Experience is the knowledge of how not to act in situations that will never happen again.
Generals are preparing for past wars. What is the result? The combat effectiveness of any army is determined not by the number of its past battles, but by the talent and abilities of the current commanders.
What blitzkrieg experience did the Wehrmacht have before the successful blitzkrieg of 1939-40? What personal combat experience did Yamamoto and his subordinates have when planning a strike on Pearl Harbor?
A properly organized and trained army does not need "combat experience".
The army needs training to simulate confrontation with a technically advanced and numerous enemy. In a thorough analysis of the threats and realities of such a war. In the creation of new tactical techniques and the development of their elements in the course of regular exercises.
How will abstract “combat experience” affect when conditions change? History is full of examples when armies, constantly fighting against weaker opponents, instantly lost their combat effectiveness in conflicts of a different type. The tragic "summer of 41".
Now we are talking about the combat experience gained in Syria. But what is the use of it?
The army can “acquire combat experience” as much as it wants, acting against guerrillas, mujahideen and terrorists. Take part in police operations and patrolling territories.
But will such "experience" be useful in a collision with modern mechanized divisions, armies and navies of the United States and China? The answer is too obvious to be spoken out loud.
There is one cautionary tale on this score.
An army that did not fight with anyone
Ironically, the United States is the only one with the experience of full-scale modern warfare. At least of all conflicts of the twentieth century, Desert Storm conditions are considered to be the closest to modern ones. And in scale, this "storm" became the largest since the end of the Second World War.
But, as mentioned above, the acquired combat experience for a quarter of a century has disappeared in time. The essence of this story lies in the preparation and planning of the operation itself. Moreover, the Yankees had no experience of war in the desert before.
The situation was complicated by the distance. A group of half a million soldiers and thousands of pieces of equipment was deployed to the other side of the Earth (excluding the forces of the allies, who often needed help themselves).
War with the Papuans
For a quarter of a century, Saddam amassed so many weapons that the armies of most developed countries could envy him. In terms of the quantity and quality of its armed forces, Iraq in 1991 was objectively ranked fifth in the world. The Hammurappi and Tavalkana guards tank divisions are not barmaley in the vicinity of Palmyra.
Saddam's army was a proven combat tool sharpened during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)
In 1990, one day was enough for her to seize and occupy Kuwait.
Invaluable combat experience. Motivation. Modern samples of Soviet and Western weapons, aggravated by their number. One of the most advanced air defense systems in the world.
Citadel 2.0
While the Yankees were carrying diapers and cola across the ocean, the Iraqis erected three defensive lines on the southern border of Kuwait and deployed 500,000 mines. For maneuvering fire resources in the directions of a possible breakthrough in the desert, over 1000 km of new routes were laid, leading to the flank of the attacking units of the Multinational Forces. With camouflaged cover and prepared positions for Iraqi military equipment.
Southern Kuwait was turned into an impregnable line capable of withstanding massive attacks by enemy tank and motorized columns. "Kursk Bulge" in the sands.
Wear it down in defensive battles. Discard. Inflict unacceptable losses.
Unfortunately for the Iraqis, the Pentagon also had the opportunity to study the results of Operation Citadel. Study well enough not to repeat the mistakes of Hitler's generals.
Neither airstrikes nor heavy artillery fire can crush such a serious line. Any ground army, stepping on such a "rake", would have suffered terrible losses. The example of "Citadel" left no doubt - thousands of burned out tanks, 83 thousand killed by the Nazis.
Six weeks of supersonic war
The first phase, as expected, was the offensive air “preparation”.
Thanks to better coordination and numerical superiority, the MNF (80% US Air Force) aircraft immediately seized the air initiative. Iraqi pilots, heroes of the air battles of the Iran-Iraq war, could not offer any intelligible resistance. The surviving MiGs and Mirages flew in a hurry to Iran. Not a trace remained of the powerful and echeloned air defense.
The deafening blow of 88,500 tons of bombs undoubtedly weakened Iraq.
But how did this affect the half-million-strong group in Kuwait?
Bomb every dune
As the Coalition commanders admitted, shelters, engineering structures and road embankments erected on the Hussein Line reduced reconnaissance capabilities by 90%. After six weeks of intense bombing, 2/3 of the Iraqi armored vehicles and fortifications remained in the ranks. Then it turns out that the Americans overestimated the accuracy of their strikes - the actual losses of the Iraqis turned out to be even lower.
The weakened but undefeated grouping continued to occupy the lines, having everything necessary to continue the hostilities. No air strikes could force Saddam to withdraw his army from Kuwait.
The command of the Ministry of Taxes and Communications was well aware of this. There was no “electronic miracle” that could win the war. This task could only be solved by a soldier, "putting his boot on the border of Kuwait and Iraq."
"Contactless" war of a new type which was talked about in subsequent years - nothing more than a propaganda "duck", created with the aim of concealing from the public the true scale and risks of "Desert Storm".
We will not talk about future wars, but as of 1991, neither the US Armed Forces nor any other country could break through the Hussein Line without the risk of retaliatory fire and counter-attacks from the Iraqi Guard.
Therefore, the main intrigue, event and lesson of the "Tempest" were not the bombings and launches of "tomahawks", but the last three days of the war. Ground phase.
270 kilometers in 12 hours
The Americans planned a march in a large “arc” passing through the territory occupied by the enemy. Through the Iraqi desert. With the subsequent breakthrough into Kuwait from the northern, weakly defended direction, to the rear of the grouping, entrenched on the "Hussein line".
Smooth only on paper. In reality, the plan raised concerns. The Hussein Line is not a static Maginot Line. It was based on the "steel fists" of armored units, capable of turning around and taking a fight from any direction.
Everything depended on the pace of the offensive. Will American tanks and motorized infantry have time to break into Kuwait before the enemy regroups forces and launches a counterattack? Will the technology stand the test of fire and sand?
By the evening of the first day of the offensive, the MNF units, moving through the territory of Iraq, deepened 270 km. Then the pace slowed down, the resistance grew. On the fourth day, the advance units wound 430 kilometers of desert on tracks.
First of all, the Iraqi generals were shocked. No one imagined that modern tank armada would be able to move at such a speed. On the sand. Day and night. Instantly suppressing any resistance.
A significant "positive" role was played by the experience of the Iran-Iraq war, where opponents are used to marking time, waging fierce battles for every ruin in settlements.
Attempts to detain the "Abrams" by the forces of scattered units that had time to get in the way of the enemy were not crowned with success. The most significant battle was at Easting-73, where units of the Tavalkan division (one of the best Iraqi units armed with new types of tanks, including T-72 and T-72M) managed to dig in. There is no reliable data on casualties in that battle. But, the overall result shows that the resistance has been broken. A few hours later, both Tavalkana brigades ceased to exist.
Helicopter assault forces were used to capture control points along the route of the tanks. Then began airlifting of fuel and ammunition. By the time the equipment arrived, refueling points were already ready in these areas. In pursuit of the tanks, 700 trucks with fuel rushed from the very border.
All artillery was divided into two groups. While one provided fire support, the other moved forward at maximum speed, barely keeping up with the tanks.
Like a giant ice rink, US heavy divisions crushed everything that got in their way.
Blitzkrieg on new physical principles
The main components of the success of the ground phase, which passed surprisingly quickly and without noticeable losses for the Coalition, are called:
A) The use of the latest means of observation, control and communication. Compact navigational instruments "Trimpeck" and "Magellan" were of much more importance to the soldiers than the controversial Tomahawk cruise missiles. Analogues of GPS navigators, which became popular in the civilian market a decade later. Unlike civilian devices, they made it possible to calculate the angles of art. fire and warn about the danger of being in the zones of air strikes.
The next important novelty was night vision devices, massively introduced in all divisions of the US Army. Monocular goggles AN / PVS-7 for crews of combat vehicles, goggles AN / AVS-6 for helicopter pilots, thermal sights AN / PVS-4 for rifles and machine guns.
All this made it possible not to slow down the pace of the offensive in the dark. On the contrary, at night the Americans gained absolute superiority, opening fire even before the Iraqis knew of their presence.
Everything is clear here. The Iraqis fought on an equal footing with Iran for eight years. But during the "Tempest" they felt all the delights of a war with a technologically advanced enemy.
But that was not all.
B) The second reason for success was, without exaggeration, an outstanding organization. The Americans could coordinate the actions of their units, stretching hundreds of kilometers across the dangerous desert. And to establish a supply system, which neutralized the traditionally inadequate reliability of Western equipment in difficult conditions and allowed us to maintain an unprecedented rate of advance.
In addition, the ability to conduct major offensive operations around the globe has been demonstrated. In the shortest possible time, having transferred a half-million ground group across the ocean and adjusted its supply.
Epilogue
The speed with which Iraq “blew” shows that it was preparing for another war. Despite scrutinizing old techniques? combat experience gained in the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the long, bloody confrontation with Iran, it turned out that the Iraqi military had no idea what they would have to face in the hot winter of 1991.
Last time, the Americans surprised the world with their system of organization and technical innovations that changed the situation on the battlefield. Navigators, thermal imagers, attack helicopters with automatic detection of enemy positions (Firefinder). What variations are possible in our time?
According to the author, one of the most significant aspects is the massive introduction of guided weapons. Up to guided artillery shells and guidance systems for unguided aircraft missiles (NURS). Practice confirms the theory. If during the "Tempest" only 30% of ammunition belonged to guided weapons, then by the time of the invasion of Iraq (2003) the share of such ammunition had increased to 80%. Nowadays, almost every bomb has its own targeting system.
All this will make even a "limited military conflict" with the participation of technically advanced countries completely different from what we are used to seeing in reports about the defeat of ISIS.
We can recall the more dense air support. When each combat aircraft is capable of using precision weapons and finding targets at any time of the day. For comparison: during the war with Iraq, only 1/7 of the American aviation possessed such capabilities.
Robotics, drones planning bombs for a hundred kilometers. New classes of combat vehicles. Even more long-range artillery.
However, enough forecasts.
Even on the example of "Desert Storm" it is clear how serious, in military terms, a country with the status of a superpower is. And how does a conflict of this level differ from the usual “anti-terrorist operations” and clashes between the countries of the “third world”.
