG-29M, ordered by Damascus about 15 years ago.
During the years of the civil war, the Syrian fighter aircraft suffered heavy losses. The fleet of MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, which were actively used for bombing and assault strikes on militants, has been reduced by about half. The reasons for this were both combat damage and accidents and disasters associated with wear and tear of equipment due to poor maintenance.
The MiG-25PD interceptors, due to their resource depletion and unsuitability for use as bombers in the initial phase of the civil war, were mothballed in fortified hangars at air bases. According to the published information, the main part of the interceptors suitable for further use is concentrated at the Et-Tiyas airbase, located 4 km south-west of the Tiyas settlement of the same name in the Homs province.
Later it was reported that some of the interceptors were returned to service. In the spring of 2018, photos of the Syrian MiG-25PD appeared on the network. It is reported that these vehicles allegedly participated in repelling a raid by Israeli aircraft that attacked the alleged control point of Iranian drones.
What combat success the interceptor fighters managed to achieve, the newest of which was built in 1985, is unknown. But the MiG-25, at a record altitude and flight speed, has always been very expensive and difficult to operate. In addition, it is unclear how, in the face of the most powerful electronic jamming and air supremacy of Israeli aviation, fighters with outdated onboard radar and communication equipment were aimed at the target. It can be assumed that several reanimated MiG-25s could be used for patrol demonstration flights or conducted reconnaissance.
Based on satellite images of the Syrian airbases, where the MiG-25 was previously based, the bulk of these aircraft are "real estate", with no chance of returning to service. The once formidable three-fly interceptors are now mostly abandoned on the outskirts of airfields outside the runway, or for several years standing motionless next to arched concrete shelters. Only a few examples have been seen near hangars where maintenance of the Su-24M, Su-22M and L-39 is carried out, which are still actively involved in bombing and assault strikes against militants.
Among the fighters available in the ATS Air Force, the MiG-29 is of the greatest value. These vehicles were also used to bombard Islamist positions, but in a very limited way. Modern fighters capable of carrying R-27 air combat missiles are cherished in Syria and are trying to prevent their losses. While the MiG-29M is theoretically capable of countering the Israeli F-16I Sufa, the Israelis are outnumbered and better prepared. In addition, outdated ground-based radars are used to guide Syrian Air Force fighters, and the Israeli Air Force has modern AWACS aircraft. At the beginning of the 21st century, the SAR leadership planned to update its Air Force by purchasing heavy fighters of the Su-30 family from Russia. But in view of the difficult financial situation and the internal armed conflict that began in Syria, these plans were not destined to come true.
The civil war that began in 2011 had disastrous consequences for the Syrian air defense system. By the summer of 2015, no more than 30% of the C-75 and C-125 air defense systems deployed at stationary positions remained in working order. Also, the number of operating radar posts has been reduced by about half.
The main reason for the losses was the fighting between the armed opposition and government forces. Several air defense systems and radar stations, caught in the epicenter of ground battles, were destroyed as a result of artillery and mortar attacks.
Some part of the air defense equipment and weapons ended up in the hands of the militants. Fortunately, among the bearded Islamists, there were no specialists capable of operating the S-75 and S-125 complexes, which are quite difficult to maintain.
After the outbreak of the civil war, the system of repair and maintenance of equipment of the air defense forces, created with the help of the USSR, fell into decay. Until 2011, specialized maintenance bases and repair and restoration enterprises, together with centers for training and preparation of calculations, made it possible, despite their considerable age, to maintain existing anti-aircraft missile systems, radars, control equipment and data transmission in a sufficiently high degree of combat readiness. On this infrastructure, technical measures for "minor modernization" and refurbishment of the hardware of the complexes were regularly carried out, anti-aircraft missiles were maintained in specially created arsenals.
Currently, the eight most recent S-75M3 air defense systems built in the mid-80s are on alert in the western part of the country and in the vicinity of the ports of Lactakia and Tartus and near Homs. At the beginning of 2017, two S-75M3 complexes were deployed southwest of Damascus.
Due to the exhaustion of the technical resource and the impossibility of maintaining it in working order in 2012-2015, the S-75M medium-range air defense system with the B-755 missile defense system and the low-altitude C-125 with paired launchers were decommissioned. Since it turned out to be difficult to evacuate obsolete equipment and old anti-aircraft missiles that found themselves in the combat zone, they were often "disposed of" by detonating directly at the firing position, which made it possible to avoid falling into the hands of the militants. As for the complexes that had further prospects for use, they were taken out to storage bases and airfields under the control of the government army. Currently, about 10 divisions of low-altitude air defense systems S-125M1 and Pechora-2M are deployed in the territory controlled by the government Syrian forces.
The same situation has developed with the military complexes "Strela-10", "Osa-AKM" and "Kvadrat". Until mid-2011, Syrian mobile military air defense systems were involved in combat duty in the vicinity of military airfields and large military bases. However, judging by the satellite images, at the beginning of 2012, the mobile air defense systems left the places of their previous deployment and moved to shelters in territories free of Islamists. Nevertheless, in October 2012, at least three combat vehicles of the Osa-AKM air defense system with 9M33 missiles became trophies of the Jaysh al-Islam militants.
Since July 2013, the Osa-AKM air defense systems captured by the Islamists have been used in hostilities against government aircraft. It is reported that the militants managed to shoot down two Mi-8 transport helicopters and damage the combat Mi-25. According to information made public on October 15, 2015, by the representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Major General Igor Konashenkov, the hit of the corrected KAB-500 bomb dropped from the Su-34 front-line bomber destroyed the camouflaged position of the Osa anti-aircraft missile system, previously captured by militants from the Syrian armed forces. The concrete shelter in which the air defense system was located was completely destroyed. Apparently, by the end of 2016, all the Wasps captured by the militants had been destroyed or disabled.
As for the short-range complexes Strela-10 and Osa-AKM, which remained at the disposal of the Syrian army, they have a sufficiently high modernization potential and, after major repairs and improvement of the electronic filling, they can operate for another 10-15 years. Options for a fairly budgetary modernization with a simultaneous increase in combat characteristics are offered by Russian and Belarusian enterprises. Whether they will be implemented, first of all, depends on whether there are financial resources in Syria for this.
Unlike the Strela-10 and Osa-AKM air defense systems, the Syrian Kvadrat complexes are at the final stage of their life cycle. Already in the mid-80s, the Israelis learned how to effectively jam the radar equipment of a self-propelled reconnaissance and guidance system. Unlike the Buk air defense missile system, the Kvadrat self-propelled launchers are completely dependent on the reconnaissance and guidance station's performance and cannot direct anti-aircraft missiles on their own. In addition, the supply of 3M9 anti-aircraft missiles ceased in the mid-80s. Currently, the stocks of air-conditioned missiles are practically exhausted. The complexes "Kub" and its export modification "Kvadrat" use missiles with a semi-active radar guidance system with a ramjet solid-propellant engine. The warranty storage line for the 3M9 SAM is 10 years, after which the rocket must undergo maintenance with the replacement of the composite fuel and the check of the electronic components. The "Kvadrat" complexes themselves, created according to the technologies of the late 60s, are built on an element base with a high percentage of electric vacuum devices. Based on this, we can assume with a high degree of confidence that the Syrian "Squares" will soon be decommissioned and decommissioned. Syria has remained one of the few countries where mobile military air defense systems of the "Kub" - "Kvadrat" family are still in service. Most of the states that traditionally use Soviet and Russian air defense systems have switched to modern versions of the Buk air defense system.
At the beginning of 2016, images of SURN 1S91 and SPU 2P25 with 3M9 missiles captured by the Islamists in the vicinity of the city of Deir ez-Zor were published on the network. In this regard, fears were expressed that the "Square", which fell into the hands of terrorists, could pose a danger to combat aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces operating in Syria. Subsequently, Russian military aviation was actively working in this area and, most likely, elements of the captured air defense system were destroyed or disabled. In any case, more photos of the captured anti-aircraft complex were not published.
A significant part of the anti-aircraft artillery available in the Syrian army is used to fire at ground targets. First of all, this applies to 23-mm twin mounts ZU-23, which are mounted on various chassis and are a fairly effective means of fire support.
In the course of hostilities to cleanse populated areas of militants, the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" proved to be quite good. To reduce losses from cumulative ammunition, part of the combat vehicles installed homemade lattice screens.
Talking about the current state of the air defense system of the SAR, it is impossible to ignore the most long-range Syrian air defense systems S-200VE, which cover about 70% of the country's territory and the border areas of a number of neighboring countries. However, the mass and dimensions of the elements of the S-200VE air defense system, as well as the attached radar facilities: P-14, P-80 and PRV-13, are such that their placement requires well-prepared sites in terms of engineering. And the process of deploying the S-200 from the march takes a day. In addition, launchers with missiles weighing more than 7000 kg and a length of 11 m are practically impossible to disguise and hide from satellite reconnaissance means.
With a record range and altitude of hitting air targets, the export Vega is essentially stationary and cannot fire at targets flying at an altitude of less than 300 m, which makes the two hundred practically useless against modern cruise missiles reaching at low altitudes. In addition, the complex, originally intended to combat strategic bombers, AWACS aircraft, high-altitude long-range reconnaissance aircraft and jammers, has a low probability of hitting a target when firing at maneuvering tactical and carrier-based aircraft. Despite the high cost and complexity of maintenance, the Syrian "two hundred" vehicles remain a "long arm" that potential aggressors have to reckon with. The very presence in Syria of an anti-aircraft complex with a distant limit of destruction of 240 km and capable of destroying targets at an altitude of 40 km makes potential aggressors reckon with this.
Syrian S-200VE regularly participate in repelling Israeli air raids. So, in March 2017, 5B28E anti-aircraft missiles fired at four Israeli Air Force planes that had invaded Syrian airspace. Debris from rockets fell on Jordanian soil. The Syrians reported that, allegedly, one plane was shot down, the Israelis - that "… the safety of Israeli citizens or aircraft of the Air Force was not threatened."
On October 16, 2017, the S-200VE air defense system, in response to the destruction of the Osa-AKM air defense system on the Lebanese-Syrian border, fired one missile at an Israeli aircraft in Lebanese airspace. According to the Syrian command, the plane was shot down. According to Israeli data, the target illumination radar was disabled by the retaliatory launch of an anti-radar missile.
On February 10, 2018, an F-16I of the Israeli Air Force was shot down by an anti-aircraft missile. The plane crashed in the north of the Jewish state. The pilots ejected, the condition of one of them is assessed as serious. According to representatives of the Israel Defense Forces, the aircraft was fired from the S-200VE and Buk-M2E air defense systems.
On April 14, 2018, the Syrian S-200VEs were used to counter a missile strike by the United States, Britain and France in 2018. According to American data, eight missiles were fired, but they did not hit the targets. Which, however, is not surprising, as already mentioned, the capabilities of the S-200 air defense system to combat low-altitude targets are very limited.
On May 10, 2018, the S-200VE complexes, along with other air defense systems, were used to counter the strikes of the Israeli Air Force. According to statements made by Israeli representatives, one air defense system was destroyed by return fire. In the course of air strikes, Israeli Air Force fighter-bombers used the Popeye CR.
Until recently, eight S-200VE anti-aircraft missile battalions were deployed in positions in Syria. According to information published in foreign media, during the latest Israeli and American air strikes, some of the complexes were disabled. Photos of the destroyed radar target illumination 5N62 from the air defense missile deployed in Er-Romandan, 10 km east of Damascus, have been published on the network. Judging by the nature of the damage, the ROC received a direct missile hit, after which it caught fire.
The target illumination radar is the most vulnerable element of the S-200 air defense system. In addition, the combat capability of the complex is sharply reduced in the event of suppression or destruction of radar equipment issuing target designation - the P-14 (P-80) standby radar and the PRV-13 radio altimeter.
A number of foreign and domestic experts point out that even if the hardware of the S-200VE systems is operational, the stocks of anti-aircraft missiles will be used up in the next few years. According to some reports, there are 2-3 missiles per launcher in Syria. The release of the 5V28 type missiles was completed in the late 80s, and Russia is unable to supply operational missiles. In our country, the last S-200 complexes were removed from combat duty and disposed of more than 10 years ago. Perhaps Iran will be able to help with the preservation of the S-200VE in the combat composition of the Syrian air defense. As you know, the Islamic Republic also operates complexes of this type, and according to Iranian data, its own production of anti-aircraft missiles has been established for them.
In general, the capabilities of the Syrian air defense system to protect its airspace are very limited. Although the Syrian leadership is making significant efforts to maintain control over the country's airspace, in a state torn apart by an internal conflict, the centralized control system of air defense forces was destroyed, many regional command posts, radar posts and communication centers were lost, radio relay and cable lines were damaged. Recent American and Israeli air strikes have demonstrated that antiquated Syrian air defense systems are highly vulnerable to the effects of modern electronic countermeasures. Today, the Syrian air defense has a pronounced focal character. The number of stationary positions of air defense systems and radar posts in the south and southeast of the country in the regions bordering with Jordan, Israel and Lebanon has decreased several times. There are practically no means of air defense and air control in the north and west of Syria. These gaps are actively exploited by the air forces of unfriendly states: the United States, Israel and Turkey.
The hopes of the Russian "hurray-patriots" that the deployment of our fighters and various anti-aircraft systems at the Khmeimim airbase would provide an anti-aircraft "umbrella" over the entire territory of the SAR turned out to be untenable. Russian air defense systems in Syria ensure the security of the base itself and are not involved in repelling Israeli and American air attacks on Syrian targets. Thus, the air defense system of the SAR is forced to independently counteract the enemy, which has a significant numerical and technological superiority. Recently, under various pretexts, the United States and Israel have been systematically destroying the Syrian military and industrial infrastructure and directly the air defense weapons. So, on May 10, 2018, Israel, during strikes on Iranian forces in Syria, attacked the S-75M3, S-200VE, Buk-M2E and Pantsir-S1E air defense missile systems. After that, the press service of the Israel Defense Forces published a video of the destruction of a Russian-made anti-aircraft missile and cannon system by the Spike NLOS missile.
Shortly before that, on April 14, 2018, under the pretext of retaliation for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government forces in Douma and Eastern Ghouta, the United States, France and the United Kingdom launched a series of missile strikes on targets controlled by government forces. In the operation, sea and air-based cruise missiles were used: BGM-109 Tomahawk, Storm Shadow, SCALP, AGM-158 JASSM.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 103 cruise missiles were found in Syrian airspace. Of these, 71 targets were shot down by air defense fire. The total consumption was 112 anti-aircraft missiles: S-200VE - 8; S-125M1 / Pechora-2M - 13; Buk-M2E - 29; "Square" - 21; Osa-AKM - 11; Strela-10 - 5; "Pantsir-S1E" - 25.
Thus, it turns out that the Syrian anti-aircraft systems managed to shoot down approximately 70% of cruise missiles with an average consumption of 1, 6 missiles per target. Which, given the current state of the Syrian air defense system, can be considered an outstanding result. However, the main task of the air defense forces is not to defeat air targets, but to protect the covered objects. Apparently, the Syrian calculations failed to fulfill this task. According to the American, British and French military, all the objects selected as targets were destroyed, as evidenced by satellite images of objects before and after the strikes, as well as reports from the scene. There is also alternative information regarding the effectiveness of Syrian air defense in repelling missile strikes. So, according to American data, the Syrians failed to shoot down a single aircraft participating in the operation, and not a single one of the 105 launched cruise missiles. A spokesman for the US Defense Ministry, denying the Syrian interception of any number of missiles, confirmed that during the missile strikes, Russian air defenses were "active", but did not attempt to intercept. At the same time, a Russian AWACS A-50M aircraft was in the air. Apparently, the Russian military shared information about the air situation, provided target designation to the Syrian air defense systems, and some of the cruise missiles were indeed intercepted. However, the statement that 70% of the air targets involved in the missile attack were shot down is not credible.
After air and missile strikes began to be launched against the targets of government forces with enviable regularity, the question of improving the Syrian air defense system arose again and Russian officials started talking about the possibility of supplying anti-aircraft missile systems of the S-300P or even S-400 family. This, in turn, caused a flurry of publications in Russian print and online publications, whose authors, in isolation from existing realities, often quite freely consider various options for events and get confused in the modifications of anti-aircraft missile systems.
On "Military Review", the author, who regularly writes about the prospects for the deployment of the S-300 air defense system in Syria, is Yevgeny Damantsev. A typical example of his work is the publication When will the Syrian S-300s wake up? How the Russian General Staff is twisting Israel and the United States around the finger. In it, Eugene hints at the possibility that long-range Russian air defense systems are already at the disposal of the Syrians, and that an unpleasant surprise may await the Israeli Air Force during the next raid. The respected author suggests that the S-300P battalions can be secretly delivered to Syria and deployed on the eastern slopes of the Lubnan al-Sharqiyah mountain range. At the same time, it is not clear what modification of the S-300P we are talking about, since the text of the publication constantly mentions various options: S-300PS, S-300PMU1 and S-300PMU2.
In order to make it clear to readers how different modifications of the S-300P differ and what the probability of their appearance in the ATS is, we will consider them in the order of appearance. The adoption of the S-300PS into service took place back in 1982, and mass production was carried out until the early 90s. The system, which replaced the S-300PT with towed launchers, used the same missiles of the 5V55R family with a semi-active seeker and a maximum range of 75-90 km for hitting air targets. The main difference between the S-300PS and the S-300PT was the placement of launchers on the MAZ-543 self-propelled chassis. Due to this, it was possible to achieve a record short deployment time - 5 minutes.
Before the start of mass deliveries of the S-400 air defense systems, it was the S-300PS, together with the relatively small S-300PM, that formed the basis of the armament of the Russian anti-aircraft missile forces. The export modification of the S-300PS, known as the S-300PMU, from the second half of the 80s was supplied to the allies under the Warsaw Pact - Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and in the early 90s to the PRC. In addition to some changes in the composition of electronic equipment, mainly related to the state recognition system, the export version also differs in that the launchers are offered only in the version transported on semi-trailers.
The S-300PS anti-aircraft missile system has been on alert for a long time and has proven itself in the army. However, at the moment, the S-300PS air defense system is considered obsolete and must be replaced by new generation anti-aircraft systems. The age of most of the air defense systems of this type has passed or is approaching 30 years. At the same time, the assigned resource of the hardware and mechanisms of the S-300PS is 25 years, and the warranty period for the storage of the freshest 5V55RM anti-aircraft missiles expired in 2013. The S-300PS operated in the RF Aerospace Forces are mostly worn out and are in the final stage of their life cycle. In 2016, the equipment of several Russian divisions was donated to the allies in the CSTO - Belarus and Kazakhstan. At the same time, military observers noted that all the transferred S-300PS air defense systems have a small stock of missiles and need refurbishment. It is clear that in this situation, the supply of S-300PS to the Syrian armed forces is out of the question.
In 1989, tests of the S-300PM air defense system were completed. Thanks to the introduction of a new 48N6 missile and an increase in the power of the multifunctional radar, the target destruction range has increased to 150 km. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union had the most negative impact on the volume of serial construction of the new anti-aircraft system. Although the S-300PM was officially adopted in 1993, amid the massive reduction and reform of the air defense forces, production for the needs of its own armed forces lasted only a few years. By 2014, all the existing S-300PM air defense systems underwent refurbishment and modernization, after which they received the designation S-300PM1. The export version of the S-300PM was offered to foreign customers under the designation S-300PMU1. The buyers of this anti-aircraft system were Greece, China and Vietnam.
At the same time, during the modernization, some of the anti-aircraft systems were transferred to towed launchers, which is not of particular importance when carrying out combat duty at stationary positions in peacetime, but is a step back in terms of mobility, if necessary, to hastily change the firing position. Since 2013, work has been underway to fine-tune the previously released air defense systems to the level of S-300PM2 Favorit. At the same time, due to the introduction of a new 48N6E2 missile defense system into the ammunition load, the refinement of radar and guidance equipment, the launch range was increased to 200 km and the capabilities of destruction of ballistic targets were expanded. The first regimental set of S-300PM2 air defense systems began to be on alert in the Moscow region in December 2015. The export version of the S-300PM2 air defense system is known as the S-300PMU2. This modification was supplied to China, Azerbaijan and Iran. The main external feature that makes it easy to distinguish the S-300PMU2 from other modifications is a towed launcher with a Russian-made BAZ-6402 tractor, which is also used to transport the S-400 air defense launcher.
Based on the experience of past years, it is known that the process of fulfilling a contract for the construction of anti-aircraft systems of the S-300P family and training calculations takes 2-3 years. At the same time, the commercial cost of the S-300PMU2 regimental set (2 zrdn) is estimated at not less than $ 300 million. seen as unconfirmed fantasies. In addition, several years ago, representatives of the Almaz-Antey Concern VKO stated that the serial construction of the S-300P air defense missile system would be completed and all production facilities would be used for the production of the S-400. An attentive reader may argue that S-300PM1 / PM2 air defense systems, available in the Russian armed forces, may be supplied to Syria. This is certainly possible, but it will certainly be an irrational step, since it will not work out quickly to train the Syrian calculations and the Russian military will have to carry out combat duty on them, which in turn is fraught with combat losses. It is naive to believe that the Israelis and Americans will refrain from destroying anti-aircraft systems that are located outside the Russian military base and threaten their combat aircraft. And the anti-aircraft cover of the most important strategic objects on the territory of Russia is very far from being perfect, and the gratuitous transfer of several modern and very expensive anti-aircraft missile systems to another country will clearly not benefit our defense capability.
Separately, I would like to say about the probability of the survival of the S-300P in Syria. The statements about the possibility of deploying an anti-aircraft battalion on the slopes of the mountains from those who are in the slightest degree familiar with the requirements for the engineering arrangement of firing positions cause nothing but a grin. In the past, the Syrians have already practiced organizing anti-aircraft missile ambushes in mountainous areas, where Israeli aircraft tried to hide behind mountain ridges, being out of sight of ground-based radars. But the preparation of the basing sites and the rise of the air defense missile system in the mountains were fraught with enormous difficulties. At the same time, the military complexes "Kvadrat" and "Osa-AKM" were used, which are much less cumbersome and heavy than the S-300P air defense systems. I would like to remind you that the 5P85S self-propelled launcher on the MAZ-543M chassis with four missiles weighs more than 42 tons, with a length of 13 and a width of 3.8 meters and its cross-country passability is very limited. Often people far from the armed forces forget that in addition to launchers, the anti-aircraft battalion includes about a dozen multi-ton vehicles for various purposes: combat control points, radar detection and guidance, antenna posts with tractors, transport-charging vehicles and mobile diesel generators … It is difficult to imagine how this all very vulnerable and cumbersome economy will be able to freely move around a country engulfed in civil war, and how the presence of several anti-aircraft battalions with long-range missiles in modern conditions can be hidden from undercover, radio engineering and space reconnaissance.
In the domestic media for the S-300P and S-400 air defense systems, a halo of "superweapons" has been created, capable of equally successfully fighting both aerodynamic and ballistic targets at over-the-horizon ranges. At the same time, it is somehow not customary to say that anti-aircraft systems, undoubtedly outstanding in their characteristics, have some disadvantages. In the case of participation in repelling massive raids of enemy air attack weapons, the weak point of long-range anti-aircraft systems is the long reload time. With a high fire performance of the S-300P and S-400 air defense systems, in a real combat situation, a situation may arise when all the ammunition on the launchers will be used up. Even if there are spare anti-aircraft missiles and transport-loading vehicles at the starting position, it will take a lot of time to replenish the ammunition load. Therefore, it is very important that heavy anti-aircraft systems are covered with short-range complexes, which is far from always possible to be implemented in practice.
It is no secret that the Americans and Israelis, during the training of their pilots, pay special attention to training in the fight against the Russian S-300P and S-400. It is reliably known that the S-300P radar systems are available at American training grounds, and the Israeli Air Force in the past, together with the US Air Force, worked out the destruction of long-range Russian-made air defense systems. At the same time, the S-300PMU / PMU1, available in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Greece, were used as a conditional enemy.
Currently, the possibility of providing the S-300P to the Syrian armed forces is an argument in dialogue with our "partners" - the United States and Israel. However, this is unlikely to be implemented in practice. This step is capable of causing a further escalation of tension, and from a military point of view, it makes no special sense. The vulnerability of expensive and cumbersome anti-aircraft systems from sabotage in a country where government forces have not yet regained control over the entire territory is very high. And without proper support from radio engineering units, the effectiveness of the S-300P will be significantly reduced. In practical terms, the delivery of the latest export versions of the Buk and Tor air defense systems looks like a more rational step that can really strengthen the Syrian air defense system. Unlike the S-300P air defense systems, the combat vehicles of these complexes, although they do not have such a range of destruction, are capable of conducting combat operations autonomously, have better mobility and the ability to effectively combat low-altitude highly maneuverable targets. However, the solvency of Syria in the current conditions raises great doubts and if the decision to provide modern anti-aircraft weapons is still made, then the financial burden will ultimately fall on the Russian taxpayer.
