On July 26, Voennoye Obozreniye published the publication Military Objects of the Republic of Korea on Google Earth Satellite Images, which provided a brief overview of the military potential of the Republic of Korea and provided satellite photographs of South Korean military installations provided by Google earth. Pictures of the territory of the DPRK are in about the same low resolution as pictures of objects in South Korea. In this regard, unfortunately, it is almost impossible to assess the potential of the North Korean Ground Forces using Google earth.
The regular armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Korean People's Army), according to data published in the West, number up to 1.2 million people (the fifth largest army in the world). At the same time, the population of the DPRK is 24, 7 million people. According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military budget of North Korea is approximately 16% of GDP - $ 10.1 billion. However, it should be understood that due to the closed nature of the DPRK, this is a very approximate figure; the country spends less than $ 1 billion on defense. The number of the Land Forces of the Korean People's Army (KPA) is estimated at more than 1 million. The ground forces have: 20 corps (12 infantry, 4 mechanized, tank, 2 artillery, defense of the capital), 27 infantry divisions, 15 tank and 14 mechanized brigades, an OTR brigade, 21 artillery brigades, 9 MLRS brigades, a TR regiment. The KPA is armed with about 3,500 medium and main battle tanks and over 500 light tanks, more than 2,500 armored personnel carriers, over 10,000 artillery pieces (including about 4,500 self-propelled guns), more than 7,500 mortars, over 2,500 MLRS, about 2,000 ATGM installations, about 100 mobile launchers TR and OTR. The troops have more than 10,000 MANPADS and 10,000 anti-aircraft guns and quadruple 14, 5-mm machine gun installations, about a third of them in stationary positions. The tank park is mainly Soviet tanks: T-54, T-55 and T-62, as well as their Chinese counterparts. Light - PT-76 and Chinese Type 62 and Type 63.
North Korea has achieved some success in tank building, on the basis of the Soviet T-62 medium tank was created the "Cheonmaho" tank, and on the basis of the T-72 - "Pokphunho". In total, about 1000 tanks were built in the DPRK, taking into account the light M1975 and M1985. However, according to some sources, the DPRK still has T-34-85 and IS-2 in a number of fortified areas. The production of ATGMs in the DPRK began in the second half of the 70s. The first anti-tank missile systems of North Korean production were the wire-guided Malyutka. In the 80s, anti-tank units began to receive the Fagot ATGM. Despite the general technological backwardness of North Korean industry, considerable success has been achieved in the development and production of certain, relatively modern, types of weapons and military equipment. In general, the North Korean army is equipped with samples created in the 50-70s. However, taking into account the size, unpretentiousness and high ideological motivation of the personnel, the KPA, acting on the defensive, is capable of inflicting unacceptable losses on any aggressor.
The military doctrine of the DPRK is based on active defense. Most of the regular North Korean Ground Forces are stationed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The southern regions of North Korea for 250 km along the demarcation line along the 38th parallel have been turned into a continuous zone of fortified areas with numerous long-term weapon emplacements, engineering barriers, minefields, capital multilayer shelters and tunnels several kilometers long. These tunnels are supposed to carry out the transfer of reserves and the supply of supplies under conditions of air supremacy of enemy aviation. The mountainous terrain of most of the territory of the DPRK contributes to the creation of lines of formidable long-term defense. Antiamphibious defense of the coast is carried out by seven army corps and coastal missile and artillery units of the fleet and aviation commands of the Air Force and Air Defense, part of the forces of the border corps. In the "rear" regions of the DPRK, two mechanized corps and a tank corps of the operational reserve are deployed.
The DPRK's most important military argument is its nuclear weapons. Practical work on the creation of the North Korean atomic bomb began in the 70s. Contrary to myths prevalent in Western media, China and Russia did not directly contribute to the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The reactors that produced plutonium in the DPRK are local versions of the British and French reactors, and the production line for reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel and separating plutonium is based on Belgian technical documentation. North Korean specialists gained access to these Western projects with the DPRK joining the IAEA. After multilateral negotiations with the participation of China, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan ended in failure in 2003, the DPRK leadership issued an order to convert the accumulated stocks of fissile materials into nuclear warheads. The failure of negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue was facilitated by the US aggression against Iraq. The then leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il, was well aware that if Iraq had nuclear weapons, then, most likely, the United States would not risk attacking this country, and perceived the demands of the United States and Japan as a desire to weaken their country's defenses.
The most famous North Korean nuclear facility is the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Its construction with Soviet technical support began in 1965. Initially, it was a purely research scientific object. Subsequently, the scale of research and work carried out here on the production and accumulation of fissile materials was increased many times over. After North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993, refused to pay for the work performed on the construction of a nuclear power plant with light water reactors in the Sinpo area and did not allow IAEA inspectors to visit its two nuclear facilities, Russia stopped cooperation with the DPRK in the nuclear field.
Google Earth Snapshot: Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center
In order to comply with the secrecy regime, this nuclear complex in the DPRK was named "Yongbyon Furniture Factory". Although a sense of humor in North Korean state security officials cannot be denied, such conspiracy will certainly not help to hide the bulky complex with concrete domes of reactors, coolers and high-rise chimneys from space reconnaissance means. However, this is far from the only North Korean facility. American and South Korean intelligence agencies point to at least a dozen other suspicious structures where research on the North Korean nuclear program may be conducted.
On October 3, 2006, North Korea became the first country not to be a member of the official "nuclear club" to give advance warning of an impending nuclear test. The need to create and test their own nuclear weapons was justified by the threat of aggression from the United States and the introduction of economic sanctions aimed at strangling the DPRK. At the same time, in an official statement read out on North Korean Central Television (KCTV), it was noted: “The DPRK is not going to use nuclear weapons first, but on the contrary, will continue to make efforts to ensure the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula and take steps towards nuclear disarmament and a complete ban of nuclear weapons ".
Google Earth snapshot: alleged nuclear test site at North Korea's Phungeri nuclear test site
An underground nuclear test explosion was carried out on October 9, 2006 in a mountainous area at the Phungeri test site in Yangando province, 180 kilometers from the border with Russia. According to the seismic stations, the explosion power did not exceed 0.5 kt. The DPRK stated that this was a test of a compact low-power charge. However, there are reasonable doubts about the ability of the North Korean nuclear industry to create high-tech compact charges. Some experts believe that the first officially announced North Korean nuclear test was a bluff, and in reality large quantities of conventional explosives were detonated underground. At the same time, the possibility of an unsuccessful nuclear test is not excluded, which has repeatedly happened in other countries. Due to the improper functioning of the automation, the use of insufficiently purified plutonium, or in the event of mistakes made during the design or assembly, a nuclear explosive device could not produce the entire planned energy release. Nuclear experts call such an explosion with an incomplete fission cycle the term "Effervescent". But despite the uncertainty about the nature of the test explosion, most of the experts in the field of nuclear weapons no longer doubted the DPRK's ability to create nuclear charges. According to US intelligence services, in the mid-2000s, North Korea had enough plutonium to create 10 nuclear warheads. After the first officially declared underground nuclear test explosion, two more underground tests were carried out there at the Phungeri test site: on May 25, 2009 and on February 2, 2013. In mid-2015, American reconnaissance satellites recorded the construction of another adit at Phungeri. Almost simultaneously, the representatives of South Korea announced that they had information about the preparatory work being carried out in the DPRK for testing thermonuclear weapons. Confirming this, on December 10, 2015, Kim Jong-un announced that the DPRK had a hydrogen bomb. However, many considered this statement to be another North Korean bluff and nuclear blackmail. However, their doubts were dispelled on January 6, 2016, when seismic sensors on the territory of the DPRK recorded an earthquake with a magnitude of 5.1 points, experts linked it with the next nuclear test. According to the seismogram, its yield is approximately 22 kt, but it is not clear what type of charge was tested. There is reason to believe that it was not a thermonuclear, but only a primary nuclear charge enhanced (boosted) by tritium. Subsequently, over the water area of the Sea of Japan, in air samples taken by American reconnaissance aircraft, isotopes characteristic of this type of bomb were found.
A report recently published in the United States states that the DPRK has accumulated enough plutonium to create 30 nuclear warheads. Most likely, Pyongyang will not stop there and intend to significantly expand its nuclear program in the future. If the rate of plutonium production in the DPRK remains at the current level, after 2020 the North Korean military will have about 100 nuclear warheads at its disposal. Even if American experts once again made a mistake and overestimated the number of North Korean nuclear warheads by half, half of this number will be enough to completely destroy the industrial and defense potential of the Republic of Korea. Given the modest technological capabilities, the DPRK faces a serious problem in the development of delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads. The easiest way is to create nuclear bombs transported by cars or tracked vehicles.
Nuclear bombs installed on their own territory will pose a serious threat to the advancing American and South Korean forces in the event of an attack on the DPRK. But if they are blown up, the neighborhoods within a radius of tens of kilometers will be exposed to prolonged radiation pollution, that is, the use of nuclear bombs in a rather limited area is possible only in the event of an imminent military defeat, when the North Korean leadership has nothing to lose. The development and creation of sufficiently compact sabotage charges by analogy with the Soviet and American "nuclear backpacks" in the DPRK seems unlikely.
The most promising delivery vehicle is ballistic missiles. The creation of long-range models was intensified after the decision of the DPRK leadership on the practical implementation of its own nuclear weapons program. The pedigree of many North Korean ballistic missiles is from the Soviet 9K72 Elbrus OTRK with an 8K14 (R-17) liquid-propellant missile. This complex is known in the West as SCUD. However, these missile systems were never delivered from the USSR to North Korea, possibly out of fear that the DPRK might share them with China. In the late 70s, several complexes with a package of technical documentation were received from Egypt. Taking into account the fact that with Soviet assistance in the DPRK by the mid-80s, many metallurgical, chemical and instrument-making enterprises were built, and the R-17 missiles themselves, created using the technologies of the 50s, had a simple and understandable design, with their copying in North Korea did not have any particular problems.
North Korean ballistic missiles began to enter service en masse in the mid-80s and have undergone consistent modernization in order to increase the flight range. In 2010, the Musudan MRBM missile system was shown at a military parade. The exact characteristics of this mobile missile system are unknown, but some experts believe that it was created on the basis of the Soviet R-27 SLBM, adopted in service in the USSR in the late 60s. According to unconfirmed information, specialists from the Makeev Design Bureau took part in the creation of this North Korean ballistic missile. The Americans believe that the Musudan launch range reaches 3000-4000 km, while in their affected zone there are American military installations on the Pacific island of Guam. In the summer of 2013, a US reconnaissance satellite spotted two MRBM launchers on the country's east coast at the Donghae missile range in Hwade-gun County.
Google Earth Snapshot: Launch Facilities at Donghae Rocket Range
As part of the implementation of the North Korean nuclear missile program, a line of missiles with a launch range of 1000-6000 km has been created. North Korean ICBMs are combinations of both proven missile systems and newly created stages. On the basis of ballistic missiles, launch vehicles "Ynha-2" and "Ynha-3" have been created. Launched from the Sohe Cosmodrome on December 12, 2012, the Eunha-3 launch vehicle launched the Gwangmyeongseong-3 artificial earth satellite into orbit, making North Korea the 10th space power. The launch of the spacecraft not only showed the DPRK's ability to launch satellites into low-earth orbit, but also deliver nuclear warheads thousands of kilometers if necessary.
Google Earth Snapshot: Launch Facilities at North Korea's Sohe Cosmodrome
The Sohe Cosmodrome was built on the western coast of the DPRK in the province of Pyonganbuk-do near the northern border with the PRC, 70 km west of the nuclear center in Yongbyon. Construction began in the first half of the 90s, but after the start of negotiations on the North Korean nuclear missile problem, it was frozen. Construction intensified in 2003, and by 2011 the main launch facilities and infrastructure of the cosmodrome were ready for operation. On the satellite images of the Sohe cosmodrome, you can see two launch positions. According to data published in the South Korean media, there are also silo launchers for MRBMs at the cosmodrome. At the moment, the pictures show that the starting complex of the polygon is expanding. To date, North Korean ballistic missiles are not yet in a position to threaten most of the US territory, but in their affected area are: American military bases in Hawaii, Japan and South Korea. According to data released by South Korean and American intelligence agencies, the DPRK is creating the Tephodong-3 ICBM with a launch range of up to 11,000 km. North Korean heavy ballistic missiles during tests demonstrated low technical reliability (about 0.5). Their hitting accuracy (KVO) at best is 1.5-2 km, which makes it possible to effectively use ICBMs, even with nuclear warheads, only against large area targets. Taking into account the fact that the preparation time for the launch of heavy missiles in the DPRK is several hours, all of the above does not allow us to consider North Korean medium and long-range missiles, built in addition in small numbers, as effective weapons. But the very fact of creating an ICBM in a country with very limited resources and being in international isolation commands respect. Most experts agree that Pyongyang may have several dozen medium-range ballistic missiles of various types at its disposal.
Submarines with nuclear torpedoes, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles can become other means of delivery. But, despite the loud statements, apparently, North Korean specialists have not yet managed to create reliably operating missile systems for diesel-electric submarines. Given the developed anti-submarine American and South Korean forces, the North Korean diesel-electric submarine, in the event of a full-scale conflict, has little chance of breaking through to South Korean or Japanese ports. There is reason to believe that the Musudan MRBM is used during test launches from North Korean diesel-electric submarines.
Google Earth snapshot: North Korean diesel-electric submarine pr. 633 in the dock of a shipyard in Nampo
According to Western estimates, the North Korean fleet has 20 diesel-electric submarines, project 633. Seven boats of this type were supplied by China in the period from 1973 to 1975, and the rest were built at their own shipyards in the period from 1976 to 1995. At the moment, the submarines of Project 633 no longer meet modern requirements. The two boats are believed to have been converted for ballistic missile testing.
Google Earth snapshot: North Korean diesel-electric submarines at base Mayangdo
The submarine forces of the DPRK Navy also have about 40 small Sang-O submarines. The construction of boats of this type began in the late 1980s. The boat is about 35 meters long and about 4 meters wide and has a total displacement of 370 tons. She is armed with two 533 mm torpedo tubes and can carry out mine laying. The crew is 15 people. In addition, 20 Yugo-class midget boats are mentioned. The total displacement of the Yugo boats is about 110 tons, the armament is two 400-mm torpedo tubes.
Google Earth snapshot: New North Korean submarine at Juktai-dong shipyard
However, in addition to the outdated diesel-electric submarines of project 633 and small boats of the Sang-O type, in the very near future, more advanced submarines should be expected as part of the North Korean Navy. So, on the satellite images of the Juktai-dong shipyard, you can see a submarine with modern, perfect in terms of hydrodynamics, forms, more than 65 meters long.
In general, the North Korean fleet is very unbalanced; in addition to diesel-electric submarines, it includes 3 URO frigates, 2 destroyers, 18 small anti-submarine ships, 34 missile boats, 150 torpedo boats, and about 200 fire support boats. For landing operations, 10 small amphibious assault ships of the "Hante" type can be used (they are capable of carrying 3-4 amphibious tanks), up to 120 landing boats (including about 100 "Nampo", created on the basis of the Soviet P-6 torpedo boat, developing speed up to 40 knots and having a range of more than 150 km, they are capable of carrying a platoon of paratroopers), up to 130 hovercraft, 24 minesweepers Yukto-1/2, 8 floating bases of midget submarines, a submarine rescue vessel, minelayers … To carry out sabotage and amphibious assault landing behind enemy lines, there are two brigades of special operations forces.
Google earth snapshot: North Korean missile boats and patrol boat at Nampo port
High-speed missile and torpedo boats are capable of carrying out surprise attacks in the coastal waters of the DPRK. Submarines, despite their advanced age, can block sea communications, carry out minefields and land saboteurs on the enemy's coast. But the North Korean Navy is unable to withstand the fleets of the United States, Japan and South Korea for a long time. The main function of the DPRK Navy is to lay minefields against the landing of coastal assault forces, protect strategic ports and provide cover from the sea for ground forces. The coastal defense system combines minefields with coastal artillery and missile batteries. The coastal troops have two regiments (thirteen anti-ship missile divisions) and sixteen separate coastal artillery artillery battalions. They are armed with outdated Soviet anti-ship missiles "Sopka", Chinese anti-ship missiles HY-2 (a copy of the Soviet P-15M) with a range of up to 100 km, as well as coastal artillery guns of 122, 130 and 152-mm caliber. If outdated bulky missiles with liquid-propellant rocket engines are equipped with a nuclear warhead, they will be able to pose a serious threat to squadrons of the most modern warships, thus leveling the technological and numerical lag of the North Korean fleet.
The North Korean Air Force is formally one of the largest in the world. Officially, the DPRK does not comment on their numbers and combat strength. According to information contained in foreign directories, the DPRK Air Force has about 1,500 aircraft. However, this information seems to be greatly overestimated, due to the deplorable technical condition, the chronic lack of aviation kerosene and the low skills of most of the flight personnel, hardly half of the payroll of the DPRK Air Force is able to rise into the air.
Google earth snapshot: Il-76, Tu-134 and Tu-154 aircraft at Pyongyang airfield
It should also be borne in mind that air and passenger transportation in North Korea is carried out on airplanes and helicopters assigned to the Air Force, piloted by military pilots. In total, the DPRK has about 200 passenger and transport aircraft of various types, listed in the Air Force, including: An-24, Il-18, Il-62M, Il-76, Tu-134, Tu-154 and Tu-204. In addition to aircraft, the DPRK Air Force has about 150 transport, communications and combat helicopters: Mi-2, Mi-8, Mi-24, Harbin Z-5, and even 80 light American MD 500 purchased through third countries.
Google earth snapshot: An-2 biplanes at Sondok airfield
In the DPRK, the most numerous transport and passenger type of aircraft is the An-2 piston biplane. According to rough estimates, there are about a hundred of them, some of them are adapted for suspension of bombs and NAR and can be used as a night bomber. In addition, An-2 painted in a khaki color are actively used to send saboteurs to South Korea.
North Korea has 24 operating airfields as well as approximately 50 reserve airstrips. Many airfields look abandoned, but the presence of capital underground shelters and the good condition of the runway and the necessary infrastructure indicate that the DPRK authorities pay great attention to maintaining them in working order.
Google earth snapshot: MiG-17 fighters at Orang airfield
A large part of the North Korean aviation fleet is a collection of rarities, more suitable for a museum exhibition on the theme of the 50-60s of the last century. On satellite images of DPRK airfields, you can still observe MiG-17 fighters and training MiG-15UTI. Allegedly, more than 200 of these machines are still in service in North Korea. It is difficult to say exactly whether this is true, many planes stand motionless for a long period of time. Perhaps the reason that they have not yet been cut into metal is the intimidation and misinformation of the United States and its "South Korean puppets". In practical terms, hopelessly outdated subsonic fighters, which are not in flight condition, in the event of a real conflict, can be used as decoys, diverting expensive guided bombs and missiles. Serviceable subsonic fighters of the first post-war generation can be used for assault strikes and for training purposes. For initial training, Nanchang CJ-6 aircraft (Chinese copy of the Yak-18 TCB) are used, they can also be used as light night bombers.
Google earth snapshot: H-5 bombers at Uiju airfield
Another "dinosaur" of the Cold War, still preserved in the North Korean Air Force, is the Il-28 front-line bomber, or rather its Chinese counterpart, the N-5. According to the Military Balance, in 2014 there were as many as 80 units in the DPRK. However, on satellite images, you can see at most four dozen bombers. How many of them are actually capable of taking off and performing a combat mission is covered in darkness. Compared with the pictures five years ago, the number of H-5s at airfields in North Korea has significantly decreased.
Google earth snapshot: F-6 and MiG-17 fighters at Koksan airfield
If you again believe the Military Balance, then the DPRK Air Force has 100 supersonic Shenyang F-6 (Chinese copy of the MiG-19). Although their number is also most likely overstated, compared to the antediluvian MiG-15 and MiG-17, these are newer machines. Production of the F-6 in China continued until the early 1980s, and a significant portion of the aircraft may still be in good condition.
Google eartn snapshot: MiG-21 and MiG-17 fighters at Toksan airfield
Since the mid-60s, MiG-21s of various modifications have been delivered to the DPRK from the USSR. Currently, North Korea has more than 100 MiG-21bis and Chinese Chengdu J-7 fighters. It is not possible to distinguish them from each other in the photographs.
Google earth snapshot: MiG-23 at Bukchon airfield
During the next modernization of the Air Force in the mid-80s, North Korea received 60 fighters with variable wing geometry, the MiG-23ML and MiG-23P. Taking into account those lost in aviation accidents and flying out their resources, the DPRK should have a little more than 40 MiG-23s. However, no more than a dozen "23s" can be found at airfields, the rest are under conservation or hidden in underground shelters. This is primarily due to the shortage of spare parts and the fact that the MiG-23 is a rather difficult machine to maintain and operate. The most trained pilots of the elite 50th Guards and 57th Fighter Aviation Regiments fly the MiG-23 and MiG-29, they are based near Pyongyang and provide cover for the DPRK capital.
Google earth snapshot: North Korean MiG-29 and MiG-17 at Suncheon airfield
Google earth snapshot: Su-25 attack aircraft at Suncheon airfield
The first MiG-29s appeared in North Korea in mid-1988. Before the collapse of the USSR, 30 MiG-29s and 20 Su-25s were sent to the DPRK. At the moment, about half of these aircraft are in flight condition. Taking into account the fact that the number of operational combat aircraft in the DPRK Air Force is very limited, even the most modern of the available ones: MiG-29, MiG-23 and Su-25 have small chances of breaking through to South Korean and American targets well covered by air defense systems. In the event of a full-scale war, most of the North Korean combat aircraft will be quickly destroyed, and anti-aircraft systems will have to reflect the attacks of South Korean and American combat aircraft.
Google earth snapshot: the position of the C-75 air defense system in the Nampo area
More than 40 surveillance radars operate on the territory of the DPRK. These are mainly old Soviet radars: P-12/18, P-35 / P-37 and P-14. However, there are a small number of relatively new stations 36D6 and Chinese JLP-40. In 2012, the DPRK anti-aircraft missile forces were transferred to the Air Force. The most numerous North Korean air defense system is the S-75. At the moment, there are about 40 divisions of the S-75 air defense system and its Chinese clones HQ-2. But recently, satellite images show that there is a minimum number of anti-aircraft missiles on the launchers of the complexes deployed in positions. Apparently, this is due to the lack of air-conditioned missiles.
Google eartn snapshot: the position of the C-75 air defense system in the Yongchon area
North Korea in the mid-80s received 6 S-125M1A "Pechora-M1A" air defense systems and 216 V-601PD missiles. Until recently, these low-altitude complexes were on alert around Pyongyang, but now they are not in combat positions. Having served for more than 30 years, these air defense systems need to be repaired and modernized, and anti-aircraft missiles have long expired their warranty period.
Google eartn snapshot: the position of the C-200VE air defense system in the Sohung area
In 1987, North Korea acquired two S-200VE air defense systems (channels) and 72 V-880E air defense systems. The technical condition of the North Korean Vegas is unknown, as well as where they are now deployed. In the pictures of known firing positions, you can see launchers with missiles covered by covers. But with the same success it can be mock-ups. In the known areas of the S-200 deployment, numerous false positions were equipped, anti-aircraft artillery batteries were deployed to provide cover from low-altitude air strikes and cruise missiles. According to South Korean media reports, the radiation typical for the operation of the ROC S-200 air defense missile system was recorded by South Korean and American means of radio intelligence not far from the contact line. Deployed in border areas (front line in North Korean terminology), the S-200s are capable of striking air targets over most of the territory of the Republic of Korea. It remains a mystery in what composition the North Korean anti-aircraft systems were redeployed to the border. It is possible that Kim Jong-un is bluffing, deciding to simply unnerve the South Korean and American pilots by transferring only the target illumination station (ROC) to the border without launchers and anti-aircraft missiles.
