The goal of the military reform being carried out today is, among other things, the creation of well-armed (corresponding to the cost-effectiveness criterion) and highly mobile general-purpose ground forces that meet modern requirements. The main content of the organizational staff measures to reform the formations and formations of the Ground Forces is the elimination of the army echelon with the transformation of armies into operational commands (which, apparently, is expedient), and combined-arms (tank and motorized rifle) divisions into corresponding brigades.
The tank and motorized rifle divisions that Russia received from the USSR are really cumbersome and have long ceased to meet the requirements of modern combat command, the introduction of components of which successfully began in NATO countries back in the 80s of the last century. Today they are characterized by the formula - command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.
However, in my opinion, the specificity of potential (albeit hypothetical) military threats to Russia is such that the total transformation of divisions into brigades can only lead to further "imbalance" of groupings of troops in threatened directions. For example, in the Leningrad Military District, such brigades (former divisions) have existed for more than a year, although initially in different (than newly introduced) states. But the border with Finland and Norway is one thing, and the border with China is quite another.
It seems advisable to have in the ground forces in the optimal ratio both combined-arms brigades of a new look and divisions, but also a new look.
SHELF ANACHRONISM
I think the issue should be the creation of a fundamentally new type of divisions in the Ground Forces, with the rejection of the traditional, truly anachronistic regimental organization. I propose to consider the possibility of creating unified formations of three types: a heavy division, a light division (instead of the usual tank and motorized rifle divisions) and an airborne assault (airmobile) division. The proposed airborne assault division should be fundamentally different from the simply renamed (without any significant organizational staff measures) in the airborne assault of the existing 7th and 76th Guards airborne divisions. I will talk about the Airborne Forces themselves, which are not part of the Ground Forces, below.
What is the quintessence of the proposed "divisions of the XXI century" (divisions-XXI)? These, apparently, should be formations with integrated combat control, based on the creation of divisional centers “knocked down” into one computerized system: a combat command center (instead of the previous divisional headquarters), an air defense center, a combat support center and a logistics support center.
Fundamentally new for the Russian army should be the inclusion of an aviation component in combined-arms divisions - helicopters (which in itself is not new and is characteristic of the ground forces of the advanced NATO countries), and in heavy divisions (as an experiment) - squadrons of attack aircraft (which has no analogues in the world) … At the same time, heavy and light divisions will also have airmobile capabilities in terms of including an airborne assault brigade in their composition. Taking into account the presence in them of the strike and airborne transport aviation component, these will be divisions of "triple capabilities", but at a different level that meets the challenges of the time than the experimental American division "Tricap" of the 1971 model known to specialists. The idea of its organization was ahead of its time, but it turned out to be incompetent due to the limited capabilities of the then technologies of combat control.
Apparently, the ratio of divisions and brigades should be different for the zones to the west and east of the Urals. Divisions should be deployed primarily where the potential enemy relies on large-scale classic offensive operations with massive use of armored vehicles.
Another important point is the unification of the organizational and staff structure of combined arms battalions and fire divisions, from which, like Lego bricks, brigade combat commands of the most optimal composition should be "assembled" in relation to the tasks being solved at the moment and in this direction. Unification will affect not only structures, but also weapons and military equipment, with a decisive disposal of morally obsolete models.
This raises a lot of problematic questions regarding the equipment of the newly formed ground forces brigades of a new look. For example, as far as we know, the artillery brigades' armament includes the old 100-mm MT-12 and MT-12R anti-tank guns. As an important tactical advantage of these cannons, the possibility of firing ATGMs of the "Kustet" complex from them is presented. In fact, this kind of improvement resulted in a ridiculous heavy towed ATGM launcher.
Classic anti-tank guns, even if adapted for ATGM firing, are an anachronism (including the 125-mm heavy towed ATGM "Sprut-B"). They can be considered only as a palliative caused by the lack of a sufficient number of new self-propelled anti-tank systems.
The expediency of the new appearance of the 125-mm self-propelled anti-tank gun 2S25 "Sprut-SD" with dubious survivability in battle due to the low level of protection raises questions and the expediency of the presence in the armament of motorized rifle brigades of a new appearance. This is simply a light tank, created in accordance with the ideology of the 70s (even with powerful weapons), embodied at one time in the Swedish IKV-91 vehicle. Does the army need such equipment?
THE CONCEPT NEEDS TO CHANGE
I would also like to draw your attention to the erroneous, in my opinion, military-technical concept of the development of the domestic Airborne Forces (Airborne Forces).
Not so long ago, information about the adoption of a new BMD-4 combat vehicle - a "winged" analogue of the BMP-3, into service with the Russian airborne forces, became the property of the public interested in military affairs. Public responses about this new product, of course, are complimentary - how, equipping the Airborne Forces with it "increases (2, 5 times) the firepower of airborne units, allows you to solve any problems without the support of tanks and artillery, whether on the offensive or on the defensive" (I quote according to one of the Internet sources). Indeed, the 100-mm cannon - a launcher that fires the Arkan ATGM, and the 30-mm BMD-4 cannon look solid. But is this airborne vehicle needed? The question is not idle - Russian taxpayers should not be indifferent to how effectively money out of their pockets is spent.
The domestic definition of the main combat properties of the Airborne Forces includes:
- the ability to quickly reach remote areas of the theater of operations;
- the ability to deliver sudden blows to the enemy;
- the ability to conduct combined arms combat.
There is something to be seriously questioned here.
With regard to the main tasks solved by the Airborne Forces (rapid capture and retention of important areas and objects deep behind enemy lines, violation of his state and military control), these abilities are unequal. Obviously, being a "long-range scalpel" (but not at all a "club") in the hands of the command, the Airborne Forces cannot and should not conduct a combined-arms battle in the same tactical parameters as the combined-arms (tank and motorized rifle) troops. Combined arms combat with a serious enemy is an extreme case for the Airborne Forces, and they have little chance of winning.
Throughout the history of the Russian Airborne Forces, there was a desire of the military leadership to give them just combined-arms qualities, although obviously worse than those of purely ground forces. First of all, this was expressed in the desire to equip the Airborne Forces with expensive armored vehicles - at first more or less suitable in terms of weight and dimensions, and then specially designed. If you think about it, though, this clearly contradicted the golden rule of combining cost and efficiency.
HOW THE WINGED INFANTRY WAS BORN
A brief historical excursion is appropriate here. Already our first airborne unit - an experienced freelance airborne detachment of the Leningrad Military District, created in 1930, was armed with light MS-1 tanks (initially, of course, non-airborne). Then the Airborne Forces received T-27 tankettes, light amphibious tanks T-37A, T-38 and T-40, which could be airlifted by low-speed heavy bombers TB-3. Such machines (up to 50 pieces) were equipped with the landing method of individual light tank battalions that were part of the airborne corps (according to the state of 1941). During the Great Patriotic War, an attempt was made to create an exotic gliding system "KT" - a hybrid of a glider and a light tank T-60.
In fact, none of these tanks was needed by the Airborne Forces. Indeed, for reconnaissance, motorcycles and light vehicles of high cross-country ability (such as the soon appeared GAZ-64 and GAZ-67, American Willis and Dodge) were quite suitable, and in a battle with a serious enemy with powerful artillery and heavy tanks, using thin-armored and weakly armed light tanks would still be pointless. In general, until the end of the 40s - the beginning of the 50s in the USSR, special weapons and military equipment for the Airborne Forces were not created, except for the ridiculous in its caliber for the end of World War II 37-mm airborne cannon model 1944 (and, in principle, very the compact submachine gun of Sudayev - PPS-43 turned out to be suitable for the paratroopers).
It should be noted that during the war, the Red Army Airborne Forces were used for their intended purpose to a limited extent and not very successfully. Mostly they were used as ordinary, albeit the most well-trained, rifle troops. In the same landings that were landed, the armored vehicles of the Airborne Forces practically did not take part, and in 1942 the tanks were removed from the armament of the Soviet airborne formations.
It should be recognized that the specially created airborne tanks of the USA and Great Britain during the Second World War - Lokast, Tetrarch and Harry Hopkins - were also unsuccessful. For the most part, they did not participate in hostilities due to weak weapons and armor, as well as design flaws. During the Normandy landing operation of 1944, a tragicomic story even happened to the British "Tetrarchs" during the landing from landing gliders: some of them got stuck, entangled on the ground in the lines of parachutes lying around.
Unlike their opponents, the Germans did not burden their own parachute troops not only with useless armored vehicles, but also with transport in general, limiting it mainly to motorcycles. Among them was the original NSU HK-101 Kettenkrad semi-tracked motorcycle tractor (the latter became the first vehicle in history specially designed for the Airborne Forces). And this despite the fact that the Luftwaffe received the world's largest military transport aircraft Me-323 "Gigant" with a carrying capacity of 11 tons, which in principle made it possible to take on board light tanks.
It was a clear understanding of the tasks facing the "winged infantry" (including the expectation that the paratroopers would seize the transport on the spot after the landing) that allowed the command of the Airborne Forces (PDV) of Hitlerite Germany to avoid erroneous decisions on equipping them with unnecessary equipment. But Germany managed to create, in addition to "Kettencrad", also a number of samples of special airborne fire weapons.
After the end of World War II, there was a revival of the Soviet Airborne Forces. They did not receive tanks (although prototypes of air transportable light tanks appeared), but the participation of paratroopers in combined arms battles was still provided for. To do this, already in the 50s, they began to equip the Airborne Forces with heavy (in relation to this branch of troops) weapons: 85-mm self-propelled guns SD-44, 140-mm rocket launchers RPU-14, airborne self-propelled anti-tank guns - 57-mm ASU- 57 (9 for each airborne regiment) and further 85-mm ASU-85 (31 for an airborne division), as well as armored personnel carriers BTR-40. SD-44, RPU-14 and ASU-57 landed by parachute, and ASU-85 and BTR-40 - by landing method.
It is curious that in the United States in 1947, the armored vehicles provided for the airborne division were completely absent. On the other hand, attention was drawn to the saturation of the American Airborne Division with cars (593) and light anti-tank weapons - bazookas (545). However, in the late 1950s, the Americans developed the states of the so-called pentomy divisions, optimized (as it was believed) for conducting combat operations in a hypothetical nuclear war. For these states, the US airborne division was supposed to have 615 armored personnel carriers, its own nuclear missile weapons (the Little John light tactical missile system) and, importantly, 53 helicopters.
Very soon the Americans became convinced of the cumbersomeness of such an organizational structure. As a result, according to the states of 1962, the armored personnel carriers from the airborne division, like the Little Johns, were removed, but the number of cars was increased to 2,142, and the number of helicopters - to 88. True, the Yankees also did not do without a passion for airborne self-propelled anti-tank artillery - I have in mind tracked tank destroyers "Scorpion" with an openly located 90-mm cannon. However, the "Scorpions" were superior to the ASU-57 in armament power, and they favorably differed from the ASU-85 in their lower weight and the ability to land on parachutes (the ASU-85 parachute landing system was created much later, when the ASU-85 was completely outdated).
Having abandoned the solid bulletproof armor, which was questionable in terms of protective properties, when creating the "Scorpion", the Americans approached the creation of the most optimal in terms of tactical and technical characteristics mobile artillery system for the Airborne Forces. Something similar, but not on tracks, but on wheels, tried to create in the USSR (85-mm semi-armored self-propelled gun SD-66 using chassis elements of the GAZ-63 car). It was not possible to "bring to mind" SD-66.
Subsequently, however, a battalion of light tanks (54 Sheridan tanks with 152-mm guns - launchers firing Shilleila ATGMs) entered the US Airborne Division. The combat value of this unit turned out to be very controversial, especially taking into account the shortcomings of the Sheridan identified during the Vietnam War (unreliable engine, missile and cannon armament complex, etc.). Now there is no tank battalion in the American airborne division, but there is a whole brigade of army aviation and a helicopter reconnaissance battalion (at least 120 helicopters).
The introduction (since the 60s) into service of anti-tank guided missile complexes (first "Bumblebees" with a self-propelled launcher on the GAZ-69 chassis, and then light portable ones) practically resolved the issue of equipping the Soviet airborne forces with light, powerful and sufficiently long-range anti-tank weapons. In principle, equipping Airborne Forces units with a special parachute version of the GAZ-66 truck - GAZ-66B - also resolved the issue of their mobility.
But the USSR Ministry of Defense still dreamed of combined arms battles behind enemy lines. Therefore, the Airborne Forces began to receive specialized multiple launch rocket systems "Grad" (airborne BM-21V "Grad-V" on the chassis "GAZ-66B") and the usual 122-mm howitzers D-30. And most importantly, the BMD-1 airborne combat vehicle was adopted, a clone of which was the BTR-D armored personnel carrier, considered as a chassis for a command and staff vehicle, a self-propelled launcher of the Konkurs ATGM complex, a carrier of calculations for portable anti-aircraft missile systems, etc. It turned out, of course, impressive, but expensive. And it is meaningless from the point of view of protective properties - for solving specific tasks facing the Airborne Forces, armor is not needed at all, and in a heavy combined-arms battle without the support of main battle tanks and helicopters, all this Soviet armored parachute splendor (including the later BMD-2 and BMD-3) there were no.
When conducting special operations in the North Caucasus, the paratroopers preferred to ride "on horseback" on BMDs (as, incidentally, the infantry - on BMPs), rather than inside …
In terms of the cost-effectiveness criterion, it also seems that the cheap 120-mm universal Nona-K guns towed by the GAZ-66 (or even the UAZ-469) vehicles are much more preferable for the Airborne Forces than the Nona-K armored self-propelled guns. WITH.
Thus, in terms of their composition, the Soviet airborne divisions (at the time of the collapse of the USSR - more than 300 BMDs, about 200 BTR-D, 72-74 SAO "Nona-S" and 6-8 D-30 howitzers in each) for use on They were clearly overweight for their direct purpose, and as air transportable motorized rifle formations, they turned out to be too weak to successfully resist tank and motorized infantry formations of a potential enemy in a direct collision, in the case of NATO countries, which also has a large number of helicopters - ATGM carriers. In essence, these divisions remain so today.
So why do our Airborne Forces need a new expensive BMD-4? By itself, without interaction with the main battle tank (which cannot be dropped by parachutes), it does not represent much value in combined arms combat, like its predecessors, no matter what the apologists of "armor" for the Airborne Forces say. Perhaps it is better to think about how to reform the Airborne Forces (including in technical terms) in relation to the tasks that they should perform?
THE AMBASSADOR NEEDS HELICOPTERS AND OFF-ROADS
In my opinion, the airborne assault forces need not easily combustible BMDs, but cheaper unified off-road vehicles (they are platforms for various weapon systems) such as the American Hummer and our Vodnik, light buggy combat vehicles like the English Cobra or American FAV and universal wheeled transporters modeled on, say, the German "Kraki" (a distant analogue of which can be considered the forward edge transporter LuAZ-967M, on which Soviet paratroopers installed 73-mm anti-tank grenade launcher SPG-9, 30-mm automatic grenade launcher AGS- 17, etc.). And - helicopters. The Airborne Forces, which today do not have their own multipurpose tactical helicopters, is an anachronism.
Russian "Hummers" (unfortunately, the multipurpose army vehicle "Vodnik" is still not a "Hammer"), "Cobr", "Krak" and even more so divisional combat, transport-combat and reconnaissance helicopters of the Russian Airborne Forces do not have, and, apparently, it is not planned to equip them with such equipment at all (the An-2 and Mi-8 air squadrons, assigned to the airborne divisions exclusively for parachute training, do not count).
It is completely incomprehensible why in the airborne divisions anti-aircraft missile battalions are being transformed into regiments. The result is anti-aircraft missile regiments, the combat means of which are armored personnel carriers BTR-ZD with MANPADS "Strela-3", that is, "armored personnel carriers". This, in my opinion, is some kind of pure profanation.
On the other hand, the current Russian commanders have the heroic death of the 6th company of the 104th Guards Airborne Regiment in Chechnya in their military "asset". On the line designated in the order in the Ulus-Kert region, that company went on its own two feet. And she fought against the Ichkerian militants as desperately as many "dismounted" Soviet paratroopers during the Great Patriotic War - without air support, calling fire from her own artillery on herself.
The military leaders, who did not understand the role of the helicopter in modern warfare, are looking at the new armored vehicles, created in accordance with the completely outdated philosophy of the armored fist of the middle of the last century. It's not just expensive - it's completely ineffective.
